


UNIV. OF
TORONTO
LIBRARY

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2007 with funding from
Microsoft Corporation





Philos
A

PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

III

NEW SERIES.—VOL. XV.

*Containing the Papers read before the Society during the
Thirty-Sixth Session, 1914–1915.*

520928

13. 4. 51

PUBLISHED BY
WILLIAMS AND NORRIS,
14, HENRIETTA STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON, W.C.

1915.

Price Ten Shillings and Sixpence nett.

B

11

A72

ns. v. 15

CONTENTS.

	PAGE
I.—SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. BY <u>BERNARD BOSANQUET</u> ...	1
II.—SYMPOSIUM—INSTINCT AND EMOTION. BY WILLIAM MCDUGALL, A. F. SHAND, AND G. F. STOUT ...	22
III.—NOTES ON BERKELEY'S DOCTRINE OF ESSE. BY C. LLOYD <u>MORGAN</u>	100
IV.—CONFLICTING SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS. BY G. D. H. <u>COLE</u> ...	140
V.—NOTE ON MR. COLE'S PAPER. BY BERNARD BOSANQUET ...	160
VI.—THE "ÆSTHETIC" OF BENEDETTO CROCE. BY ALBERT COCK	164
VII.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES. BY W. TUDOR JONES ...	199
VIII.—PHENOMENALISM. BY C. D. BROAD	227
IX.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF MAINE DE BIRAN: THE WAY OUT OF SENSATIONALISM. BY ARTHUR ROBINSON ...	252
X.—COMPLEXITY AND SYNTHESIS: A COMPARISON OF THE DATA AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS OF MR. RUSSELL AND M. BERGSON. BY MRS. ADRIAN STEPHEN (KARIN COSTELLOE)	271
XI.—SOME THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. BY F. <u>AVELING</u> ...	304
XII.—MR. RUSSELL'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT. BY G. F. STOUT ...	332
XIII.—SYMPOSIUM—THE IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. BY E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, BERNARD BOSANQUET, AND F. C. S. SCHILLER	353
ABSTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION	428
ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE JOINT SESSION OF THE ARISTO- TELIAN SOCIETY, THE BRITISH PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, AND THE MIND ASSOCIATION	431
REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR THE THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION, 1914-1915	432
FINANCIAL STATEMENT... ..	433
RULES	434
LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION, 1915-1916	437



PAPERS READ BEFORE THE SOCIETY, 1914-1915.

I.—SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY.

By BERNARD BOSANQUET.

THE main subject of which I wish to speak to-night is the question in what way, if at all, philosophy is concerned with human interests and desires, and therefore with the world of concrete fact. The importance of this problem for our whole view of philosophy has been impressed on me anew by some expressions in Mr. Russell's recent lectures "On our Knowledge of an External World." There is a great deal of matter in this book which I should have liked to discuss at length, little competent as I am in regard to certain aspects of it. But to do so would have required a treatise, and I shall do best this evening to confine myself, in principle, to the subject which I have indicated. I should hope, by giving a fairly full consideration to this single point, and a single example of it, to make clear a view of the traditional philosophy differing in principle from that of the work referred to.

I will approach the subject in this way. There has been a growing desire, I think, of late, on the part of students of philosophy to claim for their subject the name of science and the reputation of scientific method. I have always regarded with some misgiving Kant's famous aspiration to "the sure march of a science," which I have held in my own mind to be responsible for a good deal of false route-making in modern philosophy. One simple test of the influence of this aspiration,

and of the sense in which it is interpreted, is the prevalence of the opinion that philosophy should be, as I suppose exact science is in the main—I really do not know, in detail, how far this is true—cosmopolitan in character and free from special national qualities. Of course, all students can learn from each other, and can co-operate, in a general sense, for the advancement of knowledge. But I share the opinion of the late Professor Wallace* that philosophy, being, like language, art, and poetry, a product of the whole man, is a thing which would forfeit some of its essence if it were to lose its national quality. The technical reasons for this we shall see below. I take it to be a fundamental difference between philosophy and exact or mathematical science, which restricts itself to a more limited object and springs from a more specialised capacity.

But I must not give an impression that Mr. Russell holds philosophy either to be one with science or to be a summary of its results. On the contrary, philosophy, as he holds, must consist of propositions which could not occur in “the other sciences;” propositions which, like those of mathematics, would be true of all abstractly possible worlds, and among which such a difference, for example, as that between a good and a bad world is not sufficiently abstract to appear. Indeed, all questions which have what is called a human interest—such as the question of a future life—belong, for him, in theory to special sciences and not to philosophy. Nevertheless, in respect of ethical neutrality and the philosophical temper of mind, it is the ideal of the special physical sciences which he holds before the philosopher. Ethical neutrality, in psychology as in physics, has been essential to scientific success; and it is no less essential in philosophy. This principle, I must add, is insisted on more particularly in the critique of evolutionism, though it is taken as also constituting a censure upon the philosophy of the past.

* I speak from memory.

Philosophy, therefore, repudiates not merely the attempt to prove that particular pleasant things are true, because they are pleasant; but it declines to enquire into any problems of the nature or conditions, the presence or absence in the universe, of satisfaction or satisfactoriness: that is, the character of objects which produce satisfaction in intelligent beings. Philosophy, in the words cited above, deals with nothing but general and *a priori* propositions, such as state properties in which all abstractly possible worlds agree. The typical problems in which the new philosophy already claims successes are such as number, infinity, continuity, space and time. Philosophy, I think it would be fair to say, is considered as dealing with the pure logical forms common to every possible universe. It is the theory of the universal factors in all possible theory.

In contrast with this conception of philosophy it is charged against the philosophy of the past that it has been biassed by human interests and the desire for agreeable results. It has thus investigated matters which, as I understand, either are obviously facts to be determined, if at all, by special empirical sciences, such as whether or no there is a future life, or, at all events, are *de facto* qualities of particular things in particular worlds, like the presence of good and evil, and therefore are, compared with true philosophical problems, also mere questions of fact.

Here, in my judgment, a fundamental issue is raised as to the object-matter and area of philosophy. But I by no means hold that the criticism just referred to is altogether groundless. I should answer as follows.

You cannot define what questions should be asked until you know a good deal of the form which the answer will take. You cannot rule out this or that investigation unless the course of the enquiry has already shown you that it is not going to lead to an answer relevant to the sense of the enquiry. Two things follow from this. First, it is natural and normal that

within the general province of the desire to know particular problems should have to be discriminated by degrees. Thus there is a perpetual progression of questions being raised by philosophy which cannot in the end be answered by it. Its curiosity, the general desire to know, is omnivorous, and only discovers the peculiar line which it has ultimately to adopt, as the varied enquiries which it originates diverge from it and form particular routes of their own. And so, secondly, when we raise the question what problems and of what nature really belong to philosophy, it is again impossible to rule out subjects of enquiry otherwise than because of the line taken by the investigation itself. It is nothing to tell us that our interest is to be purely theoretical. There is a purely theoretical interest whenever anything of any kind can be found out. What we want to know, with a view to determining the limits of our subject, viz., philosophy, is what connected object-matter, other than that of enquiries which prove themselves to have the limitations of a special science, there is revealed by the actual pursuit of the general desire to know. If I am asked what I mean by the limitations of a special science, I answer unhesitatingly that the investigation itself must decide. The more an enquiry burrows into its own hole, neither depending on a general view of what we experience, nor contributing to one, the more nearly it is a special science, and the less it belongs to philosophy. And once more, positively, what enquiries belong to philosophy, only the investigation itself can show. It is not dependent on our antecedent ideas, and all prescription of methods is futile. It grows like a tree, or burrows, to use our former metaphor, like a mine. And what hangs together in its progress belongs together, and what is discriminated as we go forward is distinct.

But the view we are discussing suggests an antecedent limitation, and it seems to me that in the suggestion a very obvious confusion is operative. The confusion is this. It is implied that because the interest of philosophy is purely

theoretical, therefore the matter about which it theorises must itself be theory and its objects. Thus philosophy is confined to the theory of theory, including under the second reference to theory those forms of being—number and the rest—which are specially taken account of in physical and mathematical science. Philosophy becomes equivalent to Logic and that the Logic of the objects of science.

Now, is there any ground whatever for this restriction? There are great worlds of human interest, embodied in structures and experiences which *prima facie* have as good a claim as anything else to become the objects of disinterested consideration. Such worlds, for instance, are the world of æsthetic experience and the world of religion, morality, society. They themselves, indeed, are not, like the world of science, primarily structures of theory. They are, in a sense, not impartial as to human interests. They are themselves human interests—interests of finite minds—in a concrete form.

But the impartial and theoretical nature of philosophy furnishes no reason at all why these existing interests, themselves not theoretical, should not be included among its objects. They are, to describe them in general, worlds of satisfaction. And there is no reason that I can see *a priori* to exclude from philosophical investigation the nature of satisfaction and the objective character which it involves, and which may be called satisfactoriness. If the course of the investigation proves that no result can follow from pursuing this line of enquiry, then the question falls to the ground. I only say that *prima facie* the character of satisfaction and satisfactoriness is an object of general theory which is in no way ruled out by the fact that it is not necessarily itself of a theoretical nature. The only question is whether it is capable of being investigated by logical processes of thought, and that, surely, nothing but the attempt can show.

I am obliged so far to differ from an expression employed by Mr. Carr in his interesting work on *Change*. He seems to me, in agreement with a very considerable movement of

philosophy since the return to Kant, to adopt the principle which I am disputing. I do not know that it really makes much difference to his fundamental contention. But he considers, if I follow him rightly, that philosophy is a peculiar study just in the fact that it is the theory of theory and not the theory of the world. I believe that the restriction of Philosophy to the theory of cognition, which follows from this assumption, is a false route, due largely to Kant's aspiration after the sure march of a science.

For the sake of illustration, as the point seems to me all-important, I will briefly refer to another writer who unwarily at one time fell into a similar view, and I will explain where it now seems to me that he was mistaken. When I wrote about Logic I am afraid that I really thought, though I did not loudly proclaim it, that Logic was the whole of philosophy. I argued thus to myself: Philosophy is the connected system of the form or ultimate universal essence of all objects, including, of course, all systems of objects. Now about all objects or systems of objects, the pure truth, so far as ascertainable, is to be sought for in the sciences and not elsewhere. Therefore, if it were possible to analyse out of the sciences and exhibit in their connection the universal essence of all objects and their systems, one would have in the result at once a logic and a philosophy.

But I now seem to myself to see that the common oversight of all such argumentation is just this: Philosophy no doubt is a theory and its interest is theoretical. But no presumption arises from this that its object-matter is in turn a theory, or objects or kinds of being as apprehended through theories. Its object, *prima facie*, is the universe, with all its activities and values, among which the theories of exact science with their objects form only a certain proportion.

And we are not to be told that this is to subordinate truth to our subjective desires. Such an objection, like the views which I have referred to above, would rest on a mere confusion.

Satisfaction in the subject *prima facie* involves satisfactoriness (value) in the object, and to rule out the problem of satisfactoriness in general from philosophical enquiry is to anticipate the course of philosophical investigation and to violate the general rule, that the true form of a question can only be determined in so far as its answer is known.

Thus it appears to me that the very plausible position, which I once shared, must be fundamentally modified. Logic, as the theory of theory and of its objects, is not the whole of Philosophy. The object-matter of Philosophy is much more than the object-matter of Logic—unless, in a way which I shall suggest, and the idea of which to some extent influenced my former position, the area of Logic is very widely extended. For philosophy deals with the universe, in which the characters fundamental for science form only a single province, by the side of others no less illuminating. Besides the theory of what concerns the sciences, a philosophy which is to have any claim to deal with the universe is bound *prima facie* to undertake a theoretical consideration at least of beauty and of goodness. There is no less and no more reason, to start with, for the former than for the two latter. Whether each can maintain itself as a fruitful investigation depends on the course of the investigation itself, and cannot in any way be determined beforehand. All of them, as branches of philosophy, are alike theoretical, and the demand is rightly to be maintained that their interest shall be the pure interest of knowledge. But to suggest that a pure theoretical interest can only apply itself to the investigation of pure theory and its objects is at best, it seems to me, a mere verbal confusion.

But we have not yet completed our view of philosophy. For, applying to logic itself the conception which we began by eliciting in the case of other branches of philosophy, we see that it also is liable to be described as an enquiry into a form of satisfaction, with the necessary correlation of a certain form of satisfactoriness. This character of logic is *prima facie* obvious,

and nothing but the detailed investigation can further confirm or can overthrow it. But supposing that investigation reveals a common and fundamental character in the objects studied by the several branches of philosophy whatever they may be, it is clearly possible that this common character will afford the object-matter for a more general mode of consideration, which will be the only one applicable to the whole of experience and of what is experienced as such. This most general mode of consideration will be metaphysic. It will differ from logic in two obvious ways. It will not restrict itself to the area of the forms concerned in the sciences, but will look directly at all the provinces of what is experienced. And, reflecting upon Logic itself, it will find in it and its objects and its criteria just one case among others of the main principle of reality; the principle which investigation detects as satisfactoriness in all provinces of the universe, though not in all equally.

The result would be, as indeed recommends itself unconquerably to common sense, that Metaphysic, as the central philosophy, would be altogether a wider theory than that of logic, dealing primarily with all great modes of satisfactoriness which the whole body of experience presents to the theoretical spectator. Of such modes logic itself is one, and, dealing directly with the ultimate forms of connection and completeness, has a prominent place in helping to detect the characters which pervade all reality and constitute its cohesion or interconnection. I insert the latter term so as not to exclude *ex hypothesi* all forms of plurality.

For of plurality, as of other possible characters which might be selected to push forward against our suggested account of philosophy, one can say in a preface or general study only that their claims must be referred to the investigation itself. So, again, if it should be said—and in a preface or introductory essay anything may be said—“ You give prominence to beauty and goodness because you like them and like to think they are prevalent; why not take evil, disorder, natural appetite as your

clues and names of provinces, and treat your universe as made up of such departments as these?" The answer is simple. It makes no difference where you begin. The enquiry itself takes charge of the form of the question, and cannot but lead to the same recognition of structure, from whatever isolated phenomena we may make our start. The difference between good and bad, for instance, resolves itself into a fundamental difference in types of order, such that the bad necessarily presupposes the good and falls within it. So that any investigation which starts from the phenomena of the former is necessarily led to affirm it in its real correlation with its foundation in the latter.

Now we are prepared to estimate the criticism that our theoretical interest in systems of satisfactoriness is one with a bias in favour of the aims of private desire. The technical point is that on which we have just been insisting. The enquiry into reality as such may begin anywhere; and it is very natural that in the process of defining itself it should pass through a phase of taking up and sifting the suggestions propounded by personal and private interests. These interests exist; they must indicate some character of the universe; and they are, therefore, to the problems of metaphysic as particular facts of daily observation are to the theories of science. When confronted with the problems of reality, they have undoubtedly some contribution to bring. In a theory which has to face the universe as a whole, nothing which is can be treated as if it were not. The attempt to do so at once convicts the theory which attempts it of arbitrary superficiality.

But what has to happen is this: Every personal bias and desire has to be scrutinised—it is the mere consequence of the large aim of the theory—with reference to what it indicates in the completeness or incompleteness of the universe. The natural thing, then, historically speaking, is for problems of this kind to split in two. The significance of such a problem being raised remains for philosophy. The problem as one of particular

fact may or may not prove possible to be attacked by the methods of science. It is easy to observe the progress of this discrimination in such a question as that of the continued existence of the higher and lower animals after what we call death. "*Sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse.*" This is plainly an experience demanding philosophical consideration. You may rule it out as mystic after a metaphysical enquiry, but hardly before. On the other hand, there comes the question of fact as to the survival of living beings, which has nothing specially philosophic or of religious interest about it at all. We can see in the historical attitude of philosophy to the latter how the discrimination between the two attitudes is promoted by the actual investigation. But we seldom or never see the attitude of Plato, for example, correctly represented. It is in the main an enquiry what sort of perfection can be held possible for a finite soul, and how this perfection would be subserved by the various forms of continuance familiar to popular imagination, supposing any one of them to be real.

Now that we have cleared away, I hope, the prejudice that would deny to philosophy the right of direct enquiry into reality at first hand, we are ready to approach the relation of philosophy to science, and to compare the progress of the former with the sure march of the latter.

It is true, we shall find, and for good reason, that philosophy does not emulate the advance of the particular sciences, by making discoveries after the manner which their problems prescribe to them. It is not true, we shall find, and for reasons equally good, that philosophy fails to make the kind of progress which her own problem dictates and demands, and which is necessarily and essentially different from making discoveries of the kind by which the several sciences advance.

In the gradual discrimination of the enquiries initiated confusedly by the omnivorous appetite for knowledge, two classes of truths come to be plainly distinguished,—statements of particular fact, and statements of general connections. These

constitute the branches of knowledge which fulfil less and more completely the ideal of science. What they give us are laws of the world of objects in shapes less or more separated from unessential matter,—less so in statements of fact, more so in statements of law. Assuming these two classes of truths to be segregated, the appetite for knowledge has not yet received its fullest and characteristic satisfaction. There still remains before it, as an object of investigation, the whole body of what is experienced, taken together, including both what comes through truth, and also what comes directly in the various forms and structures of living. About this whole body, not of what is known only, but including what is given in feeling, in action, in valuation, and the structures and systems which realise them, the appetite for theoretical understanding is compelled to make affirmations. As analysis has amply demonstrated, these affirmations, and these alone, are what directly and ultimately satisfy its demand. For they alone are what directly and ultimately affirm about the totality of things, which is its final and characteristic object. Truths of particular fact, which in a certain sense give reality, can give with it no rational connection. Truths of principle and connection, which in a certain sense give rationality, give nothing persistent or actual,—nothing but the linkage of possibilities. The sort of reality which sequences of possibilities demand as their basis, and which actuality demands as its rationale, cannot be expressed either as a fact or as a law. It demands affirmations of what is at once actual as contrasted with the linkage of possibility, and necessary as contrasted with fact. These alone can satisfy the appetite for knowledge, which has discriminated and set aside the more elementary types of statement, as steps in its approach to these. They alone are true categorical judgments, and the system of them is philosophy.

So far I have avoided the traditional expression that philosophy is the investigation of reality as such, or of being *qua* being. Because in a sense everything is real or has being,

and before we had made some progress in discrimination it would have been impossible to answer the question what was intended by the additional phrase "as such." But now we have at least a negative answer. When all particular facts, and all abstract connections, have been discriminated within what we are endeavouring to know, there still remains the demand, which so far nothing at all has been done to satisfy, that we should make some effort to apprehend the universe which surrounds and penetrates us, in its own character, by affirmations which characterise it and not merely factors within it. This attempt, to speak about the whole complex to which we belong in its own character, and without isolating part from part by selected conditions or reservations, gives the meaning of the expression "an enquiry into reality *as such*." The feasibility of the enquiry cannot be determined *a priori*. If we find out anything, we find it; if not, not. It is an old and true remark that anyone who professes himself able to deny *a priori* the possibility of any type of knowledge, already presupposes his own possession of some part of the knowledge which he denies to us. To protest against mere thinking is meaningless. Nothing but thinking can give knowledge; and all thinking without any exception is the endeavour of certain experiences to affirm themselves as a whole. From what depth and width of experience such a process can produce results of value, nothing but thinking itself can tell us. Obviously not; for there is nothing else that can give to knowledge any results at all, and therefore you can overthrow the results of thinking only by those of other thinking, and any issue between the two is simply a theoretical conflict, like another, to be decided by theoretical considerations.

This characteristic of philosophy, that it speaks about the whole complex of being without any reservation, brings us to the point in which we are interested at this moment. The peculiarity is, we said, that its affirmations are fully categorical. As it makes no reservation, so it isolates no problem and

admits no working hypothesis. This must be so of necessity with any endeavour of thought that tries to speak of reality in its own character. Plainly no affirmation about reality can be true which is inconsistent with any true affirmation about it. Fictions, and consequences drawn from mere possibilities, are altogether excluded. This seems to me, I may add, to be the moral of Husserl's curious view of the *a priori*, which stands alone, I believe, among doctrines of this subject, in admitting that *a priori* propositions may often contradict each other, and need reconciliation. That is to say, what passes for *a priori* is usually mere *prima facie*. Such an *a priori* has no place in philosophy.

Now this characteristic affects the problem of progress in philosophy. A famous teacher used to say, it is reported, with reference to people who wished philosophy to be scientific: "They want to make discoveries." The implication is that philosophy ought not to make discoveries in the sense in which the sciences make them, and *prima facie* admits the censure of unprogressiveness. What distinction between science and philosophy is here signalised?

The answer follows plainly from what has been said. The essence of philosophy lies in the connected vision of the totality of things, maintaining in every point the subordination of every element and factor to every other element and factor as conditioned by the totality. It may be compared to the best theory of Impressionism. You may perfect your detail and finish as much as you please, but there is one inexorable condition. Lose subordination to the whole and all is lost. You must never violate the singleness of the impression.

And the impression whose singleness is the condition of philosophy is not, we saw, that of the mere encyclopædia of the sciences. It includes the direct contemplation—the valuation—of the whole spectacle of life. And nothing can be affirmed as true in philosophy which does not sustain itself in a thinking process to which the whole of this experience is contributory.

The result for our immediate argument is twofold. Philosophy can never be revolutionised by discovery; and it can never fail to be progressive so long as thinking is possible and human nature changes.

It can never be revolutionised by discovery, as, for all I know, a particular science may be, and as a particular branch of technique certainly often is. This, I take it, is the meaning of saying that in it you cannot make discoveries. Philosophy rests on the whole spectacle of the ordered universe, and on the judgments of value which are essentially and rationally implied in that vision. To revolutionise it would be more than to pass from one civilisation to another, though that is perhaps the nearest realisable analogy. It would almost be to pass from one universe to another. In estimating such sayings as these, it must be remembered that philosophy does not make itself. It is in the main a reading of civilisation.

And it cannot fail to be progressive. A limited technique, which is readily revolutionised by a discovery, can hardly be progressive. A whole way of doing is abandoned, and a new one takes its place. But the vision of reality, which embodies the changes of life and knowledge, while retaining the singleness of its first impressions, must necessarily progress so long as thought survives. It must progress, because it incorporates new matter with old. If it dropped the old in passing to the new, then indeed there would be change, but no certainty of progress.

What I have been saying may be more simply put by referring to what will commonly, I think, be admitted—that there are subjects, and those some of the greatest, on which the judgments of great men are of especially permanent value. I do not believe it to be true that the acquired content of philosophy, with its reactions on the world, is second in importance to that of any other intellectual activity. Any view of the history of culture which suggests this inference I take to be a caricature. It is not a matter, I should contend, of

belief in specific dogmas. It is a matter of the recognition and appreciation of great structural worlds. The apparent differences of dogma which divide philosophers are as nothing compared with the differences of recognition which divide all philosophical students from those who have not seriously busied themselves with the matter. The relation between Kant and Hume is a good example of substantive agreement between thinkers who rank as polar antagonists.

Of course I know well how open to objection and even to mockery is such a picture of philosophy. I am just identifying it, I may be told, with the subjective impressions of individuals upon things in general guided by their likings. I am allowing it nothing at any point precise or verifiable or scientific.

Now I have been endeavouring this evening to be positive rather than negative, and to explain as frankly as possible what sort of thing I took philosophy to be, in preference to guarding myself against obvious criticisms on special points. But I will indicate in a few sentences the line of my answer in principle to censure of that type.

There is, I am convinced, no demand for accuracy so severe as that which is inherent in the criterion applied by philosophy to the categorical judgments which compose it. For their essence is to be tenable only when corrected and sustained by the whole body of propositions which can be affirmed of the real as such. Isolation, which is as I understand the essence of working hypotheses and of the strictly scientific method, is here inadmissible. Only the hypothetical can be isolated; the categorical challenges all reality, and is false if it anywhere in the universe of experience meets with an insuperably refractory element. And I think that many students will agree with me that, where the method of working hypothesis is introduced into philosophical reasoning, there does appear to result an extraordinary want of precision. To me this seems natural. It is only in philosophy that you may not suppose what you please, as long as for your immediate purpose it will help you

to obtain a result. In philosophy you must take things as they are, that is to say, if you are going to make use of special points of view, you must show that these points of view are not in conflict with well-established facts. If you follow a method which does not conform to this requirement, then I think you fall greatly below the standard of precision and verification demanded by philosophy. The whole treatment of data, for example, in the work which I began by referring to, seems to many of us to rest so entirely on fictions *ad hoc*, that it has no place in a philosophical argument at all. I appeal to any modern account of the objects of sense perception.

I can illustrate this contrast of total attitude, without going into metaphysical argument, by the impression which I gather from some remarks on Inter-relatedness in the work in question. I take this example, as one which *prima facie* in a careless statement tells against my view, in order to show how much agreement may be pointed out between the supposed paradox of the philosopher and the deliverance of common experience, on condition that both are seriously examined with completeness and impartiality.

We are told that Mr. Bradley pronounces relations impossible. But there is more likely to be error, the author continues, in his very subtle argument, than in so patent a fact as the inter-relatedness of things in the world. And then mention is made of experiment and the empirical outlook in contrast with *a priori* errors, quite after the manner of John Mill.

Now, the author seems to me not in any way to imagine how totally foreign all this suggestion appears, rightly or wrongly, to the problem at issue as others among us see it. The very intimate affinity of the outlook of traditional philosophy with such a doctrine, for example, as naïve realism, and the very special and limited sense in which alone it can have to do with *a priori* thinking, seem not in any way to be present to him. The sort of difficulty it is dealing with, and the kind of way

in which it is approaching it, do not seem to us to have come near to his mind at all.

Without going into the dialectic of relations, but treating the matter on the basis on which the author puts it, as a question of the estimation of facts, I begin by saying that all the absoluteness—the rigidity of statement—is on the critic's side. Mr. Bradley has, one might say, exhausted his very considerable resources of language in pointing out the two-sidedness of the problem, and how, if you cannot do with relations, no more can you do without them. It is the rigidity of the critic's dogma that philosophy and fact appear to join in impeaching.

Now my modest contribution is merely this: Whatever, I urge, may be the ultimate truth in metaphysic or in science, certainly a complete and sympathetic outlook over our world does not warrant the critic's attitude. In common experience throughout life the interrelatedness of things, if strictly construed, is no doubt at times a very valuable point of view, but is not a very prominent or patent fact.

The first point that strikes one is that, by the ordinary mind, in quite commonplace and unreflective apprehension, a great part of our surroundings are not considered as things at all. We do not analyse them so. Out of doors, in the country, the conception of things hardly ever occurs to us. Fields, hills, moors, roads, the sky—these are not thought of as *things*, as terms of relations, each at arm's length to others, a discriminated unit. "I see no lines in nature," said the French artist, and I think he might well have said, "I see no relations." Inter-relatedness belongs surely to the sort of stage at which you begin to think in terms of maps or diagrams, and set down positions or reactions of isolated units with reference to one another. For relations in the strict sense you surely must have strictly bounded and distinguished terms; and in ordinary life we recognise nothing of the kind, except when we are handling portable objects, from which our notion of "things" is, in the

main, derived. Continuity, in the popular sense, is the leading character of our world. I do not know exactly how one's kinsmen come to be called one's relations; but I think that this narrow reference of the word in everyday usage shows how unfamiliar is the general or logical idea of interrelatedness in common life.

An obvious objection will carry us further. You are talking, it may be replied, of spatial relations; and you are using as your *schema* to represent them a sort of line or thread, which presupposes terms removed from each other by spatial boundaries like islands on a map. But relations are of more and richer kinds than this; they need not be spatial, and they may include any kind of combination or meeting point or reaction or common frontier.

Very well; it is admitted then that this sort of interrelatedness which is shown, *e.g.*, on a map of a countryside, as opposed to the intimate knowledge of the countryside itself and loving habit of intercourse with it, is not a thing common or present or patent to the ordinary mind of the country-dweller. But it is urged that you can find much richer interrelatedness than that symbolised by a map, and this, it is implied, *is* something patent and predominant in our daily experience. Let us see. Before going further, we may ask, in speaking of interrelatedness, though of course it need not be spatial, there is yet a limit to its unity, is there not? We are not to say all or any unity is interrelatedness, are we? If so, of course, *cadit quæstio*; but with it falls all attempt to represent philosophy as objecting to interrelatedness.

I suppose when you speak of relations and terms you do necessarily isolate them from the rest of the world. You exclude, *pro tempore*, the bearing upon them of any thing or fact, not specified in the terms, or in those relations between them, which have been named. I do not mean that you deny the existence of anything else; but *ex hypothesi qua* thinking relationally, you disregard it *ad hoc*. It is this negative aspect of relations that makes them *suspect* to common sense. Let me

give a non-spatial instance. Two persons are described as in the relation of master and servant. Now the relation thus stated—take it, *e.g.* as a basis of jural obligations—does exclude, does it not, all consideration of them except as master and servant? But plain fact and common sense protest that no such relation is a real fact of the world. It is a good point of view to take into consideration; but it is no solid fact; and no solid fact can be of such a character.

And if you rejoin, "Of course that is understood, but relations are to be reasonably interpreted with regard to what they imply," then I say you are being carried away along a path on which there is no necessary halting point. You are, and this is our complaint of all non-philosophical method, not insisting on your distinction to the bitter end. You are taking your hypothesis lightly and easily, and working it just as you please, without strict and severe attention to what it actually says and demands when confronted with the great body of experience. For what you have now before you, in the "relation" thus leniently interpreted, is no longer a relation, but some complete form of unity, some real totality such as the community, or the moral world, or humanity, within which, of course, there may be countless relations, but none of them strictly taken suffice to constitute a real fact or entity, and none is in ordinary life ever dreamed of as doing so. *Summum jus, summa injuria.*

Thus relations, strictly speaking, not only are never thought of by the unreflective mind, but they are, if strictly understood, unsatisfactory to the mind which contemplates things at all completely.

Let us think of a familiar human face. The pupils of the eyes may be three inches apart, and when the head is erect the line that joins them would be horizontal. Undoubtedly the eyes can be considered as thus interrelated. But would anyone, looking at a human face, still more at a friend's face, think of it in this way, except for some special purpose, such as fitting a pair of spectacles to it?

I may be told that selection does not falsify. But I am not at this moment arguing that it does. I am not saying that such relations are false, but only that interrelatedness of this kind is not a patent fact, because, in reality, no one even thinks of it. But, it may be rejoined as before: That is your fault; there are plenty more relations of the eyes to each other and to the rest of the face, relations of all kinds, not merely spatial. If you took in all these, you would be reproducing quite a fair idea of the face, and there would be nothing odd or unusual in your account of it.

Yes, but in as far as you approached something like a portrait, you would be getting away from the point of view of relations. It would then be straining language to say you had got a complex of relations between the features, instead of simply saying you had reproduced the face. When you had once recovered the singleness of the impression, however much you might seem to have built it up out of relations, the relations as such would have disappeared, and that which replaced them would be an experience of a different type, an individual unity.

In fact, relations are thought of in the main at certain stages of experience. The interrelatedness of things can only be a prominent fact when we are thinking about the world in terms of discriminated things or persons, and when we are not thinking about it in terms of breadths or unities, the singleness of impression with regard to which has either never been destroyed or has been fully recovered. If we mean by its being a patent fact that it is a way of thinking which is often necessary and whose truth *ad hoc* cannot be denied, then interrelatedness is a patent fact and I do not think that any philosophy rejects it. But if we mean, as the antithesis to the view of traditional philosophy implies, that it is something generally obvious, and thoroughly endorsed by common sense and experience, and of wide value and influence in everyday thinking or in the fullest knowledge of things, then *negatur*. A categorical view of the world does not bear out the idea.

My contribution has aimed at nothing more than showing that interrelatedness occupies in the world of fact and common sense and sound judgment a position closely corresponding to that which it occupies in, for example, Mr. Bradley's philosophy. Philosophical consideration explains, and on the whole justifies, the verdict of a really serious and careful empirical outlook and the usage of common sense. And that I am convinced is the typical position of traditional philosophy. And, while its essence does not lie in discoveries that revolutionise it, if a doubt is raised whether it has something valuable and of its own to reveal to thought, I point to the simple facts. Its demand for precision is so intense, and its valuations are drawn from so universal and critical a survey, that its opponents can be shown, I think, in quite definite and assignable respects, not to see at all what sort of requirements they are up against. Not that by any means they fail to bring valuable material, which in time will find its due place and rank; but they do not see the necessity of using in philosophy only such propositions as will stand a criticism motivated by the whole character of the Real. Failing this, the attempt to philosophise becomes a game of play. I gather that in regard to Haeckel, on the one hand, and Mach on the other—I do not know Mach as I ought, I am thinking of Scheler's remarks—this would now be an accepted description, and I cannot help believing that it would extend further.

II.—SYMPOSIUM: INSTINCT AND EMOTION.

By WILLIAM McDUGALL, A. F. SHAND, and G. F. STOUT.

I. *By* WILLIAM McDUGALL.

IN this article I am concerned to criticise some points in Mr. Shand's recent book.* Of the merits of the book I will say nothing further than that I recognise them to be many and great.

I wish to bring up for further discussion certain points in which Mr. Shand's views differ from those which I have expressed in my *Social Psychology*; points in respect of which I am not convinced of my error, and in respect of which I believe our differences not to be due to misunderstanding only, but to be very real and to involve far-reaching consequences for the psychology of character.

In order to define the differences between us, it is necessary first to state concisely the principal points of agreement. We are agreed in holding—

(1) that character is a complex structure built up by the organisation, in one more or less harmonious system, of a number of innate dispositions to feeling and action;†

(2) that these innate dispositions are of very different degrees of complexity;

(3) that certain of the emotions are primary in the sense that each of them is unanalysable and springs directly from an

* *The Foundations of Character*, London, 1914.

† Mr. Shand recognises the importance of the distinction between, on the one hand, dispositions as facts of mental structure and, on the other hand, emotions, desires, thoughts, as mental activities, but unfortunately he does not carefully observe the distinction. I cannot but think that, if he had done so, he would have avoided some obscurities and have recognised more fully the difficulties in the way of his views that I have to point out.

innate disposition (*i.e.*, each of these primary qualities of emotion is experienced when and only when a certain innate disposition is excited); and we are agreed in recognising anger, fear, curiosity, and disgust, as primary emotions in this sense ;

(4) that the terms "sentiment" and "instinct" are properly used to denote facts of structure, *i.e.*, dispositions, rather than modes of experience or activity.

These are the main points of agreement. Beyond these our views have very little in common. The fundamental differences from which all others proceed concern the nature of the innate dispositions to feeling and action. Mr. Shand distinguishes six classes of such innate dispositions, namely :

(1) sentiments, of which love and hate and respect are the chief ;

(2) dispositions of the primary emotions (which are, in his view, anger, fear, disgust, curiosity, joy, sorrow, and repugnance);

(3) dispositions of appetites (of these sex and hunger are the chief);

(4) dispositions of impulses (a class containing two members only, namely, the tendencies which I have called self-display and self-abasement);

(5) a large number of instincts ;

(6) dispositions of innate tendencies.

The dispositions of the first four classes are so complex, comprise so many distinguishable parts or minor dispositions, that they are properly called systems of dispositions. The most complex are the sentiments ; to the consideration of them I shall return later. Our fundamental difference concerns these other five classes of innate dispositions. I can recognise no real differences of kind among them, but only differences of complexity. Mr. Shand claims to find grounds for regarding them as different in kind and function.

As regards the sixth class, that of innate tendencies, I find

it impossible to discover that Mr. Shand has anywhere defined them or given any illustrative instance. I am compelled to suspect that this class is nothing but a phrase which serves to obscure certain difficulties that arise in the course of his exposition.

As regards the third and fourth classes (the appetites and the impulses) the ground of Mr. Shand's distinguishing them from the dispositions of the primary emotions is merely that "their feelings have not often the individual distinctness of fear and anger" (p. 29). Nevertheless we are told that their feelings may at times reach "a high degree of emotional intensity" (p. 28). We may therefore put together Mr. Shand's second, third, and fourth classes (his dispositions of the primary emotions, of the appetites, and of the two impulses of self-display and self-abasement) as essentially similar in nature and function; we may bring all of them together under a common name. We might agree to extend the name emotional dispositions to all three classes; but there is a term now coming into common use which will better serve this purpose, namely, the substantive "affect" and its adjectival form "affective." The advantages of this word are (1) that it is a purely technical term; (2) that it covers both the feeling aspect and the conative aspect of conscious process; and so, when we speak of an "affective disposition," we imply one whose activity involves both conation and feeling or emotional excitement. In my *Social Psychology* I described conative and emotional dispositions as distinct structural elements; and I still think that there are certain grounds for regarding them as distinct; yet, if they are in principle distinguishable in the dispositions which we are now considering, we must recognise that each emotional disposition is so intimately bound up with some conative disposition that we may, for most purposes, regard the innate emotional-conative disposition as a structural and functional unit, the "affective disposition."

Mr. Shand himself does not distinguish conative from

emotional parts in the dispositions of the emotions, appetites, and impulses; and he will therefore, I believe, be ready to accept this bringing of his three classes together under the common head of "affective dispositions."

Putting aside the sentiments for later discussion, we have thus reduced Mr. Shand's last five classes of innate dispositions to two classes, namely the "affective dispositions" and the instincts. The fundamental difference between us is that Mr. Shand sees here a difference of kind, while I can recognise no such difference. In my view, all the innate conative dispositions are essentially of similar nature; they are all affective dispositions; and the named "emotions" are merely the feeling qualities that attend the operations of some of the most complex of these dispositions. And an instinct consists in the innate conjunction of any such affective disposition with one or more cognitive dispositions.

What, in Mr. Shand's view, is the nature of the difference between the affective dispositions and the instinct? And what are the grounds which lead him to maintain this distinction of kind?

I will state Mr. Shand's view as clearly and concisely as possible, hoping that, if I misrepresent him, he will correct me. There are passages which might lead one to suppose that Mr. Shand identifies an instinct with a reflex mechanism of the nervous system that has no mental function, whose operations contribute nothing to consciousness; especially passages in which he speaks somewhat confusingly of parts of these innate dispositions as being in the mind or in consciousness and of other parts as being in the body or nervous system.* But he

* "Fear, as we feel it, is not the entire system of the emotion. The emotion is only a part of that system. It is, in fact, that part which is present in consciousness; but there is another part which is not in consciousness; namely, the executive part which carries out the impulse of fear, and the receptive part which evokes that impulse" (p. 180); and he goes on to speak of the instinct as the executive part of the system. "We have distinguished three parts in the system of an emotion: (1) that part which is in consciousness and is alone the felt emotion; (2) that

explicitly repudiates the identification of instinctive with merely reflex action, asserting that from instincts spring felt impulses. He repudiates various other views of instinct, but nowhere attempts to define his own view concisely. Still, since he admits that a felt impulse to action may spring from an instinct, we are justified in assuming that he would agree to describe an instinct as being or comprising an innate conative disposition. But each of the affective dispositions (including Mr. Shand's emotional dispositions) also is regarded as being or comprising a conative disposition towards an end.

Both kinds of dispositions are also said by Mr. Shand to be innately connected with certain stimuli. I accept the fact implied, though I have preferred to state it differently, namely, to say that the conative disposition is innately linked with some cognitive disposition. There is no difference between us here. Mr. Shand would, I think, accept my way of stating the facts; but it does not seem to him worth while; to me it seems very much worth while. Innate cognitive dispositions are as real as the conative; and we are justified, indeed compelled, to regard them as structural units distinct from the conative dispositions. The fact that certain objects, situations, or impressions, excite certain conative tendencies in the individual on his first encounter with them, implies his possession of such innate cognitive dispositions and their linkage with

part which is organised in the body; (3) that part which is present in our behaviour and accessible to external observation. Now assuming that there is some instinct present in the system of an emotion, this instinct will include so much of the second or bodily part of the system as is inherited, and is innately excited by certain stimuli, and innately evokes a specific kind of behaviour in response" (p. 185). See also another similar passage on p. 27. The obscurity of these passages is partly due to the failure to hold fast to the distinction between facts of mental structure and facts of mental process. The system of an emotion is a structure, yet Mr. Shand speaks of the emotion (as felt in consciousness) as part of the system, as that part which is in the mind. But even when allowance is made for this confusion, a degree of obscurity remains which baffles me completely.

certain conative dispositions ; and the facts that we may learn (a) to respond to other objects with these same conations and (b) to respond to the same objects with other conations than those innately connected, these facts show that these innate cognitive and conative dispositions are distinct functional and structural units. It is in connexion with the sentiments that this mode of statement is chiefly important.

The affective dispositions and the instincts of Mr. Shand are alike, then, in being or comprising conative dispositions and in being innately linked (in many, if not all, cases) with cognitive dispositions, in virtue of which linkage the apprehension of certain objects gives rise to conative reactions independently of prior experience of such objects.

They differ in that the excitement of each affective disposition is accompanied by feeling of specific quality, which feelings, in the case of those that have most "individual distinctness," we call "emotion," and which in all other cases we call emotional excitement ; whereas, in Mr. Shand's view, the excitement of an instinct involves no feeling but only impulse or conation. In other words, in Mr. Shand's view, the instincts differ from the affective dispositions in that, while the latter are both conative and emotional in function, the former are conative only.

It seems to me clear that the difference in this respect is not absolute, but is one of degree only. I submit that strong impulse is always accompanied by feeling, and that the named qualities of feeling which we call the emotions are but the most highly differentiated members of a group containing qualities of many lesser degrees of differentiation, and therefore of many lesser degrees of "individual distinctness." This is admitted by Mr. Shand in respect of those conative tendencies which he calls the appetites and the impulses ; and he offers no reasons for denying all feeling-accompaniment to the conations that he attributes to instincts.

I submit, further, that, if this difference were an absolute

one, if the impulses of the instincts lacked all accompaniment of feeling, it would not be important. Mr. Shand himself has taught us that the all-important distinguishing feature of an emotion is its tendency to work towards some specific end. Only, then, if "a high degree of individual distinctness" of the feeling that accompanies a conation is the introspective mark of some other dynamic or functional peculiarity of the disposition from which it springs, will it justify the separation of the instincts from the "affective dispositions."

Mr. Shand claims to have discovered such a functional difference between them. He asserts that the conative tendency of every instinct expresses itself in a single mode of bodily movement only; whereas the affective disposition is commonly the dominant member of an innate system within which are organised several instincts, and that each emotion, or appetite, therefore can express itself in several alternative modes of bodily activity. If this were true it would be important. But is it true either in fact or in principle?

Let us note first that of one of his primary emotions, namely curiosity, Mr. Shand tells us that it has in its system only one instinct. This seems to throw some light upon Mr. Shand's conception. Why, if this affective disposition is organised to express itself in a single mode of bodily activity only, should it be necessary to assume a second disposition, the instinct, subordinated to the emotional or affective disposition, in order to account for this tendency of the emotion to express itself in bodily action? The answer seems to be that Mr. Shand started out long ago with an obscure belief that emotions are mental facts and instincts are bodily facts; that the emotion, as he puts it, is in the mind and the instinct in the body; that therefore, without the instinct organised within it, the affect (the emotion or appetite) could do nothing to guide bodily activity. He seems in fact to be influenced here by a crude psycho-physical dualism, and to use the instinct as a means of bridging over the gulf between mental and bodily processes; and he does in fact

repeatedly speak of an emotion as exciting the instincts of its system and as picking and choosing among them that one best suited to its purposes at any given moment. Now, if Mr. Shand consistently maintained that the instinct is merely a motor mechanism in the nervous system, the distinction might have at any rate the virtue of clearness and consistency. But, as we have seen, he repudiates this view of instinct; in his own language, the instinct is partly in the mind and partly in the body. It would seem that his view is rather that, while the emotion and its disposition are purely mental facts (wholly in the mind), the instinct is both mental and physical (partly in the mind and partly in the body) and thus serves as the bridge he needs from the emotion (the mental fact) to the physical fact of bodily movement. After the most anxious consideration I am driven to the conclusion that this is Mr. Shand's view.

But surely we cannot accept any such crude psycho-physical dualism? We must regard both the affective disposition and the instinct as psycho-physical dispositions; or, if we are "parallelists," we shall regard both alike as neural dispositions; and, in either case, we have no ground whatever for accepting Mr. Shand's assumption that the emotional or affective disposition cannot express itself in specifically directed bodily action without the mediation of another disposition of the class to which he arbitrarily restricts the name "instinct."

Let us next examine Mr. Shand's dictum that "an instinct has only one kind of behaviour connected with it, and when the appropriate stimulus excites it, must tend to respond with this one kind of behaviour." I submit that this dictum is an arbitrary and wholly baseless assumption and is contradicted by a multitude of facts.

In the sphere of most typically instinctive behaviour, nothing is commoner than to find the animal using two or more different kinds of bodily action in the service of one instinctive end, and varying and adjusting these according to the circumstances of the moment. Every instance of the operation of what is well

named chain-instinct affords examples. When the predatory wasp secures its prey, it kills it by a varying combination of stinging and malaxation, and carries it to its nest by means of a multitude of bodily activities that are infinitely varied and adjusted according to the circumstances. Are we then to say that its behaviour is governed by an emotion which selects at every stage of this train of activity the most appropriate of a large number of instincts? When a dog chases a rabbit over rough ground, are we to say that an emotion of pursuit selects in turn from among a number of instincts that are organised in its system, running, leaping, yelping, turning to the right or left, halting, sniffing, doubling, and so on? Is it not rather true that, whether the fundamental and elementary modes of bodily movement involved in locomotion, seizing, vocalisation, and so forth are attributable to so many corresponding simple instincts, or are more properly regarded as mere reflexes, the human infant (and in a less complete degree the animal also) quickly learns to make use of them for the attainment of any of his innate ends. This selection of the appropriate mode of movement and its nice adjustment to the end striven after is not, as Mr. Shand says, effected by "an emotion" or by an appetite, within whose system are organised an array of instincts corresponding to every different movement that may be used. This selection and adjustment of appropriate movements is the work of intelligence; it is in this way that intelligence everywhere pervades and adapts instinctively prescribed action. Every innate cognitive-conative system is so organised that its excitement tends, independently of the guidance of experience, to issue in some kind of movement, or, more usually, in some train of movements, which succeed one another as each movement modifies the situation. In the less intelligent animals these movements are definitely prescribed by the innate organisation; in the more intelligent (and most so in man) they are but vaguely defined, and much is left to the guidance of experience; and in

man this goes so far that every possible movement and combination of movements is placed by his intelligence at the service of every innately prescribed end.

Mr. Shand cites the appetite of hunger in the human infant to illustrate his view. The infant, he says, has the appetite for food, and this, which "is aroused by internal rather than by external stimulation," is "the feeling and impulse which accompanies and controls the search for and absorption of food" (p. 28). This appetite, he says, is in itself incapable of determining any appropriate movements; but it has organised within it an instinct, which is the instinct to make the sucking movements when the nipple is placed between the infant's lips. This account of this appetite seems to me false in respect of two matters of fact. The appetite may be excited by the odour of the milk, and this excitement expresses itself in vague groping movements of the head; if and when these bring the nipple between the infant's lips, this movement gives place to sucking. That is, this instinct has two stages of bodily expression; the first excited by the odour of the milk, the second by the new stimuli resulting from the first stage of activity. It is a simple and typical instance of a chain-instinct of two links. It differs in the human infant from the corresponding instinct of the kitten, in that in the latter the searching movements of the first stage involve more widespread bodily activity; in the kitten the groping movements of the head are accompanied by vigorous and more or less random movements of the limbs, which give a larger range of locomotion in search of the nipple. If we are to follow Mr. Shand in distinguishing the appetite from instincts organised within it, we shall have to recognise two instincts at least in the appetite of the infant and a larger number in the appetite of the kitten, instincts for the movement of each leg and for each twist and turn of the trunk and tail.

Mr. Shand supports his distinction of the instincts from the affective dispositions (*i.e.* the dispositions of the emotions,

appetites, and impulses) by maintaining not only that the system of an emotion may contain innately organised within it a number of instincts, but also that the same instincts may be organised within the systems of several different emotions. In illustration of this principle he writes "the instinct of flight in birds may be roused to activity through the emotions of fear, and of anger, and through the appetites of hunger and of sex. The combative instincts connected with the emotion of anger are found also in a modified form in connection with the enjoyment of play, as we see when dogs play at biting one another and alternately give chase and take to flight. What instincts may not enter the system of this wonderful emotion of play?" (p. 191).

Of the reference to the "emotion of play" I will only say that I do not think it is meant to be taken seriously. Does Mr. Shand really mean to maintain that we have to regard all play as the expression of an emotional system that has innately organised within it, as instincts, all the bodily movements that are made use of in play. If so, why has he not mentioned this "wonderful emotion of play" in enumerating the primary systems, or on any other page of the book?

If we accept this principle, that an instinct is a disposition that responds to excitement with an impulse to some one bodily movement only, and that, where an impulse expresses itself in two or more kinds of bodily movements, we have to attribute it to a system in which an emotional disposition presides over an array of instincts, we shall have to remodel entirely the nomenclature of animal psychology. We shall have to attribute the nest-building of a bird to such a system presided over by an emotion and containing a multitude of instincts, instincts of flying, hopping, perching, pecking, twittering, and of all the varied movements involved in the actual construction of the nest.

Or consider a similar instance from the sphere of instinct *par excellence*, the behaviour of the insects. A hunting wasp digs, without example or previous practice, a burrow for the

reception of her egg and of the prey which she stores with it for the nourishment of the grub; and the burrow is of a form and size proper to her species. The making of the burrow is an instinctive activity; but it consists in a series of actions, the succession and precise nature of which is varied at every stage according to the requirements of the situation. Are we to ascribe this train of activity to an emotional system, and each one of its constituent acts to a special instinct innately organised within this system? Surely—if each of the several modes of bodily activity involved in the whole activity is properly attributable to one of so many distinct instincts innately organised within one system, and under the guidance of a dominant conative disposition; then we must regard this whole system as a complex instinct. That is to say, if there is evidence of innate organisation of conative dispositions in systems consisting of dominant and subordinate dispositions, there is no reason to regard the dominant member of such a system as radically different in nature and function from the rest, and to describe it as an emotional disposition capable of intelligent choice and control and adaptation, while the rest are called mere instincts and regarded as capable only of rigidly and mechanically determined response. It is of the very essence of every conative process that it is a mental, and therefore a more or less intelligently self-adapting, process.

I conclude, then, that in using these two arguments—(1) the multiplicity of instincts within any one emotional system, (2) the organisation of the same instincts in different emotional systems—to support his view of the difference between the emotional disposition and the instinct, Mr. Shand proceeds from a radically false conception of instinct. Although he has repudiated the view that instinctive action is merely mechanical reflex action, he has continued to allow this view to influence his whole treatment of the foundations of character.

In combating my view that all the innate conative

dispositions are of essentially similar nature, are all alike "affective dispositions," and that the distinctive qualities of feeling which we call "emotions" are but the most individually distinct or highly differentiated qualities of the feeling that accompanies and qualifies the operations of all such affective dispositions, Mr. Shand uses a third argument in addition to the two which we have examined above.

It runs as follows:—"An instinct may be excited, and even evoke the behaviour which is characteristic of it, without exciting a particular emotion" (p. 188); therefore any instinctive behaviour and the emotion which usually accompanies it are dependent upon distinct dispositions. In support of this he writes:—"We may also fight without feeling the emotion of anger. With calmness we may watch the movements that our opponent is about to make, and guard against them. At times there may be a rush of angry emotion; at others, the behaviour of the instinct and the acquired skill proceed without it" (p. 189). Again I am tempted to ask—Is this seriously meant? Surely it is obvious that, if we fight without anger, we are not fighting instinctively, that the whole business is volitional rather than instinctive.

The fact that a man may strike down another in cold blood, or that (as in the mock combats of the stage) he may simulate the movements and expressions characteristic of fear or anger without experiencing these emotions, is surely no ground for holding that these movements are the work of instincts working in dissociation from emotions. Such facts merely illustrate the principle that increasing intelligence, with its clear foresight of ends desired and its increasing range of choice of means, places all modes of bodily movement at the service of every conative tendency, of every desire. Surely a more significant fact pointing in the opposite direction is the difficulty found, even by experienced actors, in perfectly simulating in cold blood the bodily movements and expressions of the emotions! In order to prove his point, Mr. Shand must

show that animals sometimes exhibit instinctive behaviour without the emotion that usually accompanies it. There is only one instance that seems to lend colour to this view that instinctive activity may be displayed in such dissociation from the appropriate emotion, namely the playful fighting of young animals, more especially of dogs. Now, if the bodily behaviour of the young dog were in all respects the same in playful fighting and in serious fighting, the difference consisting solely in the absence of angry emotion and of its visceral symptoms in the former case, the fact would, I admit, be strongly in favour of Mr. Shand's view. But this is not the fact. The movements, though similar in many respects, are different in essentials. The several movements employed are, according to Mr. Shand, the expression of as many instincts. Consider then what these movements are and how they differ in the two cases. The movements of approach are very different. In place of the rigid, erect, wary attitudes and movements of fighting, the playing dog approaches his fellow with free bounds, scampers about him in the most incautious manner, spreads out his fore paws and depresses his body almost to the ground in a way that the fighting dog never does and could not afford to do. And, in respect to the movement which gives the play the greatest semblance to fighting, namely, the seizing the other with his teeth, the action is essentially different; in the one case he merely mumbles his fellow's skin or paws with his teeth, in the other he snaps viciously or fiercely pushes home his teeth in the other's flesh.

I submit, then, that it is not true to say that in the two cases the same instincts are at work, but in the one case accompanied by the emotion of play and in the other by the emotion of anger; but that it is truer to say that two different instincts are at work in the two cases; in the one the combative instinct which employs one variety of movements accompanied by the emotion and impulse of anger; and in the other, a different instinct (which perhaps may be properly called an instinct of

play-fighting) which employs a different though somewhat similar series of movements accompanied by an impulse and a feeling or emotion of a different quality (which perhaps deserves the name of an emotion of play). I have now examined and, I think, shown to be fallacious Mr. Shand's three arguments against my view of the relation between emotion and instinct. Let us now see how his view works when applied to the interpretation of a particular emotion.

The emotion that best lends itself to Mr. Shand's interpretation is fear, and he has devoted the whole of a long chapter to the consideration of it. He maintains that fear in man expresses itself in at least eight different modes of conduct; each of these he regards as the expression of an instinct which is innately organised within the system of fear, and which has its own specific end and native tendency or impulse, distinct from that of the fear-disposition itself. These eight instincts are:—

- (1) "that which directs escape by rapid movements";
- (2) "that which directs escape by hiding";
- (3) that which "inhibits all sounds coming from the animal itself";
- (4) that which "is characterised by clinging to someone or something, or keeping close to it for protection";
- (5) that which "is expressed by a shrinking or starting back from fear";
- (6) that which is "characterised by paralysis or immobility";
- (7) the instinctive cry for help or protection;
- (8) "defence by means of aggressive action, as the fighting of an animal at bay."

By including under fear a number of emotional states which are in popular speech called fear (as when we say "I fear I have lost my umbrella"), but which are of quite different nature and are more properly called states of anxiety, Mr. Shand attempts

to make the innate system of fear still more complex, comprise a still larger number of tendencies, impulses, or instincts.

The emotion of fear is said to choose intelligently whichever of these instincts is most appropriate under the circumstances as a means of securing the universal end of all fear, which is said to be "to prevent the occurrence of some threatening event whether the danger be 'real' or 'imaginary'"; and a law of behaviour of all fear is added, namely—"Fear throughout its varieties strives to avoid aggressive behaviour." These are regarded as two conative tendencies proper to the emotional disposition of fear, over and above the eight instinctive tendencies organised in its system.

That Mr. Shand finds it necessary to define the end or ends of the emotion in these highly abstract terms is a fact which should of itself lead us to suspect his conception of some serious flaw.

I submit that the nature of fear may be more properly stated as follows. It is an instinct which impels the animal or man to seek cover and there lie hid. It is thus a chain-instinct of two links; for the attainment of its end commonly requires the succession of two modes of behaviour, first the seeking cover, secondly the lying hid. The same impression (*e.g.* a terrifying noise) which causes us, when in the open, to seek cover, causes us, if already in cover, to be perfectly still and silent, or at the most to make some movement to perfect our cover, as, for example, to pull the blankets over one's head, if one is in bed. The cover which is instinctively sought by the child is no doubt that provided by the body of the parent or other fellow creature; and the cry of fear, which commonly accompanies the first shock and the beginning of flight, is a serviceable feature of the process of taking cover.

In this way all of Mr. Shand's first seven modes of behaviour are sufficiently accounted for; for numbers (1) and (5) and (7) are incidental to the process of taking cover and numbers (2), (3), (4), and (6) are merely partial aspects of the lying hid in

cover. Surely it is a little absurd to attribute hiding, and the immobility and the silence which are involved in the hiding, to three separate instincts! The eighth mode of behaviour, namely, turning at bay when the path of escape is blocked, seems to me to be sufficiently explained in the way I have suggested, namely, as a special case of the general principle that the obstruction of any strong conation tends to arouse anger. Mr. Shand argues that, when a man or animal turns to attack another under these circumstances, no anger is felt; the emotion continues to be fear pure and simple; and he sees evidence of this in the fact that, as soon as a road of escape is opened, the combative behaviour is apt to give place again to the movements of flight. If it could be shown that this is true, Mr. Shand's point would be proved; but I think the evidence is all against him. The point can only be decided by introspection or retrospection. But the behaviour of animals is quite compatible with my view. The cat cornered by a dog does not always resume her flight at the first opportunity. She turns with seeming fury upon her pursuer and, if he turns tail, will sometimes give chase and drive him from the field.

It is not necessary to suppose that anger completely drives out fear; for although their tendencies are opposed, most of us know at first hand that it is possible to be angry and afraid at the same time. Further, it is an indisputable fact, which Mr. Shand himself acknowledges, "that all impulses when obstructed tend to arouse anger" (p. 509); and again in another connexion Mr. Shand lays it down that "Fear tends to elicit anger in support of its end when its impulse is obstructed" (p. 261). If this is admitted, why should he seek any other explanation of the fact that the behaviour of fear is apt to turn, when obstructed, to the behaviour of anger?

In view of these admissions I cannot but regard his contention that the combative behaviour of the animal at bay is unaccompanied by anger as a bit of special pleading in favour

of his view that the dispositions of the emotions are distinct from the instincts.

As regards the crucial evidence on this point, my own retrospection of boyish experience on being harried and turning upon my pursuers seems to bear out my view; and I seem to see unmistakable instances of the same infusion of fear with anger not infrequently among my children.

In his chapter on anger, Mr. Shand sets out to show in a similar way that the system of anger also comprises many distinct instincts; he distinguishes six varieties of primitive anger, namely :—

- (1) that which seeks to destroy its object;
- (2) that which seeks to overcome opposition;
- (3) that which seeks to prevent attacks by threatening attitude;
- (4) that which is vengeful and seeks to inflict punishment for past injury;
- (5) that "which is directed to effect and maintain social subordination";
- (6) disinterested anger or that which subserves "the preservation of other persons";

Of these suggested varieties of anger, in each of which we are invited to see the operation of one of six different instincts innately organised within the emotional system of anger, two only demand notice; for I cannot conceive that any reader of Mr. Shand's book will incline to accept the other four as distinct varieties.

The last variety, the so-called disinterested anger, seems to me to be merely a special case of the "general law that all impulses when obstructed tend to arouse anger" (p. 509). The most striking examples are afforded by the furious combative behaviour of mothers in defence of their young. The occasion of such displays is the obstruction of the protective impulse of the maternal instinct; but any sentiment in which this

disposition is organised may condition similar outbursts of anger.

The third variety is the only one for which it is or can be claimed that it expresses itself in any peculiar attitudes or movements; it is therefore the only instance in which the assumption of a special instinct has any plausibility. Animals of some species, notably the cat, do seem to be provided with a special instinct (and in some species special apparatus, such as the rattle of the rattlesnake, the hood of the cobra, and the hollow quills of the porcupine) for threatening or frightening their enemies.*

But these instances may, I suggest, be best interpreted by the assumption that in these species the combative instinct is organised as a "chain instinct" of two links, of which the threatening attitude and actions represent the first link, the actual attack the second. And it is, I think, not improbable that the threatening attitude is the expression of anger of a lower intensity, and is therefore specially apt to appear when anger is partially controlled and inhibited by the simultaneous excitement of fear.

In a similar way Mr. Shand would have us regard the emotional system of disgust as comprising at least three groups of allied instincts:—

(1) a group of instincts of ejection from the mouth, including "vomiting, choking, spitting, and blowing out" (p. 381);

(2) a group of instincts which are aroused by the mere contact of the disgusting thing with some part of the external surface of the body; "the shrinking, shaking, and cleansing instincts";

(3) "lastly, there is the instinct of pushing away, with the hands or feet, from contact with the body, something which

* Cf. the two drawings of an angry and a terrified cat, figs. 9 and 15 in Darwin's *Expression of the Emotions*.

arouses disgust." In this third class are the tendencies or instincts of "turning away of the eyes, the head, the body from the thing that disgusts us."

I shall not attempt to deal with this array of alleged instincts further than to admit that, as I suggested in *Social Psychology* (p. 56, a suggestion which Mr. Shand accepts), perhaps we ought to recognise two original varieties of disgust, a tactile and a gustatory. In my view this would mean that we commonly confuse under the one name "disgust" two somewhat similar instincts having emotional qualities not easily distinguishable. I draw attention to the case of disgust, because, in connexion with it, Mr. Shand raises explicitly a question which it is essential that he should answer satisfactorily, if his view is to gain acceptance. Namely, "What is the use and function of the emotion, as distinguished from the use and functions of the several instincts that have preceded it?"

The last phrase refers to his view that the emotion of disgust has somehow been developed from this array of instincts which are now organised within its system. In relation to the other emotions Mr. Shand has not attempted to answer this urgent question. In the case of disgust, his answer runs:—"In the emotion the different instincts, the different types of behaviour, the different organisations find a common organisation. . . . The central tendency of the emotion is . . . to turn away the eyes, head, or body, so that there may no longer be a perception of the disgusting object. . . . Its chief function is therefore preventive. If we went farther we should be more disgusted, and one or other of the original instincts would be fully exercised."

Again, "This emotion has, therefore, a range of adaptiveness to which no one of the instincts could possibly approximate, being able to excite just that instinctive tendency, and to utilise just that type of behaviour which it requires in the circumstances, and always exciting the instincts of ejection in

some degree on which both the feeling, as well as expression, of the emotion seem partially to depend. In such a case the excitement of this or that particular instinct of turning away, of shrinking, of shaking off, of pushing, depends not on the original stimuli of these instincts, but on the previous existence of the emotion itself, which thus becomes a centre through which these several instincts may become interconnected" (p. 392).

We have here an interesting suggestion to the effect that the system of disgust in man may have been evolved by way of a coalescence of the affective dispositions of several instincts that were originally distinct. But it is possible to regard this suggestion as plausible, without accepting Mr. Shand's view that the disposition of the emotion of disgust has been superadded, in the course of evolution, to the several instincts that are supposed to have become conjoined, and that the disposition of the emotion is given in our innate constitution as a disposition separate and distinct from the several instincts over which it presides, selecting and controlling their operations as a higher independent and intelligent power. We may rather suppose that each of the originally independent simple instincts had its own affective tone; and that, when their affective dispositions coalesced to form a more complex one which responds as a whole to any one of the original stimuli, these vaguer affective qualities ceased to be separately experiencable, being swallowed up in the one massive affective quality that we call disgust.

Mr. Shand draws a parallel between the relation of the emotion to its instincts and the relation of a sentiment (as he conceives it) to its constituent emotions (p. 394). But even if we accept his conception of a sentiment as a system consisting of several emotional dispositions directly linked together (a conception I have to criticise presently), the parallel breaks down; for the sentiment (so conceived) consists of the connected emotional dispositions; it is not, and does not involve, some further disposition superadded to the system with the

function of intelligently controlling the operations of the subordinated emotions; yet that is the conception of the relation of the emotion to the instincts of its system which he asks us to accept.

Lastly, it may be noted that Mr. Shand attempts to give colour to his arbitrarily narrowed conception of instinct by writing such phrases as the following:—

“Behaviour . . . of that stereotyped and definite character, to which we usually restrict the term ‘instinctive.’” But, if we ask what justification he has for using the pronoun “we” in this large collective sense, implying a consensus of opinion, we can find it neither in popular usage nor in any consensus of scientific opinion. Popular speech uses the words “instinct” and “instinctive” in the widest and loosest possible manner; and the majority of psychologists regard the term instinctive as implying so little of the “stereotyped and definite character” that they hold themselves justified in speaking of instincts of imitation and of play.

I have now answered Mr. Shand’s arguments against my view of the relation of emotion to instinct. It remains to point out that the difference between us in respect to the problem is not merely verbal, but involves important consequences.

If my view of the relation of emotion to instinct is true it provides a guiding principle for the distinguishing of the primary emotions (those which are rooted in innate affective dispositions) from various states of feeling or emotional excitement which arise when, through the development of intelligence and thought, the conative tendencies acquire a great extension of their reference to past and future.

It was this principle that led me to reject joy and sorrow from the list of primary emotions. But there is a group of emotions of similar status with joy and sorrow with which I did not attempt to deal.

Under the head of “prospective emotions of desire,” Mr. Shand treats of the following six emotional states,—

confidence, hope, anxiety, disappointment, despondency, and despair. "Desire," he tells us, "is a very complex emotional system which includes actually or potentially the six prospective emotions," and he adds that desire is "essentially an organisation of those emotional dispositions which are characteristic of its process" (p. 463) namely the dispositions of these six emotions. And he proceeds to discuss the tendencies of these emotions or the ends towards which their impulses are directed.

These emotions, then, are in his view comparable to the primary emotions in that they are forces of character, which have their own ends, and which impel us to thought and conduct for the attainment of these ends.* And they spring from innate dispositions entirely comparable to those of the primary emotions of fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, etc. Desire, then, is, or rather springs from, an innately organised system of emotional dispositions, and it answers to Mr. Shand's definition of a sentiment. But he does not class it with the sentiments, and although he does not give any reasons for not doing so, I have no doubt that he would repudiate any such suggestion; for he is, I think, aware that this would be just as improper as to class it with the emotions. Desire he rightly defines as an impulse become conscious of its end. And he recognises that in the developed mind any impulse, certainly any strong continued impulse (the impulse of any one of our primary emotions or appetites, and presumably the same is true of the impulses of many of our instincts, if not of all of them), does, when it cannot at once attain its end, become desire.

We are led then to this remarkable conclusion, namely, that every one of our conative dispositions (whether comprised in a sentiment, an emotional disposition, an appetite, or an instinct)

* "If in the course of our enquiry we come upon any so-called emotion' which is not such a force, which has neither impulse nor end . . . we shall for our purpose refuse to accept it as emotion, because it lacks the fundamental character of that class of facts to which we here restrict the term" (p. 179).

has organised within it the dispositions of these six prospective emotions of desire.

The emergence of this conclusion (which Mr. Shand has not explicitly drawn, but which inevitably follows from his statements) must, I think, lead every unbiassed reader to suspect that there is something radically wrong with his exposition.

If we accept it, various difficulties at once present themselves. Firstly, what becomes of Mr. Shand's main distinction between an emotional disposition and an instinct, namely, that the former presides over a system which comprises an array of instincts; for we now find that each instinct also presides over a system which comprises the dispositions of these six prospective emotions.

Secondly, how are we to understand the development of the dispositions of these prospective emotions in ontogeny and phylogeny. As long as the child or the race has not attained the power of clearly foreseeing the ends of its impulses, *i.e.*, of desiring them, it is incapable of these emotions; as soon as it attains this power it experiences them. If they spring from six corresponding emotional dispositions, were these implanted in the race by some act of special creation in anticipation of the rise of intelligent foresight of ends?

If we take seriously the conception of an emotional or affective disposition, we shall have to maintain that these prospective emotions of desire do not spring from specific dispositions, that they are not independent forces, that they have no impulses, ends, or tendencies distinct from the desire, *i.e.*, from the impulse of the emotion or appetite in the course of which they are experienced as incidental feelings. Leaving out "disappointment" (because it involves surprise), I submit that the five so-called prospective emotions of desire, namely, confidence, hope, anxiety, despondency, and despair, are merely names that we give to five points or regions in a continuous scale of qualities of feeling which may be experienced in the life-history

of any strong continued desire. Such desires spring most commonly from our strong sentiments, though not in all cases. When we are moved by any strong desire and have no reason to doubt of the attainment of the desired end, we enjoy in some degree the pleasure that we anticipate from the attainment of the end, and this anticipated pleasure sustains and reinforces our efforts. Desire thus qualified and strengthened by the anticipated satisfaction or pleasure of attainment, and untroubled by any doubt of success, is what we call "confidence." If, however, we begin to see grounds for doubting of our attainment of the end, if we begin to foresee difficulties and the possibility of failure we begin to hope, *i.e.*, our desire, though still qualified by the anticipated satisfaction of success, is at moments qualified also by the anticipated pain of failure, an anticipation which, like all obstruction to impulse at all levels of mental development, diverts the attention to some extent from the end, and directs it to the means we have chosen, leads us to try or to contemplate possible alternative lines of action.

As the difficulties become still more clearly envisaged, the anticipated pain of failure acquires a greater influence and displaces more and more the anticipated pleasure of success; we dwell more continuously upon the various possible means to our end, we suffer anxiety. Thus hope passes by insensible gradations into anxiety, and, as the difficulties loom still larger and success begins to appear improbable or impossible, the anticipated pain of failure overpowers and drives out the anticipated pleasure of success and depresses the energy of our desire; anxiety then passes over into despondency. Lastly, when it becomes obvious that success is no longer possible, that our desired end is impossible of achievement, we despair. The desire is still strong within us, but we see no possible line of action that can lead to success; therefore our conation is utterly baffled, though the end still lies in the future, desired but unattainable. The resolute man confronted

with difficulties sustains his desire and his anticipation of attainment, his intention, by an effort of volition; and thus in him the attitude of hope persists by reason of his volition, where, in a less resolute man, it would give place to anxiety, despondency, or despair. And the volatile man of vivid imagination passes rapidly up and down the scale from confidence to despair and back again, as his imagination depicts now success, now failure, now the difficulties in his path. In all this change of feeling from confidence to despair there are operative only three forces—the desire itself, the pleasure of anticipated attainment, the pain of anticipated failure—and all the ends and impulses and tendencies which Mr. Shand ascribes to these emotions are adequately accounted for by the influence in varying proportion of pleasure and pain upon desire. I have no time to show this in detail, but any reader of these chapters of Mr. Shand's book may easily apply this principle of explanation, and will, I venture to say, find it adequate if he admits the fundamental propositions that pleasure promotes and sustains activity towards an end, pain diverts and obstructs it. In this way we may supersede the array of complicated laws of these emotions which Mr. Shand has drawn up (p. 505 *et seq.*).

Consider a single one of these laws:—"If Hope succeeds in destroying Anxiety, it destroys itself, and the new emotion of Confidence takes the place of both." Quite true!—if we claim the poet's licence to personify every state of feeling and treat it as a personal agent. But does not this statement, that hope cannot exist without anxiety, clearly show that they are not distinct emotions springing from distinct dispositions? Is it not more scientific to admit that the truth embodied in this proposition is merely that anxiety and hope are due to different degrees of the influence exerted upon desire by the intellectual recognition of the uncertainty of attainment of the desired end. To present in detail the alternative explanations of the facts dealt with by Mr. Shand in this connexion would require

almost as many pages as he has given chapters to the topic, and I must pass on.

Mr. Shand has not treated of the retrospective emotions of desire, which are as interesting as those of the prospective group. Suppose that our desire was to succour a friend in a position of danger, and we learn that we are too late, that he has succumbed and is no more. Our desire turns to regret. That is to say, the impulse to succour him persists and governs all our thoughts, but we cannot look forward any longer; we can only look back and regret that we did not do this or that or the other thing; all our thinking is coloured by the pain of baffled desire. If we recognise that we are to blame in any way, our state of regret is coloured by shame and self-reproach and becomes remorse; while, if the desire sprang from a sentiment of love and we can find no reason to blame ourselves, the regret at his death is a tender regret, the emotion which alone is properly called sorrow, *i.e.*, the tender emotion springing from a sentiment of love, the protective impulse of which is painfully thwarted by the removal of the object of the sentiment.

The name "Sorrow" should, I submit, be restricted to this tender regret, which is the retrospective desire that springs from a sentiment of love deprived of its object. Like the "prospective emotions of desire," it is a feeling that has no conative tendency of its own distinct from that of the sentiment in which it is rooted; it does not spring from any specific affective disposition, but is like those other emotions of desire, a state of feeling incidental to the course of desire. The impulse to restore its object, which Mr. Shand regards as the specific impulse of a primary emotion of sorrow, is the tendency of the sentiment of love.

But there is a primary impulse and emotion to which Mr. Shand extends the term sorrow, and by so doing gives colour to his view that sorrow is a primary emotion. He speaks of the sorrow of the child excited by the taking away of

his toy. Children very early display this reaction, which consists essentially in loud cries, sobbing, and tears, and involves no tendency to restore any object. The state of feeling or emotion that accompanies this reaction is, I submit, properly called distress; and the feeling, together with the complex unlearned reaction, common to all members of the species, must be ascribed to an innate affective disposition which, like that of anger, does not seem to be innately connected with any innate cognitive disposition; for, like the disposition of anger, it seems to be excited only secondarily to other impulses. The typical result of the thwarting in the child of any strong impulse is first anger and then, if the impulse thus re-enforced still fails to attain its end, distress. That is to say, we are endowed with this innate tendency to relax our efforts and to cry aloud for help whenever we "come to the end of our tether," when we feel that our powers are quite incapable of coping with the situation. The biological value and function of this reaction are obvious; it seems to be primarily a function of infancy and childhood, when the help of older persons is so often required: but it seems to persist in the female sex into adult life; and even strong men, when their utmost efforts prove unavailing, sometimes break down and cry aloud for help on whatever higher powers they may have learnt to conceive, thus showing that in them also this disposition is not wholly transitory.

The two emotions of anger and distress occupy, then, a position unlike any others. They spring from innate affective dispositions and therefore have their specific bodily tendencies and expressions; but they differ from the others in depending for their arousal, not upon any particular objects or sense-impressions, but upon the thwarting of other impulses.

This affect, properly called "distress" (which I failed to recognise in *Social Psychology*), must be ranked with the primary emotions. It is frequently excited by the event which more commonly than any other initiates sorrow, namely,

the death of a beloved person, and this fact leads to the common error of confusing sorrow with distress. They are different in feeling and tendency. Distress is wholly painful; sorrow has its sweetness. The tendency of distress is to cry for aid; the tendencies of sorrow are those of the sentiment of love. The baffling of any strong impulse may give rise to distress; but sorrow is the retrospective emotion of the thwarted desires of love, and presupposes that sentiment. In an earlier publication, Mr. Shand himself seems to have come near to the recognition of the dependence of sorrow on the sentiment of love; for of inconsolable sorrow he wrote: "Who ever heard of it where profound love did not precede it and survive with it?"*

Sentiments.

When writing my *Social Psychology* I claimed that I had grasped, adopted, and made large use of Mr. Shand's conception of a sentiment. It was therefore with some surprise and misgiving that I discovered, on reading *The Foundations of Character*, that I had failed to grasp his conception and had arrived at and made use of one very different from his. I am inclined to believe that my own conception is truer and more useful; and therefore I am concerned to state clearly the difference, and to criticise Mr. Shand's notion.

In explanation and excuse of my mistake, I may point out that Mr. Shand's views have altered considerably since the date of his earlier publications on this topic. In 1907, he still conceived an instinct as something very much more than a tendency to one rigidly prescribed bodily activity. He wrote of the instinct of love as "a very complex instinct, connecting together the dispositions to a great many emotions and desires."† And at that time he accepted my view of the relation of the

* Article on "Mr. Ribot's Theory of the Passions," *Mind*, N.S. vol. xvi, p. 492.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 497.

emotions to the instincts.* And though it was impossible to discover in this and preceding articles any clear-cut conception of instinct or sentiment, I felt justified in reading into them the conception of the sentiment that I had reached.

In my view a sentiment is essentially a system consisting of a cognitive disposition linked with an affective disposition (or with two or more such dispositions) to form a single functional whole. How then does it differ from an instinct as conceived by me? I reply that there is no difference of structure or function which will serve as a differentiating mark. A very simple sentiment is only distinguished from an instinct by a difference in its history; namely, that while in the instinct the connexion between the cognitive and the affective dispositions which are its essential constituents is innate, in the sentiment this connexion is acquired through the individual's experience. If all or most children shrank in fear upon the first near approach of any dog, and continued to show fear on the approach of any dog, that would justify us in asserting that the affective disposition of fear is innately connected with a cognitive disposition that renders possible the discriminative perception of dogs; we should properly say that the reaction was instinctive, or was the expression of an instinct.

But if a child who, like most others, showed himself at first unafraid and friendly towards dogs in general, were savagely attacked, and so intensely frightened, by a dog on one or more occasions, and if thereafter he always showed fear at the mere sight (or, perhaps, even the mention) of this dog (or of any dog), then, I think, we might properly say that the child had acquired a sentiment of fear for this dog (or for dogs in general, as the case might be). This sentiment would be one of the simplest possible type, but it would determine an enduring or constantly recurrent affective attitude and behaviour towards a particular object, or class of objects;

* *Op. cit.*, p. 503.

and the disposition underlying any such attitude and behaviour determined by the experience of the individual is what I had proposed to call a sentiment.*

Many sentiments comprise within their system two or more affective dispositions, *e.g.*, a small boy at school may quickly acquire a sentiment of fear of a bully; but the same bully may repeatedly excite his anger as well as his fear; and in that case the habitual attitude of the small boy towards the bully becomes one of alternating and partially blending fear and anger. From this we may infer that the disposition of anger has become incorporated in his sentiment for the bully. In this case we must suppose that the sentiment consists of the one cognitive disposition linked with the two affective dispositions of fear and anger respectively.

Mr. Shand conceives a sentiment as a group of emotional or affective dispositions directly connected with one another, this connexion being in most cases innate. In the system of the sentiment so conceived the cognitive disposition occupies no necessary place, discharges no essential function. For the sentiment as a system of affective dispositions is innately given, and when through experience it becomes habitually directed upon any particular object, its structure and nature undergo no essential modification; the connecting of the system of affective

* In this I was but extending to the whole class of habitual emotional attitudes acquired through experience the term which Stout had confined to the higher and more complex systems of this kind. Writing of such simpler attitudes, he proposed to call them emotional dispositions, and added "On the higher levels of mental life where ideas and concepts play a prominent part, emotional dispositions are very complex, and are called *Sentiments* or *Interests*" (*Manual of Psych.*, 2nd Edit., p. 312). This restriction of the term "sentiment" to the more complex types only seems to me regrettable for two reasons: (1) It divides into two parts, artificially and arbitrarily and in a manner incapable of precise definition, the one natural class of existents: (2) The term "emotional disposition" is needed to denote the fact of mental structure which underlies the enduring capacity for each kind of primary emotion (in the way I have used it above) independently of its habitual direction upon any particular object or class of objects.

dispositions with some one cognitive disposition is a fact of secondary importance. Whereas in the sentiment, as I conceive it, the connexion of the affective dispositions with one cognitive disposition is the essential fact constitutive of the sentiment. For the affective dispositions are not connected with one another directly, but only indirectly through the object, or, more strictly, by their common connexion with the one cognitive disposition. This is the conception of the structure of the sentiment which I, following the lead of Professor Stout and, as I supposed, of Mr. Shand, set forth as clearly as I could by the aid of a diagram. Why has Mr. Shand repudiated this conception and substituted this other conception? Partly owing to the analogy which he supposes himself to discover between the system of an emotion and the system of a sentiment. The emotion is said to control several instincts organised within its system, as the sentiment is said to control the several emotions of its system. Here we see an illustration of the dangers of lax usage of words. I have already pointed out that, even if we accept Mr. Shand's notions, no true analogy obtains. In his system of an emotion the emotional disposition is a fact of structure over and above the instincts, and the emotion has its own end and is an independent supervening force which does actually control the instinctive tendencies. Whereas in his sentiment there is no corresponding disposition over and above the emotional dispositions; and when he says that the sentiment controls the emotions organised within it, he means presumably that the system as a whole modifies the operations of its parts.

But the consideration which has most influenced him seems to be the following. Taking maternal love as the type of a sentiment, he argues that the sentiment is innately organised apart from any object to which it may become directed. For, when the child is first put into the mother's arms she feels joy; and, when the tendencies of this joy are thwarted, it turns to anger; when the object is in danger, her joy gives place to fear; and if it be taken wholly from her, joy, fear, and anger give

place to sorrow. Hence the dispositions of these four emotions must be innately connected to form a single system, which is the sentiment of love.

If we accept provisionally this conception of the sentiment, we shall find that the difficulties it raises are more numerous and more serious than those it solves.

How are we to conceive this sentiment of love to become directed to its object, the child (or dog, or cat, or other creature)? Mr. Shand's answer is that the object, when apprehended, excites joy; and joy, being a member of the system of love, directs the other members of the system to this object. Why then does the object excite joy in the mother? To this question Mr. Shand provides no answer. Shall we say—because it is beautiful or seems beautiful to her? Or shall we say, with Bain,—because contact with the soft warm skin of the infant gives her pleasure? Neither answer will serve. If we take the former, we are at once confronted by the fact that the new-born baby appears beautiful to the mother (and perhaps to a few other very motherly persons), while to the rest of the world it appears distressingly ugly. Clearly there is a mystery here, or rather a difficulty for Mr. Shand's hypothesis; a difficulty which, I think, is insuperable so long as he rejects the notion of a maternal instinct.

In every sentiment of love this leading rôle is assigned to joy. There are, it seems to me, two serious objections to the acceptance of this view. It seems to reveal the cloven foot of hedonism. The hedonists said "We love an object, because it gives us pleasure"; Mr. Shand says "We love it, because it gives us joy." Whereas the truth seems to be that, when we derive joy from our relations with a loved object, it is because we love it; the love is the condition of the joy. Mr. Shand's view has most of the speciousness of the hedonist theory, but in one respect it falls short of it. The hedonists did make some pretence of explaining how we come by the pleasure which they assigned as the cause of our love; they professed to

derive it from the pleasures of sensation, as, *e.g.*, Bain, who regarded the pleasure of contact with the soft skin of the infant as the cause of maternal love. Whereas Mr. Shand does nothing to explain how we come by the joy to which he attributes this leading rôle in all loves. Again, the *modus operandi* of joy in fixing the sentiment of love upon its object remains utterly obscure. Joy, we are rightly told, may be incidental to hate. Why, then, do we not love the things we hate ?

Hate is (according to Mr. Shand) a sentiment which, like love, comprises, or rather consists in, the dispositions of the same four primary emotions, joy, sorrow, anger, and fear, innately linked together. The first question that cries for an answer is—Are these four dispositions numerically identical with those that are innately connected to form the sentiment of love ? Or does each normal individual inherit these four emotional dispositions in duplicate ; one set being connected to form the sentiment of love, the other set of duplicates to form the sentiment of hate ? And whichever answer Mr. Shand may give, we have to ask the still more difficult question : How, then, does hate differ from love, if both consist of the same four emotional dispositions directly connected with one another ? For the most refined subtlety will hardly succeed in abolishing the distinction between love and hate. Mr. Shand will reply that these sentiments are distinguished by the fact that the emotions of joy, sorrow, fear, and anger are excited in these two sentiments respectively by quite opposite situations of their object. Quite true ! But his account of these two sentiments so far elaborated gives no hint of an explanation of this profound difference of their operations. Presumably it is due to some difference of the linking of the four dispositions. But if so, what is this difference ? Mr. Shand has not told us, and I cannot conceive how his hypothesis is to meet this difficulty.

If the dispositions of the emotions of joy, sorrow, fear, and anger, are innately linked together (and doubly linked unless

they are present in duplicate), how are we to understand the fact that any one of these four emotions may be excited by certain objects quite independently of the other three? Is there not fear unaccompanied by joy, sorrow, and anger; anger without sorrow, joy, and fear? It seems clear that these emotions are capable of being separately excited by objects that cannot be said to be objects of either love or hate.

On my view of the structure of the sentiments of love and hate these difficulties do not arise, and the facts on which Mr. Shand bases his conception are completely explained in another manner. First, any affective disposition, though organised in the system of any sentiment, remains free to be sporadically and independently excited by other objects, or to enter into the composition of any other sentiments, sentiments of like or of different nature for other objects; for, in entering into the system of a sentiment for any object, it is linked directly, not with other affective dispositions, but only with the cognitive disposition concerned in the apprehension of the object. And love differs from hate in that in it the essential feature which gives its character to the sentiment is the direct connection with the object (*i.e.*, with its disposition) of the affective disposition of the protective instinct, whose emotion is the tender emotion; while hate owes its character to a similar direct connexion of the object with the dispositions of anger and fear (and perhaps of other emotions, such as disgust).

If, then, these objections must prevent our accepting Mr. Shand's conception of the structure of the sentiment of love (or hate), how are we to deal with the facts on which he chiefly relies in arriving at it; namely, the facts which seem to him to show that the four emotional dispositions, those of joy, sorrow, fear, and anger, are innately connected with one another to form the sentiment of love and also that of hate?

Let us consider the instance Mr. Shand has chosen for the illustration of his view, namely, the maternal attitude, and see how we may explain his facts without his assumption of an

innate sentiment of love consisting of the systems of anger, fear, joy, and sorrow, innately linked.

Mr. Shand says that in the mother the infant excites joy ; though why this should be the case he does not attempt to explain ; and the lack of this explanation is the most serious defect of his hypothesis. My view is that the maternal instinct is so constituted that the presentation of the bodily form of the child and especially its cries for aid excite in her an impulse to protect it, to cherish it, primarily to hug it to her bosom and to still its cries ; that this impulse is accompanied by a feeling of specific quality which is properly called tender emotion ; and that, as this impulse accomplishes its end, she experiences a satisfaction which is intense in proportion to the strength of the impulse. If it is impossible for her to take action towards this end, the impulse at once becomes desire. This instinct may be excited by the presence, and especially by the signs of distress, of any infant ; but normally it is evoked most readily and strongly by her own infant, to which in the human mother it becomes habitually directed before the birth of the child, this direction being strengthened and confirmed by every act of tender care and forethought on behalf of this particular object. This specialisation of the direction of this affect upon the one object constitutes a sentiment for that object ; it gives strength and continuity to the desire to cherish and protect this one object above all others. The prospective reference and the intellectualisation of the attitude towards the child raise the satisfactions that attend success of all efforts springing from this sentiment to the level of joy. Joy, as Mr. Shand recognises, is closely related to confidence and hope. It is one of the emotions of desire ; it differs from confidence in that, while this is wholly prospective, joy is the state of feeling characteristic of progressive satisfaction of desire. The desire of the mother for the welfare of her child can never attain a final satisfaction ; as soon as it accomplishes one end, others spring into view ; it is also retrospective, as the mind contemplates past achievement.

Mr. Shand himself recognises three kinds of joy: (1) of attainment, (2) of anticipation, (3) of retrospect (p. 511); and in doing so, he implicitly admits that joy is a state of feeling that results from the operation of impulse or desire which is other than the impulse or desire which he attributes to joy itself, namely, the desire to maintain the present state of affairs; this is to admit that joy is not a primary emotion, and that its alleged impulse is a fiction; for how can the joy of anticipation or of retrospection have, or be, at the same time the desire or tendency "to maintain the situation."

"If we consider the cause of Joy we find that in one class of cases, some felt impulse or desire has been an essential condition of it, that another condition has been the fulfilment of the end of that impulse or desire" (p. 283). That is exactly my contention. In the special case of maternal love, the impulse or desire whose fulfilment is the cause of joy is the protective impulse; and joy adds no other conative force or end; its effect is merely that of all forms of pleasure, namely, to support and confirm the tendency from the satisfaction of which it accrues.

What Mr. Shand calls the fears of love are, I submit, properly called anxieties. It is true that, indulging the common tendency to degrade language by using a stronger word than is needed, we commonly speak of our fear for the safety of a loved person, just as we speak of our fear for the safety of our umbrella. But in both cases the emotional state is one of anxiety, a feeling quite distinct from fear; it is, as we have seen, one of the "prospective emotions" common to all desire.* The impulse which governs the mother in a state of anxiety is

* Medical writers have contributed to this confusion of "anxiety" with fear, by giving the name "anxiety neurosis" to a condition characterised by abnormal liability to fear. As Dr. Ernest Jones has pointed out ("Pathology of Morbid Anxiety," in volume of papers on *Psycho-Analysis*, London, 1913) the bodily symptoms in many of these cases are very distinctly those of fear. Anxiety may of course complicate the state of fear.

the leading impulse of her sentiment, the desire to protect her child. Her fearlessness when this impulse is awakened is proverbial.

That anger is aroused when this protective impulse is obstructed is merely a special case of the general law that "all impulses, which are abruptly interfered with, tend to arouse anger" (p. 488).

The sorrow of maternal love we have already accounted for; it is the protective desire of the sentiment turned to tender regret. If the object is suddenly torn away in a manner which renders unavailing all the efforts of the protective impulse (re-enforced perhaps by anger), the instinct of distress to cry aloud for aid may be excited; and so this reaction may initiate the sorrow, which persists when this impulse has died away.

This peculiar relation of the impulses of anger and of distress to all conation affords, then, no ground for the view that their dispositions have any special innate connexion with dispositions of joy and sorrow within an alleged innate sentiment of love. The relation is peculiar and difficult to understand; though in physiological terms a plausible explanation might be suggested.

All the facts on which Mr. Shand relies are thus adequately explained in a much simpler manner than by his assumption of an innate organisation of joy, sorrow, anger, and fear in a sentiment of love; and in a manner which avoids the intolerable confusion that results from this assumption. The extent and hopelessness of this confusion can only be fully appreciated after a resolute bout with Mr. Shand's later chapters. In order to justify this characterisation I need only cite some of his statements about desire: "Desire is an abstraction" (p. 519). Yet it is more; for "desire is one kind of impulse," (p. 509). "In some impulses . . . there is the thought of a result or end. . . . Such impulses in agreement with ordinary usage we shall call desire" (p. 461). But desire is more than an impulse conscious of its end, for it is also "a very complex emotional system" (p. 463); "it is a system having a variety

of constituents" (p. 493). "It is essentially an organisation of those emotional dispositions which are characteristic of its process" (p. 463), *i.e.*, it is a system comprising the emotional dispositions of its six prospective emotions and its several retrospective emotions. And yet "it is a complete mistake to represent desire as an independent force and to suppose that it can be co-ordinated either with the emotions or with the sentiments" (p. 519). These explicit statements (each of which is repeated more than once) to the effect that desire is an abstraction, an impulse, and a complex system of emotional dispositions cannot be reconciled with one another.

But still more impossible of acceptance is the following clear implication:—A sentiment is an innately organised system of emotional systems, each of which comprises, besides an affective disposition, an array of instincts. Each of these is a disposition capable of giving rise to an impulse which on occasion may become desire. Each is therefore a complex system of emotional dispositions (namely, those of the emotions of desire). But each of these dispositions again can give rise to an impulse, which, according to the nature of all true impulse, may become desire under the conditions of obstruction and sufficient foresight of ends. Hence each of these dispositions of the emotions of desire is itself a complex system of emotional dispositions, and so in an infinite regress of systems within systems, all innately organised.

The only way of escape from this infinite regress and this tissue of obscurity and confusion is, I submit, a return to the principles with which I set out as guiding hypotheses; the principles, namely, that each of the primary emotions springs from an affective disposition not essentially different from the conative dispositions from which spring our impulses to action that are not qualified by feelings of high degree of individual distinctness; that among all these conative dispositions the only important distinction in respect of innate organisation is that most of them are innately linked with cognitive

dispositions corresponding to appropriate objects (these thus constitute instincts in the full sense of the word), while some few (notably the dispositions of anger and of distress and, perhaps, one for the expression of feelings of pleasure) are, perhaps, not so linked, but are dependent for their excitement upon special incidents of the course of activity of other conations; that only the primary emotions or affects are properly to be regarded as conative forces springing from conative dispositions; that all other emotional states are blendings of these primary qualities of feeling, or feelings incidental to the conflicts and complications of the primary conative tendencies which inevitably result from the development of the intellect.

In conclusion, I may point out that the conception of sentiments which I adopted in my *Social Psychology* and my view of their fundamental rôle in all mental development is receiving confirmation from the side of psycho-pathology. For the morbid "complex," which now figures so largely in this field, is essentially of the nature of a sentiment, namely, a cognitive disposition functionally linked with some one or more affective dispositions, or (in the older terminology) an idea to which a strong affect is attached. It differs from a normal sentiment in being out of harmony with that system of sentiments centred about the self-regarding sentiment which is the character. Not a few psycho-pathologists seem to be on the point of discovering that the "complex," far from being something exceptional and essentially morbid, is the functional and structural unit of all mental activity that is not purely instinctive. By the identification of these two conceptions, the "complex" and the "sentiment," two conceptions arrived at by entirely independent lines of thought and observation, we may hope to bring into line, into relations of mutual helpfulness, academic and medical psychology, which until very recently have been strangely remote from each other. But the conception of the sentiment which has this great rôle to play is

not that one which is presented in *The Foundations of Character*, but that one which Mr. Shand has ignored and implicitly rejected.

II. *By* A. F. SHAND.

It might be supposed from Mr. McDougall's long and elaborate attack on my book that it was, in the main, concerned with his own; but it had very different objects. It is true that I had to consider the relation of emotion to instinct. Mr. McDougall, as far as I knew, was the only writer who had formulated a clear theory of this relation. That was, to my mind, a great merit. We have had many studies of the relation of instinct to intelligence, but this more comprehensive and difficult study has been neglected. I therefore carefully considered his theory, which at first favourably impressed me: when I came to apply it to the facts it seemed to me inconsistent with them. But my direct criticism of it was confined to about four pages (pp. 188-192). The subsequent chapters on the primary emotions, which seem to support my theory, are so far antagonistic to his; that is all. My own theory I thought was an advance on his, because it could accept facts which his was obliged to ignore. I only put it forward tentatively. For the difficulty of this enquiry into the bases of character impresses us so differently. He is as full of confidence as I am of doubt. Where I can only reach a provisional solution of my problem at the end of a long chapter, he will resolve his definitively in a sentence. But nowhere is he more confident than when he is attacking what he supposes to be my theories.

The first eight pages of Mr. McDougall's paper profess to summarise my opinions. I read them with astonishment. I could not recognise my thoughts, so much were they changed. These summaries are presented without any quotation from my book to justify them, without even a reference to a particular

page of it. This is a dangerous course to adopt even where one writer is in sympathy and agreement with another ; where his disagreement is considerable, and he is disposed to attack to reassert his own opinions, it is sure to result in misconceptions. These eight pages are full of them ; and even in the rest of his paper, where he supplies some quotations from my book, they are still numerous.

I shall pass over Mr. McDougall's misconceptions, except where I touch upon them incidentally, and shall at once attempt to make clear—which I do not think he has done—just what his theory is and what mine is, and the principal differences between them. If I have to repeat much that I attempted to make plain in my book, at least, as my object there was to define a method of enquiry and to formulate a number of provisional rules reached by means of it, I may be able here to make a clear comparison of our divergent theories. I shall have to confine myself to this topic, which I understood was the subject of the symposium. It will alone occupy all the space at my disposal. I cannot therefore deal with Mr. McDougall's accounts of my theories of Desire and Sentiment.

Mr. McDougall's theory of the relation of primary emotion to instinct is attractive in its simplicity. He leads up to it by a general statement of the nature of instinctive behaviour. "In every case," he says, "some sense-impression, or combination of sense-impressions, excites some perfectly definite behaviour, some movement or train of movements which is the same in all individuals of the species and on all similar occasions" (*Social Psych.*, Sec. 1, Ch. II); such behaviour being innately determined and directed to the end of preserving the individual or the species. This account represents the general opinion of naturalists, which, like him, I adopt. Yet, in the present paper, he forgets that he has made this admission in his *Social Psychology* about the "perfectly definite behaviour" of instincts "the same in all individuals of the species," and

uses this unjustifiable language of a phrase of my own carrying the same meaning. He charges me with attempting "to give colour" to my "arbitrarily narrowed conception of instinct by writing such phrases as the following:—'Behaviour . . . of that stereotyped and definite character to which we usually restrict the term "instinctive."'" And he goes on to ask me "what justification" I have "for using the pronoun 'we' in this large collective sense, implying a consensus of opinion" (p. 43).

This passage well represents the quality of his criticisms, and illustrates his endeavour to attack at every point, even if inadvertently he attacks himself.

We have now seen what the behaviour of innate dispositions must be if these innate dispositions are to be properly called instincts. We have next to consider the psychical process which the excitement of an instinct invariably involves. This problem is hardly noticed by naturalists, but it specially concerns psychologists; through it they may hope to improve the general theory of instinct.

The "sense-impression" that excites an instinct must have "meaning," says Mr. McDougall, and we must regard it as "distinctly of the nature of perception" (*Social Psych.*, Ch. II). I answer that it is so, doubtless, in many cases, but no evidence is given to show that in others it is more than sensation. That this sensation is "favoured" over other sensations experienced with it may be accounted for by the innate connexion between it and the instinct. We come next to a curious theory of the "psycho-physical disposition" which is an instinct. It consists of "three corresponding parts, an afferent, a central, and a motor or efferent part, whose activities are the cognitive, the affective, and the conative features respectively of the total instinctive process" (*op. cit.*, Ch. II, p. 32). That we can divide up our experience in this way seems to me doubtful, and opposed to the general teaching of the inseparability of these three aspects of mental process. How does Mr. McDougall

know that the afferent side is purely cognitive and not also affective, and that the central side is affective and not also cognitive and conative? He does not know; but he gives us instead his unsupported assertion.

These points connected with Mr. McDougall's theory of Instinct are minor ones: my principal disagreement with him concerns his statement that the activity of an instinct is accompanied in all cases by an emotion that specially belongs to that instinct. I will quote his own words: "Instinctive behaviour is always attended by some such emotional excitement, however faint, which in each case is specific or peculiar to that kind of behaviour" (*op. cit.*, p. 28). Now, if we ask for any evidence of this necessary connexion between one kind of "instinctive behaviour" and one kind of "emotional excitement," we find that he can only find "many cases" (*Ibid.*) in which we can infer that a specific emotion is felt, which no one denies. From this he concludes that "we seem justified in believing" (*Ibid.*) that it is so in all cases. This is the very point in question, and Mr. McDougall assumes it. Now, there is no objection to Mr. McDougall assuming the central point of his theory; but in this case it must be held modestly as no more than a hypothesis. We have next to enquire whether it is a good hypothesis.

The hypothesis that the kind of instinctive behaviour is connected with the kind of "emotional excitement" experienced with it, seems to make the quality of the one the determining ground of the quality of the other. This is his definition of an instinct. It is a "disposition" which, among other effects, "determines its possessor to perceive . . . objects of a certain class," and to "experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object" (*op. cit.*, p. 29). The last quotation to which I have to refer defines the nature of this emotional excitement when the instinct is a "principal" one:—"Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of emotional excitement, whose quality is specific or peculiar to

it; and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion" (Ch. III, p. 47). We have now got the chief features of the theory:—(1) The kind of instinctive behaviour determines the quality of the emotional excitement felt with it; and (2) when the instinct excited is a "principal" one, the "emotional excitement" which is its "affective aspect" is what we call a primary emotion. It follows from the second that there must be at least as many primary emotions as there are "principal" instincts; and the number may be much larger than the eight recognised by him (see Sec. 2, Ch. III).

What, then, are "principal" instincts? Are the nest-building instincts "principal" ones; and if not, why not? But if they are, what is the primary emotion connected with them? There is none—none, at least, which is the proper and peculiar "affective aspect" of these instincts. We return to the first point of the theory, that which makes the kind of instinctive behaviour—which we have to remember is "perfectly definite" behaviour—determine the quality of the emotional "affect." What a curious theory is this: that sufficiently definite behaviour determines an emotional excitement of particular quality. But the behaviour, you answer, must be innately determined. Why should that make the difference? Why should not any kind of behaviour, so long as it is sufficiently definite and complex, give rise to a particular emotion? This behaviour consists of movements; such a succession of movements gives rise to a succession of motor sensations. Is it the peculiarity of these sensations that determines the emotion and confers on it a peculiar quality? If it is, then the peculiar sensations connected with other kinds of definite and complex behaviour, not innately determined but the result of habit, must also condition the excitement of other emotions. When I take my watch at night out of my waistcoat, and, after winding it up, lay it in a certain place, all the

while thinking of something different, this complex behaviour, this succession of definite movements, has a corresponding succession of definite sensations. These, therefore, should give rise to a particular emotion. But there is no emotion at all—so far as these sensations are concerned—and my mind is such a blank with regard to them, that a minute after they are completed I cannot remember whether I have wound up my watch or not. Do not the simpler kinds of instinctive behaviour sometimes resemble such habitual actions? Instincts are frequently compared to habits; sometimes are regarded as inherited habits. Why should not some instincts operate to evoke their own peculiar behaviour with as complete an absence of emotional excitement as do some habits?

It may be urged that the mechanical perfection of these habits stands in the way of their eliciting emotions; for we do not attend to what we are doing, and if we do not attend to what we are doing, how can it condition an "emotional excitement" of a particular quality? But it is this mechanical perfection which is so often insisted on as characteristic of instincts, and it is this absence of intelligence which the older writers on instinct emphasised. This antithesis of instinct and intelligence was no doubt a mistake, so far, at least, as the more complex instincts were concerned, which require intelligent supervision; but so far as there is this mechanical perfection in other cases, and absence of attention, so far will the instinctive behaviour be unaccompanied by emotion.

Let us next suppose that the definite and complex behaviour, which is held to condition an "emotional excitement" of particular quality, is not like a mechanically perfect habit, but involves attention and intelligent control. What difference will this make? and what "emotional excitement" must there be necessarily connected with this fact? For instance, I re-arrange all the things on my work-table so that I may be able to find what I want at the moment with less waste of time than

heretofore. Here is complex and definite behaviour, which, like some instinctive behaviour, occupies a considerable amount of time and requires intelligent supervision. I do it thoughtfully and with complete calmness of mind; there is no trace of "emotional excitement." But if the theory be true that it is the "kind of behaviour" which conditions the emotion, and gives rise to its "specific" quality, then there should be a definite emotion connected with it. The fact that the "kind of behaviour" is innately determined in the one case, and in the other has been acquired through experience, that in the one it is common to a given species and in the other is more or less peculiar to the individual animal, cannot confer on the former the mysterious property of exciting an emotion of specific quality. On the contrary, if an emotion is excited in either case, it is more likely to be in the second than in the first. For the first approximates to a stereotyped and mechanical action.

If, then, "instinctive behaviour" determines some kind of "emotional excitement" which is "specific or peculiar" to it, this cannot be due to the peculiar motor sensations connected with that behaviour, nor to its being innately determined, nor to its approximating to a degree of mechanical perfection, nor to its requiring intelligent supervision; and we can find no facts here to support Mr. McDougall's theory.

There is another consequence of this theory which he does not seem to have foreseen. If it is the "kind of behaviour" which determines the quality of the "emotional excitement," different kinds of behaviour will be accompanied by different emotions, and the greater the difference between the kinds of behaviour the greater will be the difference between the emotions. Now apply this to the facts. In my chapter on Fear I have drawn attention to the many different types of behaviour that may be connected with that emotion. There are two which are as much opposed as any varieties of behaviour can well be. The first is a fear which depends on

silence and immobility to escape from danger, as when the young bird, pecking its way through the shell, hears the warning cry and arrests its action, or as when men hear the approach of an enemy in the dark, and remain motionless and silent. The second is a fear that manifests the loudest noise and most violent efforts to escape of which an animal or a man is capable. Both may be instinctive; but, waiving this point, whether they be so or not, they are two of the most contrasted modes of behaviour which it is possible to conceive, and, therefore, according to the inference we have drawn from the theory, they ought to give rise to the most contrasted emotions. Yet what are the facts? Both may spring from the same emotion of fear.

Now, this seems to me as convincing a proof as we can find that it cannot be the kind of "instinctive behaviour" that determines the quality of the emotion that may be connected with it. At most, this behaviour to some extent modifies the emotion, without, however, altering its essential character. The fear that we feel in lying silent and motionless and listening to the thumping of our hearts, trying even to make our breathing inaudible, does not feel quite the same as the fear that impels us to run as if the devil were behind us; but though having such diverse sensational accompaniments, both are the same primary emotion.

I have hitherto dealt with Mr. McDougall's theory from a different point of view from that which I took up in my book. There criticism of it had to be kept within the narrowest limits and subordinated to my general aims; but I shall now refer to this other criticism. When I came to study the emotions of fear and anger, I saw clearly that there was not only one instinctive behaviour of fear for a given species of the higher animals that feels the emotion, but more than one. I shall not repeat the detailed evidence I furnished in my chapter on fear in evidence of this, but, assuming it to be true, I shall ask whether it be incompatible with Mr. McDougall's theory.

I judged that, at least, it called for a considerable recasting of that theory. Let us first recollect that, according to him, each one of "the principal instincts," when excited, conditions also the excitement of what "may be called a primary emotion." Just, then, as each principal instinct is connected with one primary emotion, so the same primary emotion must be connected with only one instinct; therefore a plurality of instincts connected with the same primary emotion seems to be inconsistent with his theory. It is not requisite to prove that this plurality occurs in the case of every primary emotion, it is sufficient if it is proved to exist in the case of one. Now, according to him, the emotion of fear is "the affective aspect" of "the Instinct of Flight" (Ch. III, p. 49). Yet he had also recognised that concealment is resorted to under the influence of fear, he was therefore compelled by his theory to assert that concealment was part of the instinct of flight,—that, in other words, there could be no concealment without a precedent flight. I tried to show that there are a number of cases of flight without concealment and of concealment without flight. Very disingenuously, it seems to me, Mr. McDougall in his present paper attempts to force the facts into agreement with his theory. "I submit," he says, "that the nature of fear may be more properly stated as follows: It is an instinct which impels the animal, or man, to seek cover and there lie hid. It is thus a chain-instinct of two links" (p. 37). Notice that in place of the term "flight," in his book, he here substitutes the milder phrase "to seek cover." For "flight," if it has any proper meaning in relation to fear, means a succession of rapid movements—whether by running, by swimming, or by the use of wings—for effecting escape. Now, as there are obviously animals that, under the influence of fear, do not always resort to such rapid means of locomotion as they possess, but, being either at the entrance of their holes, have only to drop into them, or, moving about already under cover, have only to lie quiet where they

are, or, being near cover, have only to creep stealthily into it, because of these patent facts, we have the substitution of the phrase "seeking cover" for the term "flight." But the phrase "seeking cover" means seeking concealment, and seeking concealment need not involve flight. In such cases, therefore, the instinct is not constituted of these two links.

We have seen how Mr. McDougall's thought on such important matters as the nature of the instinct connected with a primary emotion fluctuates, let us now enquire more particularly concerning "the instinct of flight" which, at least in his book, he declared to be that which gives rise to the primary emotion of fear. We are very apt, in speaking in this general way of *the* instinct of flight, to forget that there may be as many different instincts of flight as there are animals that employ different modes of rapid locomotion to escape from danger. Now, we know that there is an instinct of flight in birds which, though imperfect when the young bird leaves the nest, yet enables it to fly before it has learnt by practice. But the instinct of flight in birds is not only connected with the emotion of fear, it subserves all emotions that employ this means of locomotion to attain their ends. When, therefore, the instinct of flight is spoken of as proper to fear it must be this instinct of flight modified. We may say that the bird flies more rapidly under the influence of fear; but is it certain that anger or the joy of exercise may not impel it to a flight as rapid? A soldier may run to attack an enemy with the same speed that he runs away from him. What seems distinctive of the flight of fear is rather the direction which the fleeing animal takes. This capacity to take the right direction is either instinctive or acquired by experience. But in either case the foundations of the instincts of flight connected with fear are the instincts of locomotion of different species of animals.

As my first objection to the theory of Mr. McDougall was that a primary emotion may employ different instincts for the attainment of its end in different situations, so my second was

that the same instinct may subserve the ends of different emotions. These instincts of locomotion are a clear proof of this fact. Upon these two important facts, as I believe them to be, my theory of emotion is based.

We have seen how Mr. McDougall, in the case of fear, is driven to represent instinctive flight and instinctive concealment as necessarily connected in a single chain-instinct; how will he, from the point of view of his own theory, have to deal with the other instinctive modes of behaviour which I tried to show were also characteristic of fear? To take only two of them: there is the death-shamming instinct; there is the clinging of the young to the parent animal. How will he deal with these instincts? Now it is obvious that he cannot join them to the instincts of flight and concealment to form a still more complex chain-instinct; for to say that whenever the child clings to his mother from fear he must simulate death and run away and hide would be too absurd. What resource, then, is open to him if he is to hold to his theory? He takes the only alternative short of denying that there are such instincts. He denies that they are or belong to fear. The passage in which he states this deserves to be quoted in full. "By including under fear," he says, "a number of emotional states which are in popular speech called fear (as when I say 'I fear I have lost my umbrella'), but which are of quite different nature and are more properly called states of anxiety, Mr. Shand attempts to make the innate system of fear still more complex, comprise a still larger number of tendencies, impulses, or instincts" (pp. 36, 37).

I need add nothing to this except to point out that Mr. McDougall must resort to the same devices in attempting to explain away the varieties of behaviour connected with other primary emotions. I will refer to one other case. I have always maintained that joy and sorrow were primary emotions. Mr. McDougall, in his book, denied that they were. I tried to show that there was a primitive sorrow in the

presence of bodily suffering, the expression of which was the cry for help (*B. 2, Ch. IX, pp. 2, 3*). He now adopts this, but it would be inconvenient for his theory to allow it to be called sorrow. For there is another variety of sorrow, the behaviour of which is expressed in efforts to restore the past; so he discovers that the former is "properly called distress" (p. 49). "The name 'Sorrow,'" he says, "should, I submit, be restricted to this tender regret, which is the retrospective desire that springs from a sentiment of love deprived of its object" (p. 48). Really some knowledge of human nature is requisite if we are to treat of these questions. Mr. McDougall has not recognised such an elementary fact as that bitter sorrows are as familiar in the experience of love as the sorrows that are tender. He next proceeds to tell me, inaccurately, my own theory, namely that the "impulse to restore its object" is "the tendency of the sentiment of love" (*Ibid.*) It is not *the* tendency, but one of the tendencies of love. He concludes with another misconception. He charges me with regarding this tendency "as the specific impulse of a primary emotion of sorrow" (*Ibid.*). Now I have a chapter in my book (*B. 2, Ch. X*) in which I carefully explain that this is one of "the secondary tendencies of sorrow" (p. 319), which are manifested only in sentiments.*

I have next to deal with a verbal question. When I had recognised the variety of behaviour that may arise from the same emotion in different circumstances, and, therefore, the very complex system which the emotion may have, I could not call

* In reference to Disgust, Mr. McDougall remarks that I accept his view that there are "two original varieties . . . a tactile and a gustatory" (p. 41). I certainly hold this theory, since it is my own. If I had adopted it from him, I should have acknowledged my debt. In one of several conversations I had with him during the writing of his book I mentioned the theory, which was in my MS., though I had never published it. Mr. McDougall must have forgotten this. There are other resemblances between our books that have a similar origin, as for instance that there are three kinds of Sentiments, Love, Hate, and Respect, and that Surprise is not a primary emotion in the same sense as are other emotions.

this system an instinct, and the emotion the "affective aspect" of it, as Mr. McDougall has done, because of the variety of instincts that may be comprised in this system. In reviewing my book in *The Philosophical Review*, Mr. W. K. Wright says, "It seems to the reviewer that, while Mr. Shand has made a good point against Mr. McDougall in showing that an emotion may find expression in one of several modes of behaviour, and that the same mode of behaviour may be attached to different emotions, it none the less remains more advantageous to retain the term 'instinct' for the entire disposition which Shand calls the 'system of the emotion,' and to confine 'emotion' to the affective phase 'present in consciousness.'"* Now I certainly do confine the term "emotion" to the side of the system "present in consciousness," but since the instincts that may be contained in this system are active in different situations, I did not feel that I could call the group of them "an instinct." I should not have felt this difficulty if all these instincts could be regarded as links in a single chain-instinct. This, I think, I have shown they cannot be.

Since, then, I conceived that the system of an emotion might contain a variety of instincts, I reached a conception of the relation of instinct to emotion very different from that of Mr. McDougall. For instead of the emotion being a part of the entire system of the instinct, some instincts at least were parts of the entire system of the emotion. I regarded instincts as providing no more than hereditary modes of behaviour, common to some species of animal for the attainment of ends. Such might be connected with any emotion to which they were serviceable. Instead of the picture that Mr. McDougall has drawn of the "instincts as the prime movers of all human society" (*Social Psych.*, Ch. II, p. 44), driving it to predestined ends, I conceive of the instincts as persisting indeed, but with their methods of behaviour changed by acquired

* September, 1914, Vol. XXIII, p. 5.

ingredients, and though still directed to the old biological ends, directed also to the acquired ends of our great sentiments that value welfare, honour, and truth above life itself.

The third ground alleged by me in my book against Mr. McDougall's theory of the relation of instinct to primary emotion was that an instinct may be excited without necessarily evoking any particular emotion. This has not the same importance as the other two objections, for even assuming it to be true that "some emotional excitement, however faint," must accompany the excitement of every instinct, at least the same instinct may be accompanied by different emotions. I urged this point only because it seemed to me a fact of introspection that, for instance, some typical behaviour of fear may be elicited where the action is very sudden without the emotion being excited with it. So many people have had this experience, sometimes feeling the fear after their danger has passed when they reflect on it, but not feeling it at the time, that I do not think it can be gainsaid.

I have now dealt with Mr. McDougall's theory. In the first place I have tried to show that it is only an assumption; in the second place, that as such it is not a good hypothesis, since it conflicts with the facts; incidentally I have tried to make the prominent features of my own theory clear. It interprets the principal facts to which I have referred, with which Mr. McDougall's theory is in conflict. I do not pretend that it is perfect. I do not believe in perfect theories. I try to make theories clear at certain points, while leaving them undefined at others,—clear in those directions where I have the facts which they have to interpret, vague in others where I have not yet got the facts. By this method theories become flexible and progressive, and adaptable to the new facts which our research may bring to light.

We have considered the relation in which primary emotion stands to instinct, I shall now try to make clearer my own conception of primary emotion. Primary emotion is at first a

biological force pursuing its innately determined end by means of instincts and other dispositions organised with it. It is underived from any other extant emotion. As emotion it is also "feeling," and has the specific quality of the primary emotion which it is. It is not necessarily an intense feeling; it is sometimes a very faint one, but it always has this quality so long as it remains the same emotion. The quality of its feeling,—that which makes us feel it to be anger or fear, or joy or sorrow, for instance,—is much more closely connected with the organic sensations that enter into it than with the motor sensations that accompany the instinctive and acquired modes of behaviour which it initiates. Hence there may be very different modes of behaviour connected with the same primary emotion without its fundamental quality being affected by them.

Primary emotion is also essentially conative, since it is a force directed to the preservation of life; but its original biological end is supplemented in man, at least, by a number of acquired ends, and by them his freedom and progress are assured. When we compare the original biological end with these acquired ends, the end which is common to all of them is something exceedingly abstract.

Thirdly, emotion has always its cognitive aspect. It has the awareness, and in man the thoughts characteristic of the emotion which it is.

This being what primary emotion is, so far as I understand it, I shall finally try to make clear the nature of the instincts which it employs, dealing incidentally with some of Mr. McDougall's principal misconceptions.

One of his charges that most frequently recurs is that I separate the dispositions of emotions from the instincts. My claim, he says, that an emotion may employ different instincts will not "justify the separation of the instincts from the affective dispositions" (p. 28). Now, so far from separating a primary emotion from the instincts by which its end is attained, I state explicitly that these instincts are part of its system.

For the system of the emotion is much larger than that part which we call the emotion. His unfounded charge is apparently based on my denial that, when one of these instincts is aroused, the emotion must be felt with it, since I conceive that the same instinct may possibly subserve different emotions, and that, in some cases, the instinct may evoke its own appropriate behaviour without there being anything more in the mind than the impulse to achieve that behaviour. How much separation is there here? Yet he proceeds to make this charge the ground of a most fanciful interpretation. He says that I am influenced by a "crude psycho-physical dualism," and that I use "instinct" "as a means of bridging over the gulf between mental and bodily processes" (p. 28). We have all heard in this Society of the ancient doctrine of the *Tertium Quid*. Instinct, he thinks, is my *Tertium Quid*. But I did not need one, and if I did I should answer that Mr. McDougall, in requiring me to justify it, would be confusing the standpoint of science with that of metaphysics, which latter alone has to furnish a final and coherent theory of the relation of body and mind.

Another of his principal misconceptions concerns the meaning which I have attached to the term "instinct." He says that "often I seem to identify an instinct with a reflex mechanism of the nervous system that has no mental function, whose operations contribute nothing to consciousness" (p. 25);—even reflexes may be accompanied by sensations;—that still I admit that impulses spring from the excitement of instincts. But he says I do not think it worth while noting that an impulse is innately linked with "some cognitive disposition." To him it "seems very much worth while" (p. 26). There is not only no passage quoted to excuse his misconception, but there is my express statement to controvert it. I say: "If our primitive impulses have not thought, in the narrower sense, they have a certain prospective awareness. They are looking forward to the next step in advance, though they do not

definitely anticipate it" (*B.* 3, Ch. I, 1.—"Of the Difference between Impulse, Appetite, and Emotion."). He proceeds still further to misconceive what I mean by "impulse." He says that, in my view, "the excitement of an instinct involves no feeling but only impulse or conation" (p. 27). Again neither reference nor quotation; what is worse he does not remember that three pages earlier (p. 24) he has quoted the following statement of mine concerning the nature of impulses:—"Their feelings have not often the individual distinctness of fear and anger" (*B.* 1, Ch. III). Again on p. 459 I say: "If we cannot regard the appetites merely as conation, neither can we so regard the impulses." They possess feeling, are "pleasant or unpleasant under varying conditions," and "even capable of a considerable degree of excitement under prolonged obstruction" (*Ibid.*). These are samples of his criticisms.

The distinction between the impulses and the emotions is an exceedingly difficult one. I say that, looked at as "statical facts," we might be tempted to define the former as "undifferentiated, prospective emotions" (p. 459), because they involve cognition as well as pleasure and displeasure, and under obstruction are apt to become excited. If they are not emotions, it is certain, at least, that they are capable of arousing emotion, as anger at obstruction, and repugnance to the continuance of the present state. But they are generally assumed to be different from emotions. The great number of them, in comparison with the emotions, is a striking fact, as is also their lack of individuality. All through the day impulses succeed one another in our minds. If I am tired I feel an impulse to sit down; if I have rested too long, an impulse for exercise; if I am uncomfortable, an impulse to vary my position. I have an impulse to write, an impulse to stop writing, an impulse to feel the fresh air, an impulse for greater bodily warmth or coolness. These impulses, as well as many others, recur from day to day; but no one, apart from theory, would call them emotions. Yet they not only, as we have seen, are apt

to give rise to emotions, but, in many cases, spring from them. For instance, a disagreeable state of the body is apt to give rise to repugnance, the repugnance, to an impulse to get out of this state into some other. On the other hand, are there not often, as Prof. Stout would say, "short cuts"? Does not the disagreeable state of the body often directly initiate some change of position, not only without requiring an emotion of repugnance, but without even our feeling an impulse? I cannot always verify the presence of impulse when I change my position, when I get up or sit down, take up a pen to write or put it down. It is these sort of doubts that assail me when I read Mr. McDougall's assurance that there is always an emotion accompanying an instinctive activity, whereas I am not convinced that there is always an impulse felt, although I adopt this as a hypothesis. Mr. McDougall's confidence in dealing with these difficult questions amazes me. I think it wiser to be cautious, as we have no direct knowledge of what is present in the minds of animals. So also with regard to this question of the difference between emotions and impulses. We have to avoid dogmatism and to formulate our tentative hypotheses to interpret such facts as we have been able to grasp. Without, then, in my book, pronouncing any definite opinion as to whether impulses are or are not a kind of undifferentiated emotion, I try to direct attention to a certain functional relation between them. In the system of an emotion there will be a variety of different dispositions to different kinds of behaviour so far as the end of the emotion is attainable by diversity of means. Connected with these different kinds of behaviour there will be in the mind the different impulses that elicit them. The same emotion, then, will be capable of eliciting a number of different impulses in different situations. I therefore concluded that impulses bore a relation to emotions similar to the relation which emotions bear to sentiments. That was my tentative hypothesis of their relation.

Now while on p. 28, and again at the top of p. 34, Mr. McDougall is inclined to minimise the difference between impulses and emotions, saying that I had taught him that "the all-important distinguishing feature of an emotion is its tendency to work towards some specific end" (p. 28), and that impulses also have ends, yet, when he comes to discuss Desire, which he says I rightly define "as an impulse become conscious of its end," he forgets what he has said, his conception changes, and after remarking that I would refuse to class "desire" with the sentiments, he goes on to say that he thinks I am "aware that this would be just as improper as to class it with the emotions." (p. 44.)

I cannot deal further with Mr. McDougall's misconceptions, but as I wish to distinguish the different varieties of instincts more clearly than I have done in my book, I will examine the charges he makes against me of misunderstanding "instinct." He does not, of course, use such a mild term as this. He accuses me of "arbitrarily" restricting the term (p. 29), and because I say that there is only "one kind of behaviour" connected with a given instinct, he "submits" that this "is an arbitrary and wholly baseless assumption and is contradicted by a multitude of facts" (p. 29). If I have arbitrarily restricted the meaning of the term, he might at least remember how I have restricted it. I considered a number of uses of the term "instinct." There is what is spoken of as the "parental instinct." I tried to show in my book (pp. 40, 43) that this instinct is a group, or rather a system, of instincts, that the "instinct of self-preservation" is also a name applied to a number of instincts all of which have this end of self-preservation. Finally, there are what have been more recently called "chain-instincts."* These also are systems of instincts (see *B. 11*, Ch. XIV, p. 371). Now, in considering the relation of instinct to emotion I tried to confine myself to

* See "Instinct," by Carveth Read, *Brit. Journ. Psychol.*, Vol. IV, Part 1.

single instincts, to the constituents of such groups, and to limit the unqualified employment of the term "instinct" to them. It was obviously not the group, or system, as a whole which was referred to in my statement that "an instinct has only one kind of behaviour connected with it" (p. 192), since I had pointed out the variety of behaviour involved in the "parental instinct." But, as Mr. McDougall has specially referred to these chain-instincts (pp. 30, 31), I shall now consider the bearing on his theory of one of the most complex of them. I will take his example of the solitary wasps, because these insects have been so admirably and minutely studied by M. Fabre and Mr. and Mrs. Peckham.

We may regard the whole process by which solitary wasps select the ground for their nests, make their nests, attack and kill or paralyse their prey, fly with it or drag it to their nests, draw it in, lay an egg, attach this to the dead or paralysed body of the prey which has to serve as food for the larva when it matures, and finally close up the nest so that the position of it may be concealed from other animals,—all these different kinds of instinctive behaviour, we may regard as proceeding from a single chain-instinct, because they belong together and work progressively to a single innately determined end. What is this end? It is the preservation of the species to which the animal belongs; not its own preservation. This one complicated chain-instinct is, therefore, no other than the parental instinct of these animals.

Now Mr. McDougall says, "Each of the principal instincts conditions . . . some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it" (Ch. III), and that, in the case of principal instincts, we call this excitement a primary emotion. He has never, I think, explained what he means by this term "principal," and it is susceptible of different interpretations. But here there is no ambiguity: he includes the "parental instinct" in his list of principal instincts (Ch. III) as that instinct which has Tender emotion as its affective

aspect. This he regards as "a true primary" (Ch. III). He has never appreciated the evidence which I brought forward* to show that "tender emotion" is the name of a class of very different emotions, as pity, gratitude, reverence, aspiration, tender joy and tender sorrow. Which of these is his primary emotion? He has never answered this question, and he would find it difficult to answer adequately. But let this objection pass. We will assume in his behalf that there is only one tender emotion, that this is primary, and corresponds to the excitement of the parental instinct.

How, next, can he deal with the various instincts of the solitary wasp which are included in its parental instinct? Mr. and Mrs. Peckham have attempted to distinguish these instincts. (1) Since they found that "when the young emerged from the pupa case and gnawed their way out of the mud cell" in which they were born, that these wasps were ready to sting if touched, "thrusting out the sting and moving the abdomen about in various directions"—"movements well directed"—they rightly concluded that "stinging . . . is an instinctive act" (*op. cit.*, p. 294). (2) They next remark that "the particular method of attack and capture practised by each species in securing its prey is instinctive," and they give examples of the methods practised by different species (*ibid.*). (3) "The mode of carrying their booty is a true instinct. *Pomphilus* takes hold of her spider anywhere, but always drags it over the ground, walking backwards; *Oxybelus* clasps her fly with the hind legs, while *Bembex* uses the second pair to hold hers tightly against the under side of her thorax. Each works after her own fashion, and in a way that is uniform for each species" (p. 296). Here, we may remark in passing, is an illustration of that "one kind of behaviour" which I alleged to be connected with each instinct. (4) The fourth instinct which

* Ch. "Tender Emotion," in Professor Stout's *Groundwork of Psychology*.

the Peckhams noticed concerned the choice of the food: "no fly robber ever takes spiders, nor will the ravisher of the spiders change to beetles or bugs" (p. 295). The fifth instinct concerns the care of the victim "before the hole is made": "preparing the nest before the food supply is secured"—as in *Ammophila* and others—"is certainly instinctive" (p. 296). (6) The "way in which some of these wasps act after bringing the prey to the nest" is an instinct. One "places the grasshopper at the entrance to the excavation and then enters to see that all is right before dragging it in" (*ibid.*). (7) The "general style of the nest depends upon instinct" (*ibid.*).

There are, then, at least seven instincts, if these observations are correct, included in this wonderful "chain-instinct," which is the parental instinct of the animal. It would not be difficult to find others. If stinging is an instinctive act, so is the flight of these wasps. There are also the important concealment-instincts by which different species of these animals close their nests. Thus *Ammophila* closes her nest sometimes with a piece of earth, sometimes with a piece of stone with some earth to cover it; in one case it was "so neatly covered as to be almost indistinguishable" (p. 32).

Now whether these instincts be more or less numerous, how can Mr. McDougall interpret them on his theory? They cannot be "principal" instincts, or he would have to find a primary emotion for each of them. He could not do this, and if he could it would be contrary to his theory that the parental instinct has one primary emotion—the tender emotion—as its "affective aspect." If, then, these instincts be subordinate, what "principal instincts" are there other than "the instinct of self-preservation" and this "parental instinct"; for all others are subordinate to them. In that case we should have only two primary emotions. But let this pass. These instincts we will assume are subordinate, still, have they not all their own specific emotions, for, according to him, "instinctive behaviour is always attended by some such emotional excitement"

(Ch. II)? It follows from this theory that there will be different emotions connected with these instincts: a much better conclusion than the one previously reached, but contradictory of his central theory that each of the principal instincts conditions only "one kind of emotional excitement" (Ch. III).

We have assumed hitherto that all the instincts comprised in this "principal" instinct are subordinate, yet if we look closer we find that two of them are included in his list of principal instincts. There is the instinct by which the wasp attacks its prey, and there is the instinct by which it closes its nest. The first is the combative instinct or, as he calls it, "The instinct of Pugnacity"; the second is the instinct of Concealment. The first gives rise to the primary emotion of anger and the second, to the primary emotion of fear, on his theory. For although in his book he called the second "the instinct of flight," being now more impressed by the behaviour of concealment, he defines it as an instinct that impels an animal "to seek cover and there lie hid." The excitement of this "principal instinct" is then accompanied by two other primary emotions besides tender emotion, which is contrary to his theory. Here, too, we find, as in many other cases, an instinct of concealment working independently of any instinctive flight from an object of fear.

Mr. McDougall's theory, then, whichever way we approach it, fails to interpret the facts, and involves us in contradictions.

I shall finally consider the bearing of this study of a very important chain-instinct on my own theory. Let us first, for clearness' sake, classify the instincts according to their degree of complexity. In the first class, having the highest degree of complexity, I should place the parental instincts, which, in our present case, contain the seven subordinate instincts already specified. In the second class I should place many of these subordinate instincts as, for instance, the nest-building instinct; the instinct of attack and destruction of prey; the instinct by which the wasp drags or flies with its prey to the nest; and the instinct of concealment by which the nest is finally closed.

If we examine the members of this second class, we find other subordinate instincts contained in each one of them. For instance, the combative instinct of *Ammophila* comprises not only its method of seizing its prey, but also its stinging instinct. This wasp seizes its caterpillar from above, and having firm hold of it bends its abdomen under the body of the insect and stings it in one of its segments. But this is not sufficient; other segments are also stung or the method of "malaxation" is also resorted to. Again in its nest-building instinct there are also comprised other instincts. There are its instincts of locomotion,—its instincts of flight and of walking,—both of which are required for the building of its nest. How many others should we not find if we studied this question minutely?

In the third class I should place the simplest instincts, which are often subordinated to the instincts of the second class,—as, for instance, the various instincts of locomotion; the instincts by which different species of animals seize, and those by which they destroy, their prey. Pecking at any small object by the chick, grasping things in the hand by the child, would belong to the same class. These innate dispositions which provide such simple modes of behaviour may be serviceable to the systems of a variety of emotions. It would be convenient for Mr. McDougall to say that they "are more properly regarded as mere reflexes" (p. 30), so as to escape awkward questions as to the specific emotional excitement which, according to his theory, must be connected with each of them; but changing their names will not alter their nature. He can no more bring evidence to prove that there may not be felt impulses connected with the activity of these instincts than he can prove that the "principal" instincts must always have one and the same primary emotion connected with them.

Passing from this third class of instincts to the first, it is obvious that the parental instinct is too complex to have only one primary emotion as its affective aspect. It is the innate

base of the sentiment of parental love, and as such I have treated it in my book (*B.* 2, Ch. IV, p. 2). It is included in this great system, but not in that of any emotion. I do not mean that, wherever there is an animal possessing this organised group of instincts, there must be present also the love of offspring, but that where this love is developed these instincts provide modes of behaviour which are instrumental to the care of offspring. In the second place, only those instincts can be organised in the system of an emotion that are capable of subserving its end.

In conclusion, as I cannot accept Mr. McDougall's hypothesis that each instinct has its own specific emotion, I shall now refer again to what we may more safely connect with it, namely, impulse. Let us then assume that whenever an instinct is aroused an impulse is felt toward the behaviour characteristic of this instinct. Now an impulse becomes what we call desire when it foresees its end. When the end is far off because the process that leads up to it is complex,—as in nest-building,—there may be no foresight of the end, yet there may still be foresight of one or other of the stages which often recur, as in the laying of twigs to form the nest. The impulse, then, to find a twig, to return with it, and put it into position, may conceivably become desire. Now it is worth enquiring what the emotional side of instincts would be, at most, if their impulses were always desires. When the excitement of an instinct arouses desire, there may occur, in the interval before the desired end is attained, some of the prospective emotions, as hope, anxiety, and despondency, etc. In stating, as I have done in my book, that these emotions belong to Desire, and probably only to it, I am not formulating a theory, but describing what I believe to be the facts. If, then, all the impulses of instincts were desires, and the interval sufficiently great before the desired end were attained, we should probably have one or others of the prospective emotions, and perhaps all of them, aroused with these desires. Instead

of each instinct—as in the hypothesis of Mr. McDougall—giving rise to its own specific emotion or “emotional excitement,” each would give rise to the same monotonous fact of desire, with its ever-recurring prospective emotions. But many of our instincts are connected with such a simple kind of behaviour and are so quickly accomplished, that in place of a rich emotional development there is only the momentary feeling of an impulse.

Now in this connexion, it will be instructive to turn to the Peckhams' observations. Their work, which largely consists in testing the observations of Fabre, has a peculiar interest of its own by reason of its psychological curiosity. They notice the innate tempers that distinguish these insects in their work: how some are slovenly and others thorough in their work. They seem to discern their emotions in nest-building and in the pursuit of prey. What they say gives no support to Mr. McDougall's theory of the connexion between one instinct and one emotion. Of a wasp that was closing its nest by jamming the earth in “with much energy,” they remark: “This part of her work” was “accompanied by a loud and cheerful humming” (*op. cit.*, p. 36). On another occasion after a wasp had built its nest and dragged a grasshopper into it, and laid its egg, afterwards closing up the nest, the Peckhams, during its absence, opened the nest and took away the contents. “When we returned to the garden, about half an hour after we had done the deed, we heard her loud and anxious humming from the distance. She was searching far and near for her treasure-house, returning every few minutes to the right spot, although the upturned earth had entirely changed its appearance. She seemed unable to believe her eyes” (*op. cit.*, p. 68). Now if this is not desire, and desire accompanied at first by anxiety and afterwards by disappointment at the unexpected disappearance of its nest, I do not know how to interpret it. Referring to another case where a wasp had been absent for a long time from its nest apparently in search of prey and returned empty handed, they remark: “In

the realm of wasp-life, disappointments are not uncommon" (*op. cit.*, p. 62). In another case, in which they also destroyed a nest, the wasp on returning "was much puzzled and disturbed," and hunted for it for an hour and a half, but "finally gave up in despair" (p. 37). Thus we have no suggestion that the building of the nest, the search for prey, and the return to the nest are connected with specific emotions. On the contrary, their instinctive behaviour appears to be accompanied by desire for the result to which it is directed, and according to the situation is affected now by anxiety, now by disappointment or despair, as well as probably by hope and other emotions.

We have seen that the same emotions may accompany different instincts, and different emotions the same instinct, according to its situation. We shall now return to look at the problem from the point of view adopted in my book. There I started from primary emotion, and had to consider the varieties of behaviour which in different situations are selected for the attainment of its end. Let us take the emotion of anger; it has a prominent impulse, and among human beings, this impulse, through the checks to which it is subject, very clearly becomes desire. Now it will not matter substantially what line of behaviour the angry man adopts, nor how much this behaviour is instinctive or acquired, the desire to attain his end will be affected by the same emotions of hope, anxiety, disappointment, despondency, so long as his thoughts of the situations in which he is placed vary in the same way.

We must then clearly face this conclusion. Every primary emotion as soon as its impulse becomes desire may give rise to one or other of the prospective emotions. If it is anger, it then no longer will be pure anger; it will be anger mixed with anxiety, or angry hope, or angry disappointment, or angry or "sullen" despair. Do you not think that the angry German nation as it moves so uncertainly to its goal, moves forward and backward, is not from day to day affected by a variety of prospective emotions, which, indeed, so far from being

independent, are determined by the changing prospects of this prevailing anger.

I must now conclude my reply to Mr. McDougall. I have been disappointed with his criticism, not because of his disagreement with my opinions. I thought that he would have first mastered my book and discerned what was true or useful in it, before criticising what was false or useless. But in attacking me at all points in defence of his own theory he has not noticed how, in excluding sympathy, he has lost insight. Hence the misconceptions which succeed one another through the course of his paper. Confident in his own theory, he has shown scant respect for mine, and, therefore, has dealt with it carelessly. So determined is he upon attack that he even attacks the theory of the sentiments of which he made so much use in his book. He had thought he had learnt it from me, now he finds that he "had failed to grasp" (p. 50) my conception, and the theory that he so much praised turns out to be his own. If I have developed my theory, sentiments are still, in my view, not single emotions, but systems of emotional dispositions. Mr. McDougall has fundamentally changed his conception. We have here another of those fluctuations of thought of which I have given other instances, which he does not detect in himself. He now puts forward his conception as "truer and more useful" than mine. Let us see what his conception was and what it is. In his book he accepted my theory of the sentiment as "an organised system of emotional tendencies centred about some object" (Ch. V, p. 122). "What is meant," he says, "by saying that a man loves or hates another is that he is liable to experience any one of a number of emotions and feelings on contemplating that other, the nature of the emotion depending upon the situation of that other" (*ibid.*, p. 123). In his present paper, his change of attitude is shown at the first mention of my theory when he is dealing with another topic. He says: "Even if we accept his conception of a sentiment as a system consisting of several emotional dispositions directly linked

together (a conception I have to criticise presently) . . . " (p. 42). What, then, is the new conception which he has formed? "In my view," he says, "a sentiment is essentially a system consisting of a cognitive disposition linked with an affective disposition (or with two or more such dispositions) to form a single functional whole" (p. 51). That is to say the fact of there being a system of emotional dispositions "centred about some object," which he formerly regarded as essential to the constitution of a sentiment, he now regards as accidental. He is reverting to an older conception of the sentiment without knowing it. For according to him every emotion must now be called a sentiment when the connexion between it and its stimuli has been "acquired through the individual's experience" (p. 51). A man's fear of a financial loss is not therefore an emotion but a sentiment of fear; his anger at an insult is a sentiment of anger; but the mother's love, however complex its constitution, so far as it be innately aroused at the first experience of offspring, would be, according to his new conception, an emotion, not a sentiment of love. What is the use of this?

I have only mentioned this instance to show to what lengths Mr. McDougall's opposition to my theories has now gone. But what will he gain by reverting to an older kind of criticism which we have now for long happily discarded? A forceful utterance; a confidence in enunciating opinions without evidence; a certainty of misconceptions; the pleasure of using strong language to characterise my opinions. Antagonism of this sort hinders co-operation. Science can hardly be advanced by it. The criticism that leads to progress is penetrating and just, and that must be first of all sympathetic.

III. *By* G. F. STOUT.

I find that the exact nature of the questions at issue between Mr. Shand and Mr. McDougall is obscured by their "divergent" use of a technical term of central importance—the term *Instinct*. The application of this word in Psychology or Biology must, from the nature of the case, be to a large extent arbitrary in relation to popular usage. The popular usage is loose, fluctuating, and inconsistent; it cannot, therefore, do more than suggest the main direction in which a definition is to be sought. Unfortunately, it does not even do this in an unambiguous way. It is true that, for the most part, nothing is called instinct except some kind of congenital endowment. But if we inquire what kind of original endowment is necessary and sufficient, the fluctuations of ordinary usage supply no certain guidance. There is, however, one of the popular applications of the term which is relatively definite and precise, because it is founded on a group of facts easily accessible to observation. I refer to the popular distinction between the actions of animals as determined by instinct and those of human beings as determined by reason and the lessons of experience. Here, an essentially distinctive character of instinct is taken to be the occurrence, independently of previous experience of results, of more or less ample and sustained trains of movements connected with each other and with the varying situation, so as to lead up through progressive stages to certain ends analogous to ends which, in the case of human beings, are aimed at with definite prevision by means learned in past experience. It is also recognised that such trains of movements involve psychical process of a peculiar kind, innately determined and not involving rational contrivance or the use of the past experience of results. But the nature of this psychical activity is generally regarded as a mystery. It is from this popular view that most writers on Psychology and Biology have taken their clue in attempting to give a definition of Instinct for scientific purposes,

and the fact that most writers have done so is a very strong reason why succeeding writers should follow the same course, so long as it is not shown that definitions so reached are unserviceable or embody false principles or a false view of relevant facts. Now Shand here simply follows the main line of tradition. For him the central fact from which the definition of instinct must start is the existence of trains of congenitally determined movements, directed to ends and distinctively characteristic of the various species of animals. He admits that such trains of movements are, at least in general, conditioned, as regards their inception and continuation in varying situations, by psychical processes involving intelligence, another and varied emotional excitement. He further admits that the specific nature of such processes cannot be accounted for without assuming corresponding innate predispositions. But he does not regard the intelligent process, even if we take into account its innately determined character, as constituting the differential mark of instinct. This he rather finds in the complex trains of motor behaviour. He even regards it as possible that these may be developed without the co-operation of intelligence, and even in this case he would still call them instincts.

At this point Mr. Shand appears to me to go too far, and to justify, in part, Mr. McDougall's criticism, that he obscures the distinction between instinctive behaviour and reflex action. There seems to be no definite and general criterion to mark the special train of movements distinctive of instinct, except by reference to the nature of the psychical process on which their initiation and progress depend. At any rate there is none so clear and comprehensive as this. Hence, even though he may be justified in making the existence of congenital trains of movements of a certain kind his point of departure in defining Instinct, yet he runs a grave risk of confusion unless he also refers to the kind of psychical process involved in the execution of these movements. For, apart from the

special nature of the psychical process which conditions them, it is, to say the least, very difficult to determine what special kind of movements or trains of movement is meant, and, in particular, to distinguish such movements from reflex actions following each other in connected series.

Apart from this fault, which is easily rectified, Mr. Shand's definition of what he means by Instinct seems to me quite defensible. It covers a very important group of facts having a natural unity. It is clear, definite, and consistent. It takes its point of departure in the most clearly marked application of the word to be found in common speech, and it follows the main tradition of writers of reputation on Psychology and Biology. There are, however, two criticisms used by McDougall which require to be noticed before proceeding to his own definition. He finds fault with Mr. Shand for a "crude psycho-physical dualism" which leads him to regard an instinct as "partly in the mind and partly in the body." Now, without asserting that Mr. Shand's language is always such as I would have chosen myself, I am bound to defend him against the charge of "crude dualism." There is a very important sense in which it can be truly said that the congenital dispositions entering into the constitution of an instinct are partly in the mind as well as in the body, and partly in the body only. An instinctive process involves psychical activity of an intelligent kind which is innately determined. Consequently, it involves a psychical disposition. Doubtless this psychical disposition is directly associated, either in the way of parallelism or interaction, with a neural disposition. But this neural arrangement is only part of the innate organisation required for the execution of a train of instinctive movements, as congenitally pre-determined. The rest is a purely bodily prearrangement having no direct psychical correlate. In Mr. Shand's language, it is in the body, not in the mind. When a newly hatched chick pecks at a grain of corn, the fact that its interest and attention are selectively directed to the grain is due to a psycho-

physiological disposition. But it is due to a purely physiological, not to a psycho-physiological disposition, that attention to the grain is followed by just that special co-ordination of motor processes which constitutes the act of pecking at the grain.

The second point raised by Mr. McDougall is a verbal one, and though confusion may arise if we do not come to an understanding about it, it does not, so far as I can see, involve any question of fact or principle. Mr. Shand uses the term "instinct" not only for a train of movements regarded as directed to a certain end, but also for the several movements which enter into the composition of such a train. This usage is, I think, rightly condemned by Mr. McDougall. It is, at least, inconvenient as leading to ambiguity. I should call the several movements which enter into a train of instinctive activity, instinctive movements, but I should not call them instincts.

Mr. McDougall's own definition of instinct passes over as unessential the existence of definite trains of movements congenitally determined and selects as the distinguishing mark the existence of psychical dispositions with their nervous correlates. This course has two disadvantages as compared with Mr. Shand's. The first is that it starts from a comparatively vague and ambiguous popular use of the word in which the tendency is to use it for any belief or impulse which the speaker or writer cannot account for by experience and reason. It is thus that we speak of a woman's instinct as contrasted with a man's reason, or of the trade instinct which distinguishes a good from a bad bill. The second disadvantage is that the proposed definition is not in agreement with the prevailing application in writers on Psychology and Biology. I recognise, however, that the mere fact that a writer of so much weight as Mr. McDougall has decided on a certain usage is in itself a strong reason for adopting it. I have been so far influenced by this consideration that in the new edition of my *Manual of Psychology* I have, in this matter, though with misgiving,

followed Mr. McDougall's lead. I cannot, however, even for the sake of peace and good understanding, accept, without important reservations, the special terms in which he now formulates his definition as "the innate conjunction of an affective disposition with a cognitive disposition." Here I first take exception to the term "affective." This term is, according to Mr. McDougall, purely technical, and as such is coming into common use to "cover both the feeling aspect and the conative aspect of conscious process." This statement surprises me. I should rather say that the terms "affect" and "affective" had been recently introduced for the express purpose of marking off the feeling aspect of conscious process from the conative.* The reason is obvious. The terms "affect" and "affective" imply the being passively affected as contrasted with the active tendency involved in conation. Where Mr. McDougall speaks of an affective disposition, I should rather speak of a "conative-affective disposition" or, if one word is required, of an "interest disposition" or "dispositional interest." This is, of course, a purely verbal question. It is otherwise with another difficulty which seems to me to be very important. I cannot admit that Mr. McDougall is justified in including in his initial definition the distinction between two separate dispositions—separate structural units as he calls them—a cognitive disposition and a conative-affective disposition. This would be legitimate only if it had been clearly shown that every instinctive activity includes the innately determined knowledge of something of the same nature as what is otherwise learned by experience. If, for instance, we could assume that when a young squirrel is confronted with a nut, its innate constitution is such that it knows of the existence of a kernel inside the husk, and if we could assume that every instinctive process essentially

* Thus Titchener, who denies the distinct existence of conation, and affirms that feeling only exists, expresses this view by saying that only affective states exist.

involved such innate knowledge, it would perhaps be right to make the existence of a special cognitive disposition part of the definition of instinct. But so far is this from being proved for all instincts that it seems very doubtful whether it holds good for any. In most cases, at any rate, the facts seem to be covered by assuming—(1) the power of knowing or perceiving in general, and (2) a special cognate interest whereby attention is selectively directed to certain objects rather than others. Thus Mr. McDougall ought to have confined himself to the existence of cognate psychical dispositions in general as constituting instinct, leaving it an open question whether these include special cognitive dispositions as distinct structural units separate from conative-affective dispositions. However this last question is to be answered, it still remains true that instinctive activities throughout involve cognition and are throughout concerned with perceived objects as such. Nor does Mr. Shand, on the whole, deny this, though he seems to suggest that there may be exceptional cases in which it does not hold good.

We may now turn from the question of definition to the questions of fact and principle which are at issue between Mr. Shand and Mr. McDougall. Here, my main difficulty is to formulate distinctly and to separate from each other the various points in dispute. Neither side is very clear in this respect, and each has evident difficulty in understanding the other. Mr. Shand regards Mr. McDougall as holding that the same instinct always involves the same emotion, whereas Shand himself holds that the same instinct may involve various emotions. Here I incline to Shand's side if he has rightly interpreted his opponent's view. The issue is, however, obscured by Mr. Shand's double use of the word "instinct"—(1) for the congenital basis of the total instinctive activity, (2) for the congenital disposition corresponding to the several partial modes of motor behaviour which enter into its composition. McDougall wrongly takes for granted that Shand

uses the word exclusively in the second sense, and he argues the point at issue by objecting to this usage and by insisting that instinctive activity includes the whole complex train of movements leading up to a certain end. But it is clear that even if we choose the meaning which he regards as the only right one, his position is still indefensible. In the course of the whole nest-building activity or in the case of eggs and young, various emotions occur in response to varied circumstances.

There is, however, a further question on which I cannot side so unreservedly with Shand. He apparently holds that the various emotions which occur in the course of an instinctive activity have their source in a congenitally organised system of congenital dispositions. It would seem from some passages of McDougall's paper that this is for him the vital issue. He does not really intend, it would seem, to deny that variable emotional states may and do arise in the different successive phases of the same instinctive activity. What he means to assert is rather that, in the case of each instinct, there is always one, and only one, kind of emotion which is *congenitally determined*. Other emotions emerging in the course of the instinctive activity are conditioned, as regards their nature and interconnection, not by a special instinctive endowment but by general psychological laws, *e.g.* the law that forcibly thwarted conation tends to give rise to anger.

The theory is interesting; but I do not, at present, see my way to accepting it. I ask myself in vain what single congenitally determined emotion belongs exclusively to the nest-building instinct or the pursuit and capture of prey. It seems to me that in the case of such instincts it may be very well maintained that, given persistent conation and variable circumstances, *all* the changeable modes of emotional excitement are equally referable to general psychological laws as distinct from special innate dispositions.

Again, it seems to me that Mr. McDougall is too hasty in

assuming that because an emotion only arises under certain general psychological conditions, according to a general rule, the concurrent operation of congenital disposition is excluded. This seems particularly plain in his treatment of what Mr. Shand calls the prospective emotions—confidence, hope, anxiety, despondency, and despair. For instance, he tells us that anxiety arises as the “anticipated pain of failure acquires a greater influence and displaces more and more the anticipated pain of success.” This is true, but it is by no means a complete explanation. For, if we inquire how this influence of anticipated failure becomes operative, we find that the emotion of anxiety produces anticipation of failure just as much as inversely. Sometimes, indeed, the emotion seems to come first. Further, under otherwise similar conditions, the occurrence and the intensity of the emotion depend on whether and in what degree the person concerned is of an anxious as distinct from a hopeful turn of mind. Some are congenitally hopeful, some congenitally anxious. As for McDougall’s denial that such states as hope and anxiety are emotions, I think we may set it aside. If anxiety is not an emotion, I do not know what an emotion is. Turning from Mr. McDougall to Mr. Shand, I ought to say that I think he has gone astray in ascribing to innate disposition what can be accounted for by general psychological conditions. In particular I am inclined to agree with McDougall that the interconnexion of emotional states within the course of an instinctive activity is due to such general conditions rather than to specially organised systems of congenital dispositions. At any rate, the question requires special discussion.

Besides the question whether and under what conditions different special emotions occur within the same instinctive activity, Mr. Shand and Mr. McDougall also discuss at length the question whether the same special emotion can be directly connected with different types of motor activity and also the same type of motor activity with different emotions. I

am inclined to agree with Shand as against McDougall in answering both these questions in the affirmative. The reasons pro and con are sufficiently stated in their two papers. The point chiefly urged by McDougall is that where the type of motor behaviour varies the emotion does not remain just the same. This can scarcely be denied; for emotions which are of the same general kind constantly show special variations in particular cases. But what requires to be shown is that with variation in motor behaviour there is a corresponding degree of difference in the connected emotions. I do not think that Mr. McDougall has succeeded in showing this. On the contrary, it would seem that a comparatively small and insignificant difference in emotions is possible where there is great and conspicuous difference in motor behaviour, and also inversely. The battle between the two opponents concerns not only Instinct and Emotion; it also extends to the Sentiments. McDougall charges Shand with shifting his original position so that he now gives quite a different account of the nature of a sentiment, replacing a true and tenable view by one which is false and untenable. I confess that I cannot detect this change. Mr. Shand seems to me to give the same analysis of what constitutes a sentiment as he always has done. In particular, he seems to me to hold now, as at first, that a sentiment involves a cognitive system, and is organised in relation to a cognised object which is said to be loved or hated. The only part of Mr. McDougall's criticism here with which I am disposed to agree is his protest against the assumption that the systematic interconnexion of emotions within a sentiment is due mainly to a special innate disposition rather than to general psychological laws. That is to say, if this really is Mr. Shand's view, I think him wrong. But I am not sure that his view has been correctly interpreted.

III.—NOTES ON BERKELEY'S DOCTRINE OF ESSE.

By C. LLOYD MORGAN.

I.

1. LET E be the ego, T a thing, or a group of related things, and R^c the cognitive relation. Then the primary relational formula in cognition is ER^cT . Here is a formula, charming in its apparent simplicity, briefly expressive of the extraordinarily complex subject-object relation so-called.

2. Neglect, for the present, the complexity of the terms in relatedness; neglect, too, the fluency of cognitive process: we have then to notice that, since the formula holds for all cases, every known thing, as known, is in this relation.

3. We have here the "ego-centric predicament" (Perry). Every known T implies ER^c (*cf.* notes 18, 19). Translating this into Berkeleyan phraseology, we may say that, in so far as perceived, the esse of a thing is percipi.

4. That provisionally defines the esse of T in Berkeley's treatment. What of the esse of E ? Just as the esse of T is defined in terms of percipi, so is the esse of E defined (by implication) in terms of percipere. Its "existence consists in perceiving ideas and thinking" (*Principles* (hereafter *P.*) § 139).

5. Now, Berkeley calls the thing as perceived an idea, or a collection of ideas, and speaks of it in this relation as being in mind. But the expression "in mind" is ambiguous.

6. Berkeley speaks of "my Self, that is, my own mind" (*Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous* (hereafter *D. iii*), Frazer's Edition of 1901, p. 449). If, then, in accordance with this and other like passages, we identify the mind and the ego, and if the distinguishing mark of mind in this sense is percipere,

how can the idea be in mind, since the distinguishing mark of the idea or thing is *percipi*?

7. It is clearly not in mind in this sense. It must therefore be in mind in some other sense. Let us suppose that by in mind in this other sense Berkeley means "within that which the formula ER^cT expresses." Thus, "qualities are in the mind only as they are perceived by it" (P. § 49). Of the thing, then, as idea or collection of ideas or of qualities, *esse* is predicated within the formula, and within the formula is spoken of as in mind.

8. But what, if any, is the status of *T* when it is not within the formula? Is it then non-existent? Berkeley's answer is that it is only non-existent within that formula. It is no longer, or not yet, within *my* mind. But it may be within (a) other finite minds, or (b) some supposed mind; and (c) it has continuous *esse* within the mind of God.

9. If no place can be found for *T* within any finite formula, it none the less has an enduring place in that which expresses relatedness to the all-knowing Eternal Spirit. "There is, therefore, some other Mind wherein they [ideas] exist during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them" (D. iii, p. 447).

10. Hence there is an abiding relational formula GR^cT ; and when *E* knows *T*, both *E* and *G* are simultaneously knowing *T*. The continuous *esse* of *T* is therefore dependent on GR^cT , and, in so far as continuous, is independent of ER^cT . None the less it is dependent on R^c relatedness. Its being is in being known.

11. But is the R^c relatedness in ER^cT and that in GR^cT of like nature? The former is primarily sense-perception. And when Berkeley says: "Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind" (D. ii, p. 425), it would seem that our perception and God's perception are to be regarded as of like nature.

12. Berkeley, however, also asserts that "God perceives

nothing by sense as we do"; and, again, that "His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense as ours are" (D. iii, p. 459). So far, therefore, the R^c in the formula ER^cT and that in GR^cT are not wholly of like nature.

13. In any case the essential relation for Berkeley is between spirit (E or G) and thing or idea (T). All esse falls either within the one or within the other. "There are only things perceived and things perceiving"; "besides spirits all you conceive are ideas" (D. iii, pp. 453, 472; cf. pp. 422, 479).

II.

14. We have seen (10) that ER^c does not, for Berkeley, determine the continuous existence of T. That is determined by GR^c . So far as finite percipients are concerned, therefore, the esse of thing is independent of the esse of ego.

15. None the less, the starting point of Berkeley's treatment is that, within the formula ER^cT , so far as it obtains, the then and there esse of T is determined by the ER^c . It is from this basis that he proceeds to "conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him" (D. ii, p. 425).

16. Let us, for the present, restrict our attention to the basis from which he starts—the reiterated assertion that a thing exists only, for us, in so far as it is perceived or perceivable (D. iii, p. 451).

17. But may not other modes of relatedness than that of cognition exist in the perceivable world? May not two things, T and T', be in some other relation, say, R^s ; and may not TR^sT' (e.g., the gravitative relatedness of earth and sun) have being independently of being known by us?

18. Assume that it may. Do we then escape the ego-centric predicament? Seemingly not. For every *known* case, as known, is $ER^c(TR^sT')$. Here, instead of a thing as a relatively simple term, we have, as a complex term (in brackets) things in such and such relation.

19. And every *knowable* case, as knowable, is 'ER^c(TR×T')', where 'E' stands for someone who might know if he were in R^c; meaning thereby, as Berkeley says, "that if we were placed in . . . such and such a position and distance, both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of planets" (P. § 58).

20. A crucial question of great difficulty here arises. Grant that the esse of TR×T' is independent of either ER^c or 'ER^c, is its *sic* esse none the less dependent on R^c relatedness?

21. Now whether the thing, or some relatedness of things is, apart from actual ER^c or supposed 'ER^c, just the same as it is within the field of cognitive relatedness, we cannot directly determine; for it is obviously impossible to compare the thing (or relation) as known or knowable, with the thing (or relation) as neither known nor knowable.

22. We are forced back, therefore, on general considerations. I conceive that the fundamental question is whether the nature of a term is, or is not, in some or in all cases, determined by its relation to other terms.

23. Is the nature of oxygen, and is that of hydrogen, *in water*, what they severally then and there are in virtue of their chemical relatedness? So long as we are dealing with their *ad hoc* natures—their natures in a given respect—I take it that the reply is in the affirmative.

24. It may be said, however, that the mass of oxygen and that of hydrogen are the same both in nature and amount (a) prior to, and (b) subsequent to, their entry into this or any other specific chemical combination. True; but it may be urged that the mass character of physical terms is always determined by their relatedness in this respect to other physical terms.

25. Again, it may be contended that the nature of things in a room is nowise determined by their space-relatedness therein. True, their otherwise nature is not thus determined. But is not their position? And is not position just the one and only

matter for consideration which is *ad rem* in respect of their spatial relatedness?

26. The problem is, no doubt, a difficult one. But there is, I think, much to be said for the contention that, given any mode of relatedness, the *ad hoc* nature of the terms is dependent on their then and there relation (*cf.* 184).

27. Now, in the case of the things in a room, spatial relations are always present; one cannot get rid of them. But this ubiquity does not prevent us from asserting with confidence that their otherwise nature is unaffected by their position. Their otherwise nature is dependent on their otherwise relatedness.

28. The cognitive relation is also ubiquitous so far as actual or possible knowledge is concerned. May we then say that the otherwise nature of its terms is unaffected by their entry into this mode of relatedness and is determined by their otherwise relatedness?

29. The trouble here is that this otherwise nature, and these other relations, must also be known, or must at least be dealt with as knowable. And what may be their nature save as knowable we obviously cannot know.

30. I hazard the assertion, if it be only to draw the enemy's fire, that all scientific knowledge tacitly presupposes the 'ER^c in the formula 'ER^c(TR×T'), where 'E again stands for a supposed knower.

31. No doubt both science and common sense assume that the *existence* of TR×T' is not dependent on any entry into cognitive relatedness—but, as I conceive, neither the one nor the other has much interest in affirmations or denials concerning its *nature*, save only as knowable.

32. Wherein then does such a doctrine differ from that for which Berkeley contended? In this; that such a doctrine of the knowable presupposes an 'E, whereas Berkeley's doctrine presupposes an actual continuous knower, namely, God. His doctrine is not excluded, but it is not necessarily included.

33. And further that such a doctrine postulates a real existence nowise necessarily dependent on cognition, however much or however little its nature as knowable (its *sic esse*) may be dependent on the knowledge relation; whereas Berkeley denies existence independent of existence in mind, *i.e.*, within some cognitive formula.

34. "The question between the materialists and me," he says, "is not, whether things have a *real* existence out of the mind of this or that person, but whether they have an *absolute* existence distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to *all* minds" (D. iii, p. 452).

III.

35. We started with the drastically simplified formula ER^cT; and we regarded Berkeley's expression "in mind" as, at any rate often, equivalent to "within that which this formula expresses." Let us now consider further what T stands for in this formula.

36. Primarily it stands for a thing. But what is the connexion between thing, as perceived or perceivable entity, and idea in Berkeley's treatment? Often they seem to be identical; not infrequently something more complex (*e.g.* a thing in motion) is spoken of as an idea; but I take it that, at bottom, the idea is, for Berkeley, a specific quality of the thing, either (α) actually presented to sense, or (β) re-presentative of what may be, but is not, so presented, *i.e.* "what is suggested from experience" (D. i, p. 415).

37. In this third sense of the word, a thing is a collection of the qualities which are, or may be, presented as ideas. "As several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence, having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple; other collections of

ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things" (P. § 1).

38. When, therefore, we are in perceptual relation to such a thing, part, and part only, of the collection is immediately presented to sense; this may be symbolised by P, the sensory presentation. The presentation, here so named and symbolised, involves stimulation of sensory receptors, but is, be it noted, far removed from a bare sensation, though Berkeley sometimes uses this word.

39. Presentation to sense generally includes many sensations in their given relatedness, *e.g.* an apple in the basket on the table, a stone falling to the ground. Such relatively complex presentations are, in Berkeley's wider usage of the word, called ideas.

40. But supplementary to what is immediately presented there is, in all perception, that which is "suggested from experience." Let us call this perceptual fringe, which supplements the presentation, *meaning*, and let us symbolise it by "m." Then what is in mind at the moment of perception is Pm—a presentation qualified by meaning. We may therefore in this connexion substitute for the formula ER^cT the formula ER^cPm .

41. It must be noted that *this* meaning is a re-presentative fringe of sensory derivation which qualifies the presentation, and that it may profitably be distinguished from the higher order of meaning to be spoken of as significance below (Section VI).

42. It must also be noted that, for perception, the presentation may be variously changing, *e.g.* as a ship sails out of harbour, while the suggested meaning (and significance) remains relatively constant. If, therefore, we apply the word "object" or "thing" to the Pm it changes with every change of P. Furthermore, "strictly speaking we do not see the same object (in this sense) that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye" (D. iii, p. 463).

43. Now what we commonly call the thing is much more than this so-called psychological object Pm. It may be (a) the whole collection of ideas or qualities with which 'E can be in perceptual R^c relatedness; or it may be (b) the physical object with unperceivable properties which are correlated with the perceivable qualities under (a); or, I suppose not infrequently with most of us, it may be some hybrid, begotten of (a) and (b), with a touch of throwback to the psychological object Pm.

44. In the passage above quoted (37) from Berkeley, the thing, I take it, is that just characterised under (a). It is not only the actually perceived Pm but is the whole perceivable "collection of ideas" comprising all that is presentable to a supposed 'E.

45. Let us henceforth use the word "thing" in this sense (a) and distinguish it, as perceivable, from the physical object (b). On this understanding we shall not use the word "thing" for a spirit (*res cogitans*) as Berkeley does (P. §§ 39, 89). It will be more convenient to speak of the ego as a percipient entity, than as a percipient thing. The thing will thus be always a perceivable entity.

46. Now in Berkeley's doctrine any given presentation P is actually part of the perceivable thing. It is that quality, or related group of qualities, with which some E is in the direct R^c relation of sensory acquaintance.

47. Neither the presentation, nor the total complex of presentable qualities, is a *tertium quid* or intermediary, related on the one hand to the ego and on the other hand to the thing. The thing is its perceivable qualities (D. i, p. 384). None the less, things are, for Berkeley, in some manner, intermediaries, susceptible of relatedness on the one hand to some E, and on the other hand continuously related to God.

48. Men of science, within their province, substitute for God the physical order of nature; and they, too, I think, generally regard the presentation as, in some sense, intermediary between the observer and physical reality. We have, they say,

the physical object as reality—though some would add, as a qualification, hypothetical reality—and we have the perceived qualities as appearances.

49. The ego is on this view perceptually related to the appearances, and they in turn are related to, or correlated with, the physical object. The problem thus raised is a difficult and subtle one. It must suffice here provisionally to accept the view that one and the same entity is knowable in different ways; as thing perceptually and as physical object conceptually. But the physical object as such is beyond the reach of perception.

50. Reverting now to the perceptual Pm, both P and "m," as analytically distinguished within the synthetic whole, are in mind as related to the ego within the psychological formula for perceptual cognition.

51. But we are wont to regard the suggested meaning as in mind in a rather more intimate sense. We say that the perceivable thing supplies the presentation but does not supply, then and there, the meaning. That, we commonly say, is supplied by the mind. Do we here mean supplied by the ego? (*Cf.* note 103 ff.)

IV.

52. Locke had distinguished between real and fantastical or chimerical ideas. But of the former some—those which answer to the primary qualities—are "exact resemblances of something in the things themselves"; while others—the secondary qualities—are only "constant effects" (*Essay*, Bk. ii, Ch. 30).

53. Berkeley regarded all qualities as constant effects, not indeed of the things themselves, but of the causal influence of the Eternal Spirit; and his position with regard to the primary and secondary divisions is that they stand on an equal footing. Of both alike the *esse* is *percipi*. In neither case can the ER^c (or 'ER^c) be rubbed off the slate.

54. A few notes may be made (1) on sundry modifications of

our formula to express some conditions of perception, (2) on the so-called subjective nature of secondary qualities, and (3) on the relation of secondary qualities to properties of the physical object.

55. There can be no doubt that, when we look out on a distant landscape, the colour no less than the shade of yonder hill seems to belong to the hill. But with changing illumination, and changing atmospheric conditions, the colour of the hill changes. There is a series of successive presentations. (*cf.* note 42).

56. As I understand him, Dr. Nunn would say that the hill "owns" all these colours just as the fire in one's grate owns "an indefinite number of hotnesses disposed spatially about it" (*Proc. Arist. Soc.*, N.S., X, p. 205).

57. I should prefer to put the matter thus: If T stands for the perceivable thing and T' summarises the complex of relevant terms in relation (including spatial relatedness) intervening between T and the sensory receptors, then any given $TR \times T'$ "owns" just one colour or one hotness and never more than one.

58. If we say that a thing "owns" all its perceivable hotnesses or shapes, none the less any one of them, like any one perceivable colour, is unequivocally determined when the T' conditions are taken into consideration. This, of course, applies to the case of the oar (D. iii, p. 456) that appears bent in water. Not only the visible bentness, but the exact amount thereof, is determined by the then and there $R \times T'$.

59. There is no doubt often a strong perceptual tendency, where $ER^c(TR \times T')$ obtains, to refer all that occurs in virtue of the presence of $R \times T'$ to the major term T. Thus we say that the oar itself looks bent. To discuss how this relationship of reference comes about psychologically would involve the whole problem of perception, especially in connexion with place reference.

60. This is beyond our present scope. However it may be

explained, unquestionably where the thing is, there too, for perception, is its shape and there too is its colour.

61. It will, however, be urged that no one denies that in naïve perception the colour appears to be out there in the thing; the point is, that it is not really out there, but in the retina or the cortex of the brain. This, of course, it will be added, does not mean that the retina or the cortex is itself coloured; it means that in the retino-cerebral system arise those conditions under which it appears to be coloured.

62. If so, then these conditions must be introduced into our formula. Revert to the landscape illustration. When we say that we see the distant mountain as delicately blue tinted, that with which we are actually in cognitive relation is not only the hill T , but the complex $TR \times T'$, where T' stands for the contributory conditions external to the organism.

63. Extend this interpretation a stage further. Introduce also as T'' the physiological conditions, also unquestionably present in colour vision; then the total complex with which E is in the cognitive relation of direct perceptual acquaintance, is $(TR \times T)$ as conditioned by $R \times T''$.

64. The suggestion here is that the objective term is very complex, and that the least we can introduce, if the formula is not to be hopelessly inadequate, is $ER^c[(TR \times T')R \times T'']$. It must not, however, be supposed that, within the perceptual situation, the $R \times T''$ is cognised as a set of physiological conditions. To these we are in cognitive relation, if at all, in highly conceptual fashion. For perception the coloured thing is just coloured thuswise, and there's an end on't.

65. But in so far as the $R \times T''$ conditions are, for interpretation, physiological, they are sometimes said to be subjective in one sense of that ambiguous word. Are they subjective, however, in the sense of being *in* the ego as the E of our formula? It must suffice here to say that I assume that they are *in relation to* the ego, as qualifications of T to which are referred all

the modifications due to subsidiary terms in relevant relation to it.

66. For perception it is the planet Mars that is red, notwithstanding that the locus of the $R \times T''$ conditions is within the organism. If it be asked whether Mars was red before organisms had been evolved, I take it that our reply should be that, even then, Mars was *knowable* as red, though, some of the conditions being absent, it could not then be *known* as red.

67. I conceive that if we assert that sapphires were blue at a time before cognitive relatedness had been fully evolved, what we mean is that they would have then appeared as blue things if some 'E had been there to observe them under conditions of normal embodiment.

68. In other words, the doctrine of knowable existence (which, I take it, is the doctrine of science and common sense) is subject always to a supposal of that which the fully constituted cognitive formula seeks to express. But incidentally it may be asked: If Mars is red to the knowledge of the Eternal Spirit, is there, in a formula expressive of that knowledge, anything analogous to the $R \times T''$ of the human formula?

69. Now, a physicist may urge that what is really present in the physical object is not colour but what he describes in terms of vibrations, distribution of electromagnetic waves, and so forth.

70. Here, within his province, he is assuredly right. He must deal with physical relatedness in physical fashion. If it is his business to trace the relation between electromagnetic waves starting forth from out there and electromagnetic or other physical changes in, say, "resonators" in the retina or in the cortex of the occipital lobe, by all means let him stick to his business.

71. But we must remember that he is dealing with the electromagnetic or other such relatedness of physical objects, for scientific thought, and not with the immediate cognitive relatedness in which a coloured thing is a perceivable term.

72. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that the thing is that with which we have direct perceptual acquaintance, whereas the physical object is that of which we have conceptual knowledge, though no doubt the one is, for scientific interpretation, correlated with the other. It only serves to confuse the issue if we persist in speaking of physical properties as if they were primary qualities.

73. As I here use the words, a quality is perceivable; it is susceptible of sensory presentation. But the electromagnetic properties of physical objects are unperceivable, no matter how closely they may be correlated with perceivable qualities.

V.

74. We have noted that the thing is, for Berkeley, a collection of ideas, that these ideas are perceivable, and that their *esse* is *percipi*. But what of the *esse* of substance? It is clearly not *percipi*. If that were so we should have an idea of "matter," which Berkeley roundly denies. Since, then, we are limited to the alternative, either ideas or spirits (13), and since substance is excluded from the category of ideas, "it is evident that there is not any other substance than spirit or that which perceives" (P. § 7). Otherwise stated, ideas or qualities "which subsist not by themselves are supported by, or exist in, minds or spiritual substances" (P. § 89, *cf.* § 91).

75. Take, now, that thing or collection of ideas which we call a quartz crystal. Grant that its perceivable qualities, as attributes, are supported by substance. In what sense do these qualities "exist in minds or spiritual substances"? Do they exist (*a*) in the ego or (*b*) in that with which the ego is in cognitive relation? Surely, even for Berkeley, the substance, like the qualities, is in mind in the latter sense (*b*) of this ambiguous expression.

76. In so far as we have knowledge of the substance of quartz, we are in some sort of cognitive relation to that of which we have this knowledge. But what is this substance to

which we are in thought-relation, if not in the relation of sensory acquaintance? What is it for science which carries on the tradition of that "material substance" against which Berkeley's arguments were directed?

77. A difficult question this, which I cannot here discuss. From the answers which may be given I select that which will, I think, best keep us in touch with Berkeley.

78. If we regard (as Berkeley, in the *Siris*, permits us to regard) substance as the order of relatedness which gives unity to a group of terms, or of parts within a whole; then, as relational, it will be that which, in his (afterthought) terminology, is termed a notion and not an idea.

79. It may be noted, however, that Berkeley's attitude towards relations is somewhat uncertain. According to P. §§ 27, 89, and 142, we have notions not ideas of relation. But he speaks of "motion being only an idea" (P. § 58, cf. §§ 7, 50, 102). Motion, however, involves change of relation in space and time. Hence "the idea I have of motion doth necessarily include relation" (P. § 112). The idea therefore includes a notion!

80. All relations, however, are also spoken of as "including an act of the mind" (P. § 142). The word "notion," indeed, primarily signifies such acts. Order of relatedness must therefore, so far, be in that which perceives. Hence it would seem that the esse of substance must be one with the esse of percipere.

81. Again we must ask: In what sense is the ordered relatedness in, let us say, the orbital motions of the planets attributable in esse to percipere? No doubt to observe them or to explain them includes an act of the mind. But, even for Berkeley, such acts of the human mind do not give them the esse of continuous being. *That*, during the intervals between the terms of human perception, is dependent on their being, at all times and everywhere throughout the solar system, perceived by God.

82. Broadly considered, the essence of Berkeley's immaterialism lay in his contention that all relational order is, in its true being, spiritual in esse. Just as the modern man of science may believe that there is but one substance—the order of nature—which is the ground of all world-happenings; so Berkeley, after his manner, taught that there is but one substance—the Eternal Spirit—who is the Source of all phenomena.

83. In the case of God and the world, then, is substance restricted to spirit as All-knowing, or does it extend also to the world as all-known? Here, again, we have the ambiguity of "in mind." Berkeley seems to read it both ways, now the one and now the other, according to the exigencies of his argument.

84. One more question. "If we suppose that one and the same Mind is the Universal Principle of order and harmony throughout the world, containing and connecting all its parts" (*Siris*, § 287), we must ask whether this order and harmony throughout the world *has being through being known* by God.

85. In many passages Berkeley's reply to this question is in the affirmative. In other passages, however, this cognitive doctrine of esse is, as we shall see, supplemented by a causative doctrine (*cf.* 137).

VI.

86. Berkeley realises the distinction between relatively perceptual cognition and that higher order of knowledge which involves conceptual terms. Contrast, for example, his statement that a sound presented to hearing suggests "from experience" a coach (D. i, p. 415), with his reference to "the principles and theorems of science" which "are universal intellectual notions" (D. i, p. 382, *cf.* p. 461).

87. Let us here briefly consider how this distinction may be introduced into such formulæ as I have tentatively put forward as a scaffolding for our thought, in the hope that they may aid us in interpreting the problems with which Berkeley deals.

88. In our Third Section attention was restricted to cognitive relatedness of the perceptual order. "Meaning" was there low-level meaning characterised by unexplained expectation derived from previous perceptual experience, and normally closely related to practical behaviour. Thus a child throws sticks into the water and expects them to float. There may be little more than low-level meaning in this case.

89. But so soon as the child has in mind something answering to the proposition "that light things float," he is beginning to cognise particular cases in their relation to a general rule. The ways of things are coming to be in some measure grasped as a step towards the interpretation of nature on a systematic scheme; and, of course, also as a step towards more effective behaviour in their midst.

90. I propose to use the word "significance" for this higher level of meaning where the particular is related to the general (in some sense of these words), and to symbolise it by "s." There is, however, no hard and fast line of division between meaning and significance.

91. When a child, under guidance, comes in some measure to understand why a dry needle, though made of steel which is heavier than water, can none the less rest on the surface without sinking, he has so far enlarged his scheme in terms of which natural happenings may be interpreted, and a fact of observation has acquired for him a significance which before was absent.

92. A boy or girl who sees a bee extracting the nectar from a sage-blossom, and grasps that this is a case of fertilisation effected by insects, has a presentation not only perceptually qualified by meaning, but also conceptually qualified by significance for his system of natural knowledge. We may symbolise by Pms.

93. It is questionable whether for us, after infancy, any presentations fail to carry with them some fringe of significance. At any rate, in so far as the mental attitude is in any measure

thoughtful and interpretative, we have not only P, and not only Pm, but always Pms.

94. We must now, assuming the terms in relation to be susceptible of explicit differentiation, note (1) that a presented fact which carries such significance is in relation to some term (often very complex) within the sphere of our thought—I shall call this a supposal; (2) that, since our thought is primarily derived from and applicable to the order of nature, something within that order answers to the significant term—I shall call this a truth; and (3) that when there is a supposal in mind it has the relation of reference, more or less valid, to some truth in the order of nature to be interpreted.

95. In the sense in which I here use the word, scientific laws refer to truths in the structure of the knowable world, which have being quite independently of our supposals. Such truth-structure is the complex relational order which connects and gives unity to presented facts. In this sense of the word, then, knowable truth is every whit as much part of the knowable order of nature as perceivable fact as presented to sensory acquaintance.

96. But the supposals themselves have a relational order which may well be regarded as *their* truth-structure—that which gives unity and coherence to a supposal or system of supposals. Thus a purely imaginary supposal, such as that elaborated in a good novel, has consistency of truth-structure.

97. When we say, however, that the novel is true to nature we introduce the relation of reference. And when we say that scientific supposals or hypotheses are true, we assert that the truth-structure of the supposal corresponds to the truth-structure of that order of nature from which the supposal is derived and to which it is applicable. It is in this last sense of the word and, I think, in that sense only (where a relation of reference obtains), that truth is antithetical to error.

98. In scientific interpretation a somewhat elaborate supposal takes the form of a so-called ideal construction. Let me

illustrate as briefly as possible. An embryologist will confidently and successfully predict exactly what will be seen if you open a hen's egg, say at the end of the fourth hour of the third day of incubation.

99. Why so ? Because he has, after long and careful study, a panoramic "mental picture" of all the sequence of happenings in the embryo. The images and truth connexions within his ideal construction have reference to the facts and truths of egg development. The accuracy of his prediction is a test of true correspondence of the one to the other.

100. Of course, the whole panorama of egg-development is not in mind at once any more than the whole Berkeleyan idea of an apple is in mind at once. In both cases numberless details of the actual are absent. At best there is in mind only an outline sketch of salient features. And this sketch is in the one case *perceivable* and in the other case *conceivable*. Only some relevant part forms either the perceptual supplement, as meaning, or the conceptual supplement, as significance, at any given moment.

101. Of course, too, the development of the egg *as knowable* forms no part of the supposal or ideal construction as such. Eggs developed quite effectually long before there were any supposals having reference to that development, and they continue to do so independently of any actual cognitive process.

102. One more point may be noted. When the egg is opened and the embryo is seen, there is a sensory presentation supplemented by meaning and significance ; there is Pms. But just before the egg is opened the observer may have an image of the embryo that will be seen. That image, supplemented by meaning and significance, is in mind in cognitive relation to the ego. Hence what is thus "in mind" is Ims.

103. Now, we have already seen (51) that even low-level meaning is commonly said to be "in mind" in a somewhat more intimate manner than the sense-data immediately presented. I take it that it may be claimed that significance in

relation to a supposal is "in mind" in a yet more intimate way. It is not infrequently asserted that nature supplies the bare facts while the mind supplies the truths. That, it would seem, was Berkeley's view. But the human mind nowise supplies the truths in the first sense of the word "truth" which was emphasised above (94).

104. None the less, a supposal may be said to be in mind in a peculiarly intimate sense as a private possession, won by the intellectual sweat of one's brow; whereas the knowable events to which the supposal has reference are, so to speak, public property and owned by the world of nature for mankind to know in due season.

105. If I am considering the geometrical properties of some plane figure, that consideration is proximately based on such *ad hoc* ideal construction as I have built up—meagre, no doubt, but my own for what it is worth. But it is none the less ultimately based on that from which my ideal construction has been derived, the knowable universe of geometry.

106. But if the scheme thus reduces to an ideal construction on the one hand, related to some knowable universe on the other hand, and if the ideal construction is so intimately in mind that some are disposed to say that, in this connexion, it is the mind, why not, it may be urged, carry this interpretation a stage further? Why not frankly identify with the ego what is thus with special intimacy in mind?

107. I cannot here follow up this suggestion. For the present I am content to note that the ideal construction is something in relation to the ego, something minded, implying an ego as *mind^{ing}*. It should, therefore, it would seem, retain its place on the objective side of our formula.

108. Let us, then, symbolise it by S, as a supposal, and let us symbolise the world-process to which it refers by W. Then it would seem that our cognitive formula will be $ER^c(SR^rW)$, where R^r stands for the distinctively psychological relation of reference.

VII.

109. In the *Introduction* to the *Principles*, Berkeley is chiefly concerned to disprove the existence of general and abstract ideas. The question he raises may be subdivided into two questions: (*a*) Is there something in mind which is in some sense general or abstract in its signification? (*b*) Is that something an idea.

110. Take (*b*) first. What is an idea in this connexion? It is, for Berkeley, either a more or less complex presentation to sense, or an image as re-presented. As such, therefore, it is in either case inevitably, by definition, particular.

111. No one has ever seen man in the abstract, or dog in general, or just motion; nor can he conceive (as Berkeley often uses the word), that is to say, frame an image of any of these. He sees, or he images, this negro, or that spaniel, or something in specific rectilinear or curvilinear motion, swift or slow.

112. If this be so, then clearly an abstract idea is a contradiction in terms. We can form no abstract or general idea of triangle, since any given triangle, as idea, is a *this*, or a *that* existing in mind just *thus*—say, a scalenon drawn on paper.

113. So much, in brief, for Berkeley's answer to the second part of the subdivided question. If we accept his definition of idea we must concur in what he here urges.

114. In reply to the first part of the question: Is there something in mind which has universal significance? Berkeley lays stress on the presence of a name. In so far as the name triangle is indifferently applicable, within its appropriate range, it has reference, he says, to any one of many particular ideas. Hence, as Hume put it, interpreting Berkeley with emphatic approval, "all general ideas are nothing but particular ones annexed to a certain term which gives them a more extensive signification" (*Treatise*, Part I, § 7).

115. But this more extensive signification must be "in mind"; and something of the nature of a definition must be

"in mind," as Berkeley admits. "It is one thing," he says, "for to keep a name constantly to one *definition*, and another to make it stand everywhere for the same *idea*; the one is necessary, the other useless and impracticable" (*Int.* § 18).

116. It stands indifferently, he urges, for any one of many like ideas or like things. Furthermore, not only a name, but any given idea or thing may serve to signify other like ideas. Thus a particular inch-long line becomes "*with regard to its signification*" general by being made the sign which "represents all particular lines whatsoever" (*Int.* § 12).

117. Elsewhere (§ 16) he urges that, having demonstrated that the three angles of an isosceles rectangular triangle are equal to two right angles, one may be certain that the demonstration extends to all other rectilinear triangles of what sort or bigness soever—that is, to all like figures which conform to the definition of a plane triangle.

118. Now, the likeness of all these triangles must be somehow in mind, and the judgment "that the three angles, etc.," must be somehow in mind. Of both esse can in some sense be predicted. But it is not the esse of percipi; hence, in view of the alternative above noted (13), it must be grounded in the esse of percipere.

119. For Berkeley, similarity or diversity of ideas is not itself an idea; as a relation it falls (in his afterthought terminology, but not in that of the *Introduction*) under the head of notions. And as a relation it includes an act of the mind (P. § 142).

120. But the mind as acting is the ego. Hence, similarity of ideas is in the ego as understanding. "To discern the agreements and disagreements there are between ideas . . . there is nothing more requisite than an attention to what passes in my own understanding" (*Int.* § 22).

121. Many passages in Berkeley point to his belief that the esse of all relations is one with the esse of percipere. That is why "spirits, relations, and acts" are grouped together, and of

them it is asserted that "we cannot so properly be said to have an idea but rather a notion" (P. §§ 27, 89, 142).

122. At any rate, Berkeley seems to be feeling his way in the *Principles* towards the position, to be more fully developed by the heirs to his thought, that all relationing is the work of spiritual activity.

123. Revert now to the expressions Pms and Ims (92, 102). The P or the I stands indifferently for any presentation or image to which the expression is applicable—that is, let us say, for any given triangle; while the "s" stands for significant similarity in the mind of him who asserts "that these triangles are similar."

124. But how come we to make such an assertion? How come we to have significant similarity in mind? Is there no similarity in the triangles presented? Berkeley distinctly teaches that our real ideas (presentations) as contrasted with our chimerical ideas (images) are not of our making. They are produced in us by God (P. § 29).

125. Does he here teach that the similarity of these real ideas *is* of our making? It would seem so, if to discern it we have only to perceive what passes in our own understanding. Or should we take Berkeley's broader doctrine to be that God is the source not only of particular triangles, as presented facts, but also of the truths expressed in such propositions as "that these triangles are similar" or "that the interior angles are etc."?

126. If so, though we cannot know truths as particular ideas, we can know them as universals having esse independently of *our* minds—to wit, in the mind of God whose infinite knowledge is their source.

127. But whatever be the source of the knowable world, universal truths seem to be every whit as much part of its knowable structure as are particular facts. We seem to come back, then, to the formula given at the end of the last section (108). We have in mind a supposal which has reference to a

world which, whatever may be its source, has a structure of perceivable facts and conceptually knowable truths.

128. Let us now consider a little further the rôle played by the name, which according to Berkeley "becomes general by being made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to the mind" (*Int.* § 11).

129. In its own nature, he tells us, the name is in itself particular, but in relation to the particular ideas signified or represented by it, it is *rendered universal* (§ 15). "In its own nature," then, as particular, it may be substituted for P or I in our expressions Pms or Ims, which thus become Vms, where V is the name, or the verbal description of P or I.

130. The mere substitution of V for P or I does not, however, seem adequately to express the peculiar alliance between language and significance; nor would the substitution of a name, as such, for "s" do so. In what way, then, shall we express it?

131. Now Berkeley asks "how we can know any proposition to be true of all particular triangles" (§ 16). He here slides from the name "triangle" to a proposition "that so and so holds good for all triangles," just as he habitually slides from perceptual acquaintance with facts to conceptual knowledge of truths.

132. The clue to our answer to the above question (130) seems, then, to be that significance in a supposal is expressed or expressible in a proposition. It is to the ego as judging, or affirming or supposing, not as just perceiving, that the significant proposition is in relation.

133. Substituting, therefore, "pr" for "s" we have the expression Vmpr, which is the language analogue of Pms or Ims. How close is their connexion is shown by the oft-repeated question: Can we think without words?

134. It only remains to note that propositions may refer to orders (such as those of metageometry) which only may be, and

perhaps are not, existent as part of the relational structure of the knowable order of nature.

135. How far these have being independently of some consistent scheme of supposals is a difficult question, which cannot here be discussed. In any case, even if they have being only as supposals, they are knowable orders to which the ego is in relation—public orders so to speak (*cf.* 104)—the truth-structure of which may be discussed and criticised. And they may imply supposed facts such as would be observed by a percipient who dwelt within the supposed order (*e.g.* in “flatland”).

136. Berkeley, with his strong practical bias, has not much appreciation of their value. They “set a price,” he would say, “on the most trifling speculations which in practice are of no use, but serve only for amusement” (P. § 120).

VIII.

137. We have now to note that Berkeley's doctrine of *esse*, as dependent on the cognitive relation, is supplemented by a further doctrine—that of causal dependence. Ideas, whose *esse* is *percipi*, are as such wholly inert. “There is nothing of power or agency included in them” (P. § 26). All change is caused by spirit.

138. For (1) we perceive a continual succession of ideas; (2) there is, therefore, some cause thereof; but (3) this cannot be an inert quality or idea or any combination of them; (4) hence it must be a substance as active; but (5) it has been shown that there is no material substance; it remains, therefore (6) that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit (P. § 27).

139. We have, therefore, a further definition of the *esse* of spirit (founded on the basal assumption in 2), namely, *esse est causare*; and, by implication, a further definition of existence in the changing world of facts as ideas; its *esse est causari*—if this quasi-scholastic Latin be allowed to pass.

140. All motion, for example, is regarded as an effect which

presupposes a cause; and since all causation is, *ex hypothesi*, spiritual, the cause is spirit, either Ego or God. And cause is identified with substance. Thus the *esse* of ideas is clearly not only *percipi* but also *causari*.

141. But our ideas fall into two classes—real and chimerical. In the case of chimerical ideas (images) we not only perceive them, we produce them. "There are spiritual substances, minds, or human souls which will or excite ideas in themselves at pleasure" (P. § 36). In the case of real ideas (things and events) there is not a like dependence on the human will; "there is, therefore, some other Will or Spirit that produces them" (§ 29).

142. My chimerical ideas are said, then, to be dependent on my will. But how? They are "formed by memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing, those originally perceived," *i.e.*, "actually imprinted on the senses" (P. § 1). On the other hand, my real ideas are not thus dependent on my will. In relation to me their *esse* is *percipi*; only in relation to God is their *esse causari*.

143. Hence God's production of things and events, as ideas, is not of like derivative nature to my production of chimerical ideas. We must therefore seek for some further enlightenment on the manner of their production by the Eternal Spirit.

144. Here Berkeley is apt to slip back into the doctrine of *esse* through cognition. He says, for example, "all objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind" (D. iii, p. 472). This introduces the notion of eternal existence, apparently one with *percipi*, but, as such, in some way independent of *causari*.

145. Berkeley's account of creation runs thus:—"When things before imperceptible to creatures are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with regard to created minds" (D. iii, p. 472).

146. Here we have (a) the prior existence of things, (b) having eternal existence in the mind of God, (c) the exist-

ence of created minds, and (*d*) the creation of the world "in the Mosaic account" as the rendering of pre-existing things perceivable to created minds.

147. Apart from any difficulty there may be in bringing this into accord with the Biblical narrative, the relations of the esse of eternal existence, to the esse of percipi, and to the esse of causari, are somewhat puzzling.

148. In any case we are referred back to the primal existence of "things before imperceivable to creatures." What things? Apples, stones, trees, and the like sensible things? Surely not; these are what God rendered perceptible at the Creation. It would seem rather that "their archetypes can exist only in some other mind" (P. § 99).

149. Creation, then, "in the Mosaic account" is the translation of these archetypes into ectypes. How this is effected by the causal agency of spirit Berkeley does not render clear. The essence of his doctrine, however, is that all knowing and, by implication, all that is known, all causing, and all that is caused, is essentially spiritual in substance.

IX.

150. Berkeley claims that his doctrine of spiritual causation leaves the procedure of science, in its own field, wholly unaffected. Science deals with nature, that is, with "the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds according to fixed and general laws" (P. § 150).

151. But "the connexion of ideas [thus disclosed] does not imply the relation of cause and effect, but only of a mark or sign with the thing signified" (P. § 65). Thus, whilst the "motions and various phenomena strike our senses, the Hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable (P. § 151; *cf.* Hume, *Enquiry*, Part I, Sect. VII, par. 8). We should therefore, Berkeley urges, pass from science to "nobler views," and turn from the book of nature to its Author (P. § 109). In Him we find the true Cause.

152. *This* category of cause (that of Source) is beyond the purview of science, according to Berkeley's distinction, since science deals only with effects and asks no questions with regard to the agency, spiritual or other, which produces them.

153. Let us then so far follow Berkeley as to regard scientific interpretation as wholly independent of any doctrine of Source; and to that interpretation let us direct our attention.

154. When TR^xT' is a known or knowable complex, this complex may either (a) remain unchanged, or (b) undergo change. If R^x be spatial relatedness *per se*, considered in abstraction, no change takes place in virtue of the terms being reciprocally in space-relation *only*. Similarly, when change does take place, if R^x be time-relatedness *per se*, that change does not occur in virtue of terms being in time-relation only—unless we choose to hypostatise Time as an agency (source of change); but to do this is not in accordance with scientific method as here understood.

155. If, however, there be, *e.g.*, gravitative relatedness *also*, change takes place in virtue of that relatedness, unless it be counteracted in virtue of some other coincident relatedness. Let us say that it either takes place, or tends to do so. We may call such modes of relatedness *effective*. The rather ambiguous phrase "in virtue of" must here be taken to signify that, given such and such a mode of relatedness, such and such change within the complex occurs or tends to occur.

156. It seems, therefore, that according to the nature of the terms and of their effective or non-effective relatedness, change does or does not occur or tend to occur. That is to say, as a matter of interpretation based on observation, when certain kinds of relatedness obtain, certain changes may be anticipated.

157. We do not seek in science to know what produces the change or what is its source. It suffices (a) to know that change does occur under assignable conditions, when TR^xT' is

of a specific character; (b) to ascertain the nature of the change; and (c) to learn its amount for given values of T , R^x , and T' respectively.

158. Of course, in one sense of the word, science does seek to know what produces a given change—in the sense in which we say that a spark “produces” an explosion of gunpowder, or is “the cause of” the explosion, or is what “makes” the gunpowder explode.

159. What we have here is a further relatedness to be dealt with by science. The so-called “releasing cause” is a condition under which the situation is changed from that of the existence of an explosive to that of the occurrence of an explosion. The scientific account of this “production” has nothing whatever to do with any spiritual or other agency which is the source of the observed change.

160. Proceed now to deal with $ER^c (TR^xT')$, and assume that change occurs within TR^xT' . Then E is in cognitive relatedness to a changing situation. But what is the E term here? At present one must be content to reply that, whatever else it may be in other relations, it is in this connexion a percipient entity which is characterised by just this R^c relatedness to things and events.

161. As cognitive only, in abstraction (*cf.* spatial only in 154), no change occurs in virtue of this R^c relatedness. There is awareness of the situation TR^xT' , but this mere awareness-relation, as such, is non-effective.

162. There may be, however, concurrently a bionomical relatedness of organism to environment which may be formulated as $OR^b (TR^xT')$. If so, it is the business of science to evaluate the terms and to determine the nature of this relatedness, and, as I conceive, to do so wholly without reference to source.

163. Now for scientific treatment such a bionomic situation seems to involve an effective mode of relatedness, in so far as change occurs within the complex in virtue of that relatedness. In very simple cases the change may be merely that

seen in attraction or repulsion (*cf.* tropisms). But in the course of biological evolution, as the terms and their modes of relatedness become more complex, the changes are subtly differentiated and integrated in ways which we cannot stay to consider.

164. The essential point for us here is that, in our own case, we are aware of the changes which thus occur; we are in cognitive relation to our own bodily behaviour as implicated in the complex situation. Our own body is often a term, T'' , in a more complex formula $ER^c [T''R^x (TR^xT')]$.

165. The question therefore arises: Are we to regard the ego as merely percipient of changes which occur in virtue of this bionomic relatedness as such, or are we (without invoking source which is not a scientific concept) to regard the ego as itself in effective relatedness to situations?

166. If we accept the former alternative, we are merely spectators aware of happenings which occur in virtue of other modes of relatedness than that which is psychical; if we accept the latter, we must admit that psychical relatedness is not only cognitive but also effective. Change occurs in virtue of its presence. There is not only attraction or repulsion otherwise determined, but appetite and aversion, involving feeling tone, which, *qua* psychical, is contributory to a relatedness that is not only affective but effective.

167. Of these two alternative supposals, the latter seems best to accord with the data afforded by observation and introspection, and to give the more consistent scheme of interpretation. We will assume then that the E term, in psychical relation to the whole situation, is not only in cognitive but also in some effective relation thereto.

168. This, be it noted, is in flat contradiction to the alternative doctrine of epiphenomenalism. The supposal here is that psychical relatedness as such really counts—is really effective, and that certain changes occur when it is present in virtue of its presence. For scientific treatment, however,

we do not seek to know what is its source. That, in strict adherence to Berkeley's method, is here ruled out of court.

169. It suffices to know that this or that change does occur when the psychical relation of the ego to the total situation is of a specific character, and to investigate, as fully as possible, the nature and amount of the change in accordance with the nature of the terms and of their cognitive and effective relatedness. The whole business is determinate, as grounded in the constitution of the total complex, but it is not, for science, determined by anything external to that complex.

170. So far we have an interpretation which is applicable to the perceptual level of psychical development. When we reach the conceptual level—certainly then, if not earlier—we have true conation as effective, always, that is to say, involving something of the nature of an end, as such, in view, however indefinite.

171. Thus we come back to the formula given above (108), $ER^c(SR^rW)$. But in so far as SR^rW is itself cognised as alterable, we have added complication through the introduction of a further supposal. We have $ER^c[S^rR^r(SR^rW)]$. Under this further supposal, backed by the conative relation, (*a*) in what we may broadly regard as theory, the *S* is modified so as to bring it into accord with *W*; and (*b*) in what we may broadly regard as practice, the *W* is modified so as to bring it into accord with *S*.

172. The appetence which characterises psychical relatedness in the perceptual situation now rises to the level of desire, in the absence of which the psychical relation, as cognitive only, would be non-effective. The ego, too, becomes not only a pericipient and concipient entity, but an entity which is conative in virtue of the high level of effective relatedness which obtains. Is what we, as human folk, understand by the ego ever less than this?

173. I venture to suggest, however, that the cardinal principle of interpretation in this, as in all cases, is, for scientific interpretation, the same. Given certain complex terms in

complex relatedness, change of a specific character takes place in accordance with the nature of the terms and of their then and there relatedness. Terms, relations, change; these are the data. If they can be evaluated, the problem is solved for scientific interpretation.

174. Conation must, I think, be treated *in science* on some such lines as those thus briefly sketched, though my formulation is, no doubt, tentative and inadequate.

175. Berkeley advocated the drawing of a distinction between a scientific doctrine of observed changes in the world and a philosophical doctrine of their source. He failed to realise that the knowledge relation, and all that it implies, must itself be brought under the doctrine of science; and that, as Hume sought to show, the problem of volitional change must be dealt with by science, as such, independently of all considerations of source.

176. It only remains to note that this does not involve a denial of Source. What has been said is merely an attempt to carry further the methodological distinction which Berkeley wisely advocated.

X.

177. For his assured knowledge of the *esse* of the substance of his ego, Berkeley relies on what he regards as obvious. "The being of my Self, that is my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflexion" (D. iii, p. 449). Thus we have notions, but not ideas, of such operations of the mind as understanding and willing (P. § 27).

178. The contemplation of the self is, therefore, for Berkeley the, to him, obvious cognitive relatedness ER^cE . But, clearly, there must be some differentiation of the terms in R^c . Shall we say ER^cE' ? The E' term here, the self as contemplated, is, of course, terribly complex; and it is, I take it, always an ideal construction. Only thus can it be contemplated. None the less the ideal construction has reference to an existent entity.

179. Professor Alexander, if I rightly understand his position, denies that it is possible to contemplate one's own past or future enjoyment. Obviously, if enjoyment characterises the ER^c , as *mind^{ing}*, this very same enjoyment cannot at the same time characterise the E' , as *mind^{ed}*. Still the E' as *mind^{ed}* must, in some fashion, be contemplated as *mind^{ing}*, since it is in virtue of this that it is a percipient entity. The self as contemplated in supposal must be a self that, as existent, is at least capable of enjoyment.

180. Now, there can be no doubt that, when Berkeley speaks of knowing his own ego by reflexion, he claims direct awareness of spiritual agency. The ego is for him efficient cause or source. From this he rises to a notion of God, which he obtains by reflecting on his own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections (D. iii, p. 448).

181. But even if we grant, or perhaps claim, that all existence is a manifestation of Spiritual Agency, we may none the less also suppose that all existence, as thus manifested, is susceptible of scientific explanation.

182. The relational order of the universe, as *order^{ed}* and irrespective of its *order^{ing}* by some source, is, we must suppose, knowable in scientific fashion, though, assuredly, it is far from being completely known. That order includes the cognitive relatedness in and through which it is so far known. It includes also, for scientific interpretation, the E term. But of all terms this is perhaps the most difficult to deal with in accordance with the method of science.

183. I must crave indulgence if I lead up to a tentative and provisional supposal through some preliminary considerations of a very general nature.

184. I assume that what we deal with in science is always some relational complex, which, under analysis, is resolved into terms in relation. I further assume that it is the relation which determines the *ad hoc* nature of the terms within any given relatedness. This, however, must not be taken to imply

that, if a given term is in some specific relation, its whole nature is determined by that relation.

185. That of course is not so. In accordance with the cardinal contention of a relational theory, any term has its nature completely determined by *all* the modes of relatedness of which it is coincidently a term.

186. The ultimate terms for abstract treatment are, I assume, reducible to points. I know not how to define such points if, indeed, they are definable apart from their modes of relatedness. And I confess that I have no supposal to offer with reference to what they are "in themselves." Granted, however, that relatedness implies terms in relation, a point, as I here use the word, is the limiting value in the reduction of terms to their simplest and barest expression.

187. Let me now endeavour to indicate, as briefly as possible, the nature of my ideal construction. Take first the relational view of space. We start perceptually with things related spatially and in many other ways concurrently. We reach conceptually a supposal in which spatial relatedness is dealt with in abstraction from other coincident modes of relatedness.

188. The ultimate terms in relation are points which, as spatial only, are positions. The system of positions thus spatially related *inter se* is spoken of collectively as space. Such space, in ideal construction, is a continuum of related positions any of which may be occupied by material points.

189. The continuum is such that any material point must occupy a position. It cannot fail to find a spatial point within the ideal construction of space. This does not, however, imply that every position must be so occupied.

190. A material point is one which is in physical relatedness to other such points as well as in spatial relatedness. Positions as such are not in physical relatedness. Note here, then, that a point, as term, may be in more than one mode of relatedness to other points as terms.

191. The physico-spatial relatedness of material points is

correlated with specific kinds of change or tendency to change. Those modes of relatedness which are so correlated were spoken of above (155) as effective.

192. A material point in motion occupies a continuous series of positions in succession, and exemplifies change in relatedness. Such succession involves time-relatedness. Points in time-relatedness only are instants. The system or order of instants, serially related, is spoken of collectively as time. Such time, as an ideal construction, is a temporal continuum of instants.

193. Space as a continuous order of positions, and time as a continuous order of instants, are ideal constructions, or supposals, framed for purposes of interpretation. But just as the ideal construction of the embryologist (98) is derived from, and is applicable to, the observed facts of perceptual experience, as they are presented in the embryo; so, too, are these more abstract ideal constructions derived from, and applicable to, a knowable physical order of terms in relation.

194. The continuity of positions in space and of instants in time, as supposal, does not necessarily imply the like supposal of a continuity of material points. The more fruitful supposal may be that material points are discrete, while changes in their physico-spatial relatedness are continuous.

195. A material point in motion, then, occupies a continuous series or order of positions in a continuous series or order of instants, and exemplifies change. But at any given instant, a material point, a point of space, and a point of time (the given instant) are coincident; or one point is a term within three relational systems.

196. Of course, such coincidence in the course of change is not to be interpreted as rest. A material point is at rest when it occupies one position for more than one instant. This, however, is a marginal comment. The stress is on the several relations which may concurrently obtain between terms; or, to repeat, a given point may be a term in several relational systems.

197. To proceed. A material body, as physical object, is a system of material points physico-spatially related *inter se*. As such it is a complex term which is physico-spatially related to other complex terms of like order. The "substance" of such a body is the physico-spatial order of relatedness which obtains within the system of points.

198. An organic body, or organism, is also a system of material points physico-spatially related *inter se*; but (as I hold, though the question is one of controversy) there is also a further order of vital relatedness among the constituent points, or some of them.

199. This use of the word "vital" does not involve any reference to Life as source. It merely names an order of relatedness which supervenes upon the physico-spatial order, as such, and gives the points in relatedness an added character. Such vital relatedness is effective.

200. There are, then, in the organism certain points which are coincidently in physico-spatial relatedness and vital relatedness. The nature of any such point is determined by the whole complex of relations of which it is a common term. And the complex order of physico-vital relatedness is the "substance" of the living body.

201. Now if a living body is a material body which is also an organism in virtue of certain co-present vital relations, may not a mental body be an organism which is also a mind in virtue of certain co-present psychological relations? May there not be certain points which are coincidently in systematic physico-spatial relatedness, vital relatedness, and psychological relatedness? And may not the substance of mind be the relational order which obtains within the system of points in the last-named respect?

202. On this view the supposal of science is that the psychological always implies the co-presence of the vital, and the vital that of the physico-spatial. But we cannot read the implication in the reverse order. The physico-spatial sub-order of relatedness does

not always imply the co-presence of the vital; nor does the vital necessarily pre-suppose the psychical. Such a mode of statement seems preferable to sundry formulations of psycho-physical parallelism so-called.

203. A further supposal of science is that when physico-spatial relatedness alone obtains, or is alone in evidence, certain changes occur; that when both vital and physico-spatial obtain the changes are different in virtue of the presence of the vital; and that where there is psychical relatedness also, a further difference in the changes is the outcome of its presence. This statement embodies, I conceive, the central contention of both vitalists and interactionists from the standpoint of science.

204. In any case, it is part of the business of science to study and to interpret the relations which the several sub-orders of relatedness bear to each other and, if possible, to assign to each its place and function in an evolutionary scheme.

205. And in any case, *qua* mental body or mind, the complex system of related points would derive its character from the psychical relatedness only, no matter what other sub-orders of relatedness were also present. Thus the psychologist's claim to deal with an autonomous province, in relation to other natural provinces, is provided for.

206. Such in briefest outline is a very tentative suggestion as to the manner in which the mind, as E term, may be contemplated from the standpoint of scientific interpretation. The question now arises: Will any such mode of treatment satisfy all the requirements of the case? I take it that the majority of philosophers will reply with emphasis in the negative.

207. The man of science, they will say, may be able to give a somewhat lame and very hypothetical account of the business from his restricted point of view. But in talking of sub-orders of relatedness, and the larger system of nature within which they are themselves ordered, he forgets that all this presupposes

some ordering agency on which is dependent the relationing of the whole and its parts, as a changing unity.

208. Whether the source of the total complex system is regarded as, in some sense, immanent within that system, or is regarded as, in some sense, external to it—in accordance with Berkeley's teaching—a relation of dependence, quite different from the modes of relatedness dealt with in science, is claimed to be essential to any philosophical explanation. This, it will be said, is not just one more of the given modes of relatedness among points, or systems of points; it is the dependence of one and all of these in relation to some such term as is here named source.

209. If we now ask on what grounds this claim is made, it may first be said that this dependence-relatedness is directly experienced in volitional acts, which imply an agent. When the ER^c of our formulæ stands for oneself in relation to a desired end, one feels the conative push. And we seek to name this specific mode of enjoyment when we speak of the experience of activity.

210. This expression, however, is somewhat ambiguous. It may mean (a) experience of the change itself which occurs within the complex system of related E-points; or it may mean (b) experience of oneself as the agency which is the source of that change—experience of relationing efficiency in the true ego.

211. Opinions in favour of (a) and of (b) are divided; and I confess that, as at present advised, I am unable to see by what method of proof the contention of the one party or that of the other can be established.

212. Secondly, it may be urged that the self, as contemplated, has a type of unity and continuity elsewhere wholly lacking: and that, in the self as enjoyed, we are directly aware of the source of this unity and continuity.

213. Assuming that the validity of the first part of this claim may be granted, it is obviously the latter part that is here

in place. I find it very difficult to be sure that knowledge of such unity and continuity as obtains is supplemented by direct awareness of any source thereof.

214. There remains the so-called ineradicable conviction that there must be a source on which phenomena are dependent, and that the transcendental ego must be the source of some, at least, of the phenomena of our own life. The reliance here is not so much on the verdict of introspection as on the verdict which a reasoned explanation of the universe, and of human reason itself, unmistakeably pronounces.

215. Here, I take it, the belief in a source of phenomena is, in large measure, accepted, not as a *terminus ad quem*—a conclusion to which a chain of reasoning leads up—but as a *terminus a quo*—a basis from which we must start if the existence of phenomena is to be explained in any philosophical sense.

216. How does this ineradicable conviction arise? I can only hazard a suggestion. Our whole method of exact thought deals with terms in relation. Hence when we take the whole universe of phenomena as a complex term we are impelled, in further pursuance of that method, to seek a noumenal term to which this phenomenal term is in relation. The world as ordered, we say, implies some ordering agency.

217. Condensing the universe of phenomena into U, we cannot leave it unrelated. We therefore postulate a source to which it is in the relation of dependence. Given U, we postulate R^dG to provide the relatedness UR^dG —the universe as dependent on God, or, if it be preferred, on *l'élan vital*.

218. Furthermore, since within the universe of phenomena events which are, to us, of paramount interest, seem to be in a like relation of dependence on human volition, we postulate agency here also, and regard these changes in the world as dependent on the transcendental ego as their source. Symbolising changes wrought through our volition as V, we complete the formula VR^dE .

219. Something of this sort was, I think, implicit in

Berkeley's thought. It naturally leads up to a philosophical, in contrast with a scientific, doctrine of evolution, as an ascending process of self-revelation,—a gradual realisation of that Source on which all mundane happenings are dependent.

220. If we follow Berkeley in accepting the postulate of spiritual source, then the suggested scientific account of conation, and of the mental entity, sketched in foregoing notes, must be supplemented in accordance with this philosophical doctrine of the ultimate nature of *esse*.

221. And in this doctrine what is essential is (1) due recognition of human agency directing, within its sphere of influence, the course of events which it, so far, helps to make ; and (2) due emphasis on the spiritual Source of all phenomena as "the Universal Principle of order and harmony throughout the world."

222. I see no reason why the acceptance of a scientific account of the physical world, of life, and of mind, should preclude the acceptance, within its appropriate universe of discourse, of the philosophical doctrine. But I am of opinion that scientific interpretation in terms of the one should not be confused with philosophical explanation in terms of the other.

223. When it is said, for example, that one consequence of the acceptance of the philosophical doctrine is that the order of sequence in implication, given in note 202, must be inverted, since the relation of dependence of phenomena on a spiritual source, psychical in nature, must be logically prior to any relatedness of the phenomena *inter se* ; and when it is said that vital processes presuppose some source of the conscious order, such as entelechy or *l'élan vital* ; I think that there is some confusing of the universes of discourse.

224. In dealing, too, with problems within the psychological field there are strongly contrasted methods of approach. A scientific treatment proceeds from lower to higher phases of mental development—the higher presupposing the lower ; the

philosophical treatment accepts, more or less explicitly, the principle that the lower, as manifestations, must be explained in terms of the higher, as pre-existent in the source of these manifestations. Failure to distinguish this radical difference of method only leads to a confusing of the issues involved.

225. It was Berkeley's merit that he applied his principles consistently ; and while he proclaimed that every effect, which can be naïvely observed or significantly interpreted, is dependent on the Eternal Spirit as the ultimate Source of all that exists, he left to science, as he understood it, a perfectly free hand to pursue its investigation of phenomena on its own special lines.

IV.—CONFLICTING SOCIAL OBLIGATIONS.

By G. D. H. COLE.

"The body politic is a moral being possessed of a will ; and this general will, which tends always to the preservation and welfare of the whole and of every part, and is the source of the laws, constitutes for all the members of the State, in their relation to one another and to it, the rule of what is just or unjust."

"Every political society is composed of other smaller societies of different kinds, each of which has its interests and its rules of conduct ; but those societies which everyone perceives, because they have an external and authorised form, are not the only ones that actually exist in the State ; all individuals who are united by a common interest compose as many others, either temporary or permanent, whose influence is none the less real because it is less apparent, and the proper observance of whose various relations is the true knowledge of public morals and manners. The influence of all these tacit or formal associations causes, by the influence of their will, as many different modifications of the public will. The will of these particular societies has always two relations ; for the members of the association it is a general will ; for the great society it is a particular will, and it is often right with regard to the first object, and wrong as to the second. An individual may be a devout priest, a brave soldier, or a zealous senator, and yet a bad citizen. A particular resolution may be advantageous to the smaller community, but pernicious to the greater. It is true that, particular societies being always subordinate to the general society in preference to others, the duty of a citizen takes precedence of that of a senator, and a man's duty of that of a citizen ; but unhappily personal interest is always found in inverse ratio to duty, and increases in proportion as the association grows narrower and the engagement less sacred ; which irrefragably proves that the most general will is always the most just also, and that the voice of the people is in fact the voice of God."

ROUSSEAU : Political Economy.

I HAVE set these two passages at the head of this paper because I believe that, both where they are right and where they are wrong, they afford the most valuable guidance in approaching the problem of conflicting social obligations. This problem, we have no difficulty in seeing to-day, is closely bound up with the

whole question of the place of particular associations in Society—a question which becomes increasingly urgent as the opposing forces of philosophers and practical men meet in a conflict which is at once theoretical and practical. During the nineteenth century the theory of State Sovereignty won an almost universal triumph in abstract political theory; it now seems likely that, under pressure from religious and industrial theorists, it will suffer during the twentieth century a defeat no less decisive. It is the bearing of this controversy upon the problem of social obligation that I propose to examine.

Rousseau's theory of the General Will is, in its profoundest aspect, the expression of the truth that all social machinery is the organisation of human will. Social organisation can be studied only as a branch of conduct: it is neither more nor less than the instrument of co-operative action, in whatever guise it may manifest itself. Wherever two or three are gathered together, a common will different from their individual wills may emerge: wherever two or three form a coalition or association, of whatever sort, a new corporate will comes into being.

The effect of this theory on philosophy is two-fold: it both breaks down a distinction and creates one. It breaks down the hard and fast distinction between ethics and politics which comes of treating the one as an interpretation of human will and the other not as philosophy, but as science, mechanism. It creates a distinction, not between governmental acts on the one side and private acts on the other, but between all social or corporate acts and all individual acts—a distinction between will acting directly, without intervening mechanism, and will that acts only through such a mechanism.

How comes it, then, that philosophers, who have set out since Rousseau from a conception of both ethics and politics in terms of will, have still treated private associative acts as rather of the individual than of the social type? It is, I believe, this mistake that lies at the root of our failure to provide any satisfactory answer to the problem of conflicting obligations.

In the *Social Contract* Rousseau was discussing the general will only in one of its manifestations—in the City-State. In the passages I have quoted he is treating the subject universally, so that corporate will in general becomes evident as the basis of his whole theory. Every particular association within the State, he assures us, has a general will of its own, and so far resembles the body politic, in which the pre-eminently general will is supposed to reside. But, he continues, while the will of any association is general in relation to its members, it is purely individual in relation to the State. And elsewhere, especially in the first book of the original draft of the *Social Contract* (published in the edition of M. Dreyfus-Brisac) he expressly declares that, in relation to a world-federation, the body politic itself would be purely individual.

Rousseau, in his City-State, decided, if possible, to banish associations altogether; on the ground that they would inevitably prove conspiracies against the public. He admitted, however, that there must be one important exception to this rule, since the people must appoint a government, and this government will inevitably use its corporate will in order to usurp Sovereignty, which belongs to the people. This is, in Rousseau's phrase, the inevitable tendency of the body politic to deteriorate.

Beginning, then, with an identification of the body politic with the ultimate sovereign people, Rousseau goes on to reduce to a minimum the number of conflicting wills within Society, and only admits the intrusion of any will other than those of the body politic and of the individuals composing it as a necessary imperfection of human societies. Similarly, the whole tendency of nineteenth century philosophy was to regard the association as, at the most, a necessary imperfection, to be tolerated rather than recognised, with no rights beyond those of expediency, and no powers beyond those conferred expressly by statute. From this point of view we are now struggling slowly back to a saner doctrine; but we have done this so far

more on grounds of practical necessity than on grounds of philosophic theory. We are still too apt to take a view resembling Rousseau's as our basis, and to admit exceptions only as they arise.

What, then, was the fundamental error in Rousseau's presentation of the problem? We can best understand it by trying to envisage the types of particular association he conceived. As soon as we make this attempt, Rousseau's statement of the case cannot help appearing unnatural in view of the problems our century has to face. Rousseau states the difference between the body politic and the particular association as if it were simply a question of size, extent, membership. Just as the government consists of a select body, all of whom are also members of the sovereign people, so he seems to think of every association as consisting simply of so many persons who are also citizens. General wills within general wills, from the smallest possible association to the widest possible "confederation of the world," he envisages and fears: the division of one corporate will from another by function is a division he never seems to face, and one which he sweeps away merely by implication.

The corporate will of the government, or executive, is clearly a subordinate will of the kind of which Rousseau is thinking, and where the will of the government conflicts with that of the Sovereign, it will be universally admitted that the former should, in the end, give way. But, if we ask ourselves why this is so, we shall not, I think, reply with Rousseau that it is merely because it is smaller, but because it is both smaller and of the same kind.

Rousseau, in fact, as we can see most clearly in the famous chapter in which he dismisses particular associations, always thinks of them in terms of cliques, parties, conspiracies against the public. He does not distinguish between political and non-political associations, probably because he feels that every non-political association, from the Church to the city-guild,

inevitably becomes political in defence of its vested interests and privileges. With a pessimism which the experience of France in the eighteenth century almost justified, he therefore declared in theory against every form of particular association.

When Rousseau's principle was put into practice by the *loi Chapelier* of 1791, there was, then, considerable reason, on grounds of mere expediency, for the general abolition of associations. But, as all students of French history know, the prohibition was never in effect complete, and it was not long before associations of various kinds, and especially workmen's societies, began to fight their way back to toleration and, at a later date, to recognition by the State. In practice, the revolutionary principle of the law of Chapelier broke down, and there came into existence new associations which were not conspiracies against the public, but natural human groupings with a specific function of their own.

If, then, the distinguishing feature of eighteenth century associations was privilege, passing easily into conspiracy against the public, the feature of nineteenth century association is speciality of function, which, though it may sometimes lead to controversy and prejudice the common good, is in no sense based on a conspiracy against the public. If it is privileged, it holds its privileges from the public on the ground that they are in the public interest: it is not privileged in the bad sense of constituting a vested interest irrespective of the common good.

What, we must now ask, is the relation between these particular associations and the State? Let me begin by defining my terms a little more exactly. By State I mean the governmental machine, national and local, with its various dependencies; by Association I mean any body which, whether or no it stands in a defined relation to the State, does not form part of the governmental machine; by Society I mean, for the time being, the whole complex of organised bodies within the national area, including both the State, national and local, and every organised association, of whatever kind; by Community

I mean something wider still, the whole mass of desires, opinions, traditions, and possibilities which are, for the moment, incarnated in the citizens.

The State is thus itself a complex of institutions of a more or less uniform type, which, whatever else they may take into account, generally resemble one another in being based on geographical grouping. Society is a wider complex of institutions, which resemble one another throughout only as being one and all expressions of man's associative will. The Community, as I have used the word, is the sum total of social values, organised or unorganised, capable or incapable of organisation, within the national area.

I say "the national area," not because there is necessarily a magic in it, and still less because national grouping invariably determines the extent of associative grouping, but simply and solely in order to simplify the problem. The fact that some non-governmental groupings cover an area far larger than that of a single State is of the greatest practical importance, since it may immensely strengthen them in their conflicts with any State: it is none the less irrelevant to the discussion of the respective rights of governmental and non-governmental associations; and I am discussing, not expediency, but rights. I shall, therefore, assume an isolated national area, completely covered by a Nation-State and its various local governmental bodies, and including many functional associations of varying extent. What is the relation between these bodies, and, in the event of a conflict of principle between them, how ought the individual to determine his allegiance?

Philosophical writers on the general question (as distinguished from its particular applications) have answered in one of three ways. Either they have tried to define, absolutely and inclusively, the sphere of State action, or they have imposed certain theoretical limitations upon the otherwise universal Sovereignty of the State, or, thirdly, they have accepted the theory that the State is absolutely and universally sovereign.

In the first case, which has been as a rule the earliest in point of time, the State is regarded as an *ad hoc*, or at any rate an *ad hoc*, authority, sovereign in certain defined spheres of action peculiarly its own, but elsewhere an interloper, wholly without right of intervention. This, roughly speaking, was the view of John Locke and of Herbert Spencer, much as they differed in many respects: it is the view which treats the State as primarily the upholder of something, whether it be property, law and order, liberty, religion, or morality, and not as the expression of any positive common will. Such a theory, in its old form, can have only an exceptional survival in face of modern social conditions. Those who hold it to-day are not philosophers, but practical men who wish to safeguard or to destroy some special interest. It still finds expression in the pamphlets of the Liberty and Property Defence League and in the pages of the *Spectator*: it also persists among Anarchists and Syndicalists, who still regard the State solely as the protector of property.

The second view, which became popular as the State, in the hands of opportunists, extended its sphere of activity, reverses the process of the argument: instead of defining inclusively what the State is and can do, it tries to define it by the exclusion of what it is not and cannot do. Its advocates often begin with a "bill of rights," a "declaration of the rights of humanity and citizenship," which lays down certain inalienable natural rights. The exclusion may be more or less comprehensive, and may even confine itself to excluding one special type of action from the jurisdiction of the State. It may attempt, as Mill attempted, to set up some general principle of division between actions with which the State is concerned, and actions with which it is not concerned. In any case, it accepts the view that the State is sovereign except where it is specially indicated not to be: it does not attempt an inclusive definition, and it excludes only by limitation. The further this theory removes itself from the *ad hoc* theory of the

State, the nearer it comes to the acceptance of universal State Sovereignty, into which indeed most of its adherents have been forced by the breakdown of their attempted distinctions.

Just as the æsthetic philosopher goes in search of the ultimate principle of beauty, just as the moral philosopher tries to define the ultimate nature of moral obligation, so social philosophers are inevitably driven to seek out the ultimate principle of social obligation. Their failure lies, not in this attempt, but in the answer they have been induced to accept. For, driven from the two positions we have just defined, the philosophers have almost invariably accepted, as if it were the only alternative, a theory of complete State Sovereignty. They have been Austinian enough to shut their eyes to any Sovereign that might run the risk of being indeterminate, and Hobbist enough to accept the heroic simplification which merges all conflict of obligations into a single all-embracing State obligation.

Agreement on the theory of State Sovereignty has not led, indeed, to agreement on questions of practical policy, and herein lies the chief hope that this theoretical conversion is not final. The "limitation" theory was advocated by men who wished to save something they prized from the desecrating grip of the State. It may have been a communal value they were trying to conserve; but they were called, all the same, "individualists." Sooner or later a case would be bound to arise in which the common interest was clearly prejudiced by some action of the particular type which they had excluded from the jurisdiction of the State—at all events, they could never be sure that such a case might not arise. In such a case, they would be asked, should State interference be allowed? They might answer in the negative, and so save their consistency and nothing else; for they could offer no reason. Or they might throw up the sponge, and become, theoretically, advocates of State Sovereignty.

Thus we have, on the one hand, the author of *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (or should it be "of the Charity Organisation Society"?) coupling with a theory that amounts to State Sovereignty a note of solemn warning to the State not to presume too much upon its rights; and, on the other hand, we have Mr. Ramsay Macdonald and his like practically claiming the doctrine of State Sovereignty as a justification of Socialism, with which it has nothing to do.

If we ask what has led men who differ so in practice to agree upon their theoretical basis, if we ask, that is, why men accept the theory of State Sovereignty, even while they dislike and distrust the State, we shall find the answer if we understand the problem they were trying to face. Modern social theory was born in the period of political revolution, and is throughout both a reflection of existing political conditions and an attempt to justify various political opinions. When men studied in the eighteenth century the basis of human societies, what primarily interested them was not associative action as such, but State action: they were seeking, not so much the basis of human association, as the justification or refutation of the democratic argument. Rousseau's *Social Contract* appealed to his contemporaries, and even to himself, rather as a justification of democratic State Sovereignty than as an account of the fundamental nature of supra-individual will. The current political controversies turned social philosophy into political philosophy: thinking always of the State, philosophers sought, not the principle of social obligation, but the principle of political obligation.

This attitude has indeed persisted all through the nineteenth century, and up to our own times. That mid-Victorian Rousseau, T. H. Green, is infected, in an even greater degree than his predecessor, with a purely political bias. If anything besides the State creeps in, it is regarded as a form of association essentially different from the State, and in no sense the depository of ultimate social obligation.

We have seen that all modern social philosophy goes back to Rousseau, and that Rousseau's distinctive contribution lies in the recognition that social life, no less than individual life, is the expression of organised will. Rousseau set out to find the universal principle on which human society is based; almost as a bye-product he created the theory of the modern democratic State. We have only to read the *Political Economy* as well as the *Social Contract* to be quite sure that he was seeking, fundamentally, not a theory of the political State, but a statement of the life of the community as expressed in terms of will, individual and general, or rather individual, corporate, and general. But as a result of the political preoccupations of the time, instead of creating a philosophical theory of Society, Rousseau and his successors created a philosophical theory of the State, in which other associations found a position only on sufferance, if at all.

The main reasons which led to the triumph of the theory of State Sovereignty were three—two theoretical and one practical. Thinkers of every shade of opinion felt the need for some ultimate sovereign authority; their failure to regard associations as distinguished primarily by function led them to regard all association as a potential conspiracy against the public, and therefore to support the "democratic" State against the "privileged" association; and, thirdly, the immense political upheavals of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, by fixing men's eyes on the State, have tended to make all theories of social action chiefly theories of State action.

To-day, when most of us, however firmly we may retain our belief in political democracy, have at least lost the illusion of an inevitable democratic political progress, we may reasonably hope to reach a more inclusive conception of social action, and a better idea of the relation of particular associations to the State.

The key to Rousseau's whole social theory is to be found in his conception of the General Will. Nay more: the key to any rational social theory must be found in some conception of a

General Will. Social science is the study, and social philosophy the interpretation, of the phenomena of collective personality. What right, then, has the State to claim a monopoly of such personality? Is not the very existence of particular associations a sufficient proof that the State cannot fully express the associative will of man? And is not the fact that these associations are the work of human volition a sufficient reason for crediting them with all the attributes of collective personality? Finally, if all these questions are answered in the affirmative, what superior claim has the State to the allegiance of the individual as against some particular association to which he belongs?

The General Will has been called an abstraction, and has been rejected as a guiding principle precisely by those who have felt this inadequacy on the part of the State to serve as collective "will of all work" to man's social consciousness. They have rejected the General Will because they have been always in search of a "determinate human superior," and the General Will has not seemed to form a natural attribute of any such superior. In fact, like Rousseau, they have conceived of the General Will as belonging only to the body politic, or State, and in such a connection the whole idea has seemed, as indeed it is, fantastic and abstract.

Yet what theory, in the freshness of youth, has not claimed too much for itself? The discoverers of the democratic State felt that in it they had found a method of expressing the whole civic consciousness of the individual, that political democracy was not only infallible, but omnipotent. Their ardent faith in democracy led them to an absolute trust in an absolutely generalised democratic machine, which, they believed, would equally express the common will whatever the matter in hand might be. At its best, this doctrine led to the repudiation by the State of all knowledge of distinctions of class; at its worst, it led to such absurdities as a State religion.

Yet we must not forget that, fundamentally, Rousseau's

general principles were nearly always far more true than his ways of applying them. It makes no difference that the General Will cannot find complete expression through any single piece of social machinery. It is indeed precisely that universal will which all social machinery only partially expresses. The degree in which the General Will finds expression at all through organised machinery, governmental or non-governmental, the relative share borne in such expression by the State and by particular associations, and the actual intensity of the will itself, may vary from nation to nation and from generation to generation ; but always and everywhere, all social machinery, alike in its agreements and in its conflicts, is a partial and more or less successful expression of a General Will which every community possesses.

The ultimate obligation of the individual is clearly not to any piece of mechanism, but to this General Will itself. How, then, is he to decide between conflicting claims to his allegiance, and how is he to answer the claim of the State to be served with a loyalty surpassing, and different in kind from, other loyalties ?

The State is the national geographical grouping, and as such can claim to represent those elements in the common life which are best represented on a geographical basis, that is, by a general vote of all the persons resident in the national area, split up into such territorial subdivisions as may seem desirable.

This conception of the State as an essentially geographical grouping is, no doubt, a modern conception, and is perfectly true only of the purely democratic State. In so far as any privileged order retains special governmental rights or functions, the State is not purely geographical in its basis. But though perhaps no purely geographical State exists, the typical modern State is in the main a geographical grouping, and such rights as it possesses in a social system resting on popular Sovereignty must be founded on this geographical basis.

If we assume that a larger homogeneous group has always the ultimate right to override a smaller group *of the same kind*, it seems clear that geographical representation will serve to express those purposes which are distributed with some approximation to equality among all the citizens. If we assume that a national interest should, in the last resort, override a local interest, the supremacy of the National State over local governmental bodies follows. But this does nothing to mark out the proper sphere of action of either national or local government.

The State, national and local, should be the expression of those common purposes which affect all the citizens, roughly speaking, equally and in the same way. In those spheres of action in which a man's interest is determined by the fact that he lives and makes his home in a particular country or district, the geographical group can best express the desires which he shares with his fellows. Here, therefore, the State is sovereign.

The case is altogether different when we come to those spheres of action which affect men unequally, or in different ways. The power of the State adequately to represent the common will on such questions, so far from being demonstrated by experiment, becomes with every attempt more doubtful. The incursions of the State into the realm of organised religion have been invariably unhappy, and the attempts of State departments to run industry, while there is no evidence that they have been on the whole inefficient in the commercial sense, have wholly failed to satisfy the demand of the workers engaged in them for freedom and self-government at their work.

The reason for this failure is not far to seek. Religion is a disease which takes people in different ways, or not at all. It neither affects all men equally, nor affects them in the same way. It is therefore pre-eminently unfit to be governed by a body which has no principle of selection other than the

geographical, and in which the irreligious man has an equal say with the religious, and men of different religions in the government of one another's churches. Similarly, industry affects different men in different ways, and would do so even in a community in which every man had his place in industry. Each industry has its special interests, and industry as a whole has an interest and an outlook of its own which no geographical group can adequately represent. In both cases, a broad functional difference is manifest which justifies the constitution of special associations to control the spheres of religion and industry, no doubt in relation to, but not under the domination of, the geographical group.

There is a further consideration which lends additional weight to this repudiation of universal State Sovereignty. Not only cannot an electorate gathered together on a geographical basis alone be fitted to deal with special questions which do not affect them all, or all alike, but also the persons whom they elect cannot possess this fitness. If we have learnt to distrust our politicians, is it not largely because we have allowed them to do things for which a geographical electorate is unfit to select the right representatives?

Strong as these arguments may seem, they will fall on deaf ears unless those who urge them do something to disprove the charge of individualism. Men have fallen into the theory of State Sovereignty, not because they like it, but because it has seemed the easiest, if not the only, way out of the slough of individualism. Half a hundred principles of social obligation, each binding us to a different social unit, cannot take the place of the unifying principle we set out to find. If this principle indeed proves not simple, but complex, its complexity can only be that of diversity in identity. The withdrawal, therefore, of some class of actions from the sphere of the State must not carry with it any denial of their social character, or even of their ultimate commensurability with social actions of another class. It must be simply a denial that the State

is the right mechanism for the execution of certain types of social purpose. If we can keep this social element recognised in actions outside the sphere of the State, we may hope to avoid the theory of State Sovereignty.

It is, of course, universally admitted that individual acts have, as a rule, a social element. The tendency of social theory has been to treat the social element in associative acts as similar to the social element in individual acts, and to set both in contrast to State action, which is supposed to be wholly social. It is my whole point, not that associative acts are wholly social, but that State acts are not. The associative act has two relations: it is, as Rousseau says, general in relation to the association which performs it; but it is particular in relation to the Society of which the association forms a part. It may be general in the second case, in the sense that it may be directed to the good of the community as a whole; but it is still the act of an individual in relation to that Society. The State, I contend, even if it includes everybody, is still only an association among others, because it cannot include the whole of everybody.

The object, then, of my argument is not to generalise the association, but to particularise the State. Rousseau, thinking, as we saw, always in terms of local, and not of functional, association, always conceived the body politic as the great association, claiming a loyalty before which all other loyalties faded. But as soon as we make a clear distinction between the State and the community, and still more as soon as we make one between the State and Society, the body politic loses its omnipotence, and becomes at the most *primus inter pares*.

Let us here meet one difficulty which may make against the adoption of this idea. The historical fact that the State has, in modern times, secured a monopoly of law-making, and has kept in its hands the power to recognise or outlaw all other associations, proves nothing; for it may well, under the instigation of democratic or autocratic partisans of State Sovereignty,

or from the mere pressure of events, have usurped a power to which it has no rightful title. We may repeat in this connection one of Rousseau's wisest sayings in dealing with social theory: *Écartons tous les faits!*

Even, however, if it is recognised that history is irrelevant to a discussion of right, it is not so easy to brush away the "tidy" logician, who does at least find in the universal Sovereignty of the State a theoretically ultimate resolution of all conflicts of obligation. Where, in effect, if we destroy State Sovereignty, is our ultimate Sovereign to be found? Is it not fair to answer that a dearth of good men is no reason for making a bad man king: it is rather a reason for a republic? There remains, however, the question whether this republic of obligations would not be in effect so loosely federal as to amount to anarchy. Would not obligations ceaselessly conflict, and would not the possibility of deciding such conflicts have been beyond remedy destroyed?

There are here in reality two questions. How far will functional devolution reduce the possibility of conflict to a minimum? And how far will there be any way of resolving such conflicts between two functional authorities, when they arise?

It is surely evident that the greater number of the conflicts of obligation which arise in the Society of to-day are due to an imperfect demarcation of spheres. The Ulster question was the result of fear concerning the religious effects of a political change. The most glaring failure of modern politics is in the sphere of industrial legislation. Inhumanity, arising from a lack of understanding, is the mark of the State in its dealings with man in his religious aspect, and in his capacity as worker. A division of spheres would obviate many of the conflicts of to-day, but, as both religion and, still more, industry, have their relations to men in their geographical groups, the possibility of conflict can never be altogether avoided.

We come back, then, to our second question. Where, in

our view, does the ultimate Sovereignty lie? Clearly it cannot lie in any one piece of machinery: either it is not embodied in any machinery at all, or else it exists only as the resultant of a system including many pieces of machinery of varying kinds.

All machinery is necessarily imperfect, because all machinery tends to standardise what is, in its real nature, infinitely various. The individual who wills purely wills in and for the individual situation in which he is acting: as soon as he makes for his guidance a general rule, he detracts from the perfection and purity of his willing, because he tries to classify the essentially unique. Yet the individual must, in most cases, make such general rules, because he is not strong enough to trust his judgment of each situation as it arises. He can only aim at making his rules as little crude and machine-made as may be.

All associative will, save the unruly judgments of a mob, must act through general rules, and all associative will is therefore necessarily imperfect. But if in this case the necessity for some imperfection is absolute, the degree of imperfection is none the less relative. The General Will of the community must suffer some leakage as soon as the attempt is made to confine it: at once it becomes something less perfect, the General Will of Society, including only that part of the will of the community which the least imperfect rules and formulæ can cover. This General Will in its turn consists of a number of lesser wills, differentiated by function, all of which are essential to its fullest possible expression.

On this showing, ultimate Sovereignty clearly lies with the fullest possible organised type of will. The quest for a true "ultimate" is, no doubt, in some sense a wild goose chase, since behind all organisations lurks always the final voice of the community. We are, however, dealing with this last court of appeal only in so far as it expresses itself in a mechanism or

mechanisms, and we may therefore pass by, with this tribute, the General Will of the community.

With Society, the complex of organised associations, rests the final more or less determinate Sovereignty. We cannot carry Sovereignty lower without handing it over to a body of which the function is partial instead of general. We must, therefore, reject the three theories of State Sovereignty, Theocracy, and Syndicalism, the theories of political, religious, and industrial dominance. All these mistake the part for the whole; our difficulty seems to be the making of a whole out of their parts.

The task of the social philosopher is to define the nature of social obligation; the task of the practical man is to make a Society to fit the philosopher's definition. It is mainly the philosopher's fault that the order of precedence has been so often reversed in the past. It remains, none the less, the philosopher's task to say where Sovereignty should lie, and the business of the practical man to find the requisite machinery. If, then, objection is taken to the Sovereignty of Society on the ground that it is, at best, only "more or less determinate," the philosopher's answer is clear. The determinateness is none of his business: it is for the practical man to make the Sovereign determinate. It is true that in the communities of to-day, which are permeated by the idea of State Sovereignty, the last determinate authority is the State. But, as man has made the State, man can destroy it; and as man has made it great, man can again restrict it. Moreover, as man has made the State, man can make something greater, something more fitted to exercise a final Sovereignty, or at least to provide a final court of appeal.

The demand, then, for functional devolution is not a demand for the recognition of associations by the State, but a demand that the State itself should be regarded only as an association—elder brother, if you will, but certainly in no sense father of the rest. This, I take it, has been the real motive behind the

demand for equality between Church and State—or, as I would rather say, religion and politics. This is certainly behind the new demand for an industrial democracy outside politics which has been put forward in the National Guild System of the *New Age*. It undoubtedly seems to complicate matters very considerably; but our philosophy should have taught us not to be afraid of necessary complications. We are too fond of counting heads to save the trouble, not of breaking, but of convincing them. We are too fond of patching up our quarrels without settling the principle that is at stake. Yet we know well that, though we may compose, we cannot settle a controversy between religion and politics or industry and politics merely by making one or other of them supreme. Attempts to avoid conflict by establishing the dictatorship of one of the contestants inevitably provoke, if not active conflict, at least passive discontent. Yet this is the "State Sovereignty" solution of the problem. A well-organised Society will admit the ultimate possibility of conflict, but will try to reduce the need for conflict to a minimum. Attempts to avoid conflict altogether merely end by making it inevitable.

We are left, then, with, at the strongest, a merely federal body including representatives both of the State and of the chief functional associations as the sole mechanism able to speak in the name of our Sovereign. When, therefore, differences arise between one great functional group and another, when, say, the individual finds himself torn between his loyalty to the State and his loyalty to the industrial body of which he is a member, how is he to make his choice? Simply, as Rousseau said, by means of the General Will that is in him, if he tries to choose either what is in the interest of his Church or his Trade Union or his State or municipality, he is "putting himself the wrong question," to use once again a phrase used by Rousseau. What he has to consider, and what, in a case of corporate action, his association has to consider, is none of these things, but the good of the community as a whole, which is neither the State,

nor the Church, nor the Trade Union, nor even quite the complex I have called Society, but something greater than all these. He has to decide, in fact, by falling back upon his judgment of the individual situation, guided, but not finally determined, by general precepts.

But if he has to make his choice, he has also to stand the racket. If a machine representing the will of Society can be devised to harmonise the occasional conflicts between the various functional authorities, that is no doubt all to the good. But the devising of such machinery is not philosophy, but science. Whether or no such a body can exist, Sovereignty remains with Society, and the State has no right to mount the throne, which, even if no determinate person or persons sit in it, is full of a presence which is none the less active for being indeterminate in an Austinian sense.

A last word, and I have done. Much that has gone before has been an attack on a theory which has animated political democrats; but none of it has been an attack upon democracy. Democrats have too often confused the ultimate equality, not of men's powers, but of their rights, with the sacredness of a mass vote on a purely geographical basis. Functional devolution involves, not the abandonment of democracy, but the substitution, for an omnipotent political democracy, of a functional democracy. The unit of self-government should be a functional unit: whatever a mass vote may be, a representative system on a geographical basis is certainly not the last word of democracy.

V.—NOTE ON MR. COLE'S PAPER.

By BERNARD BOSANQUET.

I think that written notes by people who are not going to be present at the discussion can only be admitted on sufferance; but I shall be glad if I am permitted to make a brief contribution, as I am much interested in Mr. Cole's paper, and I cannot possibly come up to the meeting.

I will go at once to the point which, I think, is the centre of Mr. Cole's interest, and I will attach to this point any slight criticisms I may desire to make. But my main object is to be more in agreement with Mr. Cole than I think he desires to let me be.

His interest is—is it not?—in the question whether the State would not be better treated as a particular association, and the elder brother of other associations, than as the father of the rest (p. 157). On this plan you would get at the strongest a loose federation, including representatives of the State and of the "functional associations" (p. 158). The State may be now the ultimate determinate authority; but man might make something greater, or at least more fitted to be a final court of appeal (p. 157); or, perhaps, you might do better with nothing at all but the individual's General Will, to decide in case of conflict (p. 158). It is the risk of conflict, mainly between the functional associations, that is the difficulty to be met. I note a pregnant expression on p. 153—"in relation to, but not under the domination of" (the State). Does not our whole problem turn on this "in relation to," and the shape which it must assume? At the point of contact, if not between the State and other associations, then between other associations themselves, the necessary "in relation to," does there, of course,

grow up a State, or a something greater, or is there nothing at all beyond a free contact?

Now I want to approach this question on its merits; but, of course, I desire to show how, as I think, this has largely been done on my view, and how this view admits of easy extension and adaptation.

As a transition, one word of something like criticism. I hold Mr. Cole quite right in attaching great importance to Rousseau as construing social organisation in terms of will. But I do not think he lets it appear how fundamentally Hegel and the philosophy founded on him contradicted Rousseau on this question of the particular associations. Rousseau's view, shared with the statesmen of ancient Greece, is very natural to anyone contemplating small States, governed by mass meetings. Such States and meetings might be "captured"; and often were so.

Now Mr. Cole, desiring to correct Rousseau, corrects him very much in Rousseau's own manner. He does not, indeed, suspect the functional associations and subject them to the State, but he does, in their own interest, eject them from the State. And this solution rests on a view of the State which is limited in much the same way as Rousseau's, that is, regarding it as the expression of society which can be got through a general vote of individuals occupying a certain geographical area, and therefore as, in Mr. Cole's view, a partial association compared with society and the community (pp. 144, 145, 151, 159). This follows for Rousseau from the well-known defect of his formulation of the General Will.

On this fundamental point Hegel, and all philosophy that descends from him, is diametrically opposed to Rousseau. To identify the State either with the governmental machine, or with what is ordered by a plebiscite over a certain area (which has hitherto usually been the instrument of despotism), is, we all think, I believe, to support the error which Rousseau pointed out in speaking of the will of all, and also himself made in

formulating the expression of the General Will. For Hegel the State is what is sovereign; the defining term is sovereignty, and this is by definition the "ideality" of all parts of the community, trade and religious corporations being expressly intended. "Ideality" = the tendency of any thing to pass beyond itself and seek completion in a greater thing. This is what I tried to express (*Phil. of State*, p. 185) by saying the State is Society as a unit, so far as exercising control over its members, and sovereignty is the working of a complex of institutions (*e.g.*, *Phil. of State*, p. 150). Thus belonging to the State is plainly a matter of degree, and this is very plain in Hegel's analysis of Society. The Corporations, etc., are the very stuff of which the State is made.

Well, then, this is our answer to Mr. Cole's question. It is very like something he suggests (I am not sure if he negatives it) on p. 156, top: "(Sovereignty) is the resultant, etc."

What then do we say arises at the point of "the relation to" (p. 153) or as, or in place of, the "federal body" (p. 158). Mr. Cole's answer and suggestions we have seen: a federal bond or something greater than the State, or just the individual's best decision. I do not despise any of these; but I am bold to think our answer worth hearing. We say what arises is a "constitution" and that no inhabitants of an area form a State without that. And we think that Rousseau in his best mind (in his remarks on the legislator) is with us. By a constitution we mean a whole of parts and organs, all functional (as Hegel of course perpetually insisted) and all bearing on one another in very various relations and degrees of intimacy. It lies, we think, in habits, traditions, recognitions. No plebiscite can express it; but it is the nearest thing to an expression of the community's will. (A will in principle unexpressed, goes near to enjoy the *otium cum dignitate* of the thing in itself.) And it acts as the State, in so far as it solves conflicts by authority, though in a civilised society this is never by bare authority, but always by reason speaking with authority.

A constitution is primarily a way of co-living and co-operating. It might come to be a very loose bond, as in many ways our English constitution is; and if it became very loose, the question whether it was a State or no might become verbal. But I think that the ideality of all organisations and corporations will always remain a truth, *i.e.*, they will always, at the points where they bear on each other, need to pass beyond themselves into something greater; perhaps, as Mr. Cole says, some Court of Appeal. And I believe that the collective force of the whole, when evoked by emergency, either internal or external, will continue to be very great, and capable of drastic operation; though the occasion for its display may become, we will hope, rarer and rarer.

The history of Letchworth by Mr. Purdom is an interesting example of the way in which the administration of an area raises *all* problems, and how, I think, the wise administrator brings them *all* into beneficial bearing on each other, showing separate treatment to be impracticable.

VI.—THE “ÆSTHETIC” OF BENEDETTO CROCE.*

By ALBERT A. COCK.

I. EXPOSITORY.

§ 1. *Intuition.*

TWO-THIRDS of Croce's book on æsthetic are devoted to summarising and criticising a long series of apparently false theories.

In his own theory he begins by differentiating between intuitive knowledge and logical knowledge. The former is obtained through the imagination, is knowledge of the individual, and is productive of images. Logical knowledge is obtained through the intellect and is knowledge of the universal, of relations, and is productive of concepts.

Intuitive knowledge, Croce insists, is essentially independent of intellectual knowledge. “The impression of a moonlight scene by a painter, a musical *motif*, the words of a lyric or those of daily command, entreaty, or lament, may all be intuitive facts”† without the shadow of intellectual relation.

Nor is intuition mere perception. Any objectified impression is an intuition. The Kantian doctrine of Space and Time as forms of intuition is inadmissible for Croce. “We may have intuitions without space and without time, as, for instance, a tint of sky, a tint of sentiment, an Ah! of pain and an effort of will objectified in consciousness.”‡ These are intuitions with which Space and Time have nothing to do. For Croce, therefore,

* *Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General Linguistic*, translated from the Italian of Benedetto Croce by Douglas Ainslie. (Macmillan 1909.)

† *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

intuitive knowledge is freed from intellectualism and from every posterior and external adjunct.

Neither is intuition sensation, for sensation deals with matter, which is mechanism and passivity (*cp.* Bergson), whereas intuition is spiritual activity. Nor is intuition mere association, or even representation. "Representation" is an equivocal term and Croce will only apply it to intuition when it means "something detached and standing out from the psychic base of sensations." What then, *is* intuition? Croce replies, "Every true intuition is also expression. The spirit does not obtain intuitions otherwise than by making, forming, expressing. Intuitive activity possesses intuitions to the extent that it expresses them."* Expression is a term which must cover the intuitions of the painter, sculptor and musician as well as those of the poet and linguist. Despite the optional character which Croce subsequently gives to externalisation, at this stage he insists that unless intuitions or impressions become expressions not only in the contemplative spirit but also externally, they do not really exist. People who say they have beautiful ideas but cannot express them, deceive themselves; if they had them they would express them in beautiful words, or otherwise, and thus pass them from "the obscure region of the soul into the clarity of the contemplative spirit." Beethoven's Ninth Symphony was his own intuition and his intuition was the Ninth Symphony. The artist, then, has intuitions superior to those of ordinary people. How then do we ordinary people recognise and appreciate them? Because, says Croce, we each have within us a little of the poet, a little of the sculptor, and so forth. It is not merely that the poet is born, not made. Man is himself born a poet and even the Aristotelian Society is full of them.

"Intuitive knowledge," Croce concludes, "is expressive knowledge, autonomous in respect to intellectual function; indifferent to discriminations posterior and empirical, to reality

and unreality, to space and time: intuition or representation is distinguished as form from what is felt or suffered, or from psychic material; and this form, this taking possession of, is expression. It is nothing else (nothing more, but nothing less) than to express."*

§ 2. *Art.*

Croce proceeds from intuition to art. Since the former is expression it is to be identified with the artistic fact, and there is no specific difference between art and intuitive knowledge. Art is the expression of impressions, and, since intuition is the same, their identity follows. The artistic intuition is not more intense than ordinary intuition; it has a merely quantitative and empirical difference! It is more extensive. "Certain men have a greater aptitude and more frequent inclination to express fully certain complex states of the soul."† These we call artists. This is the only difference, a purely quantitative one. Hence there is not one science of greater intuition and another of the less, but "æsthetic is one, the science of intuitive or expressive knowledge, which is the artistic or expressive fact."‡ Some men are born great poets, others small, but all of us are poets generically.

Because art is the expression of impressions, and it is only in expression that intuition really lives, the æsthetic fact is for Croce form and nothing but form. The matter or content is "emotion not æsthetically elaborated."§ It is the necessary point of departure for the expressive fact, but *there is no passage* between the quality of the content and that of the form.

The mimetic theory, therefore, is right, in so far as it means that art is intuitive; but the idealistic theory also is right

* P. 18.

† P. 22.

‡ P. 24.

§ P. 25.

in insisting on the spiritual character of the process. The photographer's work is art in so far as it expresses his own point of view, pose, grouping, etc. It is not art in respect of the intractable passivity of the nature which it copies. The true artist must vary his data, even remove details, and indeed impart an "ideal addition" to nature. "Any impression can enter into æsthetic expression or formation, but none is bound to do so."* A hypothetical man deprived of all his senses and then suddenly given sight only could make nothing of a picture. Apperceptive experience must operate, although this is inconsistent with Croce's narrow account of intuition. He holds that æsthetic expression is a "synthesis" in which direct and indirect cannot be distinguished. A merely physiological account of what the physical organs do throws no light on this synthesis.

Croce further deduces that every expression is unique, hence every work of art is indivisible. Expression as unity in variety is "the synthesis of the various, the multiple, into one."† But what is this if not associative, not intellective, not perceptual, and not conceptual?

By elaborating or expressing his impressions man frees himself from them. By objectifying them he makes himself superior to them. This is catharsis. "Activity is the deliverer just because it drives away passivity."‡ In thus applying Aristotle's doctrine to the artist himself Croce is recalling Goethe and following the verdict of the poet,

"There is a pleasure in poetic pains
That only poets know."

Reverting to the distinction between intuition and intellect we now learn that while intuition can stand without any other support, the intellectual needs the æsthetic and cannot stand

* P. 30.

† P. 33.

‡ P. 35.

without it. Conceptual knowledge is knowledge of things, and those things are intuitions. Concepts (echoing Kant) are not possible without intuitions, but Croce will not accept the other half of Kant's maxim that without concepts percepts are blind. Thought, he goes on to tell us, cannot exist without speech, and the distinction between internal and external language is purely empirical. Every scientific work is also a work of art, for it is an expression. We do not heed its artistic value as a rule because we are intent upon the intellectual content—though it seems inconsistent in Croce to admit any intellectual content into aesthetic expression. The distinction between prose and poetry cannot be justified except in so far as one is art, the other science. "Poetry is the language of sentiment, prose of the intellect, but since the intellect is also sentiment in its concretion and reality, so all prose has a poetical side." "There exists poetry without prose, but not prose without poetry"*—which is very comforting. Croce thus insists that intuitive knowledge or expression and intellectual knowledge or concept are in a relation of "double degree." The first is the expression, which can exist without the second, viz., the concept, but the concept cannot live without the first. Expression and concept thus completely exhaust the forms of the cognitive intellect.

This leads to a very interesting discussion of History.† History occupies a peculiar position. Croce maintains that it is not really a science, it seeks no laws, employs neither induction nor deduction, it is directed solely *ad narrandum*, *non ad demonstrandum*. The this, the that, the *individuum omni modo determinatum* is its sole province. Hence it is included under the universal concept of art. History is said to elaborate concepts of persons and movements, but it never can pass beyond the individual person and the individual act,

* P. 42.

† P. 44ff.

which are always unique. History is one thing; the theory of history is another; and the certainty of history is never that of science, despite the utmost efforts of documentary research. "‘What proof givest thou of all these deeds?’ the sophist asks; and humanity can only reply: ‘I remember.’"*

The pure or fundamental forms of knowledge are then, two: the intuition—Art—and the concept—Science or Philosophy. History occupies an intermediate position, the intuition in contact with the concept: Art receiving philosophic distinctions while still remaining concrete. "The intuition gives the world, the phenomenon: the concept gives the noumenon, the Spirit."† As we shall not return to Croce's views on History we may observe in passing that the doctrine that History is only a poem, a drama, must ultimately destroy that acknowledged body of knowledge which we call History. The causal concept has revitalised the subject in the nineteenth century, and even if its certainty is not that of the physical sciences, it is not because it has no certainty but because its data are human, in which category certainty is of a different order. Croce's attitude towards History is, of course, not uncommon in Philosophy. Even Dr. Bosanquet regards History as "a hybrid form of experience incapable of any considerable degree of being or trueness."‡

§ 3. *Erroneous Doctrines.*

Not until he has passed in review and disposed of a great number of existing doctrines in æsthetic and criticism does Croce come to close quarters with the nature of the beautiful. He makes a number of protests, not unjust, but still a trifle elementary, against the errors of literary analysis, the inventory classification of styles and the misplaced emphasis of theses of æsthetic symbolism, the type, of the "subjective" and the

* P. 49.

† P. 52.

‡ I quote from Dr. Morrison's paper in last year's *Proceedings*.

"objective." His point is that "it is impossible to separate, in æsthetic analysis, the subjective from the objective, the lyric from the epic, the image of feeling from that of things." "Every true work of art," he says, "has violated some established class and has upset the ideas of the critics."* Classification has an empirical utility only and establishes neither laws nor definitions.

There are analogous errors in History and Logic. The term "historical law" is either a metaphor or a contradiction in terms. Logic suffers even more. "An inexact *Æsthetic* drags with it an inexact Logic." Logic can only be reformed on the basis of *Æsthetic*. "The only logical fact is the concept, the spirit that forms the universal." Such logic is nothing but induction, *i.e.* the formation of universals, for deduction is nothing but a verbal development from these. It is therefore necessary to exclude from Logic all those propositions which do not affirm universals. "I want to read" is a non-logical judgment, a mere enclosing in words of an impression of a fact—an æsthetic datum in short. Syllogistic cannot occupy the first place in a philosophical logic: the concept alone is the prime logical fact; judgment and syllogism are mere forms in which that fact is made manifest. *Quâ* forms, "they can only be examined æsthetically, *i.e.* grammatically." "The principle of contradiction itself is at bottom nothing but the æsthetic principle of coherence."† But Croce does not tell us how the æsthetic experience becomes aware of, or reaches the principle of coherence. This is significant.

Before criticising a further erroneous series of æsthetic theories Croce resumes and develops his metaphysical analysis. To the theoretic form of the spirit in its two forms of intellection and intuition is to be added the practical activity. This is expressed in the will and is powerless without knowledge or

* *Æsthetic*, p. 61.

† *Ibid.*, p. 74.

theory. He observes, quite truly, that the so-called practical man stops when he is seized with doubt or feels himself in the dark. He has been guided by theory or knowledge unconsciously. Theory halts and action ceases. Faith falls and conduct fails.

But while this is admitted Croce criticises judgments of value. These are not *a priori* but the expression of a volition already exercised. "We do not desire things because we know them to be good or useful; but we know them to be good and useful because we desire them."* Nothing is said about bad or useless actions, but perhaps these terms are merely the outsider's adjectives. At any rate this reactionary ethic soon disposes of judgments of value—they are "altogether imaginary," and "there exist no normative sciences in general." If anyone supposes æsthetic judgments to be value-judgments we are recommended not to apply Logic to Æsthetic, nor æsthetic forms to Logic.

Consequently Croce excludes the practical from the æsthetic activity and does so in radical fashion. The æsthetic fact, he says, is altogether completed in the expressive elaboration of the impressions *within us*. When the word, figure, or *motif* is definitely conceived within us, expression is born and is complete. There is no need for anything else. If we choose to externalise it, well and good, but this is a practical fact, not the æsthetic fact, not strictly the artistic fact, despite the established usage of terms. We must anticipate fuller criticism to ask what right he has to use the term "conceived" in æsthetic activity at all on his premisses: and clearly, if the æsthetic fact is completed *within*, there can be no Æsthetics, for the externalised result is an affair of practical activity, of will, of economic.

In fact, Croce pushes this æsthetic of the spirit so far as to say that not only is it ridiculous to seek for an end in Art, but

that it is also erroneous to talk of selection of content. If there be selection it can only be (he says) from amongst data which are already expressions. "Expression is free inspiration, the artist travaileth and is big with a theme, he knows not how; he feels the moment of birth drawing near, but he cannot will it or not will it."*. This important appeal to the actual facts of the process of æsthetic creation must be examined later.

Croce passes on to consider the parallel grades of the practical activity. Theoretic activity is exhausted in Æsthetic and Logic. Practical activity is similarly exhausted in (i) useful or economical activity, and (ii) moral activity, which implies the economic. "Economy is, as it were, the Æsthetic of practical life; Morality its Logic." Even the most morally scrupulous man must conduct himself usefully (economically) if he does not wish to be inconclusive and therefore not truly moral. "To will economically is to will an end; to will morally is to will the rational end." The first is possible without the second, but the latter cannot be without the first. Examples of the economic without the moral character are the *Prince* of Machiavelli, Cæsar Borgia, or Iago. But the science of the moral includes the science of the immoral just as the science of the false is included in Logic, and of the ugly in Æsthetic. Croce excellently observes that the strength of utilitarian ethics lies in its recognition of the economic in morality; its weakness in its neglect of that which lies within the economic form. "As æsthetic intuition knows the phenomenon or nature, and philosophic intuition knows the noumenon or spirit, so economic activity wills the phenomenal, and moral activity the spiritual." "The spirit which desires itself, its true self," that is the formula of morality. These views are an interesting combination of Kantian and Hegelian ethics.

The four forms thus elaborated completely exhaust for

Croce the possible forms of spiritual activity. Each implies the others and Croce's strength lies largely in the sanity with which he gives each its due recognition. At the same time it leads him to exclude and severely criticise other apparent forms of spiritual activity. Thus, religion is nothing but knowledge. Hence it is always being destroyed by progress and always being resuscitated by further progress. Nevertheless, philosophy is gradually withdrawing from religion all reason for existing, because it substitutes itself for religion. Philosophy regards religion as "a transitory fact, a psychic phenomenon that can be surpassed."* Why it should be more transitory than other facts does not appear. Moreover, philosophy as science of the spirit cannot be philosophy of the intuitive datum and accordingly metaphysic is declared to be an impossibility.

Croce therefore proclaims himself as "ultra-metaphysical" and defines the function of philosophy to be the auto-consciousness of the spirit as opposed to the classificatory function of the natural sciences. This carries us back to the beginning of things. Did not Plato, in far nobler language, affirm philosophy to be the "auto-consciousness of the spirit"? As the spectator of all time and of all existence, however, Plato gave to the philosopher a metaphysical function of the most concrete kind, the apprehension and contemplation of the eternal Ideas, the realisation of the indwelling Logos.

Armed with these four modes, Croce argues that descriptions of æsthetic qualities such as unity in variety, truth, sincerity, individuality, and the characteristic are alike vain and verbal doctrines. Single expressive facts are always individual and they cannot be compared. The scientific value of these distinctions and of further classifications, such as romantic, classical, etc., is nil, altogether negative. None of them are capable of satisfactory definition. Expressions

certainly vary in their success or non-success, but the current terms of criticism are useless as criteria. No two critics ever use them alike. The only conclusion, then, seems to be that literary or other æsthetic criticism is impossible. It is quite right and apposite in Croce to protest against an exaggerated estimate of the terminology of criticism, but logically he ought to abandon language altogether, as individually so variable as to have no common meaning. Every scientific work is, he says, an expression, ergo unique, ergo untranslatable, ergo undiscussable. Surely the only refuge for us all, including Croce, is silence! The very possibility of conceptual knowledge seems paralysed by its dependence upon unique æsthetic intuitions, and since there is no metaphysic, what means have we of validating a common body of knowledge? In short, Croce leaves us in the miasmatic swamp of Protagorean relativity.

§ 4. *The Definition of the Beautiful.*

The ground thus cleared, Croce no longer delays facing the question of the nature of the beautiful. Æsthetic activity is not to be identified with feeling, he not untruly says, for "feeling is nothing but a fundamental practical activity of appetite or desire for some individual end, without any moral determination." He will not have æsthetic hedonism, therefore, although there is always a hedonistic accompaniment to æsthetic activity. The economic feeling or activity has two poles, pleasure or pain. These may also be called the useful and the useless or hurtful poles, and, finally, they may be described as value or disvalue. "Value is activity unfolding itself freely; disvalue is its contrary."* Earlier, it will be remembered, value-judgments had been rejected.

The Beautiful is now described as the value of expression. But in order to avoid all such useless and meaningless terms

* P. 127.

as intellectual Beauty (poor Shelley!), moral Beauty (alas for the Psalmist!) and the like, we must define Beauty as successful expression, or as expression and nothing more, "since an expression which is not successful is not an expression. The ugly, therefore, is unsuccessful expression, or in reality not expression at all." In works of art that are failures parts may possess unity and therefore beauty, while other parts may possess multiplicity and are therefore ugly.*

The Beautiful does not possess degrees, since there is no conceiving a more beautiful, *i.e.* an expressive that is more expressive, or an adequate that is more adequate. This position also follows from Croce's contention that each expression is unique and incomparable. Ugliness, *per contra*, does possess degrees, from the rather ugly or almost beautiful to the extremely ugly. "If the ugly were complete, *i.e.*, without any element of beauty, it would, *ipso facto*, cease to be ugly, because in it the contradiction which is the reason of its existence would be absent. The disvalue becomes non-value."† "The whole mystery of the beautiful and the ugly is therefore reduced to these most easy definitions."‡

With the problem thus "easily solved" Croce resumes his onslaughts upon all other theories. The beautiful is not the merely pleasant, it is not merely play, it is not the reaction of the sexual organs, it is not the merely sympathetic. Neither is it an inebriation of the senses (rigoristic æsthetic must go), nor is it didactic (pedagogic æsthetic must go). Beauty freed from expression, so-called absolute Beauty, *non est*, though beauty as freed from pleasure, play, and doctrine, is truly pure. Croce does not here make clear which "expression" he alludes to; the interior spiritual synthesis, or the optional externalisation. The ugly is again discussed and asserted to have no meaning since it is the non-

* P. 129.

† P. 130.

‡ P. 131.

expressive. This is certainly an easy way of getting rid of the problem.

The sublime is "everything that is or will be called so by those who have employed, or shall employ this term." All such terms, all proposed definitions of the ugly, sublime and comic, have no philosophic value, and are to be handed over to psychology. But Croce's criticism of quantitative definitions of the sublime would seem to place upon him the onus of framing a qualitative one, rather than of ignoring it. He says the impression of the sublime derived from reading Dante or Shakespeare is an accidental relation to the æsthetic fact. Adequation to truth alone matters.* Adequation to truth is beauty. No reason is brought forward for this new definition at the end of a chapter. We should like to know what "truth" is in this connection. Is truth a logical, æsthetic, economic, or moral datum? And what is adequation to truth? Again, while beauty is "expression," the sublime is spoken of as "impression." Is this a tacit assent to the Kantian view of the double subjectivity of the sublime?

§ 5. *The Process of Expression.*

The identification of intuition and expression in Croce, and the subjective character of his general doctrine, make it incumbent upon him now to trace the steps of artistic construction more precisely. Accordingly, he gives us a formal statement† of the "complete process of æsthetic production," viz. :—

- α. Impressions ;
- β. Expression or spiritual æsthetic synthesis ;
- γ. Hedonistic accompaniment or pleasure of the beautiful (æsthetic pleasure) ;
- δ. Translation into physical media. [This is not an æsthetic fact but an economic, an affair of the will. It

* P. 152.

† P. 156.

is optional and is only metaphorically to be called "expression."]

Anyone can see, says Croce, that the only step that is truly real and truly æsthetic is the second. Anyone can see, we may retort, that *ipso facto* the beautiful is never made manifest. Translation is naturalistic, non-æsthetic, pertinent only to economics or ethics. There can be no *raison d'être* for any treatises on a non-communicable, inexpressible, spiritual synthesis. But we pass on.

Granted that as an "aid to memory" (!) the physical translation takes place, then the process is reversed in the observer. He is able to obtain the unique and incomparable expression or intuition in the following way:*

α. The physical object or stimulus;

β. Perceptions of physical facts, sounds, tones, lines, colours, etc. These "together form the æsthetic synthesis already produced";

γ. The hedonistic accompaniment which is also reproduced.

The extraordinary thing about this alleged reproduction of the original æsthetic process is that the spiritual synthesis has either disappeared or is identified with or produced from the non-æsthetic external aid to memory. The spiritual synthesis, expression or intuition is not perception, not sensation, not association, not conception, yet now the perceptions of lines, colours, tones and the rest form this synthesis anew. No amount of perception according to Croce can yield beauty. "The beautiful is not a physical fact but a spiritual energy." How, then, can it ever be produced from a physical stimulus? *Ex nihilo nihil fit*. We are left wondering what spiritual energy is, since it has no sensations, no perceptions, etc., from which the beautiful, intuition, may arise.

Beauty being solely a spiritual synthesis, Croce has no need of any such distinctions as free and dependent, pure and mixed

* P. 158.

beauty. It "so happens," he says,* that in nature certain combinations can be used more than others in externalising our synthesis, but he does not account for this differentiation in Nature, it merely "happens." Subsequently he contends, on behalf of architecture and the crafts, that buildings and tools "are beautiful in so far as they express the purpose for which they were made."† The spiritual synthesis abiding in the clarity of the contemplative spirit seems here to have disappeared and the practical activity in the shape of economic has usurped its place. However, Croce's final position is that the physically beautiful is a mere adjunct, an optional "adjunct for the reproduction of the internally beautiful."‡ Is this not a mere mimetic theory in respect of these adjuncts?

Nature is, then, beautiful only in so far as she reproduces an æsthetic synthesis. Now if this be so, we may ask in whose mind did that synthesis originate? On Crocean premisses the Matterhorn may be metaphorically called an "expression," and beautiful if it reproduces an interior synthesis. Very well. An artist sees the Matterhorn for the first time and instantly exclaims "How beautiful!" This is because the mountain expresses or reproduces a spiritual synthesis. A layman also sees the peak and he too exclaims, "How beautiful!" In whose mind was the spiritual synthesis originally constructed? The artist is only a beholder, the layman likewise. Can we say that the unexpected inference from Croce is theistic? The spiritual synthesis originates in God, the "perfect poet Who in His person acts His own creations."

But for Croce beauty is not "given" in Nature. He proceeds therefore to criticise the alleged beauty of the human form. For his individualistic and relativistic position, all talk about the beauty of the human body is a mere abstraction.

* P. 163.

† P. 167.

‡ P. 168.

"To each man his beautiful (sympathetic), to each man his fair." "*Sunt quos*," Croce* re-echoes from Horace, "*sunt quos*," with a postscript indefinitely long." It is useless to seek for the physical laws or objective conditions of the beautiful. The beautiful has no physical existence and Fechner's enquiries are vain. "We cannot decide beauty by a referendum." How, then, are we to explain the consensus of opinion about a Venus de Milo, Rembrandt's Portrait of Himself, "Crossing the Bar," and the Eroica Symphony? The numerous cameo critiques of Croce are useful reminders of the difficulties of æsthetic theory, but do they warrant us in taking refuge in irretrievable subjectivity?

§ 6. *Technique and the Arts.*

Croce passes on to criticise theories of technique and the spheres of the various arts. Since there is no passage from the physical fact to the æsthetic no classification of the arts is possible.† All books thereon should be burnt. "Space and Time, Rest and Motion have nothing to do with æsthetic forms or art as such." A theory of the union of the arts is equally false. All we know is that certain artistic intuitions require one kind of physical externalisation, others other. Wagner required sound, colour and form, Wordsworth sound only, and so forth. But, this conceded, Lessing may rest in peace. Your medium is your own, of course.

So, also, art is independent of morality, utility and volitional form, and this despite the doctrine of adequation to purpose and adequation to truth. When art means external art, however, then we are told economics and ethics may criticise it. This is comforting to the critic and the criticised. We may call "De Profundis" insincere if we please, but this has nothing to do with Oscar Wilde's spiritual synthesis so that he has no

* P. 176.

† P. 188.

reason to complain. But what becomes of Croce's doctrine that the external result reproduces the synthesis, reproduces without addition or subtraction? Again, we are told that we may legitimately take precautions to prevent art from being employed for evil purposes.* He cannot have it both ways. Either the art work reproduces the spiritual synthesis (which is non-moral, he contends), or it does not. If it does, its qualities must be the same and there can be no question of employing it for moral or immoral purposes. These have nothing to do with it.

These skirmishes ended, Croce returns to construct a theory of taste and judgment. How are we to tell? we have asked. By reproducing it in oneself, is the answer. We must of necessity place ourselves at the artist's point of view, and go through the whole process again. The judicial activity is identical with the productive. Taste and genius are substantially identical. "To judge Dante we must raise ourselves to his level." (But why does Croce say "raise"?† How does he know *a priori* that he must *raise* himself?) Our spirit and that of the poet are to become one. In this union alone can little souls become great with the great in the universality of the spirit.

If we still press the question of a criterion we are told to avoid both relativism and false absolutism by "recognising" that the criterion of taste is absolute in a way different from that of the intellect; "it is absolute with the intuitive absoluteness of the imagination." Thus every act of expressive activity which is so really will be "recognised" as beautiful, and every non-expressive activity will be "recognised" as ugly.

Unfortunately judgments vary, even so; but Croce has his explanation. The reproduction which is requisite to our judgment means that all the conditions must be reproduced, and

* P. 193.

† P. 199.

other conditions must remain constant. Paintings fade, statues crumble, manuscripts are mutilated. By this much judgment is rendered impossible. The logical conclusion would seem to be that any work of art can only be judged at the moment of its production. Otherwise we are driven back on relativism. Nevertheless the work of restoration and reconstruction in the arts and in history mitigates the ravages of time. Moreover, whatever condition the work of art be in, it can produce its effects only in the soul prepared to receive them.*

Croce is characteristically sceptical towards histories of art as towards all history. It is possible that there may be a history of science, since science progressively conquers universals, but the same is not true of art, which is uniquely individual and is never repeated. It is therefore idle to talk about the infancy of Italian art in Giotto. His successors merely experienced a changed intuition and interest, not necessarily better. No comparison can be made. This is, of course, a logical deduction from the position that beauty has no degrees. The savage is a complete man, says Croce, and he has speech, intellect, religion, and morality in common with civilised man. The only difference is that civilised man dominates the universe more with his theoretic and practical activity.

§ 6. *Linguistic and Æsthetic.*

Croce devotes his final chapter to a general summary and the thesis that æsthetic and linguistic are identical. We are told that his treatise appears meagre compared with the classics of æsthetics because these are, as regards nine-tenths of their contents, full of non-relevant matter.

In what sense are the philosophy of language and that of art identical? Croce's answer is a little naïve. Æsthetic is expression, significant sound is expression. There are no special classes of expression. Hence æsthetic and linguistic are

* P. 206.

identical. Browning was evidently wrong in attempting to differentiate painter, poet, and musician in Abt Vogler:—

“For, think, had I painted the whole,
Why, there it had stood, to see, nor the process so wonder worth :
Had I written the same, made verse,—still, effect proceeds from cause,
Ye know why the forms are fair, ye hear how the tale is told ;
It is all triumphant art, but art in obedience to laws,
Painter and poet are proud in the artist-list enrolled :—

But here is the finger of God, a flash of the will that can,
Existent behind all laws, that made them and, lo ! they are :
And I know not if, save in this, such gift be allowed to man,
That out of three sounds he frame not a fourth sound, but a star.
Consider it well : each tone of our scale in itself is nought :
It is everywhere in the world—loud, soft, and all is said—
Give it to me to use ! I mix it with two in my thought,
And, there ! Ye have heard and seen ; consider and bow the head !”

For Croce, however, there are no classes of expression. Æsthetic and linguistic are alike. Expression is an indivisible whole, noun, verb, subject and predicate are abstractions and grammar is empirical not normative. Phonetics and philology are likewise semi-physical, non-æsthetic facts. Language as expression is continuous creation. “Every one speaks according to the echoes which things arouse in his soul”; “Literature is language in action.”

Much of this is obviously true. Pedagogic method has long insisted upon the strictly subordinate place and function of grammar, phonetics, and philology. We have long learnt that literary appreciation is of an organic whole only subsequently differentiated into parts. But when all this is said we are still left with the problem why some wholes are called beautiful and others ugly. The mere identification of linguistic and æsthetic is not a convincing conclusion to this problem, nor is the denial of the special problems and spheres of the arts much more helpful.

II. CRITICAL.

§ 1. *Intuition.*

The term "intuition," always elusive, is particularly so in Croce. It occupies a fundamental position in his subjective idealism and yet is defined largely by negatives. He maintains that, while perception is intuition, images are intuitions also and that any distinction between reality and unreality is altogether extraneous to the true nature of intuition. "Intuition is the undifferentiated unity of the perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible." But if the "perception of the real" and the "simple image of the possible" be in any respect different things, how can the undifferentiated unity of each be equally intuition? If intuition is neither mere perception nor the mere image of the possible, but the undifferentiated unity of each, we want to know what that undifferentiated unity means apart from the mere perception or the mere image, before it throws any light on the term intuition. Or again, if any "objectified impression" is an intuition, we want to know just what it is to objectify an impression, and also what is an impression, for Croce carefully insists that intuition (objectified impression) is something apart from the psychic base of sensations, different from mere perception, and independent of conception. A tint of sky is cited as a case of an intuition without space and time. I should dispute whether it could ever be experienced without a "whereness" and a "whenness" constitutive of the same. Indeed, "tint of sky" except as perception or image is meaningless to me and in either case some spatiality at least must attach to it. Granted that psychologically spaces and times grow, it may still be urged with Kant that metaphysically they are inseparably operative in "intuition."

But we are told that the test of an intuition is that it is also an expression, the product of an activity. Intuition is only known in the act of intuiting, and the expressive activity covers

the intuitions of us all—poet, painter, musician, linguist. We may perhaps be able to extract an answer to the question what does intuition mean in Croce if, therefore, we ask instead, (i) What is it which is intuited or expressed? and (ii) In what sense are intuition and expression identical?

(i) Consider the intuitive activity applied to a work of art. What is it that we intuit? Character, says Croce. Now the terms logical, associative, intellectual, perceptual, conceptual, have all been carefully excluded from the nature of intuition. Yet we intuit “character,” which cannot be on these premisses anything intellectually apprehended, but, as far as I can see, must be a *sui generis* object of a *sui generis* activity.

We try again. We are told that intuitions differ only in respect of content.

The form or spiritual activity is constant. It is the matter which differentiates one intuition from another. This matter is formless, mechanism, passivity. It is experienced but not produced by the spirit of man.* But if both a tint of sky and character are objects of intuition, in what intelligible sense are they both “matter, mechanism, passivity”? “What is felt and suffered” is likewise intuited, *i.e.* the raw material of feeling may be regarded as the object of the intuitive activity. Inasmuch as to have an intuition is to express, it would also appear that the object of intuition is the intuiting, *i.e.* activity or will itself, and this is confirmed in the Practical Philosophy. Croce’s psychology posits then an ultimate: an intuitive activity which forms or expresses, and has for objects a vast mass of data which are not perceptual, conceptual, etc., but may include tints of sky, character, and other examples of the matter, mechanism and passivity which separate one intuition from another.

Moreover, in his account of the æsthetic process he tells us that externalisation is unessential and that the fundamental moment is the expression or spiritual synthesis of an impression.

* *Æsthetic*, p. 9.

We have here an inexplicable expression of an impression which is to be called intuition but of which we may never have any evidence.

I urge, therefore, that Croce does not succeed in giving us a consistent and rational account of what intuition is. But his doctrine is even more confused and inconsistent on the relation of intuition and expression.

(ii) In the first place, "expression" is frequently and emphatically used to denote the spiritual æsthetic synthesis. Elsewhere, expression means art works, the product of practical, not æsthetic activity. Intuition is thus identified, first with the expression within, and, secondly, with the expression without. And although every expression is unique and incomparable, yet, since the spiritual synthesis may be reproduced in the critic, expression of the interior sort is communicable. But if communicable, the intuition is no longer unique, while if incommunicable, intuition and expression of the exterior sort are no longer identical. Moreover, if externalised, what is expressed is an act of will. In that case it is an act or expression of will which the observer intuits. He cannot, however, intuit such an expression unless he be of like nature and reality with the original artist. If, however, the artist and the observer are to have (the one productively, the other reproductively) the same expression or spiritual synthesis, and the same power or activity thereof, they must also have a common medium, the externalised expression. Towards this they must be in the same relationship if the spiritual synthesis is to be alike. What then becomes of the uniqueness of the artist's first intuition—expression?

Furthermore, tints of sky are expressions. They are therefore externalised acts of will. Whose? The Matterhorn is an expression, a spiritual synthesis which can be intuited by us all. If a picture or a poem is the spiritual synthesis of a mind, whose synthesis is the Matterhorn or a tint of sky

originally? If the Matterhorn rouses in us severally the intuition of the beautiful, it must be because it already expresses an anterior spiritual synthesis in an anterior mind and will. Whose? The Matterhorn has just as good a claim to be regarded as an independent expression as "Hamlet" or "Macbeth." Macbeth is originally Shakespeare's intuition, and ours only subsequently. Whose intuition was the Matterhorn originally?

I suggest, therefore, that Croce's identity of expression and intuition leads to consequences inconsistent with the pure idealism which appears to govern his theory of knowledge.

§ 2. *The Process of Expression* (A).

In the æsthetic process, says Croce, it is ridiculous to talk of selection of content. If there be selection it can only be from among data which are already expressions (interior). The artist travaileth and waiteth for delivery.

There is a certain truth in this position. All poets and not a few musicians and painters use much the same language. Thus Francis Thompson speaks of the travail of poesy—

"We speak a language taught we know not how,
And what it is that from us flows
The hearer, better than the utterer, knows."

And, again, in "Carmen Genesis":—

"Poet! still, still, thou dost rehearse,
In the great *fiat* of thy verse,
Creation's primal plot;
And what thy Maker in the whole
Worked, little maker, in thy soul
Thou workst, and men know not.

Still Nature, to the clang of doom,
Thy verse rebeareth in her womb;
Thou makest all things new
Elias, when thou comest! Yea,
Mak'st straight the intelligential way
For God to pace into.

His locks perturb man's eddying thought,
 His feet man's surgy breast have sought,
 To Man, His world, He came ;
 Man makes confession, 'There is light,'
 And names, while Being to its height
 Rocks, the desirèd Name."

Genius, then, has its gestatory periods. It is a commonplace of mysticism and psychology. But it does not follow that the poet's whole life consists of moments of birth that are beyond his control. The contemplative moment upon which Croce is laying stress is preceded by and requires the discipline of the moment of discursive meditation, and meditation is essentially selective. Take an example from first-hand knowledge of the origins of one of Thompson's poems.

One day he visited the Meynells, and while there was wholly absorbed, as was common with him, in an abstracted fit of introversion. For a long time he gazed at Mrs. Meynell in silence. Then at last he said: "Mrs. Meynell, pray for me." "I do, Francis," was the reply, "every morning." No more was said; this was the sole incident of that visit, and shortly afterwards he departed. A day or two later, however, he sent a beautiful poem to Mrs. Meynell, called "Orison Tryst," in which he expressed his gratitude for the comfort derived from this revelation of intercessory prayer.

Now this case is certainly not fully explained by Croce's theory. We have a brooding from which issues, by selection, a certain definite request. The entreaty is followed by the intimation of a new fact to the poet's mind. The fact becomes a theme, and the theme is not received in nescience but in a full and glad surprise. The hours pass, during which the æsthetic spiritual synthesis of Croce's theory takes place. But that synthesis is essentially selective. It is a synthesis not, as Croce suggests, uncontrollable, but governed by careful choice from amongst the poet's general body of faith and doctrine. This may be seen from the poem itself. Croce does not deny that the external memorial (otherwise

the intuition-expression), though an affair of the practical will, yet faithfully represents the inner synthesis. This poem throughout bears witness of the selective construction not only of metaphors but also of co-ordinated intuitions :—

“She told me, in the morning her white thought
 Did beat to Godward, like a carrier dove,
 My name beneath its wing. . . .
 Now, when light
 Pricks at my lids, I never rouse but think—
 ‘Is’t orison time with her?’—And then my hand
 Presses thy letters in my pulses shook ;
 Where, neighboured on my heart with those pure lines
 In amity of kindred pureness, lies
 Image of Her conceived Immaculate ;
 And on the purple inward, thine,—ah ! thine
 O’ the purple linèd side.”

The co-ordination of “intuitions” here, of his lady and of “Her conceived Immaculate,” could not be more convincingly displayed, and this co-ordination proceeds to the end of the poem. We observe the whole process of spiritual synthesis deliberately taking place and controlled by a will that is here also faith and love, until in a daring reach of prayer Thompson makes a final synthesis of the two names of kindred pureness :—

“Thy name is known in Heaven : yea, Heaven is weary
 With the reverberation of thy name :
 I fill with it the gap between two sleeps,
 The interpause of dream : hell’s gates have learned
 To shake in it ; and their fierce forayers
 Before the iterate echoing recoil
 In armèd watches when my preparate soul
 (A war-cry in the alarums of the Night)
 Conjoins thy name with Hers, Auxiliatrix.”

Wordsworth* is equally precise in his account of poetic construction, and lays stress upon the two moments, peace and excitation, as each equally necessary to the thriving of genius. While, then, Croce has rightly insisted upon the

* See *Prelude*, XIII, 1-10.

contemplative stillness of artistic gestation, he has failed to give its due place to the discursive seeking and selection which are also essential. A spiritual synthesis cannot be beyond control. It is an active selective construction from amongst a variety of data, whether "expressions" already or otherwise.

An almost identical error occurs in Kant.* In limiting the Sublime to an abstract feeling of relation, he, too, explicitly excludes apperceptive knowledge. We must not think of stars as suns with their systems, nor of the sea as the reservoir of clouds. The firmament must be nothing but an "all embracing vault," the sea either a restful mirror or a threatening abyss; any other ideas are teleological. We are to think of sea and sky as poets do, "merely by what strikes the eye." But it is precisely the poet who does not stop there. He does not passively wait for either an external or an internal intuition. He actively compels all his store of relevant experience, all his store of associated knowledge, to serve his need and purpose. Shelley's "Cloud" owes everything to its wealth of scientific knowledge; Thompson's "Ode to the Setting Sun" everything to his knowledge of its secular history and significance. In fact, no poetry or art could be created either upon the basis of a mere will to express or upon crude emotion or upon a sensuous basis alone. Kant's own phrase, "all embracing vault," itself contains a conceptual addition in the word "all": the eye never sees the "all" that is to be embraced, and Croce's psychology does not allow for an all to be intuited or expressed. Despite Kant, there is no such thing as pure feeling alone, devoid of all content; and, despite Croce, there is no such thing as æsthetic activity, which is nothing but form devoid of all content. In both cases the matter is essential. The "matter, mechanism, passivity" of Croce is nothing less than the whole stock-in-trade of the artist's past knowledge and experience,

* *The Critique of Judgment* (Bernard's translation, p. 137 f.).

full of rich potentialities which will ripen according to purposes at least semi-articulate in his mind. Croce's picture of the artist at the mercy of an uncontrollable will to express seems to me to be a figment. His own work is an expression governed in respect of both its form and matter by deliberate purpose and apperceptive knowledge. Stout's doctrine of noetic synthesis is a much truer account of the process of æsthetic construction. It is directed by both association and by purpose. "In any given stage . . . the next step is partly determined by the controlling influence of the central idea . . . with which the whole series is concerned, and partly by the special idea which has last emerged. In so far as it is determined by the special idea which has last emerged, the principle of association is operative: in so far as it is determined by the central idea of the whole topic, noetic synthesis is operative."* Does this not explain the orderly development of a poem like "Orison Tryst" far better than either Kant or Croce?

The Process of Expression (B).

The next important feature in Croce's account of the process of expression is his assertion that externalisation, translation into physical media, is optional, an economic not an æsthetic fact. Logically, it is sufficient to point out (*vide* I, § 5) that upon this basis the subject matter of æsthetics is beyond our reach, and Croce's work might have begun and ended like the chapter on snakes in Iceland.

There appears, however, to be a more serious error in this false idealism. Croce's contempt for the external result overlooks the fact that the artist *must*, not *may* have a medium, external to himself, in and through which to express the beautiful. The potter without the clay is powerless, the sculptor without the stone has nothing to express, and the poet works and is a craftsman with words, with sounds.

* *Analytic Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 3.

Significant sounds are the plastic material of the poet; adapted sequentially organised sounds are the plastic material of musician. We are often too intent upon the *ideas* expressed in poetry, and it has needed a Poetry Society to remind us that poetry is written primarily for the ear and not for the eye. Croce's hasty identification of æsthetic and linguistic leads him to overlook this fact. Poets are dreamers of dreams, but Shaughnessy puts that second in his ode. *Firstly*, poets are, as he says, music makers.

"We are the music makers,
And we are the dreamers of dreams."

Words then, as potential music, grow into music under the craft of the poet, and without them he cannot be a music maker, and ceases therefore to be a poet. The labour bestowed by a poet like Tennyson upon the order and form of his words represents as caressing a care for his plastic material as ever the sculptor bestows. We may even say that there are traditions in the craft of the poet as real and strong as those of any guild.

Music appears to be in an anomalous position, yet even here there is an accumulated body of plastic material which has been worked up by generations of musicians and is still submissive but necessary to the composer's craft. Abt Vogler must cry "Give it to me to use!" Without sound he is powerless, as without him music is "all dumb."

Externalisation, then, is not optional, but necessary, essential, and inevitable. Every art has its appropriate medium which is the artist's indispensable material. The manual practice cannot be avoided. The poet is a maker, and he makes music. It is not until we ourselves try to practise his craft, ourselves essay a sonnet or a lyric, that we truly understand what it is that the poet does. If, as Croce elsewhere says, there is in each of us a little of the poet, then it will be because each of us tries to compel his mother tongue to make music. Practice not only makes perfect, it makes

real. The external result is not merely metaphorically be called expression: it is the expression made manifest. is the necessary complement to the interior synthesis. *Fiat*. Yes, but what completes the fiat? *Lux facta est*.

§ 3. *The Definition of the Beautiful.*

(i) Although Croce rejects value-judgments he yet regards beauty as the value of expression. If, then, the beautiful is æsthetic value, how are we to recognise it except by intuiting its conformity to the definition, *i.e.* by making a judgment of value?

(ii) Beauty, moreover, is successful expression. No criterion is given, and we are left with the position that the successful expression of anything is beautiful. Mr. Carritt in his *Theory of Beauty* goes even further and says that the expression of any feeling is beautiful.* Very well. An impression or intuition of hate, being received or formed, is spiritually synthesised and successfully expressed as murder. Murder is then beautiful. The most repulsive impressions of vice successfully expressed, the most commonplace impressions of hunger synthesised and successfully expressed, the impression of an empty-but-would-be-filled Onoto successfully synthesised and expressed, all these are beautiful. Is this not the utter negation of æsthetics?

(iii) We may couple with Mr. Carritt's assertion Croce's further claim that pure intuition is essentially lyrical, "A landscape is a state of soul and a great poem may be contained in an exclamation." All this is a generous recognition of the shouts and sighs of humanity, but does it really carry us much further with the business of valuing works of a certain magnitude? Truly Aristotle was wise to insist that a tragedy must possess a "certain magnitude," else we should have to provide critiques of conjectural exclamations, appreciations of apostrophes, and sermons upon shouts and sighs. And all of these,

* *The Theory of Beauty*, p. 287.

quâ lyrical expressions, *quâ* expressions of feeling, are beautiful. Of course a life tragedy may be compressed into a sigh, but such tragedies are both too great and too little to be comprehended by criticism. The proper business of criticism is with expressions of a certain magnitude.

(iv) Again, in works of art that are failures parts may possess unity and therefore beauty, while other parts possess multiplicity and are therefore ugly. Unity of what? What else are synthesis, system, construction, wholeness, but synthesis of parts? But parts are multiple and multiplicity is ugly, is not expression. How then can the beautiful evolve from what is not? In perfect works, says Croce, life circulates in the whole organism, it is not withdrawn into certain parts. True, but how do we know an organism except through its parts? The recognition of unity may be an *a priori* function of the spirit but it only functions where multiplicity is found to be completed and transcended by unity.

(v) Further, the beautiful does not possess degrees. It must then be an absolute, and Croce's insistence upon the uniqueness of each æsthetic expression confirms this. But he repudiates an absolute beauty, and calls Plato and Plotinus mystics (Croce's supreme word of contempt), because they conceived of Beauty absolute. Yet how are we to recognise uniqueness, the beauty that has no degrees, unless it be an absolute for which we have an *a priori* form of judgment? We needs must fashion phenomena, says Kant, under the *a priori* forms of Space and Time. May we not also say that we needs must judge æsthetic values under the *a priori* form of Beauty "transcendentally ideal?"

(vi) Beauty is expression and nothing more. Unsuccessful expression is not expression. Then why discuss the ugly at all? Those parts which have value have beauty. All else is not expression and therefore requires no value-judgment, no labelling by Croce as ugly. He has no right to bring it into his court at all, yet he says it has degrees, whereas beauty has none.

No wonder he says that the whole mystery of the ugly and the beautiful is solved by his most easy definitions. It is solved by dismissing the ugly as æsthetically non-existent yet with the assurance that it has degrees.

Dr. Bosanquet's treatment of the problem of the ugly (in the lectures delivered last autumn at University College) seems to be much more helpful and illuminating. He suggests that some cases of apparent ugliness may upon closer scrutiny prove to be examples of what he called *difficult* beauty. Cases that resist this account, which finally appear to be cases of "invincible" ugliness, cannot be denied acceptance as *expressions* (*i.e.* Croce's doctrine is rejected). But such cases are expressions which are yet inexpressive, *e.g.* a story without point. Ugliness is therefore inexpressive expression. Since man can effect expression for its own sake he can also be insincere therein, *i.e.* while expressing, he may withhold the expressiveness. If so, he creates the ugly.* I venture to hope that Dr. Bosanquet will develop and publish this important clue to the problem of ugliness.

(vii) This brings us to the most urgent criticism of Croce's easy definitions. What enables us to judge that an expression is beautiful, is successful? What enables us to say of some other claimant: this is not an expression (though what else it can be is left undetermined)? What enables us to recognise in one expression that it has no degrees, is unique, adequate, and cannot be more adequate; and in another claimant that it is an expression, albeit unsuccessful, that it has degrees, is inadequate, and possibly not unique? Since beauty is expression and nothing more, how can we tell between two objects of art that one is expression and nothing more, and that the other is a strange unintelligible impostor, a non-expression possessing degree? If the term "successful" be the sole differentia, the question still remains, how can we recognise a success which is

* This paragraph is based upon notes taken at Dr. Bosanquet's third lecture.

unique and has no degrees, or a failure which has degrees and is apparently not unique?

It may be replied that we *can* tell, since the beautiful arouses in us a spiritual synthesis like that of its creator. But the mere conviction that I have an interior state identical with another man's does not assure me that that state and its expression are beautiful. The ugly may equally well arouse the unsuccessful synthesis which begat it and then our previous difficulties reappear. How can we tell a successful from an unsuccessful synthesis or expression?

(viii) This means, then, that Croce fails to supply us with an intelligible and valid criterion. How do we know we are to *raise* ourselves and not *lower* ourselves to Dante's level in order to judge of the beauty of the Divine Comedy? We are to reproduce, ideally, the given conditions and then judge. Even if we do so, the act of judgment is different from the deed of virtue or the synthesis called beauty. Croce says that the beautiful will be recognised.* Thus he who has repudiated the mystical æsthetic of Plato or Plotinus yet tells us the beautiful will be "recognised." How? This is the characteristic dogma of subjectivity. Things will be "recognised." If we could only reproduce the intuition which expresses itself in a neatly executed murder, expresses adequation to the purpose for which it was contrived, doubtless we should recognise it as beautiful. Why not? If successful expressions are "recognised," Dante's Hell will need no Heaven. Was anything more adequately conceived and adequately fitted to its purpose than Iago's plot? So, if we can make ourselves Iago, ideally, the plot will be recognised in our judicial activity as beautiful. A lie intended to deceive, a lie carefully and elaborately constructed, if it succeeds in its expression will likewise be recognised as "adequation to purpose" and therefore beautiful. In fact, the spiritual synthesis of any sinner is his synthesis,

* P. 202.

and if successfully expressed becomes beauty which we should recognise if we reproduced the sin.

(ix) Croce is, of course, justified in calling attention to the limitations imposed by temporal changes upon judgments of historical works of art, but this ought not to be exaggerated. Raphael's *Ansidei Madonna* is still beautiful despite her half millennium. Keats' Grecian urn still yields him the conviction,

"For ever wilt thou love and she be fair."

Indeed, it is the very permanence of the beautiful which consoles Keats through the odes and through *Endymion*. Croce fails to note the relative security of music and poetry as compared with the works of sculpture and painting. We may regret that some works of beauty fade and are despoiled, but others grow. Beethoven is probably more beautiful to-day than in his own lifetime owing to the greater perfection of musical instruments. Croce asks whether a poem written in youth could make the same impression on its author in old age. Probably not the same impression but still an impression of beauty. Why should age *per se* be incapable of æsthetic synthesis and reproduction? Mrs. Meynell would like to suppress the "Letter from a Girl to Her Own Old Age," but not because it is no longer a successful expression, no longer beautiful, but because it seems too sad. Life has been happier than she dreamt.

§ 4. *Conclusion.*

It comes then to this, that Croce makes an eloquent appeal for sympathy in the matter of æsthetic criticism and for the recognition of personality and spirituality in æsthetic production. But despite his very sweeping censures of most of his predecessors this standpoint is by no means new. A great many points in Marshall's *Pain, Pleasure, and Æsthetics* anticipate Croce's positions, and it is curious to observe that both Marshall and Croce are strongly opposed to Dr. Bosanquet's

definition of the beautiful.* Croce, indeed, finds the problem as posed by Dr. Bosanquet insoluble.† There is also a good deal of ground that is common between Croce and Mr. Balfour, but the latter frankly requires and accepts "a mystical supplement" to his theory of the beautiful.

Croce criticises all "relativist" positions, but it is difficult to describe his own as anything else but inextricably subjective, relative and Emersonian.

Art, he says, belongs not to the world but to the super-world, not to time but to eternity. It is not the Kantian bridge between the phenomenal and the noumenal; it is "the dream of the life of knowledge," its complement is the concept, the judgment. Art is ever a child. Thought must not be lowered in order to elevate fancy.

Croce has missed an opportunity here. His elaborate insistence upon æsthetic as expression has led him too sharply to separate phenomenon and noumenon. Instead of regarding externalisation as optional he might have been more constructive. Had he been more appreciative of Kant he could have grafted his doctrine of expression upon that of the *Critique of Judgment*. For if beauty be expression of intuition, and if we regard externalisation not as optional but as necessary, then we may suggest that the intuition is noumenal, the expression is phenomenal, and the spiritual synthesis is the building of that bridge between the two which Kant so earnestly sought. Grant with Croce that beauty is expression, is the child of spiritual synthesis, why should not the contracting parties be the phenomenal and the noumenal? Is this not expressed by Browning when he says that "Poetry is the seizure of the infinite in the finite"?

Lastly, when we remember that the proper business of æsthetic is not with incomputable sobs and sighs but with

* *History of Æsthetic*, p. 5.

† Ainslie's translation, p. 354.

published work of a certain ascertainable magnitude, we are compelled to ask Croce to tell us what are the essential constituents qualifying such works to rank as beautiful. Here, however, it seems to me his book is too full of ambiguities and inconsistencies to be anything more than a preliminary prospecting of the field, though it is full of stimulating *obiter dicta*.

VII.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF VALUES.

By W. TUDOR JONES.

§ 1. *Introduction.*—The increasing importance of this subject in the Philosophy of the Present is my reason for bringing it forward before the members of the Aristotelian Society. It is surprising how very little attention has been called to the subject of Values in the works of English and American thinkers. Several writers have, it is true, called attention to the subject, but with one or two exceptions they have used the term Values as something which did not imply a problem at all, and which could be used of anything in either the natural or the philosophical sciences. There have been but the slightest attempts made to show the meaning and significance of Values, their origin and scope, their relation to the various sciences in various degrees, their relation to the individual, and their over-individual characteristics. Professor Urban's work on *Valuation* seems to be as yet the only work which has attempted to show that Values constitute a Philosophy of their own—a Philosophy which no one of the particular branches of Philosophy as at present constituted exactly covers. It is for this reason that I venture to think that the time has arrived when the term Value should be once again brought to life, and that it alone should be shown to cover the whole field of human thought and endeavour in a co-ordinating and synthetic manner. Of course, dealing with a subject which covers so vast a field, nothing more than an outline can be presented within the limits of one paper, and much of importance will have to be left out. The main thesis attempted in Values includes no less than the necessity of presenting a *Lebensanschauung* for man upon which he can build a *Weltanschauung*.

§ 2. *The Place of the Subject (Values) in the Philosophy of*

the Present.—Though it is true that the subject of Values has received as yet but little attention in the English-speaking countries of the world, it has during the past ten years received a great deal of attention on the Continent of Europe. The literature on the subject has increased enormously, and the battle over Values is as great in Germany, Austria, and Italy as is the battle over the Absolute in this country. A reference to the works of Liebmann, Windelband, Rickert, Münsterberg, Max Weber, and of their pupils in Germany; to the works of Meinong and Eisler in Austria; and of Croce, Varisco, and Aliotta in Italy, is sufficient to show that a new importance has suddenly been given once again to Values.* In fact, a crisis of far-reaching importance has arisen concerning the meaning and scope of Philosophy. The reason for this crisis is not difficult to discover. It is felt that the promises and even the achievements of Natural Science during the past half a century have left out of consideration the larger and better part of man's nature. During the latter half of the nineteenth century the rapid advance of the Natural Sciences seemed to promise solutions of the greatest significance with regard to our views of the Universe and of Life. But, in the main, the results have dealt with *Origins* and *Laws*, and both of these are no more than partial and fragmentary truths of the contents and possibilities of man's nature. The former (*Origins*) has achieved no more than to fill up gaps concerning the natural and psychical nature of man. It has discovered many factors which have operated during man's long history. So far as Natural Science confined itself to this work such knowledge proved itself to be of great use. But many advocates of Natural Science have not been satisfied with finding the terminus of their work there, and have been unwilling to hand on their problems to the philosopher. They

* Another remarkable instance, pointing in the same direction, is found in Höfding's *Philosophy of Religion* and *Menschliche Gedanken*.

have even attempted to confine the meaning of man to the meaning of his history as presented by natural science; they have framed into a synthesis the separate factors of man's natural history, and have reduced him as much as possible to the lowest common denominator—the denominator of a mechanical, causal Universe. To know *how* we have become what we are, and to know that *others* are in all essentials what we ourselves are, is doubtless a light of importance on man's life. But such knowledge has its limitations—limitations which Natural Science has been slow to acknowledge. To know where I have come from and how I have come to be what I am can mean no more than dealing with the operations of factors which have taken place in my history. But every human being is *more* than the factors of his history. And it is the presence of a core of reality which is more than the separate external factors that has constituted the variety and the progress which we find in the human world. We are not *now* what we *were*, because something has become a self-conscious centre where external and internal factors meet and obtain a meaning other than that which they could ever get by leaving man's potentiality out of account. It is unnecessary to prove the existence of such a centre: it is evident that man is a thinking being and is capable of modifying and even of rising above an environment which impinges upon him from the outside and blind instincts and impulses which tend to keep him on the animal level. Whenever such a self-consciousness operates (and it operates everywhere in human beings) there is an actual beginning of a new situation which cannot be accounted for entirely by its *origin*. The Past is doubtless present in the self-conscious Subject, but it is no mere lumber accumulating there and becoming the ruler of life; it is something other, which can and does become subsidiary to the claims and demands of an active self-conscious Subject. In so far as the Past is present in consciousness, it is not a mere replica of what happened as external events, but is a material

which means so much and has so much significance as a self-conscious, active being is capable of giving it. In order to make any material of his own Past an actual portion of his own experience, man has to *think* such material. Evidently the thinking of the material is something in the Present and is ever moving towards a Future. Unless, therefore, we take into account what the thinking Subject *now* is and is capable of *becoming*, we cannot, as already hinted, deal with anything more than his partial and fragmentary history. It is therefore in the *content of consciousness* that the real essential nature of man is to be found, for it is there alone that the material of the external world and of the events of history are to obtain their meaning and significance. It is clear, of course, that consciousness must obtain a great deal of the material from the outside, and it is also clear that the *nature* of the material colours the nature of consciousness, but it is also true that consciousness always in a greater or lesser degree chooses its material; it selects or rejects perpetually according to its wants and needs. In this manner man is not only acted upon by the external, but he, in his turn, reacts upon what is presented to him. His thought, feeling, and will choose or discard; and this is necessitated upon him along the whole scale of his existence from the level of physical self-preservation up to the level of the highest synthesis he is able to frame as the norm of his life. It is the presence of such phenomena and others similar that marks the limits of Natural Science and makes its results but initial, fragmentary, and external explanations of man's nature and his place in the Universe.

If Natural Science fails to take into account the *significant* in man's nature by a description of Origins, how does Science fare with regard to its other claim of *Law*? Has this latter anything of importance to offer concerning man's nature? The answer is, very little, and that of secondary importance. The progress of Science has consisted in a large measure in discovering qualities in phenomena which previously appeared unconnected

and isolated. This very process is a move from reality as that reality exists in things. The multiplicity of things have somehow to be brought to a unity because we want to know about things and to use things in the future. But, as Bergson and others have pointed out, this process is no more than the formation of general concepts concerning actual perceivable objects—objects that live their own life and change from moment to moment. Such general concepts cannot grant us the actual reality, for they are built up by a process of abstraction. If such concepts cannot grant us the reality of any single thing in the physical world, how is it ever possible for them to say anything of importance concerning the ideal content of the world of *consciousness*—a content whose reality does not consist in its relation to a world of *things* but to a world of the *Sollen*. They cannot possibly do it.

If Philosophy then is to take into account the whole of man's nature it is clear that its *material* and *methods* must be different in some important respects from those of Natural Science. It is by overlooking this fact that such chaos has been brought by natural scientists into the domain of Philosophy. There were signs that such a chaos was beginning to be dispersed, and that men of science had become conscious of the confines of their provinces, but the evil begins again to appear amongst philosophers themselves. Mr. Russell is offering us anew the old empirical definition of Philosophy, and promising great gains which will accrue to Philosophy if the methods of Science are adopted. He would have us believe that man's "ethical and religious motives, in spite of the splendidly imaginative systems to which they have given rise, have been on the whole a hindrance to the progress of philosophy, and ought now to be consciously thrust aside by those who wish to discover philosophical truth."* We are further told that we are to seek "to study the *methods* of science" and transplant these into the realm of Philosophy. In the first place, Mr. Russell overlooks,

* *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, pp. 3, 4.

throughout the whole of his paper, the fact that the conclusions of Natural Science itself are mental constructions concerning the physical universe, and in fact constitute a kind of *second* world (mental in its structure) which is indispensable for man in order to describe and explain the phenomena of the physical world. Doubtless the methods of description, analysis, genetic explanation, induction, and deduction used in Natural Science are also used in Philosophy. But these are only *modes* of handling material, and though the *methods* may be the same the *material* is different. We are bound to take a stand in the mental sciences different from the one taken in the physical sciences because our material is different. For instance, in the mental sciences the idea of *End* has a validity which it cannot possess in the physical world, for without its presence no mental science could have ever arisen. The same may be said with regard to the idea of *Value*. The significance and worth which things have for a willing and feeling Subject differentiate entirely such things in such a relation from the relation which things have in their "objective" aspect as conceived by the scientist. In the former relation the things have value or are deemed valueless according to the feeling and decision of the Subject; in the latter relation the things are "neutral"—they do not come within the domain of the Subject in the same intimate manner in relation to his life. The fact that material, different in its nature from that with which the natural scientist deals, is present as the subject-matter of Philosophy may necessitate a different *method* of treating it from that employed in the Natural Sciences. And, as we shall see later on, this is actually the case. The presence of material consisting of Ends and Values has to deal with a thinking-feeling-willing Subject and its relation to Ideals which do not exist in Space as the objects of the physical world, and do not exist in Time in the sense that Time is conceived as a perpetual flow of the moments. The individual, it is true, has material which proceeds from the world of Things, and in so far as this

is the case the logical methods employed in Science have to be employed here, although it ought not to be forgotten that any and every material as presented to a living Subject with needs and feelings and volition is different, though it has come from Space, from the material which the scientist takes into account in an abstract way in a so-called "objective" space. The material which the philosopher handles, even when it proceeds from Space to the individual, has to come into contact with the self-conscious thinking subject, and when this contact takes place the material which proceeded from the external world is now transformed into a new kind of *Dimension*—it becomes value, meaning, and significance. The thinking-feeling-willing Subject also comes into contact with "worlds" other than the physical world. He comes into perpetual contact with his own subjective world, with the world of other personalities, of history, and of the social atmosphere which surrounds him. In all these worlds Totalities or Wholes are present. The material presented to the individual is made up of the thoughts and actions of his own life, of other lives, of the life of the human world. There is thus present in his consciousness more than he himself as an individual is or can be at any one moment of his experience. Had it not been for this fact there could not have been any kind of progress in human life or thought. It may be that there is no Whole which comprises *every* aspect of life at every moment, but that there are Wholes covering various phases of life cannot be doubted. A whole need not be a "whole of things" as Mr. Russell seems to make us believe: it need not be concerned with the whole of things. It is sufficient for it, at least for most of its time, to be concerned with a *universal* within the particular realm upon which the mind is engaged—be that the realm of Logic, *Æsthetics*, or Ethics. The "logical atomism" advocated by Mr. Russell leaves out of account the presence of Wholes which alone make a common corporate life possible; and such a "logical atomism," if it existed, could only do so in a world where human beings could

not understand one another. In other words, such a world could not exist for long, and certainly it could not develop.

The attempts which have been made in the past to reduce the world of the *Ideal* to the world of *Fact* have broken down one after the other. Even if we grant that our ethical needs, for instance, are merely our own, we must still remember that they are a part of the Universe, and that any theoretical conception of the world which leaves them out of account is a construction with *the best things in the world left out*. We are compelled to take our *needs* into account, to frame out of them, if not a "theoretical view of the World," still a view of Life. A "theoretical view of the World" with no more of man's nature in it than can be dovetailed into the conceptions of Natural Science is a caricature of the world and of life. The reason for the failure of Philosophy, which Mr. Russell offers at the close of his paper (p. 30), applies far more to the natural scientists who shut their eyes to every kind of reality which is not tangible to one or other of the senses than to the idealists who refuse to construct a theoretical view of the Universe with the view of Human Life either left out altogether or reduced to a "mere flowering" of a mechanical process. The reason which Mr. Russell gives for the failure of Philosophy ought to be heeded by all who have much to say of the Universe and little to say of Man. "The failure of philosophy hitherto has been due in the main to haste and ambition; patience and modesty, here as in other sciences, will open the road to solid and durable progress" (p. 30).

Let us turn for a moment again to one of the points previously touched on—the place of Law in Science. As already pointed out, the conclusions of the scientist are *mental* conclusions: they are non-sensuous and of a universal character. They deal with the phenomena of the physical world, but they themselves are not portions of those phenomena. And besides, such conceptions are static abstractions of the physical world. If such a norm of physical science cannot come into contact with external reality,

how can it ever come into contact with the domain of individuality as this is experienced by man? Every attempt at lowering Philosophy to a scientific level is to destroy the possibility of turning into some kind of cosmos the world of mind or spirit.

My space does not permit the further treatment of this matter, but it is quite obvious that leading philosophers are feeling that, in some essential respects at least, other methods than those employed in science and empirical philosophy are needful in the realm of Philosophy proper if *mind in itself*, and not merely mind as an appendage of matter or of the universal conceptions of Natural Science, is to be further investigated with any hope of fruitful results.

Philosophy has then to deal primarily with a View of Life, and only with a View of the Universe in so far as such a View of the Universe springs from such a View of Life. For we have constantly to bear in mind that it is only out of a View of Life that the Universe can attain any value and significance. Otherwise the Universe is "neutral" with regard to worth or values. Philosophy has thus to start with the *Phenomenology of Consciousness* and not with the *Natural Science of Consciousness*. Philosophy is not a mere Psychology, although Psychology like Natural Science presents it with material. The material of Psychology is more closely allied to the content of consciousness than the facts of Natural Science, but even in Psychology the relation between physical and mental processes constitutes its main work unless it trespasses on other Sciences whose content and aim are quite different from those of Psychology. It is, I think, important to confine Psychology as closely as possible to the Natural Sciences. To extend it into the realms of Ethics and Metaphysics, as was done by the late Professor William James, is bound to lead to confusion with regard to great problems of the difference between analysis and synthesis, the whole and the part, the teleology of consciousness, etc.*

* The same remark applies to Mr. Arthur Lynch's *Psychology: a New System*.

Thus, the limits of Natural Science and Psychology in dealing with the *total content of consciousness* have necessitated an insistence, during the past few years, upon the creation of a Philosophy which will deal with the total content of consciousness as this is revealed in the thinking-feeling-willing Subject in all the relations of life. Such a Philosophy will be a kind of co-ordination of the various mental sciences from the sides of Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Metaphysics, and Religion. But the mental sciences as now divided do not make an equal contribution to such a system of Values. It is for this reason that Philosophy may be divided into two divisions.

§ 3. *The Two Main Divisions of Philosophy.*—Philosophy from very early times—at least from the time of Aristotle—has attempted to satisfy two needs. On the one hand, it has attempted to extend the domain of Knowledge so far as to construct some kind of systematic view of the Universe. It has created theories of the Universe in an objective manner—in a manner which was supposed to include Man as well as the Universe. But, on the other hand, each theoretical view of the Universe has left Man as a mere passive spectator of the Universe—a being whose life and destiny were determined by powers or forces outside himself and outside any kind of reaction which any individual or any number of individuals could exert on the Universe. Here, again, what has been touched on before has to be re-emphasized, viz., that such a theoretical Philosophy does not include the whole truth of what exists in the Universe. Man exists in the Universe not as a mere passive spectator but as an active being capable of exercising his Will upon a portion at least of the Universe, of thinking the Universe, and of leading a life quite other than that found on the physical plane.

Thus alongside of a theoretical Philosophy there has always existed, sometimes in the background, sometimes in the foreground, a practical or axiological Philosophy. Such a practical Philosophy has been needful for man in order to become some-

thing *more* than a mere play of physical forces. Philosophy is thus on its two sides a wisdom of the Universe and of Life. The two aspects have often run parallel in several epochs of Philosophy, and even when this has not been the case the theoretical has become a kind of norm for the practical, which, in its turn, furnishes the theoretical with a new "creative synthesis."

In the history of Philosophy the close connection of the two sides, if not simultaneously, still successively, is to be found. Thus in Greece, during the pre-Socratic period, we find Philosophy arising out of purely speculative interests and gradually coming under the power of practical needs, so that what began as an interpretation of the Universe becomes in Plato and in early Christianity a Philosophy of the redemption of the life of man. When we come down to the period of the Renaissance theoretical interests once again secure pre-eminence, and some of these theoretical results are turned during the period of the *Aufklärung* into the service of civilisation and culture. In Kant the two aspects find an intimate union; Philosophy with him becomes a view of the Universe and a view of Life. The two Critiques of Pure and of Practical Reason are the results of such a union. Kant perceived that man was not only a knowing but also a willing being. This aspect of Kant's teaching has been much overlooked since his day. It has to be borne in mind continually that man is not only capable of forming judgments concerning things but of realising at a deeper level than the understanding the judgments which he forms. It is necessary for man to *know*, for Knowledge becomes a kind of goal for his Will. It is evident that to *become* what he knows includes a form of activity and the presence of a standpoint which were not included in the act of knowledge by itself. Consequently, Philosophy has to insist once again on this differentiation between theory and axiology, and to see that although a close connection exists between the two still the mental sciences which deal with the former handle a material and employ a

method partially different from those of the latter. The field of the mental sciences is thus portioned into two because different kinds of work are necessitated by the double nature of man. But, on the other hand, the connection between the theoretical and the practical is of the closest because the two arise within the same consciousness. As Windelband (to whom I am indebted for the above distinction) points out: Our judgments include an act of will; our insight is partially guided by conceptions of value and by motives of the will. The main point is that a division of labour has become necessary on account of the richness of the material and of the necessity of treating it in different ways. But the tendency to forget that there are *two* portions of the field is very often found in some of the Philosophies of our day. Our wall of partition is so high that we cannot see into our neighbour's garden; and by degrees we come to conclude that there is no garden there at all! The distinction is also seen in the fact that the problems of Natural Science and of the Theory of Knowledge are problems of *existing things*, whilst the problems of *Values* have their existence only in relation to a Subject, and are therefore treated by those disciplines which deal with the Subject, viz., Ethics, Æsthetics, and Religion. These disciplines do not deal with a theoretical content but with the relation of a subject to some End or Value. It is true that theoretical disciplines like Logic consist of judgments which have a relation to the individual, and which are either affirmed or denied, and in so far must have value for the individual, for otherwise he would not select and reject, affirm and deny. Logic presents the individual with a pathway to Truth and is consequently a discipline of the different values of things—values which have a direct bearing on man's life. But before proceeding to the four sciences, Logic, Æsthetics, Ethics, and Religion, which deal with Values in their relation to man's life, we must inquire for a little while *how* Values come to man. What aspects of his nature are at work in the creation

of Values? In other words, we pass to the Psychology of Values, and finally to the actual Values themselves in their fourfold content.

§ 4. *Psychology of Values.*—By this is not meant that Values are constructed upon a basis of Psychology, but that the processes which are operative when Values are formed can be analysed.

Values involve a Subject-Object relation. "The object may include anything which satisfies a need or calls forth a feeling of pleasure. The latter definition—the feeling of pleasure—is the more inclusive of the two" (Windelband). The feeling of pleasure in one sense includes the satisfaction of a need. It is difficult to decide whether Will or Feeling is the more original of the two functions. But it is certain that both are most closely connected. As a rule, this intimate connection has been neglected in many text-books on Psychology. And the emphasis laid on one at the expense of the other has often entered into the domain of Metaphysics. The battle between the Absolutists and the Pragmatists is largely based on the question which of the three phases of consciousness is the most original. But it does seem a mistake to separate and to build a closed system on the fragmentary phases of things which are never found apart. The advocates of Absolutism and Pragmatism are unconsciously reviving a view of consciousness which is Kantian in its nature and which has been discarded by the best psychologists. The truth concerning the two seems to be in the fact that whenever Consciousness acts it acts as a whole even though only one of its three phases may be in the foreground and prominent enough to be observed. In every act of Will there is some amount of Feeling, and in every Feeling there is always some amount of Will, if not more than enough to enable the Feeling to persist from being changed into something else. And the same is true of the relation of Thought to Feeling and Will.

Still, in spite of this, there is some evidence that Feeling

may be traced back to a source more primitive than itself. It can often be noticed that Feeling springs from a source of need or Will. When we look at the matter in this way pleasure is defined as a satisfaction of the Will, and pain as its dissatisfaction. This is true when the subject is conscious of the presence of Will. But, besides this, the unconscious Will, which is designated as an impulse or need, is the origin of such feelings of hunger as pain and of satisfaction as pleasure. Such observation has grown into a theory that all pleasure or displeasure presupposes a Will, if not in a conscious form, still in the unconscious organic form which is designated as need and impulse.

On the other hand, there can be brought against this theory of the priority of the Will the fact of the Feeling-element present in sensuous primary feelings such as of colour, tone, smell, taste, etc. There is here a conspicuous absence of the Will-element. It seems true to state that there are primary feelings which cannot be classed as either pleasurable or painful.

But the opposite theory of the primacy of the Will has much to show on the side of its priority. The Will, when viewed at its source, does not seem to be only the final stage of what started in Thought and proceeded to Feeling. Man is not merely a being of thought and of conscious action; he is as well a being of deep-rooted instincts which cannot be conscious of their Ends as pleasure. Sometimes the instinct reaches an End of pleasure; but often, as in perverse inclinations, man pursues relentlessly an End which culminates in pain even though he may know beforehand something of the nature of what will happen when the process has reached its culminating point.

I have paraphrased the foregoing section from Windelband because it seems to me to express the impossibility of dividing man's nature into different compartments. It is more correct to say, as Windelband does, that both Feeling and Will are

original functions of life, and that there is *reciprocity* between them throughout life. We thus see that the Values which present themselves to both Feeling and Will have, therefore, an influence which is exercised on both.

This principle of transference between Feeling and Will is evident everywhere in life. Feeling may be often a state of dissatisfaction because some object which would satisfy some need is not yet attained. The self in the presence of such an experience becomes intensified and gathers various scattered elements together, which merge into its intensive centre until finally it becomes strong enough to find ways and means to realise its need—the Will reacts upon that part of the universe which at the moment is needful for the self. Thus a feeling of need, whether organic or mental, is transformed into a *deed*. In that feeling there might have been present elements of thought, and this is almost always the case in human beings, but in so far as such thought is present, it is thought blended with feeling towards some *End* which the self is desirous of reaching. But when the End has been reached and the Value obtained, what is the satisfaction of such a Value but another feeling on the pleasurable side? Thus Feeling transformed itself into Will in order to reach its desired End, and Will in its turn transformed itself into Feeling. This kind of transference takes place right through life, so that, until much more light is cast on Feeling and Will, we shall have to look upon the two as original, complementary elements within human nature.

But all that has been said in this section only deals with the *How* of the process, and, indeed, with the *How* in its elemental forms. But there are higher elements in the process. We are not dependent entirely upon primitive needs and their realisation. What differentiates the cultivated, moral man more than anything from his more primitive, crude ancestor is the fact that the former is capable of relegating to the background of his consciousness instincts and impulses

which otherwise would control life. There comes to be a growth of the reason why some things which are organic or primitive needs should be rejected, and why *higher* needs should be brought into existence, and a means for their satisfaction should be found. The naïve view of finding the meaning of life in the presence and satisfaction of organic Feelings and in the exercise of a Will equally organic and primitive gives place to other aspects which man is bound to take into account, whether he feels or wills the need for this. Indeed, as soon as man realised himself as a member of a community he was obliged, not only to take his own needs into account, but the needs of others as well. He is now obliged to perceive that what may be valuable to him may be injurious to another, and that what may be pleasurable to him may be painful to another. Thus a conflict of Values arises, and some kind of Standard has to arise in order to measure each one's individual values. The very fact that human society has in the course of the ages somewhat progressed is a proof that such a Standard has been operative. It has succeeded in enabling groups to live a conjoint life. This could not have been possible unless some Value over against many of the organic and individual Values of each person should be seen as necessary and useful. Such a Value may be named *Custom*. Thus we have passed beyond the realm of Psychology with its individual values to the region of *Over-individual Values*, and are consequently led into another division of the subject.

§ 5. *Groups of Values*.—Taking up further the meaning of *Custom*, we find that its nucleus consists in a reality which is *objective* in its character. It is a reality not, like that presented by Natural Science, existing in Space, although the *expression* of it has to take always some kind of "incarnation" in Space if it is to persist. Its objectivity is, indeed, twofold. On the one hand, it is true that such a reality as Custom is in the mind of the individual, but its content is recognised as *given* quite as much as the objects of Natural Science are *given*. The

content of such a reality is a social inheritance for each individual—it is present at his birth. It is true that he has to understand it, but he does not create it. And the mind is so framed as to be obliged to make a distinction between what is present as an over-individual experience and what is present as a subjective experience. This is the essential nature of the over-individual value of Custom or of anything else. No more than this would be needful to say about it if a group or a nation lived to itself and was not disturbed by other groups or nations that possessed other kinds of Customs. The Custom as a Value would persist, and would change only in the degree the life of the group or the nation underwent greater complexity. But if any group or nation had not been able to have given a tangible expression to its customs, such Values would very quickly disappear when they would be obliged to struggle amongst a community of people with customs of a different nature. Thus, for example, there has been no difficulty whatever in getting the Maoris of New Zealand to adopt the customs of Britain. Their own customs were all oral—there had been no “incarnation” of them: there was no literature and there were no institutions amongst them. The result has been that in one generation they have adopted our Values, sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, for themselves. They have been “converted” to our religion; those who could afford it have adopted our houses and furniture; they smoke our tobacco and drink our whisky; the men and the women are quite as susceptible to the need of wearing clothes and boots of the latest pattern as any group in this country. But how different it is in India! The conflict of Values has been infinitely greater there than in New Zealand. India had “incarnated” its past customs before we went there, and this helps them to persist, and renders it necessary for us even to modify some of our own customs there even so far as we ourselves are concerned. I think that this “incarnation” element in Values has been

greatly neglected in Philosophy, and that the objective character and persistency of Customs have been placed too much in the concept alone. The two sides—the mental and the tangible—have to be taken into account.

Such Custom may be designated as the will of the community; and the point here to be borne in mind is that it has to be acknowledged as a true Value by the individual. As Windelband points out, it is in this that the psychological nature of *Conscience* is to be discovered. Conscience is therefore the voice of the consciousness of the total group in the individual consciousness, which acts as a norm for the individual consciousness. Of course, Conscience does not remain at this over-individual level of Custom but applies to the over-individual levels of our four groups of Values. If this is so, we find a valuing of Values which exists partly in tangible expressions and partly in the total consciousness of the community. But an important difficulty arises here. When face to face with Custom, the individual has to remain passive and subservient to a reality and command which forces itself upon him. He is not able to do this entirely, or else there could be no progress. Customs have changed and do perpetually, if only gradually, change. The individual, in his turn, *reacts* upon such a reality. He may discover it as a mixture of the rational and the irrational, and consequently finds it necessary to change the character of the custom. Some need of the individual is not satisfied with what is presented to him in this form of custom, although the initial stages of his life may have been helped in this manner. He now finds that he has to turn to something else than the mere pleasure and security which Custom offers him. And it is at this point that the problems of practical or axiological Philosophy really begin. Where is the individual to turn for the satisfaction of his nature?

We have already seen that, in the first place, every Value signifies something that satisfies a need or gives rise to a feeling of pleasure. We have further seen from the instance of

Custom that the value does not reside in the object itself but in some Good that is felt necessary by the individual. We have to bear in mind here that often what seems good and is even felt as a Good may be an evil. The Maoris, for instance, have not gained by all the Customs they have copied from Britishers. But they felt the need for these things and many of them sold their lands so as to be able to live in the towns within easy access of the things. But at a later stage they felt that even evil things are made by a community to look as decent as possible: the Maoris have paid some attention to the *ethos* of Britishers. But, as already stated, Customs may be often good. They exercise a restraining influence over primitive instincts, impulses, and passions. *Another kind of life* takes the place of the old life—new Values come into existence and throw the old ones into a subsidiary place. But this stage is passed, though its “ghost” remains haunting the man throughout his life. No man can get out entirely from the level of Custom. But he does ask the question concerning not merely what *is* but also concerning what *ought to be*—in other words, he becomes the possessor of an Ideal. His nature, even in the *ethos* of the community, found new Values, and four groups at least of Ideals now appear to him as means by which the new intellectual and spiritual needs of his nature can be satisfied.

In the words of the late Otto Liebmann “man finds himself the possessor of a logical conscience the ideal of which is Truth; there is an æsthetic conscience whose ideal is the Beautiful; there is a moral conscience and its ideal is the Good.” To Liebmann’s triad we may add Windelband’s and Münsterberg’s religious or metaphysical conscience whose ideal consists in the unity of the other three ideals and in the final satisfaction which it brings to man. This is termed God.

It is to these Values we now turn, to see some of the ways by means of which the various aspects of man’s nature grow and find satisfaction.

§ 6. *Logical Values*.—The logical ideal or value as Truth

constitutes a portion of the work of theoretical Philosophy. It is the aspect of Logic which relates to the individual and its effect upon life that has to be dealt with in a Philosophy of Values. As already pointed out the two aspects of Philosophy are connected. Logic deals with something of far greater significance than the forms of thought. In its objective character it compels us to think the world in certain determined ways; its laws place alternatives before the human mind; its judgments distinguish between truth and error. It deals in this and other respects with the conceptions of the natural and the mental sciences, and its influence is felt even within the provinces of *Æsthetics*, *Ethics*, and *Religion*, although it cannot be said that it is the determining factor in experience at the level of *Æsthetics*, *Ethics*, and *Religion*. To obey the modes presented by the necessities of Thought is something of the greatest importance in the development of personality, although such modes may appear purely intellectual in their nature. Even if such a function of Logic were entirely confined to the intellectual realm, it would still possess great value because it would still enable the person who follows the demands of Thought and the dicta of Judgments to construct some kind of valid universe within his own consciousness. Such a personality would be richer in content than one who had not made the attempt, for he would be able to select and reject, to present before himself Ends, and partially to reach such Ends at least in Thought. The knowledge of the right way of handling the material which presents itself to man or which is sought by him is a Value: it filters some power into the mind, and has a relation to the Will on an important side. To adopt and follow the logical process in the handling of material requires at every step an act of discrimination between the various Values of the material either for himself or for the theory of the Universe or of Life into which the inquirer wishes to penetrate. However impersonal the material may seem, it is of importance to the individual because material is often impersonal, not because it has no connection with the individual as individual,

but because it has connection with, and is of importance to, *all* individuals. A theory of the Universe or of Life if it is true is true for all and good for all. The individual is thus in his battle for the possession of Truth a combatant in an over-individual struggle for the ever deeper possession of a Truth whose nucleus will persist over against the fleeting impressions of the moment. In other words, he is battling for the possession of an over-individual world which will satisfy the needs of his reason. The satisfaction of this demand of the intellectual nature of man must produce a change in him. Or, as Münsterberg says: "What else does that mean than that we grasp the elements, the parts, the groups, perhaps the whole of this chaos, and hold every bit of our experience before us as something which is to be more than a passing dream, more than a glowing spark. To have a world means to hold up the flying experience as something which is not to be experience only, but is to be itself. And yet what else can it mean to tell our experience to be itself, than to impart to it a will that it is to last, that it is to remain itself, independent of our individual experience; that it is to aim toward the preservation of its own reality; that it is to strive for loyalty to its own nature. To make a world out of our experience means, and cannot mean anything else than, to apperceive every bit of the chaos as something which must will to be itself. . . . To be itself may mean, firstly, that our bit of experience is to be preserved, is to last through ever new experiences, and is to be found again and again. The satisfaction of this demand gives us the Values of Truth."* As Münsterberg points out further: "In the field of the logical values of reality it means that we have not only the immediate acknowledgment of things, persons, and duties, but also the created values of causal, historical, and logical knowledge."† The demand for

* *Science and Idealism*, pp. 38, 39.

† *Ibid.*, p. 50.

Truth is thus a demand for something over-individual that shall persist. Even Science is thus in its final meaning idealistic, for it is nothing other than the effect of our efforts that our interpretation of the world is real and shall persist. The conclusions of the natural and the logical sciences are therefore independent of any "personal setting." But although these conclusions are independent of the likes or dislikes, of the pleasure or the pain of each individual, they still form a kind of intellectual categorical imperative to which the individual must conform and must carry still further. It is in this sense that the logical values of Truth become of importance to man—they demand from him an acknowledgment of a world of Truth which is independent of his own particular truth. If there were opportunity, it could be shown that the work of the *historian* resembles that of the scientist in many ways. The material of the two is different—that of the latter being the physical world, and that of the former being the world of will-relations. Out of the factors of will-relations an over-individual world is framed; and it is this over-individual world of History which persists and grows and becomes a norm for the individual events of Time. But this is not the whole history of man's nature. The fact is that the possibilities of his nature are so many-sided that they cannot be satisfied in one direction only. The values of Truth are cognitive in their nature—at least it is cognition which remains in the foreground—though the affective and conative aspects are also affected. But they, too, in their turn must come to the foreground, and when they come we shall see that other aspects of reality will suddenly spring into being and develop possibilities on the affective and conative sides. Thus we pass to *Æsthetic Values*.

§ 7. *Æsthetic Values*.—In the previous section we found that the Values of Truth were mainly over-individual and not direct, personal experiences of the individual. They had a direct influence upon him, but it is not he as an individual that

created them. The very structure of the world gave the material for such a construction and compelled the mind to move in the groove marked out for it. But man, much as he needs such truth, needs also something, however small it may be, which is more his own. It is not given to every man to follow Truth as far as to be able to construct an open systematic view of the Universe, and it is not given to any man to frame a closed and complete system. So both types of men require their constructions to be supplemented by something else—something which is a deep need of human nature, something which cannot be expressed in words. There are things outside us and within us which do not allow themselves to be expressed in words. There are thoughts, feelings, and intuitive and imaginative knowledge which cannot be placed into the mould of logical Judgments. We have to confess with Faust :

Ich habe keinen Namen
Dafür. Gefühl ist alles.

Now, to be itself was the main point emphasized in a Truth which is not relative, and which may be designated as absolute in so far as it was not created by the mind of any individual, and which has become an over-individual norm for the individual. Such a Truth has its own *self-subsistence*. But the individual requires, feels the need of becoming something self-subsistent in himself—in a form of immediacy. The individual claims, at least in a part of his being, the need of becoming independent, complete in himself, “not looking for any help or addition, and fulfilling all his desires through himself.” “Wherever an experience comes to us in perfect fulfilment of this demand, there the world has æsthetic value.”* Even here the individual is dependent upon material from the outside, but the material affects him in a different way from what it did in the realm of Truth. From the external world the beauty of nature presents its material; from the social

* Münsterberg, *Idealism and Life*, p. 54.

world the unity, harmony, and affection of men and women constitute the material; and in the world of his own inner life it is the equilibrium and unity of his own nature that furnishes the material. The very same material may be valued in different ways. A young man's father told me the other day that, in spite of his son's splendid achievement in the science examinations of the University of London, he still felt that a side of his son's nature was on the point of becoming atrophied. Father and son went out often to the country and observed the beauty of earth, sea, and sky. The son saw nothing but his own science in every object, and was entirely incapable of obtaining any pleasure from any landscape, however beautiful, as a whole. The father found the same material sufficient to give him strength to carry on his laborious work for the next week in a crowded part of London. The son passed from cause to effect and from effect to cause; the father was able to pick out from the remainder of the world the bit which he perceived and find it complete, absolute, and satisfying. And it is the same with every material in all the sciences. It may be handled analytically and synthetically from a logical standpoint, and it may be viewed in its totality, as a complete picture is viewed. The value produced in the latter sense is that of enjoyment. How much intellect is present in the process it is difficult to detect, but however much there is it has to be melted into the complete feeling-view which human beings are able to possess. I am inclined to think that there is more intellect in the process than some writers on *Æsthetics* are apt to think, for country people with a minimum of intelligence are not very capable of appreciating the landscape of their own neighbourhood—a neighbourhood which may draw some of the best artists to it every year in the early summer and the early autumn.

Æsthetic values of sculpture, painting, poetry, drama, and music have all had their great values in the civilising and moralising processes of mankind. They are over-individual in

their nature, but they differ from the intellectual over-individual in that they gain an entrance in the form of immediacy to the soul. They are less difficult of apprehension than intellectual truth and do not require the effort which is included in the attainment of the Good. They are all-important values in a world such as ours where but few can hope to attain to a View of the Universe, and where rest and enjoyment are sometimes needed after labouring hard to overcome some weakness of the nature. This is the effect of their value upon the recipient. What constitutes their *creation* is quite another question, into which I cannot here enter.

But there is a danger of making *Æsthetic Values* the sole Values of life. The world is meant for alternate periods of effort and rest—effort in the intellectual and moral realm, rest in the realm of the Beautiful. As pointed out above, Consciousness is many-sided, and there exists a real danger to it by making one side pre-eminent and by ignoring other sides. Something of value is lost, and only a partial development of the nature can take place. We must now pass to the third section of Values.

§ 8. *Ethical Values*.—Wherever in life we look we find, over against the ordinary daily life and its values, a *command* that has to be obeyed and whose value consists in its realisation. Everywhere such a command is presupposed, however much the individual may fail to understand the nature of it. This command is termed Duty or Moral Law. This Moral Law is differentiated from the multiplicity of relations in which man finds himself from day to day. Life has grown from lower to higher levels by means of individual and over-individual qualities. It has already been hinted that a fundamental difference exists between the individual and the over-individual elements in human nature. In the remarks on the collective life of the Community, expressing itself as the Will of the Community, there was seen to be present a reality over-individual in its nature. The history, necessity, and value

of this over-individual reality for every individual in the Community, for the preservation of the Community, for the superiority of the Community as a whole to any individual, has conferred upon such a reality an imperative character. It has become a *Sollen* (an Ought). It is thus differentiated from the reality of the natural world which merely *is*; it is also differentiated from the reality of the æsthetic world because it cannot be attained without an activity of the Will, and also because it is something which is *to be attained*, and not, as on the æsthetic level, something which is already attained and enjoyed. The self is conscious of this interval between the Ought and the Is even when it does not make an effort to travel the distance. It is conscious that one of the main values of life consists in that which is beyond the individual, however much the individual has already realised. The self is aware that it is in becoming the content of this imperative that a main value of life consists. This is no mere theory but the actual experience of what the social world presents as a demand for man to conform with. The demand is here again over-individual in its nature; it is not the creation of any one individual but something which has persisted and has constituted the actual evolution of the human world. The human world has thus created a reality beyond itself, greater than any individual experience, and persisting and growing though each generation passes away. Such a reality is independent of the pleasure of the individual, and the individual is aware that he cannot withdraw from it except at the peril of losing some of the greatest Values of life. He knows, or can know, that this greatest Value is in the *Sollen* and not in the *Sein* around him. R. L. Nettleship* expresses it beautifully: "I have a real conviction at times of something that is in and about me, in the consciousness of which I am free from desire and fear—something which would make it easy to accomplish the most

* *Philosophical Remains*, p. 107.

otherwise difficult thing without any other motive except that it was the one thing worth doing." "Such a value is beyond the grasp of the mere scientific treatment of the events in nature and in mind."* The main point that should be emphasised in Ethics is not only its descriptive character but also its imperative. This work of Practical Philosophy is looked upon by many philosophers as being greatly inferior to the relation of subject and object, of mind and body, etc. It is a province which will probably not yield such an intellectual harvest as Psychology, but it will be of incalculable benefit to the human race, and may be able to make Philosophy a living discipline to the world at large.

§ 9. *Religious and Metaphysical Values.*—Neither of the three systems of Values touches the whole nature of man. It is clear that he has to work in the three spheres if his personality is to unfold and deepen. But as he cannot get his *whole* nature into activity in any one of these Values, and as only one of them can occupy the consciousness at the same time, the final quest of life is for a unity which embraces the three. This constitutes the religious or metaphysical value of life. This level of experience means that consciousness now rests upon the final convictions it has gained from the other provinces and experiences them as one. As each of the other provinces was formed by binding the multiplicity of the material into a unity, so these three unities may become final convictions in which the final, absolute Values of life are to be experienced. As Münsterberg puts it (and Windelband and Eucken put it in a similar way): "That which completely fulfils it (this demand of our nature) is the system of our convictions. Their immediate form is religion. If we transcend the outer world by our convictions we come to God; if we transcend the social world we come to immortality; if we transcend our own inner sphere and

* Münsterberg, *Science and Idealism*, p. 61.

link it with religion we come to the belief in providential leading. In every one of these conceptions, the world of things and of men and of duties is developed into a system in which the logical, æsthetical, and ethical demands are unified, in which the causal events of the universe and the moral duties and the desire for happiness are no longer in conflict. Religion, too, can speak a hundred languages, as the logical, æsthetic, and ethical demands which must be harmonised may vary from man to man, from time to time. But the value of the conviction that the reality in which we live, if we knew it completely, would be perfectly harmonious in the totality of its demands, is eternal and absolute.”* A practically identical conclusion to the subject might be obtained from Mr. Bradley, while Dr. Bosanquet’s conclusion is not far removed from such a standpoint. We see that we have landed ourselves in a transcendent realm, in a supersensuous and over-individual world. Surely Philosophy is not to throw such demands and possibilities of man’s nature into a realm of illusion which is soon to be passed by an adoption of the “scientific method in Philosophy.” Far rather should it be the aim of Philosophy to labour among the greater as well as among the lesser values, for I am convinced that it is in such a metaphysical conclusion as I have only too hurriedly tried to sketch that the future of any genuine Philosophy lies.

* *Ibid.*, p. 65.

VIII.—PHENOMENALISM.

By C. D. BROAD.

I PROPOSE in the present paper to try and define what is meant by Phenomenalism and to state how it is related to Idealism. I shall consider the main motives and arguments that have led people to be Phenomenalists, and shall try to estimate their value. And in all this I shall have specially in view the general considerations which Mr. Russell puts forward in his recent lectures on our Knowledge of the External World. Mr. Russell's present position is not Phenomenalism, but that is the ideal which he sets before himself. I shall try and show that he is much less phenomenalist than he thinks himself. I would say at once that much the most important point is the general question of the validity of the arguments for and against Phenomenalism; no one at present claims to have worked out in detail a phenomenalist philosophy of science, so that even a perfectly valid criticism on some particular point in Mr. Russell's constructive theory would have hardly any bearing on the general validity of his philosophic method.

Before we can understand either what is meant by Phenomenalism or what kind of arguments can be suggested for and against it we must be perfectly clear as to the distinction between sensations, sense-data, and physical objects; for it is largely on the question whether and in what sense it is necessary to assume the existence of separate entities corresponding to each of these terms that Phenomenalism distinguishes itself from other views. We may in fact say at once that Phenomenalism is a philosophical theory which claims to be able in some sense to dispense with at least one of the three, viz., physical objects. This is as far as some phenomenologists, *e.g.*, Mr. Russell, are at present

prepared to go. But others believe that they can also dispense in some way with one of the remaining two. Thus Mach seems to wish to do without sense-data and to keep sensations, whilst the American realists wish to do without sensations and to keep sense-data. It must be understood that at present all that I am saying is very rough and inaccurate; I am overlooking the fact that Mach probably never even recognised the distinction between sensations and sense-data; and again I am leaving it quite vague in what precise sense Russell claims to do without physical objects and James to do without sensations. I believe that any careful thinker must recognise the three distinctions, and, in that sense, anyone who tries to get rid of any of them is merely confused, as Mach almost certainly is. But it is quite compatible with a clear recognition of these distinctions (such as is certainly possessed by Russell and I think by the American realists) to hold that one or more of the distinct terms corresponds, not to a new kind of entity, but to some complex or function of the others.

The best thing to do, therefore, is to consider for ourselves as accurately as possible in a limited space the nature of these distinctions and the motives for them. We can then consider in what sense Russell claims to dispense with physical objects, whether he is justified in holding this to be feasible, and whether any special philosophic advantages come from doing so.

Ordinary common sense unquestionably distinguishes between mental acts and their objects. But it wants to hold that the objects that we perceive with our senses are at any rate parts of physical objects. I use the word "parts" here in two senses. (1) In a geometrical sense. It is admitted that when I look at or feel a penny I only see or feel a part of it at a time. I do not, *e.g.*, see both sides at once, or, as a rule, feel the whole circumference. And of course we admit that other people who say that they perceive the same penny may be directly aware only of different parts from ourselves. But there is no special difficulty about this: if the part that you see and the part that I see fit together to form one closed

surface our united information will just tell us more about the whole physical object than either of us could have known separately. No difficulty arises unless our information is or seems to be inconsistent. (2) There is, however, a different sense in which we can say that we perceive parts of a physical object. When I look at a penny I see an object with a certain colour and shape, when I only feel it I am no longer aware of the colour but I do become aware of coldness and of some other qualities. Common sense admits that I may only be aware of some of the qualities of a physical object at a given moment; that it may have qualities of which I never become aware; and that other people may become aware of qualities of which I cannot become aware. But here again there is no difficulty of principle; my failure to become aware of a certain quality of a physical object does not prove that it is not there, and so is quite compatible with the fact that someone else can become aware of it. Once more his information and mine combined will tell me more about the whole physical object than my own by itself could, unless there be some positive incompatibility between his and mine.

Then again we suppose that the object continues to exist and to have much the same qualities even when we cease to perceive it. Of course the mere fact that we sometimes perceive it and that it then has such and such qualities is no proof that it exists or has these qualities at other times. But the common belief here does not rest on arguments, though that is not the same as to say that no arguments can be produced for and against it. Once we distinguish between objects and our awareness of them and find no difficulty in the view that they are common (in the modified sense mentioned above) to us and to others, we can at least believe that their existence and qualities do not depend on their being perceived by any particular person. This, though it would not prove that they are independent of being perceived by someone, certainly would add to the probability of this. So here again common sense has a perfectly good ground for keeping its belief unless some strong argument be brought against it.

We may say then that physical objects are defined as objects of the same general logical character as those of which we from time to time become directly aware, *i.e.*, they have qualities and parts and they can change and move. But we add to this that they exist and keep their qualities in the main unchanged when they are not objects of any mind. Common sense tends to hold (*a*) that there are such objects, and (*b*) that we quite often perceive their geometrical parts and some of their qualities. The fact that we perceive different parts and qualities at different times, and that we and others perceive different parts and qualities at the same time does not matter so long as our information is compatible; and the fact that we only certainly know that what we perceive exists so long as we perceive it is no proof that what we perceive is not parts of physical objects.

This is the belief that common sense would like to hold. If it could hold it there would be no need to introduce sense-data in any other meaning than as parts of physical objects in the sense already defined. But unfortunately it seems impossible to go on holding it. There seem to be positive incompatibilities between what two people see when they say that they see the same thing, and positive incompatibilities between what I see at various times when I say that I see the same thing and hold that it has not changed. When I look straight down on a penny I see a circular shape, when I look from the side I see an elliptical one. Common sense says that I see the same penny and that it has not changed, but it can no longer hold that the difference is that I perceive different geometrical parts of it. I may see both a complete ellipse and a complete circle, and these will not fit together as parts of one closed figure. If there were only myself to consider I could get over this difficulty. I could say that the movement of my body is causally connected with the shape of the penny, that it really was circular when I stood over it and that it really is elliptical when I stand at the side. But, if we are to accept the testimony of other people, this explanation will not do.

Another man whom I judge to see the same penny may stand still while I move. What he sees remains unchanged, what I see changes. Clearly then we cannot both be directly aware of precisely the same object, and also we cannot both be aware of different parts of the same object in any sense in which we have yet used the term "part." What I see and what he sees are both closed curves, they are not just fragments which, when taken together, will make up a closed curve. The conclusion at which we arrive is (*a*) that something changes, (*b*) that this something is that of which I am directly aware, and (*c*) that it is not identical with the penny which I say that I see nor with a part of it in any sense of that word which has yet been used, *i.e.*, it is not a part which fits in geometrically with what I see at other times and what other people see at the same time to give that closed curve which common sense calls *the* shape of *the* penny. Lastly we distinguish changes in the penny from changes in these objects of which I am directly aware. We come to believe that these objects often change when the penny does not; and, although changes in such objects are our sole ground for believing in changes in physical objects, yet we come to believe that the physical penny may alter without there being any change in that particular immediate object which I regard as peculiarly connected with the physical penny. (This would happen, *e.g.*, if the penny shrank, but I approached it in proportion as it did so). These immediate objects by means of which I judge physical objects to exist, and believe myself to learn their qualities, relations, and changes, are called sense-data.

Two questions at once arise: (1) Is there any reason to suppose that sense-data are not themselves physical objects, and, if so, how do they differ from physical objects? (2) If sense-data be physical objects is there any need to assume any other physical objects, and, if they be not physical objects, is it necessary to assume any physical objects at all? There can be no doubt whatever of the existence of such things as sense-data: it is practically a mere matter of definition. In my example

about the penny I am directly aware of an object at each moment as I move about. And it is absolutely certain that these objects have shapes and different shapes. All the objects then that are directly perceived by anyone from anywhere under any conditions most certainly exist and have the qualities that we perceive them to have at least as long as we perceive them. But are all or any of these objects physical objects or parts of them? This is commonly denied. What seems certain is that at any rate they are neither identical with nor geometrical parts of those particular physical objects which common sense says that we come to know through them. When it is pointed out to us that the objects of which we are immediately aware when we say that we see the same penny differ and are not geometrical parts of any one closed figure, we do not regard them as parts of the physical penny, and we seem to have little temptation to assert that they exist unchanged when we cease to perceive them. Yet we do not cease as a rule to believe that something connected with all these objects continues to exist. This something we call *the* penny. Common sense does hold, I believe, that we are sometimes aware of a part of this physical object, viz., when we look straight down on it. But this seems very doubtful. It is doubtful whether we mean more than that the relation between this particular sense-datum and the physical object is that of identity in respect of shape, whilst it differs from identity for all the other visual sense-data.

Now I think it will be admitted that the view to which we have been forced is an odd one and that it needs some justification. We are immediately aware of a number of rather similar sense-data the shapes of which are related in a certain definite way to our various positions. (I use the last phrase without criticism at present, though of course it needs it.) We seem to have very little tendency to believe that these exist unperceived when once we clearly understand that they cannot be geometrical parts of any one object. Yet we do believe that they are all connected with some one thing which can exist

unperceived and probably never is perceived by anyone. We do not believe that these sense-data are geometrical parts of this object, in fact the geometrical qualities of all but one of them are not supposed to be identical with those either of this object as a whole or of any of its parts. Yet, on the ground of the existence of the many sense-data, we believe that the one object exists; and, on the ground of the qualities of the sense-data, we believe that the object has such and such qualities.

There would clearly be a very great advantage if we could somehow define a physical object in terms of sense-data; if we could regard it as a function or complex of actual sense-data. We can see what conditions it must fulfil. It must be neutral as between various observers; we must be able to talk of its remaining constant while many of the sense-data connected with it change, and *vice versa*; we must be able to state causal laws in terms of such objects; and there must be a sense in which they persist when I cease to be aware of the sense-data connected with them. If such a function of actual sense-data can be found I think that all that is clear in our belief in persistent physical things would be preserved. The motive to such a construction is perfectly clear, and may be put as follows. The ordinary view about physical objects makes them logically very much the same kind of entities as sense-data. They are extended and have qualities and relations, just as a visible patch of red is extended, may be to the right of another patch, and is red. But we come to the conclusion that, whether sense-data themselves be in any sense physical objects or not, at any rate neither the physical objects in which science and even common sense are most interested nor the geometrical parts of them are ever the immediate objects of anyone's mind. Hence it seems difficult to give any satisfactory reason for believing in the existence of these objects or in ascribing to any particular one such and such qualities. Note carefully that the difficulty is not in the existence of such objects in general; their logical likeness to sense-data

which certainly do exist makes it perfectly easy to conceive of their existence and nature in general. The difficulty is to see how we can satisfactorily pass from the existence, qualities and relations of a certain group of sense-data of which we are aware to assert the existence, qualities, and relations of some determinate physical object of which we never can be directly aware. We all know roughly, of course, how we actually do pass from one to the other. It is described very fully and carefully in such books as Professor Stout's *Manual of Psychology*. But the interesting point for the philosopher, as distinct from the psychologist, is not *how* we come to regard a certain set of sense-data as the appearances of a certain physical object with such and such qualities, granted that there very well may be physical objects and that we certainly do have an innate tendency to believe that all sense-data are somehow connected with some physical object. The interesting point is whether we are *logically justified* in believing in the existence of such and such objects with such and such qualities on the basis of our general belief and the particular facts about certain groups of sense-data. If the phenomenalist can show us (a) that the causes which psychologists say produce such conclusions do not also provide good reasons for them, and (b) can offer a meaning of physical objects which shall in the main agree with all that is clear in our beliefs about them, and (c) show that we are logically justified in the believing in physical objects as defined by him, then he will be fully justified. I certainly do not think that it will be any conclusive objection to the phenomenalist if his definition of physical objects makes them of a different logical type from sense-data, *e.g.*, makes them classes whilst sense-data are particular individuals. Philosophy must certainly respect strong innate beliefs as much as possible, if there be no positive arguments against them; and it may be a part of our innate belief in physical objects that they are particular individuals like sense-data. But we know well enough that

our strongest beliefs are often very vague; *e.g.*, we all believe that in some sense $2 + 2 = 4$, but very few people could tell us precisely what they mean by 2 and 4 and +, and when they try to tell us they are almost invariably wrong. If the physical objects that the phenomenalist can offer us fulfil the conditions of being common and persistent and of being connected in an intelligible way with our sense-data and their qualities, so that our belief in such objects can be logically justified, I think we shall have little ground for complaint merely because these objects prove to be of a different logical type from that of which we had rather vaguely supposed them to be.

Let us then consider the following questions: What is the phenomenalist's objection to the ordinary physical theory; is his objection valid; and does his substitute avoid these and other objections? One argument of Mr. Russell's in favour of Phenomenalism appears to me to need considerable refinement before it can possibly be accepted. This is the argument from Ockham's Razor and from the analogy to the Principle of Abstraction in the philosophy of mathematics. Ockham's Razor is the principle that "*entia præter necessitatem non esse multiplicanda*," and Phenomenalism plumes itself on according much better with this principle than the ordinary view. I am not acquainted with the works of Ockham, and therefore I do not know in what sense he used this principle, but I can see that as it stands it is ambiguous, and it is not perfectly clear in which of its possible senses Mr. Russell uses it in favour of Phenomenalism. It might mean either (a) entities of a kind which is known to have instances are not to be multiplied, or (b) kinds of entities are not to be multiplied. The Principle of Abstraction obeys the second form. Instead of assuming a particular kind of quality common and peculiar to all equally numerous classes and making this the number of the classes, you define the number as a certain logical function of the classes, *viz.*, the class of which they are all members. Now I do not think that it can

be objected to the ordinary view that it multiplies kinds of entities to any serious extent. A physical object, as we have seen, is commonly supposed to be something very like a sense-datum; it is certain that sense-data exist, and the only addition that the common view makes is to hold that whenever a set of sense-data fulfil certain conditions then there will also exist something, not indeed identical with any of these sense-data, but still closely resembling them and only differing in that (a) no one is ever directly aware of it, and (b) that, whilst it is uncertain but not impossible that sense-data exist unperceived, it is certain that this object, if it exists at all, exists unperceived. The mere fact that a successful Phenomenalism could dispense with an entity so like many entities which certainly do exist seems to me to be no strong argument in its favour. But Mr. Russell's own theory does not succeed even in accomplishing this modest amount of simplification. It assumes more entities than the common view, and those entities seem to be of precisely the same kind as physical objects on the ordinary theory. Let us consider these points.

The ordinary view, mainly from considerations of economy, believes that sense-data only exist in connexion with living minds and bodies. It does not assume sensibilia of which no one *is* aware, still less does it assume sensibilia of which no one *can be* aware: such entities as these it calls physical objects and is blamed by Mr. Russell for assuming. But Mr. Russell's own present theory assumes by admission sensibilia of which no one *is* aware, for there are supposed to be perspectives where there are no minds. If you and I (as we say) are "looking at the same penny," your group of sense-data containing an ellipse of a certain eccentricity constitutes one point in perspective space, and my group of sense-data containing another ellipse of slightly different eccentricity constitutes another point in perspective space. / At present Mr. Russell's theory assumes that there are perspectives that come between yours and mine whether there happen to be minds there or not; i.e. that there

are groups of sense-data containing ellipses of intermediate eccentricity. But a very important point to notice is that not merely *is* no one at present aware of these sensibilia if there be no one between us now, but that no one ever *can become* aware of them. When (as we put it) anyone moves into one of these intermediate positions his brain and nervous system (once more in a Russellian sense) move into surrounding places in perspective space. So the sense-data of which he becomes aware are not those which were in this perspective, but are the different ones which are determined by this different medium. / Mr. Russell may say that their shapes are not affected by this change of medium, but I am sure I cannot see how he knows this. Shapes of sense-data very often are altered by changes of medium. If he makes the ground for his belief the fact that this is the assumption on which physics can be built up and that physics is probably true, I agree that it is a good ground. But it is precisely the same ground on which non-phenomenalists would ultimately justify their belief that the real penny is circular, although no one can perceive the real penny.

I cannot help thinking then that Mr. Russell's present theory is much less near to Phenomenalism than he supposes, and that the difference in simplicity between it and the ordinary theory is not in his favour. Instead of a few imperceptible physical objects whose existence and qualities we must precariously infer from our sense-data, Mr. Russell offers us an immense number of imperceptible sensibilia whose existence and qualities we must equally infer from the sense-data of which we are aware, the latter being always determined to an unknown extent by our brains and nervous systems. I do not see that these sensibilia differ in any important logical respect from the physical objects which the common view is so blamed for introducing. All that one can say is that there are a great many more of them than of physical objects and of sense-data taken together on the ordinary theory.

These considerations do not merely show that Mr. Russell's present theory is not at all in a position to cut the throat of the

common view with either edge of Ockham's Razor. They also show that his present view, whatever its merits in other respects, is in no way supported by a very plausible general argument which he uses in favour of Phenomenalism. The argument is as follows. The laws of physics start from observations on our sense-data and must ultimately be verified by such observations. For a law is only directly verified by its predicting that something will happen under certain circumstances and our finding that it actually does happen under those circumstances. Now the only events and conditions of which we can be quite certain are those which we can directly observe, and these are our sense-data and the changes in them while they remain our sense-data. Laws are hypothetical propositions of the form: If an event of the kind p happens then an event of the kind q will always follow after a certain time t (which may be 0, as in laws of co-existence). Now the only way directly to verify such laws is to find events of the kind p very often followed by events of the kind q , and never to find the former not followed by the latter. Mr. Russell concludes that it must be possible in theory to state all that is verifiable in the laws of physics in terms of our own sense-data, or at most in terms of our own and of those in whose existence we believe on the testimony of others. It will follow that all entities and laws which physics talks about as intermediate between the sense-data with which we start and those which verify the law must be expressible in terms of sense-data. There may be practical difficulties in this, but they must be theoretically soluble.

This argument has always seemed to me a very plausible one. But, whether it be true or false, it provides no motive for believing in Mr. Russell's present theory, for that is as far from expressing all the laws of physics in terms of my own and my friends' sense-data as is the common view. The best we can say for it in this regard is that possibly the best way to meet the moon is sometimes to go round the sun. But it will be well worth while to treat this general argument on its own merits.

In ordinary life we constantly make a distinction, not merely between our states of mind and their objects, but we also sharply distinguish between three kinds of changes. There are (1) the supposed changes in supposed physical objects; (2) changes in the appearances of physical objects while they are under continuous observation, *i.e.*, changes in the sense-data of which we are aware and by means of which we believe ourselves to become aware of physical objects; and (3) those changes, partly bodily and partly mental, which we call adjusting our bodily organs and voluntarily looking for something, *i.e.*, turning the mind now on one object and now on another. If we accept the present argument we must, of course, express (1) somehow in terms of (2) and (3). But can we still distinguish (2) and (3)? Whether sense-data do or do not exist when we cease to be aware of them a law is only directly verified by those sense-data of which we are aware while we are aware of them. So all the sense-data of which the present argument will ultimately let us take account are objects of contemporary sensations. It follows that their temporal relations must be precisely the same as those of our sensations, if we say, what seems reasonable, that we have a different sensation whenever there is any difference in the sense-data before our minds. Hence the causal laws of physics, if they can be stated wholly in terms of sense-data of which we are actually aware, can equally well be stated in terms of our sensations. There will still be a difference between sensations and sense-data, and sense-data will have some qualities which sensations lack, but physics will never mention a sense-datum which is not also the object of a sensation, and so there will be nothing in Phenomenalism with which a reasonable and atheistic Berkeleian need quarrel. I am merely stating this as a fact, not using it as an argument against Phenomenalism; Mr. Russell admits that his ideal is solipsism, and I have now tried to show that, if it can be successfully reached, it will not differ essentially from Berkeleianism.

But the consideration of those changes which ordinary people call the adjustment of the body and the directing of the mind on some object has an important logical bearing on Phenomenalism. Why do we state our physical theories in terms of intermediaries like atoms and microbes, of which we either cannot be or are not generally directly aware, in spite of the fact that the only directly verifiable laws are hypothetical propositions in terms of sense-data of which we are directly aware? There are at least three motives.

(1) We certainly do begin with a belief in physical objects, *i.e.*, objects which in general resemble our sense-data, which may actually be identical with some of them, and whose existence and changes are independent of our observation.

(2) There is a methodological reason. If we stated our laws entirely in terms of sense-data of which we are directly aware, their antecedents will always have to include sense-data connected with what I call my body and its adjustment on the ordinary view. I could not say: If a bar of iron be heated it expands. I could not say: If a certain group of gray visual sense-data is accompanied by a certain group of hot tactual sense-data, then, as the tactual sense-data get hotter, the visual sense-data get larger. For I have to take into account the facts that a heated bar does not in general look longer than a cold one, and again that a bar at which no one is looking may, by its expansion, cause a railway accident. I must add to my law something of the following kind: If I use a micrometer gauge in a certain way I shall be aware of a difference in my visual sense-data. Then I must analyse the micrometer into visual and tactual sense-data, and, since I am not always using micrometers when rods are heated, I must introduce into the antecedent of my law a reference to the muscular and other sensations which are the phenomenal interpretation of the fact that I am using a micrometer in the proper way. It is clear that, whether this be the right method of stating physical laws or not, it would be intolerably complicated in practice. We

therefore analyse the directly verifiable hypothetical into several parts. One part is supposed to go on regardless of people's minds, and, in general, regardless of the adjustment of their bodily organs. This has various effects which happen whether anyone becomes aware of them or not; *e.g.*, the expansion of the physical rails alters the gauge of the line, a physical train comes and runs off, and only at this last stage do people become aware that anything has happened. But it is further supposed that this physical process, combined with certain other physical and physiological conditions which are only occasionally fulfilled, will give rise to the awareness of certain sense-data in human minds. As this is on the whole the least usual and the least important of the immediate consequences of the physical process, we do not want every time we refer to it to introduce the hypothesis that these conditions are fulfilled. There are thus the very strongest practical motives for dividing up the observable process which can only directly serve to verify a phenomenal law into two parts, one of which at least goes on whether we perceive it or not, and another which depends on the presence of variable physiological conditions, and results, if these be present, in human minds becoming aware of certain sense-data from which they can judge that the first process has taken place.

Let us just recapitulate the results that we have at present reached. We have seen (*a*) that all physical laws do contain a great deal more than we can directly verify. A hypothetical proposition is directly verified by our actually observing in a sufficient number of cases the actual occurrence of the events mentioned in the antecedent accompanied or followed by those mentioned in the consequent. So all that we can directly verify will be hypotheticals about our sense-data, and moreover the antecedents of these will have to contain a reference to the sense-data, muscular sensations, etc., which on the ordinary theory are said to be connected with the adjustment of our bodily organs; for, unless these be present, we shall not

be aware of the other sense-data mentioned in the antecedent of the law, and so the law will not be directly verifiable. (b) Natural science and common sense substitute for these very complex and restricted but directly verifiable laws an analysis which makes them depend on the consilience of two sets of more general physical laws which separately are not directly verifiable. One of these sets of laws is about the changes of physical objects other than the human body; *e.g.*, "Iron expands when heated." The other set is about the connexion between changes in physical objects other than the body, changes in the body, and the awareness by the human mind of certain sense-data and of certain changes in sense-data. *E.g.*, a piece of iron when expanding will give rise to changes in the visual sense-data of a person who looks at the end of it through a microscope. We may, I think, fairly conclude that unless we had had a tendency to make this kind of analysis we could never have got far with physics. In the first place our laws would have been too complex and unwieldy to use or remember; in the second place there would have been no motive to look for co-ordinations between separate verified laws, for quite often the only connexion between phenomenal laws which we now believe to be closely connected is the fact that they are all implied by some general physical theory like the electromagnetic theory of light. So if our tendency to make this kind of analysis be a fault it is a *felix culpa*. Still, of course, the fact that a certain kind of analysis is useful and even indispensable in practice does not prove that our belief in its hypothetical laws and entities is justifiable. We must remember that, after all, this method is not strictly analysis; it is not simply the breaking up of a complex into separately verifiable parts. It is the showing that a complex but limited law would hold if two simpler and more general ones held. The complex one can be directly verified, *i.e.*, it only has the amount of uncertainty that all inductive conclusions have, the simpler ones have all this + the fact that,

even if the complex law be absolutely true, the simpler ones which together imply it will only thereby have their probabilities increased. So we come to the third question : Is there any logical ground for our preference for physical over phenomenal laws ?

(3) Let us take the proposition : Typhoid fever is caused by certain microscopic germs in the blood. Now typhoid certainly exists at times when no one is aware of any sense-data of this kind. But the phenomenalist will say : What this law means is that whenever a patient has symptoms of typhoid I could, after making certain volitions and having certain visual and tactual sensations (which process people who believe in matter call looking at the man's blood through a microscope), become aware of certain peculiarly shaped visual sense-data. This hypothetical proposition may be true though I do not actually have these volitions, go through this process, and end by being aware of these visual sense-data.

But the following reply would almost certainly be made. Typhoid in any actual case cannot possibly be caused by anything that is not itself actual, my real typhoid cannot be caused by what you might have done but did not do or by what might have existed if you had done certain things which you never did. You have not told me what caused this case of typhoid ; you have only told me that any case of typhoid which is also accompanied by certain volitions, muscular sensations, etc., in the patient's doctor will be followed by the doctor's awareness of certain peculiarly shaped visual sense-data. And I wanted to know the cause of *my* typhoid, not that of the visual sensations of some other patient's doctor. Now the common view gives to every actual case of typhoid an actual cause, viz., germs ; and this cause also explains why, under certain circumstances, doctors perceive peculiar visual sense-data, and why they only do so in connexion with typhoid patients. If it be really a part of the law of causation that actual events must have actual causes, and that it is only possible events that can follow

from merely possible causes, and if the law of causation be true, then I think Phenomenalism will be in trouble.

I understand the law of causation to say that every event is connected with some other event by a causal law. And I understand this to mean that, if q be any event, there is some other event p such that whenever p happens q happens within a definite interval. Here, of course, p and q must be abstract enough to be capable of recurring. Now let q be a particular case of typhoid fever, *e.g.*, let it be my typhoid fever. If no one has seen the germs in my blood and no one has examined the insides of the oysters that I ate, then, strictly speaking, there has been no event on a phenomenalist view such that whenever it recurs I shall again have typhoid fever, *i.e.*, my typhoid had no cause. Suppose you go on to say: "But, if you had examined the oysters, you would have had certain sense-data, and these cannot be experienced again without your again having typhoid"; this is not relevant. For the awareness of these sense-data was not itself the cause of the present attack, since it did not precede the attack. And you can hardly say that the hypothetical proposition is the cause of the attack. And, of course, if you say: "It is the fact which *would* have caused you to become aware of these sense-data *if* you acted appropriately which *actually* caused your attack," you have deserted Phenomenalism for the common view.

Is this a valid argument against Phenomenalism? I expect the phenomenalist to say that it takes too conventional a view of causation, and I remember that Mr. Russell has said that the law of causation is probably not true in any sense in which it is useful to science. I therefore want to make quite clear what I suppose myself to have shown. (a) If the phenomenalist says that I am not using causation in the scientific sense, but in some mystical or metaphysical one, he is wrong. I have nowhere introduced into my argument the notion of activity, or of the cause compelling the effect to happen. I have taken causal laws in the approved phenomenalist sense as laws of regular connexion. (b) I have not even assumed in my actual argument

that the cause must precede the effect in time, because on the phenomenalist view of causation (with which I am largely in sympathy) this does not seem to be necessary. To people who do hold that cause must precede effect I make the present of the following additional argument. On the phenomenalist view, the view that cause must precede effect, germs cannot as a rule be the cause of typhoid, even in those cases where people perform the appropriate acts and become aware of the peculiar visual sense-data. For in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the doctor only sees the germs *after* the patient has developed typhoid. On the phenomenalist view they must not be assumed to exist before the doctor saw them; hence, if cause must precede effect, they could not have caused the typhoid. (c) The best thing for the phenomenalist to do is to admit that some events have no causes. He ought to say: Such an abstract event as typhoid has no cause; though the more concrete event consisting of typhoid, certain volitions, muscular sensations, and tactual and visual sensations, has a cause in my meaning of the word, *i.e.*, it is always accompanied by the awareness of certain peculiar visual sense-data. I may say at once that I sympathise with the general view underlying this argument, though not with this particular application of it. What I mean is this.

All causal laws must deal with more or less abstract events, or they would be undiscoverable, and, if *per impossibile* discoverable, would be useless. And there is no general principle to tell us how abstractly to take our events. Now it does not seem to me to be *a priori* certain or indeed very probable that if *q* be any event of any arbitrary degree of abstractness there must be some other event *p* such that whenever *p* happens *q* always happens within a definite interval. It does therefore seem to me quite likely that some events have no causes in the sense of cause which I agree with the phenomenologists in using. But, although I believe that this is so in general, I certainly do not believe, as I should have to do if I were a phenomenalist, that no event which does not include those muscular and other

sensations which I attribute to my bodily organs and the adjustments of them which I have to make to observe what the common view calls the cause has any cause at all. The fact is that the phenomenalist theory cannot distinguish between those cases where I cannot or do not trouble to observe the cause, and cases where there is no cause to find; and it cannot take as events in its causal laws anything less abstract than those which include all the sensations and volitions which the common theory connects merely with the act of deciding to look for a cause and adjusting the body or using an instrument with that end in view. Many people would regard this as a conclusive argument against phenomenalism. I do not go so far. But I think we are entitled to say that we have shown two things: (*a*) that phenomenologists have never grasped how much alteration their theory demands in our most ordinary beliefs about a great many other things beside physical objects, and (*b*) that it is most unlikely that we should have discovered and verified many of the common laws of physics (even when stated in purely phenomenal terms) or had any motive to look for them, unless we had habitually analysed phenomenal and directly verifiable laws into the consilience of more general physical laws partly about our own bodies and partly about other bodies.

Let us consider the last point more in detail. I imagine it will be admitted to be a fact, but what is its *logical* bearing on the validity of Phenomenalism? The phenomenologist will doubtless say: The mere fact that a certain hypothetical analysis in terms of not directly verifiable laws was necessary for you to discover and verify certain phenomenal regularities and to co-ordinate them with each other is only of psychological interest. It is of no logical importance; it no more adds to the probability of your unverifiable laws and entities than the fact that cycloids are most easily treated by regarding them as produced by circles rolling on straight lines adds to the probability that all cycloidal bodies in nature are actually produced in this way. This is a plausible contention, let us test it.

The first point to notice is that, when we say that a certain law would not have been discovered unless people had believed a certain physical theory, the connexion between the law and the theory is different according as we do or do not think it important to state the law in purely phenomenal terms. When I say : " It is a law of light that there is always a small bright spot in the middle of the shadow cast by a small circular object like a threepenny piece, and this fact would never have been noticed if it had not been a deduction from the wave theory of light," I simply mean that, although there would doubtless have been many instances of the operation of this law in nature, none of them would have been noticed if people had not been moved to look for them by their desire to test the wave theory by its consequences. But the phenomenalist must mean something very different. The unnoticed cases are not instances of a phenomenal law at all : the phenomenal law must include among its antecedents all those muscular, visual, and tactual sensations which the ordinary view connects with the adjustment of the body to look for the effect. So the phenomenalist must say that the fact that the man sees that this result follows from the wave theory and that he desires to test the theory is the condition, not merely of his verifying the law, but also of there being any instances of its operation in nature at all. This difference, however, is not, I think, of direct logical importance.

But the following considerations are of considerable logical importance. The reason why phenomenal laws are supposed to be superior to physical laws is that the former can be directly verified ; *i.e.*, if a phenomenal law be of the form " If p happens q always follows," we can actually observe p and then observe q . If we can do this often enough the phenomenal law is rendered highly probable by induction by simple enumeration. The probability of the corresponding physical law is necessarily smaller on the same evidence ; for it is equal to the probability of the phenomenal law on the evidence,

multiplied by that of the physical law on the assumption that the phenomenal law is true; and the latter is, of course, a proper fraction. But we must notice that the only connexion between a great many phenomenal laws is the fact that they are all implied by a certain set of physical laws. For example, many of the particular phenomenal laws about light, each of which is rendered highly probable by the repeated observation of favourable instances, have no logical connexion with each other except that they are all implied by the wave theory of light, which is a physical theory and not directly verifiable. Now consider some rather recondite deduction from the wave theory, *e.g.*, the example of the bright spot in the middle of the circular shadow. We can state a corresponding phenomenal law, and of course this law, being phenomenal, is in theory capable of direct verification by induction by simple enumeration. But we must notice (*a*) that we generally do not trouble to verify such laws by trying the experiment a great number of times; that (*b*) the concatenation of circumstances needed to give an instance of the antecedent of the phenomenal law is so complicated that, from the nature of the case, we cannot experience many actual instances of the working of the law, even if it be true; and (*c*) that it has no direct logical connexion with the other laws about light which we can render highly probable by repeated direct verification.

Yet, in spite of this, we do regard such laws as but little less probable than those which we can and do repeatedly verify. The only logical justification for this is the following. The set ϕ of phenomenal laws which I can make highly probable by direct verification are all implied by the set ψ of hypothetical physical laws. The phenomenal law l which I do not or cannot render at all highly probable by the number of direct verifications is also implied by the set ψ . Let us call h the evidence for the set of phenomenal laws ϕ ; h will be of the form "I have experienced n_1 favourable instances and no unfavourable instance of the law ϕ_1 , I have experienced n_2 favourable instances and no

unfavourable instances of the law ϕ_2 , . . . and so on for all the laws in the set." Then, if we write p/q for the probability of any proposition p on any piece of evidence q we shall have the following results:—

$$\begin{aligned}
 l &\equiv l\psi \text{ or } l\psi', \text{ where } \psi' \text{ is the contradictory of } \psi. \\
 \therefore l/h &= \psi/h \cdot l/\psi h + \psi'/h \cdot l/\psi' h \text{ (by a well-known law of} \\
 &\quad \text{probability).} \\
 &= \psi/h + \psi'/h \cdot l/\psi' h. \quad (\text{For, since } \psi \text{ implies } l, \\
 &\quad l/\psi h = 1.) \\
 &= \psi/h + (1 - \psi/h) \cdot l/\psi' h. \quad (\text{Since } \psi/h + \psi'/h = 1.) \\
 &= \psi/h (1 - l/\psi' h) + l/\psi' h.
 \end{aligned}$$

Let us consider the formula that we have reached. The last factor is the probability of the law l on the assumption that the physical laws are false and that we still have the evidence for the phenomenal laws. This probability will be exceedingly small; for the whole point about the law l is that, apart from the physical theory, we had no reason to expect it, but that on the contrary it is something of a paradox. Hence this factor will add very little to the total probability. Similarly it follows that the factor $1 - l/\psi' h$ is very nearly equal to 1. Hence we see that the probability of the law l on the evidence h is very nearly the same as the probability of the physical theory on the same evidence. It follows that if I confine my attention to l and ϕ to the exclusion of ψ I have neither direct nor indirect evidence for thinking such laws as l highly probable, though I actually do so. There are in fact a great many purely phenomenal laws in which we firmly believe which we can have no logical ground for thinking appreciably more probable than the set of physical laws ψ . We can put the whole matter in a slightly different way. Such phenomenal laws as l will have very little probability unless the set of physical laws ψ has great probability, but the mere fact that ψ implies the highly probable set of phenomenal laws ϕ will not suffice to make ψ

highly probable unless ψ itself has considerable intrinsic probability.

I conclude then that if we confine ourselves to a belief in phenomenal laws, and deny a high intrinsic probability to certain physical laws, we shall have no right to believe many phenomenal laws nearly as strongly as all physicists, including those who are phenomenologists, do believe them. Once more I cannot call this a conclusive argument against Phenomenalism: possibly we do believe the recondite results of well established physical theories even when expressed in phenomenal terms much more strongly than we ought to do. But I do think that we have again shown that most phenomenologists are far from clear as to the implications of their views.

On the other hand, I do not think that anything that we have said is necessarily incompatible with such a form of phenomenism as Mr. Russell seems to want. Consider for a moment what is involved in a physical theory. There are hypothetical laws and hypothetical entities which obey these laws. Now the most noteworthy fact in the history of physical science is the persistence of general form of the hypothetical laws and the constant changes in the suppositions as to the nature of the hypothetical entities. And really this is exactly what we ought to expect. The hypothetical laws are the only part of the physical theory which continually have their probability increased by the fact that they imply phenomenal laws which are constantly verified. But if you say anything more about the private nature of the hypothetical entities over and above the fact that they are the sort of entities that obey these laws your statements are in no way rendered more probable by the success of the physical theory, however great that may be. Your beliefs about the private natures of the entities in fact can only be based on analogies with certain sense-data; and it is natural that one analogy should strike one generation of physicists and another analogy should strike another generation. These analogies have

undoubtedly been helpful in practice, but we ought to recognise at once that all statements based on them are in an entirely different and much inferior logical position to the hypothetical laws. Hence there would be a very great logical advantage if it were possible to define certain logical functions of our sense-data as the entities to which the laws of physics apply. The nature of the functions must, of course, be such that when you say that they obey the laws of physics you *ipso facto* imply all the well verified laws concerning the sense-data of which they are functions. We must be careful, however, not to confuse ourselves as to what is possible in this direction; Mr. Russell sometimes seems to me to speak as if he hoped to define functions which both obeyed the present recognised laws of physics and involved no statements about sense-data other than those which a solipsist could verify directly. These two objects, if he really has them, do not seem to me to be compatible. The present laws of physics do involve statements about sense-data which for any one person are only possible and not actually experienced. This does not seem to be undesirable, since it is the condition of all prediction by physical laws; a physical law which was a mere translation of the experiences that a man can remember would be of very little use. The most that we can ask is (a) that the hypothetical physical laws shall not imply anything contrary to what the solitary physicist can directly verify; (b) that, as a whole, they should be rendered highly probable by what he can verify; and (c) that the minimum possible shall be asserted as to the private nature of the hypothetical entities. ✓

IX.—THE PHILOSOPHY OF MAINE DE BIRAN: THE WAY OUT OF SENSATIONALISM.

By ARTHUR ROBINSON.

EVEN in his own country Maine de Biran has scarcely met with the recognition that is his due, and in other countries he may fairly be said to be almost unknown. To most of those who are acquainted with his writings this fate appears not only unmerited but even, to a large extent, inexplicable. It is true that his personal character, the course of his life, and the philosophical atmosphere of his time all conspired to keep him unknown, but though these circumstances soften the inexplicability they do not avail to remove it.

It may appear a piece of manifest unwisdom to attempt to create an interest in a philosopher of whom history has so little to say, and whose works are mostly out of print and scarce.

In extenuation I may point out that there is a close kinship between the philosophy of de Biran and that of Bergson—a kinship of the spirit rather than the letter, no doubt, but still considerable enough to ensure that the study of the one will throw light on the study of the other. Take, for instance, de Biran's theory that we labour under an illusion with regard to the reality which is actually within us, an illusion born of our tendency to objectify and represent what is incapable of being objectified and represented, and that philosophy must overcome and reverse this tendency—"il faut pour ainsi dire désobjectiver la conscience et l'apercevoir dans son intimité."* The resemblance to the views of Bergson is obvious. Further, the influence of Ravaisson on Bergson is well known, and the

* Tisserand, *L'Anthropologie de Maine de Biran*, p. 26.

influence of Maine de Biran on Ravaisson may be gathered from the latter's brilliant thesis, *De l'habitude*.^{*} In a sense, Bergson's philosophy has no "origins"; to treat it as a mosaic and trace the sources of the bits is merely stupid. But it is the continuation of a movement, and that movement includes de Biran and Ravaisson. So de Biran actually touches the thought of the present day, and the investigation of his views is not merely of antiquarian interest. Perhaps he even foresaw Bergson: "Qui sait tout ce que peut la réflexion concentrée, et s'il n'y a pas un nouveau monde intérieur qui pourra être découvert un jour par quelque *Colomb métaphysicien*?" (*Pensées*, p. 213.)

Again, de Biran was a psychologist by constitution: his works abound in subtle observations and interesting suggestions. The problems with which he wrestles so patiently are still problems—the nature of mental activity, of perception, of the self. If psychology, as Ebbinghaus remarks, has a long past and a short history, that short history has certainly not been unduly explored. The purpose of this paper is simply to investigate one little corner of it.

M. Ernest Naville† divides the philosophical career of de Biran into three periods (N. i, vi). The first—the Philosophy of Sensation—runs from 1794 to 1804; the second—the Philosophy of the Will—from 1804 to 1818; the third—the Philosophy of Religion—from 1818 to 1824. These periods are marked by distinctive characteristics, and the division is convenient and useful provided it is not pressed into a too mechanical delimitation, and the "real duration" of the movement of thought thinned and tortured to fit the plan of a "spatialized time." It is with the first of these periods

^{*} Reprinted in the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 1894.

[†] The editions of Maine de Biran's works chiefly quoted in this paper are:—(1) *Œuvres Philosophiques*, Éd. Cousin, Paris, 1841; (2) *Œuvres Inédites*, Éd. Naville, Paris, 1859. The former is referred to as C., the latter as N.

that we are now concerned—a period which presents the spectacle of a sincere and subtle thinker, who believes himself to be an ideologist and disciple of Condillac, gradually reasoning himself out of Sensationalism under the guidance of a clue found in the authorities of that school but never pursued by them. This feat de Biran accomplished practically by his own unaided genius, for during this period it is clear that he had very little acquaintance with philosophy outside the ideologists. To outline this movement is the aim of this paper, wherein I shall confine myself to the rôle of a sympathetic expositor, and, as far as possible, allow de Biran to speak for himself. This is the more necessary because one great element of value in his work lies, as I have said, in its psychological suggestiveness, which is very liable to evaporate if one endeavours to recast and summarize his thought.

M. Ernest Naville states that from an examination of the notes (of de Biran) which precede the writing of the *Mémoire sur l'habitude*, it is clear that de Biran at this period had no knowledge of the general movement of philosophy in Europe, and probably did not even know the names of Reid and Kant. Condillac and the ideologists were for him the whole of philosophy. "What more," says M. Naville, "could a Life-guard of Louis XVI, whom the Revolution had banished into solitude, know?" (N. i, x.) Even in 1803 we find him complaining of his ignorance of everything which was not ideology or Cartesianism (*Science et Psychologie*, xiii).

Condillac's psychology was an attempt to reduce all the contents of consciousness and its activity as well to transformations of passive sensations.* Memory is thus a weakened sensation, attention a dominant sensation; to have two sensations at the same time is to compare and judge. In his famous statue, the senses are awakened one after the other, and then

* In the second edition of his *Traité des Sensations*, Condillac acknowledges that it is by our own motor activity that we know of the existence of external bodies.

the intellectual faculties supervene upon—or rather are—the transformed sensations. Such was in the main the psychological stock-in-trade with which de Biran started. But he was indebted also to Destutt de Tracy, and to some degree (how far seems uncertain) to Cabanis.

De Tracy had himself remarked the part played by mobility in our experience. He was dissatisfied with the views of Condillac on the origin of our knowledge of bodies, and considered sensations of hearing, taste, smell, and passive touch an insufficient basis for knowledge of the external world. “La faculté de faire du mouvement et d’en avoir la conscience nous apprend, seule, qu’il existe ce que nous appelons des corps, et elles nous l’apprend par la résistance que ces corps opposent à nos mouvements. . . . La mobilité est donc le seul lien entre notre *moi* et l’univers sensible” (*Mémoire sur la faculté de penser*, N. i, xxii). There seems no doubt that de Biran found his starting point in the view suggested by de Tracy. Indeed de Biran expressly credits de Tracy with its discovery (C. i, 23, note). But if the two philosophers started from the same point they went in very different directions. Tracy reduced voluntary movement to two passive factors, a sensation of movement accompanied by a desire; and even says that it is by an illusion that man believes himself more active in will than in any other sort of experience (N. i, xxiii). So we may believe Maine de Biran to be quite original in his insistence on the active element in mind.

Cabanis also had reached a similar conclusion. “La Conscience du *moi* senti, du *moi*, reconnu distinct des autres existences, ne peut s’acquérir que par la Conscience d’un effort voulu; en un mot, le *moi* réside exclusivement dans la volonté” (*Rapports du Phys. et du Mor.*, ii, 361).

But it was a more general debt which de Biran owed to Cabanis—the application of physiology to the explanation of the mind, though even here his own experience of the changes in his inner life which accompanied the vicissitudes of his frail

body had already impelled him in that direction. But de Biran was shocked at the notion of the brain excreting thought as the liver excretes bile . . . "Dire que le cerveau filtre des pensées, c'est bien la plus grande absurdité, la plus grande impropriété de langage qu'on puisse imaginer" (N. i, xi). Cabanis, in short, thought that Condillac emphasised too much the external senses and neglected the fact that part of experience depends on internal physiological conditions.

Thus it happened that de Biran is most closely allied to de Tracy and Cabanis at the very points where they differ from Condillac.

It is quite clear from the *Journal intime* that the question which was to be for de Biran the essential one shaped itself in his mind quite early. "Qu'est-ce donc que cette activité prétendue de l'âme? Je sens toujours son état déterminé par tel ou tel état du corps. Toujours remuée au gré des impressions du dehors elle est affaissée ou élevée, triste ou joyeuse, calme ou agitée, selon la température de l'air, selon ma bonne ou mauvaise digestion. Je voudrais, si jamais je pouvais entreprendre quelque chose de suivi, rechercher jusqu'à quel point l'âme est active, jusqu'à quel point elle peut modifier les impressions extérieures, augmenter ou diminuer leur intensité, par l'attention qu'elle leur donne; examiner jusqu'où elle est maîtresse de cette attention" (*Pensées de Maine de Biran*, 27 mai, 1794, p. 113). "Dès l'enfance, je me souviens que je m'étonnais de me sentir exister; j'étais déjà porté, comme par instinct, à me regarder au dedans pour savoir comment je pouvais vivre et être moi" (*Ibid.*, p. 8, 27 octobre, 1823).

The only work published by Maine de Biran himself was the *Mémoire sur l'habitude*. This work obtained the prize offered by the Institute for a treatise on the following subject: "Déterminer quelle est l'influence de l'habitude sur la faculté de penser ou en d'autres termes, faire voir l'effet que produit sur chacune de nos facultés intellectuelles la fréquente répétition des mêmes opérations." This subject was first set in 1799. The

prize was not awarded, one of the treatises submitted received honourable mention—that of Maine de Biran. The same subject was prescribed for competition in 1801. Maine de Biran revised his essay and submitted it once more. The prize was awarded to him unanimously, the judges being Cabanis, Ginguéné, La Revellière-Lépeaux, Daunou, and Destutt de Tracy. In 1803 Maine de Biran published his essay. One may reasonably suspect that if he had not felt bound to publish it in just the form in which it won the prize, he would have continued to improve it for the rest of his life. Maine de Biran now became the friend of Tracy and Cabanis—a friendship which continued unabated after his next prize essay—(*De la décomposition de la pensée*, 1805)—had shown the gulf which separated him from the orthodox ideologists. The treatise first submitted is still in existence.*

The present Introduction (styled in the first *Mémoire*, “Un petit Traité des sens”) is in itself so interesting, and, moreover, so illustrative of de Biran’s genius, that I shall venture to give a fairly complete analysis of it, in spite of the fact that Tracy pronounced such a task very difficult or rather impossible.

“Nul ne réfléchit l’habitude,” said Mirabeau, and with this remark Maine de Biran begins his Introduction. There can be no reflection if there be no “point d’appui.” But the most general effect of habit is to remove all resistance, it is a slope down which we glide, not knowing. The first look into our minds reveals a chaos in which all elements whether they come from without or within are blended into a mass, which is in fact complex, though the influence of habit makes it appear simple. So we know things sooner and better the less intimately they are united to our existence and to our mental opérations. The most simple results of the exercise of the senses are missed through their very simplicity and familiarity,

* See “Les deux Mémoires de Maine de Biran sur l’habitude,” V. Delbos, *L’Année philosophique*, xxi (1910), p. 122.

“ tant il est vrai que la lenteur et la difficulté de nos connaissances, se proportionnent presque toujours à la proximité, à l'intimité de leurs objets, à la fréquence ou à la continuité des impressions qu'ils nous occasionnent ” (C. i, p. 11).

The labours of others (*e.g.*, Condillac and Bonnet) have made the study of habit possible. They, however, were compelled to study the human mind “ dans un fantôme hypothétique,” as Destutt de Tracy said (C. 314). Their method was that of the chemist who tries to form by synthesis a substance which he cannot analyse. In this attempt to recompose, as it were, the human mind, attention was concentrated on the number and nature of the materials. It was impossible, therefore, to observe how, in what order, and in what sequence these elements became united, what was the uniting force (“ la force d'agrégation ”), the degree of persistence which each displayed, either from its own nature or the frequency of its repetition. The study of the effects of habit presupposes a knowledge of the faculties and the operations of the understanding. Since all the intellectual faculties originate from sensation it is necessary to distinguish the different ways in which we sense.

Maine de Biran's purpose is to seek and analyse *effects* as it is given to us to know them by reflection (*a*) on what we ourselves experience in the exercise of our senses and other faculties, and (*b*) on the conditions or play of the organs whereon the exercise of our faculties appears to depend. Thus he attempts to unite at least, in some respects, ideology to physiology. Of the nature of forces, he adds, we know nothing except by their effects.

The next part of the Introduction consists of an examination of the nature and development of thought—a necessary preliminary to the enquiry into the effects of habit. Its first object is to clear up the ambiguity of the term “ sensation,” which played so many rôles in the system of Condillac.

The first and most general of the faculties manifested by

a living organism is that of receiving impressions. Maine de Biran adopted the word "*impression*" to mean the result of the action of an object on a living part. Thus it had for him the same meaning as that of "*sensation*" in its ordinary acceptance, and he avoided in this way the ambiguous use of "sensation," which was applied to either a simple feeling of pleasure or pain, or a complex composed of an impression and a movement.

The guiding theme of the discussion is introduced by the distinction of all impressions into active and passive. There are certain experiences, *e.g.*, a feeling of cold or heat, internal pain or pleasure, which are beyond our power to alter. We are then in a passive state. True, the affair is not simply mechanical, like one body impinging on another. The sense-organ in each case plays its part and gives the note rather than receives it. This sense-activity de Biran sharply distinguishes from motor-activity; it is to the latter exclusively that he limits the term activity.

"Que je meuve en effet un de mes membres, ou que je me transporte d'un lieu à un autre, en faisant abstraction de toute autre impression que celle qui résulte de mon propre mouvement, je suis modifié d'une manière bien différente que dans le cas précédent: d'abord, c'est bien *moi* qui crée ma modification, je puis la commencer, la suspendre, la varier de toutes les manières, et la conscience que j'ai de mon activité, est pour moi d'une évidence égale à la modification même.

"Lorsque je suis borné aux sensations purement *affectives* si l'une devient assez vive pour occuper toute ma faculté de sentir, je m'identifie avec elle; je n'en sépare pas mon existence, il me semble que mon *moi* est concentré dans un point, le temps et l'espace ont disparu, je ne distingue, je ne compare rien" (C. i, 22-23).

It is then in the experience of movement that the relation necessary for the judgment of personality, "I am," is found; that the same basis could be found in impressions absolutely

passive de Biran did not believe. Activity and personality are closely connected with the faculty of movement, which, should be distinguished from mere sensibility, though there is scarcely any impression in which both are not blended. Thus we have at one extreme the experience which results from our "loco-mobility," and on the other the experience of unusual affections in our internal organs. All other impressions of our senses are of a mixed character; the sensitive and active elements are combined in varying proportions. On these distinctions depends de Biran's use of the terms sensation and perception.

"Lorsque le sentiment prédomine jusqu'à un certain point, le mouvement qui concourt avec lui est comme nul, puisque l'individu n'en a point conscience, et l'impression demeure passive. Je conserverai à toutes celles de ce genre le nom de *sensations*. Si le mouvement prend le dessus, et en quelque sorte l'initiative, ou même, s'il est avec la sensibilité dans un degré d'équilibre tel qu'il n'en soit point éclipsé, l'individu est actif dans son impression, il aperçoit la part qu'il y prend, la distingue de lui-même, peut la comparer avec d'autres, etc. J'appellerai *perception* toute impression qui aura ces caractères" (C. i, 25).

What, then, is the share of sensibility and of movement respectively in the exercise of each of our senses?

In the sense of *touch* we find sensibility and movement perfectly united, but easy to recognise and distinguish.

For instance, if some one applies to my hand a body whose surface is rough or smooth, pleasantly warm or biting cold, during the contact I experience in this organ an impression, pleasurable or painful, which it is not in my power to increase or diminish or suspend. This is the share of feeling. To such sensations touch would be limited if it were not mobile. These passive impressions are confused and would give no basis for distinguishing the self from its modifications. Suppose, however, the body possesses a certain weight, and is left on my

hand. My experience is then different. I feel my hand pushed down and drawn by a force opposed to my own. Surely that which pushes my hand, or which constrains the movement which tends to elevate or keep my arm in position, is not the self which acts to keep it in position or to elevate it. "Quand je serais réduit à cette seule impression," de Biran continues, "je saurais qu'il y a quelque chose hors de moi que je distingue, que je compare, et tous les sophismes de l'idéaliste ne sauraient ébranler cette conviction" (C. i, 26).

Wherever, therefore, there is effort, there is always a perception of a relation between the being which moves or wishes to move and an obstruction of some kind. On the other hand, without will and resistance there is no effort, without effort no knowledge, no perception of any sort. An effortless being would not suspect any existence, not even his own. In short, it is when he begins to move that the individual perceives the first relation of existence. The foregoing remarks about a constrained movement apply equally to a free movement which is perceived through an effort depending on the resistance of the muscles.

In what consists the peculiar excellence of the sense of touch in the hand? In the fine balance of sensibility and mobility. If it were too sensitive, the movement would be interfered with, the affective element alone would remain, and the perception of forms be lost. The immense number of nerves which run to the muscles of the organ of touch are adapted at once to distinction and precision of movement and variety and delicacy of sensation. In an interesting note (C. i, 32) de Biran quotes with approval a remark of Buffon's that it is to a similar blending of sensitivity and mobility in the trunk of the elephant that the notable intelligence of that animal is due, and adds that, through all the scale of living creatures in which feeling and movement are combined in such various degrees, in man alone do feeling and movement combine in the precise balance most favourable to the development of intelligence.

The eye is the most delicately sensitive of all the senses. But sight also depends on a motor activity or muscular action. So an individual limited to the sense of sight could not only *sense*, he could also *perceive*, because he could move. It is because of its mobility that the eye is so intimately related with the operations of touch. "Comment les mains pourraient-ils dire aux yeux, *Faites comme nous*, si les yeux étaient immobiles?" (C. i, 36, note). Thus, an organ deficient in mobility, which by itself would only receive passive impressions, can acquire activity by association and correspondence with a more mobile organ.

This principle is immediately applied in the case of hearing—in itself an exceedingly passive sense, but nature has bound its impressions to an organ essentially motor. For when we hear, the organ of speech is roused to sympathetic action, and reflects the movements towards their source and incorporates them in the individual's activity.* "En entendant chanter ou parler, nous chantons nous parlons tout bas." "L'individu qui écoute est lui-même son propre écho" (C. i, 39). So in the case of hearing and speech, just as in that of touch and sight, it is a more mobile organ which communicates its activity to one more sensitive and less mobile.

The sense of taste seems closely related to that of touch. If the sensibility takes the upper hand in taste-impressions, motor-activity becomes obscure in proportion. The taste-organ is highly mobile, but in touch movement is the main thing, while in taste it is secondary and the sensation is the goal. In taste the agent is always more or less passive. In proportion as taste-sensations are less affective, less associated with actions of the internal organs, and more surrendered to the movements of the organ of taste, they approach the nature of perceptions. So also the tastes of solids are more distinct in

* Cf. Bergson, *Matière et Mémoire*, 115 (Eng. Tr., 136); Wildon Carr, *Philosophy of Change*, 119.

the sense and somewhat less confused in recollection than those of liquids.

Smell is the most immobile and passive of our senses. It holds the same position among our external senses as the polyp or the oyster in the scale of animality. Hence several odours may blend into one which defies analysis.

Last come the impressions experienced from the inner parts of the body. These de Biran calls "pure sensations": here effort, distinction, recollection, vanish as movement disappears.

In general, therefore, distinction and perception increase in proportion to the increase of the mobility of the organ and the decrease of its sensibility. Hence de Biran concludes that distinguishing or perceiving does not depend on sensibility but on voluntary mobility. Thus it follows that perception cannot be exercised on all kinds of experiences; each class of impressions has its own specific character which fits it to be either perceived or sensed. This character depends (*a*) on the form of the organ; (*b*) on the proportion in which feeling and movement are combined; (*c*) on the mode of the external action; (*d*) on the degree of excitation. Consequently, an impression can be *sensed* without being *perceived*: we cannot *perceive* a sensation. If we touch a hot body, we perceive the solidity at the same time that we sense the heat, but we cannot say that we perceive the latter. In short, sensation has been made a generic term and wrongly applied to include both sensations and perceptions. The theory that sensation transforms itself into various operations (*i.e.*, memory, attention, etc.) is untrue, for no sensations (in de Biran's sense) ever transform themselves at all.

When a sense-organ is first stimulated by an object or when a motor-organ first acts on an object, a change is produced in the sense-organ in the first case, or in the central-system in the second. This is called a disposition (*détermination*). There are two classes of dispositions (corresponding to the two classes of impressions), one for feeling (*sentiment*), another for movement. These dispositions can be made active (*a*) by the action of the

cause which formed them, (b) in the absence of these causes by a living force inherent in the organs once they have been set going by the objects.

If the sensitive disposition is rendered active by a fresh action of the external cause, what is the result? The resulting modification is like the first except in degree, which is in proportion to the intensity and persistence of the disposition first set up in the organ. The renewed sensation is in general *feebler and less affective*. To perceive this difference the individual must recognise the sensation as being the same he had sensed before; on the other hand, he could not so recognise it without perceiving some difference.

Maine de Biran next raises the question whether it is possible to recognise our sensations when they re-appear, simply by their own intrinsic characters and the changes which befall them. He answers, no. The more separate and exclusive our sensations are, the less are we able to recognise them if they re-appear. In order to compare two manners of being or to perceive their difference, the self must somehow put itself outside the one and the other. There must be a first judgment of personality. This is clearly impossible for a self which is identified with all its modifications. It is a contradiction to suppose that the self is identified with all its modifications and yet that it compares and distinguishes them. In a sensation renewed and weakened there is no base for recollection: "pour que l'être sentant pût distinguer le *souvenir* de la sensation, ou pour qu'il y eût en lui l'équivalent de ce que nous appelons *souvenir*, il faudrait que le *moi* modifié actuellement, se comparât au même *moi* modifié dans un autre instant; il faudrait comme l'a dit Condillac, 'qu'il sentît faiblement *ce qu'il a été*, en même temps qu'il sent vivement ce qu'il est': mais est-ce donc la même chose que de sentir *faiblement*, et de sentir *qu'on a été*? Comment trouver une relation de temps dans cette seule circonstance d'*affaiblissement*? Est-ce que la sensation faible n'est pas présente comme la sensation vive?" (C. i, 49.)

A motor-disposition is a tendency preserved by the organ to repeat an action or movement. The agent is conscious of a renewed effort, an effort, however, less than before. This can be recognised, because there is an identical term, the subject willing, and a varying term, the resistance. "Lorsqu'en vertu de la détermination contractée par le centre moteur et sensible, la main reprend ou *tend* à reprendre la même disposition qu'elle avait en touchant ou en embrassant un globe, l'individu se retrouve donc à peu près dans le même état *actif* où il a été, il *perçoit*; it touche encore, pour ainsi dire, par la pensée un globe absent. Cette seconde perception, très distincte de la première, se réfère à elle, et la suppose, comme une copie reconnue pour telle se réfère à l'original, c'est cette copie, ainsi conçue, qui j'appelle *idée*."

The agent is as active in the idea as in the direct impression. But the idea of the ball differs from the actual impression, because, though we can shape the movement and grasp an imaginary ball, the sensitive extremities of the fingers have not the impression they would have if the ball were present. And similarly, when the vocal organ repeats or tends to repeat the movements which correspond to the auditory impressions, the difference between the idea and the actual perception would be insensible if the hearing could renew the direct sounds, as the voice reproduces the reflected sounds. "En un mot, sans détermination motrice (originale) il n'y a ni reminiscence ni idées" (C. i, 52).

The feeling of effort, which is the origin alike of our perceptions and our ideas, admits of many degrees ("une infinité de nuances"), and weakens remarkably by repetition. But though the activity of consciousness thus weakens, its results do not; the impressions and ideas remain distinct and survive the activity. For example, in the case of sight particularly, its functions are discharged so easily that we are no longer aware of the voluntary action which directs them. The same is the case in the production of ideas or images. Visual dispositions

(*déterminations*) strongly resemble sensible dispositions. And so there are most illusions of sight and fewest of touch.

Of reproduction de Biran distinguishes two modes. The first, recall (*rappel*) or memory, is active. The second, imagination, is more or less passive, since it has to do in particular with visual images. The means of *recall* are the voluntary movements which have formed the active impressions. They are the signs of the impressions which they mark and of the ideas which they recall. "Je dirai donc que le mouvement ou l'effort reproduit dans la main, lorsqu'elle figure ou *tend* à figurer le solide, est le signe de l'idée de forme, de résistance extérieure (C. i, 55-56). Similarly with vocal movements.

"Natural signs" or "first signs" are movements which serve to recall impressions in which they have assisted. There are also secondary or artificial signs which have only more or less indirect relations with their movements, or are even purely conventional. The reason that we have no power to recall our purely affective states is that we have no "natural signs" for them, *i.e.*, no voluntary movements which enter into their formation (C. i, 57, note).

Signs are thus "l'unique soutien de la mémoire" (*Ibid.*, 57). For a being limited to sensation or passive impressions, there could be neither signs, nor ideas, nor memory.

The imagination is more closely related to the sensibility of the brain, memory to its motor force, so the products of these two faculties differ as sensation differs from perception.

Such are, in sum, the principles laid down in the Introduction. I will state very briefly how they are applied to the problem of habit. It is, of course, obvious that for Maine de Biran the essential point will be to note and compare the effects of repetition on sensations and on perceptions, between which he has drawn so deep a distinction. All impressions when continued or frequently repeated gradually grow weaker. So it often happens that the less we sense objects, the better we perceive

them, and while the sensation fades away the perception becomes clear. Compare, for instance, a smell-impression with a sight-impression. Sensations change and pass away more quickly and more completely in proportion to the passivity of their proper organ. Sounds, says de Biran, as sensations become feebler, as perceptions clearer, when repeated. Habit then alters our impressions in proportion to their passivity ; but the operation of mobility varies the result by bringing in products not subject to the same law or mode of degradation.

If then it be true that habit degrades our sensibility it cannot be on sensibility that the progress of our faculties which are capable of improvement depends. If we had no other faculties than sensation, the influence of habit would be disastrous, but its influence on the faculty of movement is quite other.

There are three causes or circumstances which tend to make a repeated impression more distinct and fit it to the perceptive faculty: (1) The weakening of the first sensible effect; (2) the increasing ease and distinctness of the appropriate movements on which its active character depends; (3) association with other movements which it determines, or with other impressions which coincide with it, and serve like so many signs as appropriate marks to distinguish it, and to cause it to be recognised when it recurs. So loud noises and bright lights interfere with perception, and this is true in general of over-sensibility. The ear cannot distinguish sounds until the vocal organ answers and reflects the impressions. Habit renders movements more and more easy, prompt and exact, but the effort or impression resulting from the movement weakens in the same ratio that the rapidity, precision, and ease increase, and in the end the movement becomes quite insensible in itself and only appears in consciousness by its products. So perception tends by its promptitude, ease, and apparent passivity to approach sensation properly so called.

In the *Mémoire sur l'habitude*, it is easy to detect the guiding ideas which characterise the philosophy of Maine de Biran. The distinction between active and passive processes, between sensation and perception, and between affective and volitional states, the insistence on effort, and its two terms on which is founded the consciousness of personality and the knowledge of the external world, the refusal to build up the mind by abstract sensations—all these are as thoroughly essential to Maine de Biran's theory as they are vitally repugnant to the tenets of the school of which he believed himself to be a disciple. This cleavage was soon to be widened.

In 1805 de Biran again obtained a prize offered by the Institute for an essay on the subject, "Comment on doit décomposer la faculté de penser et quelles sont les facultés élémentaires qu'on doit y reconnaître." This essay marks a clear rupture with the school of Condillac, and as Cousin remarks, the judges, to their infinite credit, honoured an adversary who had been a disciple. The essay was not published in the lifetime of its author; although the printing of it actually began it was discontinued. As it marks the close of the period in de Biran's thought with which we are dealing I will briefly state the position in which he now found himself.

Psychology was de Biran's point of interest, a deep dissatisfaction with the state to which ideology had reduced psychology was the force which drove him forward. The very core of the matter seemed to him to have dropped out, and though he admired the views of Cabanis he could not make psychology simply a branch of biology. The point at which matters had gone wrong, he thought, lay in the too crude application to the study of the mind of the methods and point of view of the natural sciences. What, for instance, is a faculty? In natural science it is a class of phenomena. But is it only that in psychology? or is it a real cause, an efficient force?

Bacon—"l'immortel restaurateur de la philosophie naturelle"—proposed to divide psychology as follows: (1) Of the substance of the soul; (2) of its faculties; (3) of the use and object of these faculties. But metaphysic reformed itself into a positive science of ideas or of the use and the object of the human faculties; in a word, it became ideology. Following in the track of natural science, metaphysic or ideology threw overboard ontological questions, first causes, essences and substances, etc. So disappeared the first division of the Baconian psychology. The science of the soul was then the science of its operations or faculties, which first became identified with logic, and then with grammar, and next with physiology, since ideas had physiological conditions. Thus, by following the method of Bacon, the science of Mind has disappeared; in its place we find the study of its effects and of its environment. The mind in its proper sense as subject was left out at the start, and so naturally is wanting at the conclusion of the process.

Maine de Biran has at this juncture attained a full grasp of his essential principle—the existence of mental activity, or the will, in his sense of the term. The life of man is twofold—active and passive. There is no transformation of sensations, but oddly enough, de Biran, as M. Naville remarks (i, xlii) effects a transformation equally deceptive by making intelligence only a particular aspect of the will.

In de Biran's own words,—"*Sentir et agir; avoir conscience des modifications passives; apercevoir ses actes dans leur propre détermination, ou percevoir simplement les résultats, et cela toujours dans un exercice actuel et positif de certains instruments organiques, soumis directement ou indirectement à une puissance de vouloir, moi, laquelle n'est point constituée elle-même dans sa propre réflexion, hors de cet exercice. . . . Voilà, je crois, des facultés, bien distinctes, sui generis, mais voilà tout. Telles sont, du moins, les bornes de ma vue*" (N. i, xlii).

The instability of this position is obvious. But how, and how far, Maine de Biran enlarged and strengthened it belongs to the story of the second period of his philosophy, and must be traced through the 700 pages of his *Essai sur les fondements de la psychologie*, the purpose of which was to focus and revise the results of his previous labours.

X.—COMPLEXITY AND SYNTHESIS: A COMPARISON OF THE DATA AND PHILOSOPHICAL METHODS OF MR. RUSSELL AND M. BERGSON.

By Mrs. ADRIAN STEPHEN (KARIN COSTELLOE).

THERE is one point, at least, on which all philosophers must agree, viz., that the most certain of all our knowledge (leaving out of account the *a priori* knowledge of self-evident propositions on which Logic is based) is knowledge given by immediate acquaintance. In what follows we shall use the name "datum" for whatever is an object of immediate acquaintance.

Since all knowledge (other than this *a priori* knowledge of Logic) is based on data, the first thing to do is to see what these data are. One would have supposed that, so long as anything was known by immediate acquaintance, there could be no doubt as to what it was. Unfortunately this is not so, for various reasons.

(i) We are in the habit of confusing inferences and memory with our actual data: we almost always think we are actually acquainted with what we know we could perceive under different circumstances: we tend to fill in the picture from memory, and should often find it very hard to decide for certain how much we actually perceived, and how much we ourselves added.

(ii) We also confuse data with physical objects whose existence we infer from our actual data in order to explain them. I shall take the distinction between data and physical objects for granted. Data are the actual objects of our acquaintance, and each of us has a different one of his own: the physical object is that common object whose existence we infer from our various data, and which we say is the same for

all, however various our data may be. No one actually perceives this common object (which may well be merely hypothetical): we each perceive our own data, but we explain their connection by assuming a common object which stands impartially for all of them. It is clear that what is true of this common object will often be false of our data, and *vice versa*. Now if we are not careful always to bear in mind the distinction between the two we tend to assert that certain propositions are obviously true of our data which really are only obviously true of the common object by which we explain the connection of our data with each other and with those of other people.

(iii) Finally, even if we avoid confusing our data with inferences, memory, or physical objects we shall still have difficulty in deciding what they really are, because they are always varying according to the amount to which we attend to them. We cannot decide what they are without attending to them, but yet the very act of attending produces a difference in the object of our acquaintance; as our attention varies so does our datum. It is hard to fix a datum at all, and in doing so we replace that datum by another, and so defeat our own end.

For all these various reasons it is so difficult to know what really is given by immediate acquaintance, that we cannot be surprised if introspection (which is the examination of data) yields different results for different people.

In spite of the difficulties, however, it is clear that, since data are the most certain of all our knowledge, anyone who is interested in the nature and extent of knowledge must decide what our data really are.

It is universally admitted that there are no instantaneous data—all data cover a period of change. Some data, however, change more obviously than others, and we will begin by examining these.

We commonly assume that we always perceive change as

a series of events or states in relations of before and after. M. Bergson, however, has done a service to philosophy by pointing out that our data of change are not all of the same kind. An unbiassed introspection shows us that our data of change fall roughly into two classes.

(i) Sometimes when we perceive change our data do appear to form a series of distinct terms in relations of before and after. We will call such data complexes.

(ii) But besides complexes there are other data which, though they last through a period of change and are a succession and not simply one constant term, yet do not appear to form a series of distinct terms in relations of before and after. We will call such data syntheses. Syntheses are much less familiar than complexes and some people deny that we are really acquainted with such data at all. Later we shall consider instances in which our data do appear to be syntheses, and at the same time we shall discuss the arguments offered to show that these data are not really what they appear to be.

In what follows we shall compare the views of Mr. Russell and M. Bergson on the nature of data.

To begin with, both admit that data appear to fall roughly into the two classes which we distinguished, viz., complexes and syntheses. Mr. Russell (*Knowledge of the External World*, pp. 143 and 144) considers the claim made that data of change are sometimes syntheses and not complexes.

"It is often urged that, as a matter of immediate experience, the sensible flux is devoid of divisions I have no wish to argue that this view is *contrary* to immediate experience Suppose, for example, a coloured surface on which the colour changes gradually—so gradually that the difference of colour in two very neighbouring portions is imperceptible, while the difference between more widely separated portions is quite noticeable. The effect produced, in such a case, will be precisely that of 'interpenetration,' of transition which is not a matter of discrete units."

In this passage Mr. Russell admits that our data of change sometimes do appear not to form a series; on the other hand he certainly holds that they very often do. On p. 145 he says, "it is undeniable that the visual field, for example, is complex." Mr. Russell ought surely to say "it is undeniable that the visual field *sometimes appears* complex." He should say "sometimes" because the gradual change of a colour may occupy the visual field, and we have just seen that he admits that that does not appear complex. Again, he should say "appears" because his argument is that introspection is not to be relied on to show what data really are. By introspection we can only find out what they appear to be. On p. 145 he says, "From what has just been said it follows that the nature of sense-data cannot be validly used to prove that they are not composed of mutually external units. It may be admitted, on the other hand, that nothing in their empirical character specially necessitates the view that they are composed of mutually external units. This view, if it is held, must be held on logical, not on empirical, grounds."

We see then that Mr. Russell refuses to allow the question as to what data are to be settled by introspection, but that he is willing to admit that, on the showing of introspection, data of change do appear to be sometimes complexes and sometimes syntheses. M. Bergson agrees that introspection shows data to be roughly of these two kinds.

In *Les données immédiates de la conscience*, p. 98, he says—

"... nos perceptions, sensations, émotions et idées se présentent sous un double aspect: l'un net, précis..." (*i.e.*, a complex); "l'autre confus, infiniment mobile, et inexprimable, parceque le langage ne saurait le saisir sans en fixer la mobilité..." (*i.e.*, a synthesis).

["Our perceptions, sensations, and ideas, are given to us in two ways: one distinct and clear..." (*i.e.*, a complex); "the other confused, in perpetual motion and incapable of expression because words could not contain it without arresting its motion..."]

Again in *La perception du changement*, p. 27, he says—

“Quand nous écoutons une mélodie, nous avons la plus pure impression de succession que nous puissions avoir—une impression aussi éloignée que possible de celle de la simultanéité, et pourtant c’est la continuité même de la mélodie et l’impossibilité de la décomposer qui fait sur nous cette impression.”

[“When we listen to music we have the purest possible impression of succession—an impression which is as far removed as possible from that of simultaneity—and yet it is the very continuity of the music, and the impossibility of dividing it up, that gives us this impression.”]

The music is here the sort of datum which we have called a synthesis. The quotation goes on, “Si nous la découpions en notes distinctes, en autant d’‘avant’ et d’‘après’ qu’il nous plaît”

[“If we break it up into distinct notes, into as many ‘before’s’ and ‘after’s’ as we like”]

Here, then, he admits that the music can be perceived as a series of distinct sounds in relations of earlier and later. This datum would be a complex.

We will take it as admitted that our data do at least appear to be of these two kinds. It is worth while to see what is the essential point in which these kinds differ. The difference seems to depend on whether the datum consists or does not consist of logical terms and relations.

The question as to whether or not all data must really be composed of logical terms and relations is one of the most fundamental points over which Mr. Russell and M. Bergson disagree.

Logical terms must be distinct from one another and self-identical: logical relations must be external to their terms, *i.e.*, a term can have any number of logical relations and yet be simple.

Logical relations have various properties according to their

definition, *e.g.*, the logical relations of difference and likeness are defined as symmetrical and transitive. It is undeniable that logic applies to something. What pure mathematics and pure physics deal with is obviously logical. The point at issue between Mr. Russell and M. Bergson is whether any, some, or all of our data consist of such terms and relations as would satisfy the logical definition of terms and relations.

So far we have seen that our data of change seem to fall roughly into two groups, *viz.*, complexes and syntheses. Of these, complexes seem to be logical, syntheses not. Are we then to say that some data are logical and some are not, as appears to be the case?

Neither Mr. Russell nor M. Bergson accept this view.

Mr. Russell assumes that complexes not only appear to be, but really are, logical. He undertakes to show that some of the data which appear not to be logical must really be so in fact. And since some must be, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that all are.

In *Knowledge of the External World*, p. 143, he says: "The question whether sense-data are composed of mutually external units is not one which cannot be decided by empirical evidence"; p. 144, ". . . . there must be among sense-data differences so slight as to be imperceptible: the fact that sense-data are immediately given does not mean that their differences also *must* be immediately given (though they may be)"; p. 141, "When we are considering the actual data of sensation in this connection" (*viz.*, to find out the nature of change) "it is important to realize that two sense-data may be, and *must* sometimes be, really different when we cannot perceive any difference between them." If this be true it follows that (p. 142), "although we cannot distinguish sense-data unless they differ by more than a certain amount, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that sense-data of a given kind, such as weights or colours" (*i.e.*, such as appear to form a synthesis) "really form a compact series."

Mr. Russell's argument to show that data *must* sometimes really contain differences, when we cannot perceive any differences, rests on an experiment made originally by Stumpf.

It will be necessary, in examining this argument, to bear in mind very carefully the difference between the physical object or cause of the data (which we infer from it, but with which we are not actually acquainted) and the data themselves, for I believe that the plausibility of the argument rests on a confusion of these two.

The argument is as follows:—

Take any series of physical objects, each differing very slightly from the other, *e.g.*, a series of coloured stuffs passing from yellow to red. Such a series may easily be arranged so that, if you take the datum caused by attending to any one of the stuffs and compare it with the data caused by attending to the ones immediately next to it on either side, this datum cannot be distinguished from either of the other two. We may call this stuff O and the stuffs next to it, on either side, Y and R respectively. We will call the corresponding data *o*, *y*, *r*. If we compare *o* and *y*, *o* cannot be distinguished from *y*. Again, if we compare *o* and *r*, *o* cannot be distinguished from *r*. But it may be quite possible to distinguish *y* from *r*.

From this Stumpf argues (and Mr. Russell agrees) that *o* must really have been different, both from *y* and *r*, even though we could not distinguish it from either of them.

Let us ignore, for the present, the fact that we know that the data *y*, *o*, *r*, depend on three different physical causes. What we actually perceive are the following three facts:

o and *y* do not look like two different colours.

o and *r* do not look like two different colours.

y and *r* do look like two different colours.

If we could assume *a priori* that different physical objects always produced different data, Stumpf's argument would be proved. As soon as we knew that Y, O, R, were different

physical objects, we should then be sure that y, o, r , were different data, whether we could perceive any difference between them or not. We cannot, however, decide disputes concerning the nature of data by appealing to physical objects, since the physical object, if it is known at all, is never known directly but only by inference from data. This inferred object, therefore, cannot be used to prove that the source from which our knowledge of it is derived is really different from what we suppose it to be. If data are not compatible with what we know of physical objects then we have made a mistake about what the physical object is, not about the data.

Arguments, then, to show that data are really not what we perceive them to be, must be based, not on the nature of physical objects, but on the data themselves.

The data, in this case, are:—

o and y do not look like different colours.

o and r do not look like different colours.

y and r do look like different colours.

From these data we infer three physical objects Y, O, R . Of Y, O, R , it would not be true to say that Y and R can both be like O and yet not be like each other.

But it is the empirical fact on which the whole experiment is based, that y and r can and do both look like o and yet do not look like each other.

It is argued from this that o must really be different both from y and r , but this only follows if we suppose that what is true of the relations of physical objects must also be true of perceived relations; *i.e.*, that, *e.g.*, looking like and looking different must have the logical properties (such as symmetry and transitivity) which belong to the relations of likeness and difference which hold between physical objects. In logic to be like anything is a transitive relation which involves being also like everything which is like that thing.

The empirical fact, however, that y and r both look like o

and yet do not look like each other, cannot be disputed. It is the point of the whole experiment. From this it follows that looking like anything does *not* involve looking like everything else which looks like that thing. It is argued from this that, since *y* and *r* look different, while *y* and *o* and *r* and *o* look alike, then either *y* and *r* are not really different (though they look different) or else *o* and *y* or *o* and *r* are not really alike (though they look alike). Whence it follows that sense-data must sometimes really *be* different from what they *appear* to be.

The weak point in this argument comes in in saying that the relation of likeness which has the logical property of transitivity is "real," while the perceived relation which does not have this property is not real but only "appears." This is just like arguing that because a physical penny is round, our data cannot "really" be oval but only "appear" to be oval. We remarked at the beginning how necessary it is to guard against confusing the actual data of our acquaintance with the physical objects which we infer from them. We must be equally careful to avoid confusion in the case of perceived and inferred relations.

Confusion creeps in with the use of the words "reality" and "appearance." When we contrast physical objects with our data we call the physical objects "real" and our data "mere appearances" of these "real" objects. What is known for certain to be real, at any moment, however, is the particular datum with which we are acquainted. The physical object is only inferred from data to explain their connection, and may not in fact exist at all. Many of the propositions which are true of the physical object will be false of the data from which it is inferred; *e.g.*, the physical object may remain the same, though the data from which it is inferred may vary. We are inclined to say that what is true of the physical object is what "really is," while what is true of the datum only "appears to be."

It may sometimes be convenient, if we want to speak of the

physical object in terms of data, to say that what is true of the data only appears to be true of the physical object, but if we do speak so, then, similarly, what is true of the physical object only appears to be true of the data.

The fact is simply that what is true of the physical object is true of that object but may not be true of the data from which it is inferred, and, *vice versa*, what is true of the datum is true of that datum, but may not be true of a physical object inferred from it.

This seems very obvious, but when it comes to the point we keep forgetting it, because we have got used to confusing our data with physical objects, and supposing that what is true of the one must "really be" true of the other.

Now just as we infer physical objects from the data of acquaintance, so we infer relations which are supposed to hold between these objects. I believe that the plausibility of Stumpf's argument comes from our supposing that what is true of these inferred relations must "really be" true of the relations which we perceive between our data.

In Stumpf's experiment what we actually perceive is *y* looking like *o*, and *r* looking like *o*, and *y* not looking like *r*. That there is no real relation of likeness between *o* and *y* and *o* and *r* is an inference which we make from these data. This really is like saying that because a penny is round our data of it cannot "really be" oval. It is obvious in the case of the penny that it is the inferred physical object which is really round while our data may not be round at all. When we express this by saying the penny "appears" oval, we are describing the physical object in terms of the data.

I maintain that the case of relations is parallel to that of physical objects. Just as, in the case of objects, we have two kinds, the private datum and the physical object inferred from it, so I maintain we have also the private relation-data and the common relations inferred from them. Just as what is true of the physical object may not be true of the datum, so

what is true of the common relation may not be true of the relation-datum.*

In Stumpf's experiment we saw that *o* looked like both *y* and *r*, and *y* and *r* did not look like each other. It is argued that *o* and *y*, and *o* and *r*, "appear" alike but must "really be" different.

I maintain that the statement ought to be as follows:—

Between the data *o* and *y*, and *o* and *r*, there are relation-data of likeness. Between the data *y* and *r* there are relation-data of difference. From *y*, *o*, *r* we infer physical objects, Y, O, R, having objective relations between them. The objective relations, we find, must (logically) be such that either O is different either from Y or from R, or else Y and R are alike. Suppose we choose the first alternative. If now we want to assert of the physical objects Y, O, R, what is true only of the data *y*, *o*, *r*, we must say that O "appears" to be like Y and R but "is really" different. This means that the data *o* and *y*, *o* and *r*, are alike, but the inferred objects O and Y, O and R, are different. It may be argued that this is nonsense because, if we admit that *o* and *y*, *o* and *r*, are alike, while at the same time admitting that *y* and *r* are different, we shall be admitting that things which are like the same thing may be different from one another, which is absurd.

This objection raises the fundamental point. It comes to this—which are we to give up, relation-data, or their supposed logical properties? Is it more nonsensical to say that data really are different from what they appear to be, or to say relation-data have properties which are logically absurd?

The only way to decide seems to be by considering the relation of logic to data, *i.e.*, the extent of applied logic. If logic applies to all data, then data *must* sometimes "really be" different from what they "appear" to be.

To what, then, does logic apply?

* This theory was, I believe, first thought of by Dr. Norbert Wiener.

Pure logic consists of necessary propositions ultimately deducible from self-evident premisses. Pure logic deals with purely logical entities. The fundamental hypothesis in applied logic consists in saying "if anything is a logical term . . . then logical propositions will apply to it."

In order to show that the properties of relation-data may be logically absurd we must deny that data must always be logical terms. Such a case as Stumpf's experiment is, therefore, crucial to the dispute between Mr. Russell and M. Bergson.

In the example chosen, either the relation-data between y, o, r , are different from what they appear to be, or else y, o, r , are not logical terms in logical relations.

Mr. Russell takes the former view, M. Bergson the latter.

Mr. Russell, however, can only *prove* that "sense-data . . . must sometimes be really different when we cannot perceive any difference between them" (p. 141) by assuming at the outset that all data must be logical terms. If, therefore, the question raised is exactly as to whether all data really must be logical terms, arguments such as this one based on Stumpf's experiment will not be conclusive.

We have seen, so far, that Mr. Russell assumes that data which appear to be complex really are logical, and we have seen that he explains the data which appear to be syntheses by saying that they too must sometimes really be, and so may be supposed always to be, logical complexes. We have seen that Mr. Russell bases his argument to prove this on a *reductio ad absurdum* of the view that this is not so, which relies for its effect on the tacit assumption that logic must really apply to all data. What emerges from Stumpf's experiment is that perceived relations sometimes do not appear to be logical, and we have seen that to try to settle the question whether they really are so or not by *a priori* logical arguments is really to beg the question altogether.

Mr. Russell may be right in saying that all data really are logical, for, as we have admitted, it is very hard to say

anything for certain as to what our data really are, but the evidence of Stumpf's experiment is certainly against him.

M. Bergson sees no reason to suppose that logic must apply to all data: he, therefore, takes such experiments as Stumpf's to show that some data really are not logical. He holds that data which appear to be syntheses really are not composed of terms and relations such as would satisfy the logical definitions of "term" and "relation."

According to him, such experiments as Stumpf's are not by any means the clearest cases of data which are syntheses and not complexes. In Stumpf's experiment it is assumed that the data y, o, r , are distinguishable as terms, though their relations are found not to be logical. M. Bergson holds that we often have data of change far less logical still, since they contain neither terms nor relations.

In *La Perception du Changement*, p. 181, for instance, he takes, as illustration, the datum which we experience when we move. "J'ai la main au point A. Je la transporte au point B, parcourant l'intervalle AB. . . . Si nous laissons notre mouvement de A vers B tel qu'il est, nous le sentons indivisé."

["My hand is at point A. I move it to point B across the interval AB. . . . If we leave our movement from A to B as it is, we feel that it is undivided."]

We saw that Mr. Russell's difficulty came in in explaining how it is that some of our data appear to be syntheses.

The problem for M. Bergson is just the opposite: viz., to explain how we come to have data which appear to be complexes.

So far, all we can say is that we really do appear to have two kinds of data, one of which is logical and one not. One of these data is the analysis of the other. We must now try to explain the relation between them.

Both Mr. Russell and M. Bergson would agree that these two different kinds of data may sometimes give us knowledge of "the same thing." By this is meant that the differences between the two kinds of data can be explained by reference to purely subjective changes. Both Mr. Russell and M. Bergson

would agree that, usually in practice, and always in theory, closer attention would change our datum from a synthesis to a complex. The work of this closer attention would be to analyse the original datum. The difference between these two kinds of data can be explained by our attending more or less, without any need to assume any change beyond our own attitude towards our data.

The question is, what difference does attention make?

We have said that attention analyses data.

Both would agree that one kind of data gives us more knowledge than the other, though they differ as to which it is that gives the more knowledge. Both would admit that the difference between these two kinds of data is that one leaves out some of the other.

Mr. Russell says that a datum of the kind which we have called a synthesis (*i.e.* a non-logical datum) is nothing but a complex datum with some of the parts left out. We can pass from a synthesis to a complex by closer attention. Now, according to Mr. Russell, attention is a *discovery* of parts which must have been there all along. Attention to a datum means a discovery of parts in that datum, or rather of relations of difference between parts not previously distinguished (which comes to the same thing). In *Knowledge of the External World*, p. 144, he says:—"As we saw, there must be among sense-data differences so slight as to be imperceptible; the fact that sense-data are immediately given does not mean that their differences also *must* be immediately given (though they *may* be)." The differences, according to Mr. Russell, were in the datum all along, and closer attention to the whole datum merely discovers them.

We saw that Mr. Russell could only prove that "there must be among sense-data differences so slight as to be imperceptible," by assuming that all sense-data must consist of logical terms and relations. The evidence of Stumpf's experiment was against this assumption, and if we do not make it, went to show, on the contrary, that the very sense-data which

Mr. Russell says have "differences so slight as to be imperceptible," really have not parts or relations of difference at all, in any sense which would satisfy the logical definition of "parts" and "relations of difference." They appear to be non-logical data. If these really are non-logical data, attention could not, in their case, be a discovery of pre-existing parts or relations; if the datum of attention turned out to be a complex we could only say that it was the act of attention itself which *substituted* a complex datum containing parts for the original synthesis to which we began by attending.

This is M. Bergson's position.

He says there is no reason to suppose that any data of change in which we do not distinguish differences, really have imperceptible parts, and, on the contrary, all the evidence of careful introspection goes to show that such data really are syntheses, *i.e.*, non-logical. For these reasons he denies that attention discovers parts in these data. His theory as to the relation between the complex data of attention and the original synthetic data to which we began by attending is the exact opposite of Mr. Russell's. He holds that attention arrives at complex data, not by discovering *more*, but by *leaving out* much of what was originally given in the synthetic datum.

In *La Perception du Changement*, p. 12, he says:—

"Les faits . . . nous montrent, dans la vie psychologique normale, un effort constant de l'esprit pour limiter son horizon . . . la vie exige que nous nous mettions des ceillères."

["The facts reveal a constant effort of the mind, in normal psychological life, to limit its horizon . . . life forces us to wear blinkers."]

So far we have seen that Mr. Russell and M. Bergson agree over the importance of data for philosophy, and both would admit that immediate sense-data of change appear to fall roughly into two classes—complexes and syntheses—of which the former appear to them logical and the latter non-logical. We have seen, however, that Mr. Russell denies that the data

which appear to be non-logical really are so, and that this is the first fundamental point of disagreement between them. The second point of difference is closely connected with the first, viz., this question of whether attention discovers pre-existing parts in data which are apparently non-logical, or substitutes in place of the original synthetic datum a complex datum which consists of the original datum with much of it left out. If attention discovers pre-existing parts, then the complex datum which is the object of attention will contain *more* than the original synthetic datum. On the other hypothesis this complex datum will contain *less*.

According to Mr. Russell our fullest knowledge comes from the complex data of attention ; according to M. Bergson from the original synthetic data. He calls these data "virtual knowledge," as compared with "the actual knowledge," *i.e.*, the object of attention which is actual when we attend so as to analyse.

"Notre connaissance, bien loin de se constituer par une association graduelle d'éléments simples, est l'effet d'un dissociation brusque. Dans le champ infiniment vaste de notre connaissance virtuelle nous avons cueilli, pour en faire une connaissance actuelle tout ce que intéresse notre action sur les choses, nous avons négligé le reste."—(*La Perception du Changement*, p. 12.)

["Our knowledge, far from being built up out of the gradual association of simple elements is produced by a violent dissociation. We have gathered out of the infinitely extended field of our virtual knowledge whatever concerns our action upon things, and these we have turned into actual knowledge. All the rest we have neglected."]

It might appear at first sight that in this distinction between actual and virtual knowledge M. Bergson is making a gratuitous assumption of a field of knowledge in the existence of which we have no reason to believe. This would not be a fair criticism. The very fact that we have different kinds of data corresponding to different degrees of attention shows

that our data are by no means determined when the physical object and the bodily organs are given. We can, and in fact we must, choose, further, how we shall be acquainted with them. On this will depend the kind of data we are to get. Now this point is generally overlooked because we assume uncritically that the more we analyse the better we shall know our object, and so, when we want knowledge, we attend as closely as possible, in such a way that what we get is an analysis of our original data.

Paradoxical though it seems, M. Bergson denies the assumption that an analysis of a datum gives us more knowledge than was given in the original datum. On the contrary, he says that the very act of analysis consists in leaving out much of what was originally given. Analysis is simplification, but at the cost of full knowledge.

That a thoughtful man should seriously deny that analysis is the way to increase our knowledge at once forces us to question our uncriticised assumption.

In the first place, how else *could* we know?

M. Bergson distinguishes two kinds of attention, one of which is the primarily intellectual function of analysis, the other the pure act of knowing, which has sometimes been called immediate acquaintance, but which he calls intuition.

Analysis works on the material provided by intuition. Whenever we are acquainted with a datum (*i.e.*, have an intuition) we automatically set to work to analyse it. The clearer we can get it (*i.e.*, the more nearly we can substitute a perfect complex in its place) the better we feel we know it. Now certainly there is a sense in which we do know a datum better when we have analysed it. M. Bergson's theory is that "knowledge" in this case has a practical sense, *i.e.*, that the better we have analysed a datum the more we know what we can do with it and what it can do to us. The analysis is not the same object as the original datum, but it does not make any difference to us practically what the datum really was

originally, provided we know what we ought to do in its presence. It might even be simpler not to know the datum itself. If it merely served to suggest to us an appropriate scheme of rules of behaviour, we could get on, for all practical purposes, without knowing what it was in itself at all.

It may be argued that, so long as we have a datum, that datum is what is real at the moment, and to talk of some other datum as being "the reality" for which the present datum stands is to repeat the old confusion between a datum and some other thing-in-itself with which we are not acquainted but which we could infer from it. Such an objection here, however, would not be valid. This case is not equivalent to the case where we compare data with physical objects which were merely assumed to explain our data, and may not exist at all. We have seen that we really have the alternative of being acquainted either with an original datum or with its analysis. In order to make the analysis, in fact, we must be acquainted with the original datum. When we are actually acquainted with an analysis we know that it does really stand for another datum with which we have been acquainted and with which we could still have been acquainted if we had chosen. The analysis stands for a real object of acquaintance. Indeed we often really do, in a confused way, still know the whole even when we are attending only to the analysis. Let us consider the field of consciousness. A few more or less definite qualities are distinguishable belonging to one or more of the senses, but these stand out clearly from a background which confusedly contains much more. The more we concentrate our attention on definite qualities the more we analyse a few of them out of the whole field of consciousness, and the more all the rest drops into the background. But if you destroyed the background you would destroy also the few distinct qualities of which the clear analysis consists. We said that the complex was "substituted for" the original datum. This is never really completely the case in perception: it only

happens when we turn away altogether from sense-data and occupy ourselves with thoughts instead.

The result of analysis is to isolate a little of the whole of what is given, so that we have clearly before us a few distinct terms in relations. The rest of the field of consciousness is disregarded. This is the way in which we ordinarily try to improve our knowledge.

In this M. Bergson says we make a great mistake. He says if we want speculative knowledge we ought to go to our original data themselves and try to grasp them in their entirety, instead of making haste to analyse them, which comes in fact to disregarding the greater part of them. Analysis narrows down the content of consciousness to a very few clear points. Our object, on the contrary, if we want knowledge for its own sake, should be to make the scope of direct acquaintance as wide as possible. The next question is, how can we extend our direct acquaintance? Is such a thing possible?

M. Bergson gives an interesting answer to this in discussing what we mean by "the present."

"Le simple bon sens nous dit que, lorsque nous parlons du présent, c'est à un certain intervalle de durée que nous pensons. Quelle durée? Impossible de le fixer exactement; c'est quelque chose d'assez flottant. Mon présent, en ce moment, est la phrase que je suis occupé à prononcer. Mais il en est ainsi parce qu'il me plaît de limiter à cette phrase le champ de mon attention. Cette attention est chose qui peut s'allonger et se raccourcir, comme l'intervalle entre les deux pointes d'un compas . . . une attention qui serait indéfiniment extensible tiendrait sous son regard, avec la phrase précédente, toutes les phrases antérieures de la leçon, et les événements qui ont précédés la leçon, et une portion aussi grande qu'on voudra de ce que nous appelons notre passé. La distinction que nous faisons entre notre présent et notre passé est donc, si non arbitraire, du moins relative à l'étendue du champ que peut embrasser notre attention à la vie. Le 'present' occupe juste

autant de place que cet effort. . . . Une attention à la vie qui serait suffisamment puissante, et suffisamment dégagée aussi de tout intérêt pratique, embrasserait ainsi dans un présent indivisé l'histoire passée tout entière de la personne consciente,—non pas sans doute comme une simultanéité, mais comme quelque chose qui est à la fois continuellement présent et continuellement mouvant.”—*Perception du changement*, p. 27.

[“ Mere common sense shows us that when we speak of the present we mean a certain period of duration. What period? We cannot determine it exactly, it is rather a shifting affair. My present, at this moment, is the sentence which I am in the midst of pronouncing. But this is only so because I choose to limit the field of my attention to this sentence. Attention itself is something which can be extended or contracted like the distance between the two points of a compass . . . attention, if it were indefinitely extensible, could grasp, along with the earlier sentence, all the sentences that came before it in the course of the lesson, and as large a part as you like of what we call our past. The distinction, then, which we make between our present and our past, if it is not purely arbitrary, at any rate depends on the field which our attention to life can cover. The ‘present’ exactly covers the field of this effort. . . . Attention to life, which was powerful enough and also detached enough from practical interests, would grasp in one undivided present the whole past history of the conscious person—not, certainly, as a simultaneity, but as something which is both always present and always moving.”]

This quotation shows that, according to M. Bergson, the only reason why our conscious life is divided into distinct events at all is because we do not (probably human beings cannot) make a sufficient effort of attention to embrace the whole of it in one vast specious present. We certainly can, however, enlarge the specious present more or less at will, and the break between it and the past can be more or less absolute. By an effort we can hold our attention through, say, the performance of a piece of

music, so that we grasp it all together as a whole. If the performance lasts many minutes the whole sound will not continue in the specious present because our senses refuse to hold sound beyond a certain time, but if the whole is held in tension from the beginning until it is over, it will all be the object of one act of attention which covers the minor lapses of attention due to the inability of the senses to maintain one unbroken act of attention throughout the whole.

It seems then that the effort of attention may be made in two ways: (1) by narrowing its object—this is how we arrive at analyses of our data; (2) by widening its object so as to include more of the past. In this way we enlarge the scope of our knowledge.

There, however, still seems to remain a difficulty in putting into practice this new suggestion for getting more knowledge. Even supposing we can extend our data indefinitely by increasing the effort of attention in the second way, how do we know that the past is preserved so that it can be included by a mere effort of ours in a present act of attention?

On p. 31 (*La perception du changement*) M. Bergson gives his reasons for saying that the past is preserved.

“Le passé se conserve de lui-même, automatiquement. Certes, si nous fermons les yeux à l’indivisibilité du changement, au fait que notre plus lointain passé adhère à notre présent et constitue, avec lui, un seul et même changement ininterrompu, il nous semble que le passé soit ordinairement de l’aboli et que la conservation du passé ait quelque chose d’extraordinaire. . . . Mais si nous tenons compte de la continuité de la vie intérieure et par conséquent de son indivisibilité, ce n’est plus la conservation du passé qu’il s’agira d’expliquer, c’est au contraire son apparente abolition. Nous n’aurons plus à rendre compte du souvenir, mais de l’oubli.”

[“The past preserves itself automatically. Of course if we shut our eyes to the indivisibility of change, to the fact that our past, no matter how far back, is joined to our present and makes

up one single uninterrupted change with it, it seems to us that the past is usually destroyed and that there is something extraordinary in the preservation of the past. . . . But if we take into account the continuity of our inner life, and so its indivisibility, we shall not have to explain the preservation of the past, but, on the contrary, its apparent destruction. We shall no longer have to explain how we remember but how we forget.”]

M. Bergson's view is that this whole distinction of past and present is due simply to our habit of shutting off a large part of the field of our knowledge by attention. Theoretically there need be no such distinction—the specious present might be indefinitely extended to include the whole of what we call the past. On p. 29 he says “Le ‘présent’ occupe juste autant de place que cette effort” (*i.e.* the effort of attention). “Dès que cette attention particulière lâche quelque chose de ce qu'elle tient sous son regard, aussitôt ce qu'elle abandonne du présent devient *ipso facto* du passé. En un mot notre présent tombe dans le passé quand nous cessons de lui attribuer un intérêt actuel.” [“The ‘present’ exactly covers the field of this effort” (*i.e.* the effort of attention). “As soon as this particular act of attention lets anything slip from its grasp, that part of the present of which it leaves go becomes *ipso facto* past. In short, our present falls into past when we cease to attach real interest to it.”]

To talk of “the present” and “the past” is misleading: there is no inherent distinction between them and theoretically we might be directly acquainted with the whole of our life containing both past and present. As things are, however, there is a distinction between the part to which we actually attend and the whole of the rest, to which we do not. The whole point of the new philosophical method which M. Bergson advocates is that we should try to concentrate our attention in such a way as to attend to as *much* as possible of this whole present-past, instead of attending to as little as possible, which is the natural habit of the intellect.

M. Bergson agrees with other philosophers over the necessity of starting from data. But the question is, what data? We have seen that, till now, philosophy has been content with the data given by attention used for the purpose of analysis—a complex of fragments isolated even from the datum originally given and used for the analysis. If it wanted to know more than these fragments it has had to supplement its acquaintance-knowledge by logical inferences, which at best can never give more than descriptions.

According to M. Bergson, the data from which we ordinarily start, and which we further reduce by analysis, are themselves only fragments of a much more complete whole with which we could be immediately acquainted if we cared to make the effort. His grounds for believing that there really is such a whole to be known depend on the relative nature of the distinction between present and past, which we have just considered.

M. Bergson starts from data, but not from the old data. In *Intuition philosophique*, p. 191, he says:—

“Ressaisissons nous . . . tels que nous sommes dans un présent épais et, de plus, élastique, que nous pouvons dilater indéfiniment vers l’arrière en reculant de plus en plus loin l’écran qui nous masque à nous-mêmes.”

[“Let us renew our hold upon ourselves as we really are, in a present which is solid and, what is more, elastic, which we can expand backwards indefinitely by pushing further and further back the screen which hides us from ourselves.”]

By attending in the usual, practical way, that is by analysing our data, we reduce the field of our acquaintance to a few disjointed states contained in a narrow specious present, with perhaps a few others, directly remembered, the whole pieced together by ideas standing for a few other states to fill in the gaps and make the scheme more or less complete.

All that the old empiricism could hope to do was, at best,

to fill in the gaps somewhat more fully than we need to do for practical purposes. M. Bergson tells us that we might, by an effort of attention the inverse of that of analysis, enlarge the present object of acquaintance indefinitely. Carried to perfection, this method would give us direct acquaintance with the whole of our self, past and present, and a self not consisting merely of disjointed states,—the analysis of the self as we habitually know it,—but with a far richer and more varied content. According to M. Bergson, such a datum would contain our ordinary data, but with all the rest filled in which analysis leaves out.

This view, that it is possible for us to be acquainted with data much more complete than the data of our ordinary acquaintance, was reached as follows :—

It seems certain that our data differ according as we do or do not analyse them. What is given before analysis is the material which we use in analysis, and is different from our datum when the analysis is completed. Before the analysis our datum does not appear to contain parts such as are contained in the datum after the analysis.

Now this raises a difficulty for the theory which assumes in its explanation of the connection of data that all data have parts. In spite of appearances it would nevertheless still be perfectly reasonable to suppose that even unanalysed data really have parts if it could be shown that data *must* sometimes have parts which are not perceived. We saw, however, that this could not be proved unless we assume that all data *must* be logical, and there seems no reason to make this assumption : indeed, the empirical facts contradict it. But if there are no pre-existing parts in the original datum, analysis cannot discover them. Now if we admit that analysis is not the discovery of pre-existing parts, while at the same time insisting that an analysis really contains *more* than the original datum, it is very hard to see the connection between the analysis and what is analysed, where the *more* comes from which the

analysis contains, or why *parts* should suddenly appear. We can still say that the original datum and the analysis are "correlated," but this does not throw much light on the above difficulties, and cannot be considered a very satisfactory explanation.

If, on the other hand, while admitting that there were not pre-existing parts in the original datum, we suppose that an analysis contains *less* and not *more* than what is analysed, it is easy to see how the two are connected and how the analysis gets its parts. Suppose what is to be analysed really is a continuous succession not divided into logical terms and relations (we have seen that our original data do appear to be of this kind). Suppose analysis consists in *leaving out* some of this succession. It will follow naturally that what is left, the analysis, will be a plurality of terms, distinct because the continuous succession which united them has been broken. The connection between the datum of analysis and the original whole will be one of part and whole, with this important difference, that, since the essential difference between an analysis and its original is that the analysis contains *less* than the original, no amount of analysed parts will ever fully reconstruct the original whole.

If this be the correct explanation of analysis it will follow that we really are always originally acquainted with more than the mere analyses to which we usually confine our attention.

Further, we know from experience that, by an effort, we can widen the field of our acquaintance to some extent, so as to include a longer period of duration. The data of duration with which we thus become acquainted may (as introspection shows) be either a synthesis or a complex. According to M. Bergson, it would always be a synthesis if we could succeed in overcoming our natural tendency towards analysis.

If we could widen the field of our acquaintance so as to

include the whole of duration, and attend to the whole without analysing it, we should arrive at the most complete knowledge possible, and the datum with which we should be acquainted would be a synthesis and not a complex.

This is M. Bergson's theory of knowledge.

We may now finally sum up the main arguments on which it is based.

First there is the empirical evidence.

We are not acquainted with data consisting of distinct parts until we have made an analysis; the data which we analyse do not appear to consist of distinct parts.

The second point is based on the assumption, made by all philosophers, that a simple explanation is more likely to be true than a complicated one. It deals with analysis.

If an analysis contains *more* than what is analysed, difficulties of explanation arise which are very hard to solve. If, on the other hand, an analysis contains *less* than the original datum their relations to each other are easy to explain. It seems reasonable therefore to suppose that analysis leaves out some of the original datum. If this be assumed it will follow that the distinction of parts, produced by analysis, will be a mark of incompleteness, and will give knowledge less perfect than the datum with which we were originally acquainted before the analysis.

The next point is empirical again.

It is a fact that, by an effort of attention, we can enlarge the field of our immediate acquaintance so as to contain in it more and more of the specious present. Now whatever is contained by an act of attention in the specious present is originally one datum (which may subsequently be analysed into a complex). The first absolute distinction in our acquaintance with duration is the distinction between past and present. This is, in fact, the distinction between all that we can embrace in one act of attention, and the rest which we cannot retain. The very fact of attending to some of

duration and leaving out the rest constitutes the first analysis of perceived duration—our successive acts of attention divide our acquaintance with duration into a series of distinct data, in which there is an absolute division between past and present.

If, *per impossibile*, we could hold the whole of duration in one vast act of attention, the distinction between past and present would be abolished. We should then have the most perfect knowledge of duration—the knowledge given by direct acquaintance with the whole of it. Our datum would then no longer be analysed, by our need for leaving out, into a series of distinct data (objects of successive acts of attention), nothing would be left out of this undivided datum of pure duration.

On analogy with what we know of the content of the specious presents with which we are actually acquainted, it seems reasonable to suppose that a datum of duration from which nothing was left out would no longer be a complex but a synthesis.

This is the summary of M. Bergson's argument to show that perfect knowledge (a datum carrying the whole of duration) would be, not a complex, but a synthesis.

It follows that our original data, even though they may themselves be parts of an analysis of the whole datum which would give perfect knowledge, are less incomplete than their analyses. The relations between an original datum (which M. Bergson calls an intuition) and its analysis are these: We can pass from an intuition to its analysis by leaving out. We can only pass backwards from the incomplete knowledge given by an analysis to the more complete knowledge given in the original intuition, *if we already know the original* from which the analysis was derived. If we have once been acquainted with a datum (*i.e.*, had an intuition) our analysis will serve to direct our attention to it again—we fill in again for ourselves what the analysis left out. But if we have never had the intuition no analysis will ever give us acquaintance with it

In *Évolution Créatrice*, p. 342, M. Bergson says—

“ Nous disions qu’il y a plus . . . dans un devenir que dans les formes traversées tour à tour La philosophie pourra donc, des termes du premier genre, tirer ceux du second, mais non pas du second le premier : c’est du premier que la spéculation devrait partir. Mais l’intelligence renverse l’ordre des deux termes.”

[“ We said that there is more in becoming than in the forms through which it passes successively Philosophy, therefore, could discover terms of the second kind from those of the first, but never those of the first from the second : speculation should be based on the first. But the intelligence puts the two terms in the wrong order.”]

According to M. Bergson, the essential thing in philosophy is to make the effort needed to turn our attention from the work of analysis to the original which we analyse. He says in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 16, “ Here the single aim of the philosopher should be to promote a certain effort, which, in most men, is usually fettered by habits of mind more useful to life.”

Analysis is the method of science : M. Bergson thinks philosophy should proceed in a different way. The world of ordinary experience has already been analysed by our senses and the natural tendency of the intellect. Science works out the connection between the parts of this analysis. According to M. Bergson, the special task of philosophy should be to fix the attention on the original datum from which that analysis was made.

In *L'intuition philosophique*, p. 188, he says :—

“ Il n’y aurait pas place pour deux manières de connaître, philosophie et science, si l’expérience ne se présentait à nous sous deux aspects différents, d’un côté sous forme de faits qui se juxtaposent à des faits ” (*i.e.*, as a complex) “ . . . de l’autre sous forme d’une pénétration réciproque qui est pure durée . . . ” (*i.e.*, a synthesis).

[“There would not be room for two ways of knowing philosophy and science, if we did not get our experience under two different aspects—on the one hand in the form of events side by side with other events” (*i.e.*, as a complex) “. . . on the other hand in the form of a mutual penetration which is pure duration”]

These “two kinds of experience” are our analysis and the original datum which we analyse. Science is concerned with the analysis; philosophy, according to M. Bergson, should attend to the original.

It is easy to see that, on this view, analysis takes us further and further away from the original data of immediate acquaintance which are the source of all our knowledge. Nevertheless the data of analysis are real knowledge, though less and less complete, the further the analysis is pushed:

The relations between an original datum of immediate acquaintance and its various analyses is this.

If we have once had the acquaintance (intuition), then, given an analysis, we can reconstruct it again by filling in what the analysis left out. Intuition is direct and complete knowledge, but it has the disadvantage that it requires a great effort of attention, and one which we certainly cannot maintain indefinitely. An analysis is less complete knowledge, but it has the advantage that it can be preserved without difficulty in words or pictures, and also that it can be communicated. Both the analysis and its original are, of course, equally real data when we are acquainted with them. We may, however, attend to the analysis only in order to direct our attention, by means of it, to an original datum. In this case the analysis itself will be used merely as a symbol of its original. The ideal of philosophy would be to maintain constantly an effort of attention which would contain the whole of duration as its datum. If this were possible we should not need to make any analyses nor to use them as symbols to restore our original data (intuitions), since we should always be directly

acquainted with the originals themselves. This is what M. Bergson means when he says (*Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 79), "The main object of metaphysics is to do away with symbols."

Direct knowledge may be the ideal of philosophy; in practice, however, philosophy cannot possibly get on without the help of constant analysis. It is as much as we can do to make the effort needed to get back from the analyses, to which we usually confine our attention, to our original data, and perhaps slightly to enlarge the normal field of our acquaintance. But this intuition, even if it is reached, cannot be maintained. The first task of philosophy may be to get the intuition, the second is certainly to catch it and preserve it as best we can in an analysis. We can then relax our attention, knowing that, by referring to our analysis, we ourselves at least, and possibly also anyone else who may have reached the same intuition as we did, can get it back when we choose.

In our original intuition we know our datum directly; the process of analysis is the process of understanding what we once knew. According as we think, knowing or understanding the more important function, we may regard the original intuition or its analysis as the most important part of philosophy. It is obvious, however, that philosophy must include both. This raises a very serious difficulty for philosophy.

We have seen that knowing and understanding seem to be two different ways of attending to data, and our theory has been that understanding (analysis) consisted in leaving out some of the original datum of knowledge. If this theory be correct it follows that these two ways of attending will be incompatible and cannot be carried on successfully both at once. As soon as we begin to analyse we must lose our original datum. When the original is gone our attempted analysis becomes progressively less and less reliable. As M. Bergson says, in *Évolution Créatrice*, p. 259:—

"A vrai dire, les deux démarches sont de sens contraires :

le même effort par lequel on lie des idées à des idées, fait évanouir l'intuition que les idées se proposaient d'emmagasiner. Le philosophe est obligé d'abandonner l'intuition une fois qu'il en a reçu l'élan, et de se fier à lui-même pour continuer le mouvement . . . Par la dialectique—qui n'est qu'une détente de l'intuition—bien des accords différents sont possibles, et il n'y a pourtant qu'une vérité. L'intuition si elle pouvait se prolonger au delà de quelques instants n'assurerait pas seulement l'accord du philosophe avec sa propre pensée, mais encore celui de tous les philosophes entre eux."

["To tell the truth, the two operations are contradictory : the very same effort by which we join ideas one to another destroys the intuition which those ideas set out to contain. The philosopher is obliged to give up his intuition once he has received the impulse from it, and to trust to himself to continue the movement . . . By dialectic—which is simply the relaxation of intuition—many different constructions are possible, yet there is but one truth. If intuition could last more than a few moments it would ensure, not only the internal harmony of each philosophy with itself, but the harmony of all philosophers with one another."]

This incompatibility of the two acts of attention which produced our original data and their analyses is certainly awkward. We can only get over it by constantly passing from the one attitude to the other, first knowing, then analysing, then knowing again and correcting our former analysis. As M. Bergson says (in *Évolution Créatrice*, p. 259), when a philosopher has begun his analysis, and so lost his original intuition, "bien vite il sent qu'il a perdu pied ; un nouveau contact devient nécessaire ; il faudra défaire la plus grande partie de ce qu'il a fait" ["very soon he feels he has lost his footing ; a new contact becomes necessary : he will have to undo the best part of what he has done."].

So, then, our knowledge advances by alternate acts of intuition and analysis. Philosophy cannot dispense with

either. But analysis by itself, though it is useful practically and is the perfect method for science, which deals with the ready-made analysis of our ordinary experience, is no use speculatively. Analysis is essential in philosophy to enable us to fix our intuitions, so that by using their analyses as symbols we can recall them at will and examine them at our leisure, but it is useful only, like the rungs of a ladder, to mount on in order to obtain a wider and wider view. The thing of vital importance for philosophy, from which the whole of its complex working out (*i.e.*, its analysis) depends, is the effort of attention, the inverse of analysis, by which we widen, instead of narrowing, the field of our acquaintance so that it contains more and not less than was originally given.

We saw that such an attempt was not hopeless, nor even (if our account of analysis is correct) at all inconsistent with our ordinary experience. We ordinarily attend to analyses, but in order to get an analysis we must once have known the original. If an analysis contains less than its original, then our ordinary experience is more limited than it need be.

By attending differently we could at least get back to direct acquaintance with this wider knowledge which we must once have had, and, further, we know by experience that the limits of the object of our direct acquaintance are not absolutely fixed. It is not incredible that we could widen them so as to be acquainted with very much more than those data to which our acquaintance is ordinarily confined. It would be wonderful and it is not impossible. The only way to know whether it can be done is to try.

“Entrez dans l'eau, et, quand vous saurez nager, vous comprendrez que la mécanique de la natation se rattache à celui de la marche. Le premier prolonge le second, mais le second ne vous eût pas introduit dans le premier. Ainsi vous pourrez spéculer aussi intelligimment que vous voudrez sur le mécanisme de l'intelligence, vous n'arriverez jamais à le dépasser Il faut brusque les choses, et, par une acte de volonté,

pousser l'intelligence hors de chez elle."—(*Évolution Créatrice*, p. 211).

[“Plunge into the water, and, when you know how to swim, you will understand that the action of swimming is connected with that of walking. The first is a continuation of the second, but the second could not have taught you how to do the first. So you can speculate as wisely as you like on the structure of the intellect, that will never get you beyond it You must take the matter into your own hands, and, by an act of will, shake the intellect out of its habitual routine.”]

XI.—SOME THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE.

By DR. F. AVELING.

THERE is perhaps no topic with regard to which more disagreement obtains between philosophers than that of theory of knowledge. So voluminous a literature, treating its problems from different points of view and with apparently irreconcilable results, has grown up that the task of dealing with it has become almost as great as that of dealing with the questions with which it is concerned. I shall, therefore, not attempt at present to do more than submit a certain number of issues, which appear to me to be of interest, for discussion—and this in a necessarily rather sketchy and general way. In treating the subject, however, I desire to acknowledge my indebtedness to a work of remarkable analytic power by the Rev. Leslie J. Walker, S.J.,* of much of which I shall make use, and the general division of which I shall follow in the present paper.

Notwithstanding the disagreement of more or less philosophically complete systems on the point, that theory of knowledge would seem to have the best claim to general acceptance on the part of the philosopher as well as of the layman, which is least unlike the ordinary unreflecting Realism of mankind. We wish to find our common beliefs justified and our convictions established beyond all possibility of criticism. We begin the practical business of life equipped with a certain amount of knowledge gained by tradition and personal observation. We are personally acquainted with what we call "facts"; we have knowledge concerning them; we are also in possession of a number of ideal "truths" by means of which we are able

* *Theories of Knowledge*, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910.

to deal with our facts mentally, and so, in our consequent action, to modify our environment, at least to some extent, in accordance with our preconceived ends. Our knowledge, we find, is of practical service to us. But when we begin to examine it critically, problems emerge in its regard, any solution of which must to some extent modify our previous naïve outlook. Provided always that the theory advanced be based upon indubitable fact, take account of the necessary conditions of knowledge, bring general coherence to thought, and justify the certainty with which we hold at least some propositions, the degree of this modification of outlook will be the measure of the claim to acceptance on the part of the theory in question. The fact that many philosophers at the present time are reasserting, in one form or another, the doctrines of Realism and are gaining an increasing following, is indicative of the justice of the foregoing statement. In England and abroad a strong current of thought, divergent both from the speculations and developments of Idealism on the one hand and of Empiricism on the other, is making itself felt. The Realisms which constitute it claim to fulfil the conditions indispensable for a valid theory of knowledge. If their claim be substantiated, we have a reason why they—or one of them—should be accepted.

But there is a further and a better reason than the desire to have our original beliefs and convictions with regard to reality upheld for the present recrudescence of realistic theories of knowledge. These form a moment in an ideological succession which goes back, through Pragmatism and Theory of the Absolute, to Criticism. Because of its inherent weakness and the overweighted metaphysical superstructure of the fully developed forms of Idealism, some protest was bound to make itself heard. The protest was a revolt; and the revolt took shape in Pragmatism. Here, then, were two systems, two apparently irreconcilable systems, in presence and abrupt conflict. The Pragmatist could accuse the Theorician of the

Absolute of neglecting facts and spinning webs of unsupported metaphysic, "Fine as a skein of the casuist Escobar's worked on the bones of a lie"—"An Absolute which is a higher synthesis of God and the devil." And the Absolute Idealist had every right to retort that facts alone lead nowhere, nor can lead anywhere; that the theory of the Absolute is coherent within itself; and that, after all, only *theory* is required or in question. Amid the clash and wordy conflict of the two systems neo-Realism has arisen. I do not wish to be understood to say that neo-Realism is consciously or otherwise *de facto* the derivative of Absolutism and Pragmatism; for it seems to me that the roots of Realism strike deeper—and must strike deeper—than either. And, moreover, Realism can boast a long and eminently respectable history; it has not been without its exponents for many centuries. But it does appear that philosophers must have been profoundly dissatisfied with the current systems—with the Philosophy of the Absolute because of its detachment and isolation from human knowledge and interests; with Pragmatism still more on account of its loose and almost misleading terminology, and the vaguely defined positions it defends; and with both because of a certain appearance of artificiality and elusiveness, amid which the human mind seems to labour towards a grasp of something tangible, only to find itself perpetually thwarted by the lack of finality which characterises both systems alike. Some system of Realism is the inevitable result of such dissatisfaction.* Several have been provided which—since they do not in all things agree with the old—I have called neo-Realisms.

Up to the present point I have spoken as though only three systems were to be considered; and it might be objected that in reality there is a very considerable number, each of which ought to be taken into account. I shall justify my

* Cf. Dawes Hicks, "Appearance and Real Existence," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1913-14, p. 1.

procedure, for the purposes at any rate of the present paper, by pointing to the fact that amidst the great variety of views held and difference of methods of treatment adopted by idealist writers, there is a not inconsiderable number of common threads running through the philosophy of each, which would warrant us in considering all to be of the same fabric. Like the cathedrals of the Middle Ages, which display so great an elaboration of individually characteristic detail, yet conform to a common structural plan, the idealistic presentations of theory of knowledge differ one from the other, only to emphasise the community of principles which they all embody.

The aprioristic and constructive nature of mind, for example, is insisted on throughout, as well as is the principle of immanence, each of which, together with the notion of identity of ground amidst structural difference, is borrowed from the philosophy of Kant. The principle of the identity of Being and Thought, as well as the conception of higher syntheses in which the apparent contradictions of thesis and antithesis are ultimately removed, are commonplaces of the forms of Idealism under consideration; and these have their origin in an ideological development tracing itself back to the same source. These common principles seem to afford sufficient ground to justify us in ignoring the minor differences, and grouping the Idealisms together as a typical class.

The same possibility of grouping together the different presentations of Pragmatism is apparent, and possibly in an even more obvious way. The notion of Truth in the making, first postulated and then verified in its practical application to the plastic material of experience; growing and developing in its individual and social environment; voluntaristic rather than intellectualistic, and thus corresponding rather to the purposive character of physical life than to its theoretical character, yet never reaching an absolute verification; these, together with a decided tendency towards (when not an actual assertion of) the doctrine that Reality is the same thing as

Experience, are the dominant notes of the various forms of Pragmatism.

PART I.

In this paper I do not intend to treat of the doctrines of the two widely divergent schools to which I have just alluded in any detail. It would, as I have hinted, be impossible to do this in any sense critically or adequately; and it is not necessary for my purpose. I propose, however, to underline and to offer brief criticism of one or two of what seem to me to be the more salient and characteristic features of both theories; for it must not be lost sight of that we are considering these philosophic systems in so far only as they profess to be theories of knowledge. Now theory is nothing more than an attempt, more or less complete, more or less cumbrous, possibly, to account for fact; and the fact is of primary and essential importance.

What is the fact which theory of knowledge seeks to explain?

The fact, doubtless, of knowledge.

The first duty, then, of the philosopher, in setting out to construct a theory of knowledge, will be to examine very carefully and to state very exactly what knowledge is.

Even in this initial task not all philosophers seem to have succeeded in reaching a common agreement. As a matter of fact, many would substitute "the data of experience" for "knowledge" in this connection, and say that the former are the grounds upon which theory of knowledge is to be built up. It might be argued that the data of experience, considered as such, and knowledge are by no means identical, unless experience be understood in its strictly classical sense, which is not usually the case; for static mental states, as pleasure or pain, are experiences, but they do not appear to be knowledge. They may of course become objects of knowledge, but they are not necessarily knowledge as they are experienced or lived. Moreover, simple apprehension, *qua talis*, would seem rather to

provide material for knowledge than knowledge itself—except in so far as implicit knowledge is contained in apprehension (as, indeed, it may also be contained in experiences such as those of pleasure or pain).

Such considerations, however, would seem not to be altogether supported by fact; for any change in object of consciousness, and probably also in state of consciousness, appears to be immediately classed in some way or another. Is it possible to discriminate the event from the classing? It would seem that it is not so in regard, at any rate, to normal adult consciousness. The data of experience, then, would appear to be of the nature of an abstraction practised upon the *de facto* given object. We may, however, provisionally at any rate, accept the other view, and allow "the data of experience" right of citizenship as "knowledge." But at once the further question arises: What *are* the data of experience? Are they the data of my experience or of pure experience—data afforded by that finite centre of experience which is "myself"; or of some further abstraction practised upon this; or of the totality of sentient experience of the Absolute? Absolutism and Pragmatism here enter into contact—and almost friendly contact. For Pragmatism is much concerned with pure experience as the starting point of knowledge; while Absolutism and its kindred systems look backwards to an Indifferenz-Punkt, an impersonal consciousness, or a general sentient experience.

But, we may enquire, is a constructive process from the starting-point of pure experience possible? And, again, is the dead level of impersonality of the ultimate consciousness a valid conclusion, or even a tenable theory?

An affirmative answer to the first question may be met with the criticism that the important and significant datum of experience—the distinction of object and subject—which is *de facto* given—is neglected and prescinded from.

Of pure experience I have no experience; and though

I may be able, by abstraction from my experience, to construct a pure one, I have no possible means of ascertaining whether my construction is representative or not. For pure experience might conceivably contain the very distinction which I arbitrarily, and in obedience to theory, deny of it. It must not be forgotten that the denial is a purely theoretical one. Pure experience, as "the starting point and final touchstone of all our theories about reality"* is an *x* about which nobody directly knows anything, or in any sense, save as an abstraction practised rightly or wrongly upon what we do, as a matter of fact, experience.

Pure experience, as a conclusion drawn with much metaphysical subtlety from the premisses of experience, is another matter. But it presents no less serious a difficulty for the Absolute Idealist. For if the Cosmos is in reality one and unique, how can a limitation of the individual consciousness by an "other," possibly come about? And if the distinction emerge within the mind itself, why should it so emerge? No answer has as yet been forthcoming from the Theoricians—possibly because no real or plausible answer can be given. We are left, then, with the experience of the individual, as it actually occurs, as the data upon which our theory of knowledge is to be built; and in that experience the distinction of subject and object is given. The Pragmatist has no right to ignore it, and the Idealist, if he comes to the conclusion that the distinction is ultimately invalid for thought and reality, must explain satisfactorily the fact that *de facto* it occurs in experience.

The Realist frankly admits it and builds upon it. As Professor Alexander maintains, "the starting point (of Realism) is the analysis of an act of cognition into an act of mind, its independent object, and their compresence."†

* Schiller, *Studies in Humanism*, p. 187. He is *not* here speaking of "pure experience" but of "primary reality."

† "The Basis of Realism," *British Academy*, January 28, 1914.

The further question for the Realist is this: Is the subject as well as the object given as intuited reality? So far as the object is concerned, Lossky provides us with an answer not dissimilar to Alexander's.* "A mental state can . . . be analysed as follows: The fact of being conscious must involve at least three elements: (1) the self; (2) the content (a 'something'); (3) a relation of 'having' between the self and the content. On the ground of this relation it may be said that the self is that which is conscious and the content is that which it is conscious of. . . . No rational grounds can be adduced to prove that that of which we are aware, *i.e.*, the contents of consciousness, must needs be mental states of the conscious individual. So far as one can see there is nothing but tradition and prejudice to prevent us from admitting that a physical fact forming part of the external world may, while I concentrate my attention upon it, enter the domain of my consciousness." So also Professor Dawes Hicks, in a paper communicated to this Society,† after a careful analysis of the position taken up by Mr. Bertrand Russell, concludes that "In the presence of a table, I am not *immediately* aware of *patches* of colour, or appearances of shininess, of smoothness, of an oblong shape, and the rest. What I am *immediately* aware of is a single solid object. If, then, the term 'immediate' be used in reference to our mature experience, it is of *things* that we are immediately aware, whilst presentations as such are not immediately known by us." Intuition of object independent of mind as reality known is thus asserted as a fact of consciousness.

But is the other term of the relation also intuited in the act of cognition, or is it only inferred or supposed?

It would seem to be evident that the subject term is given intuitively in reflection (memory), as was noted by St. Thomas. Truth, he points out, is known by the understanding in

* "Intuitionism," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1913-14, p. 127.

† "Appearance and Real Existence," *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1913-14, p. 35.

reflection.* The mind knows, or is acquainted with, its own act in intro(retro)spection. It intuits subject and object in their cognitive relation. Upon this fact of introspection St. Thomas bases his further theoretical considerations. The proportion in which truth consists can only be known when the character of the act of understanding is known; and the knowledge of this depends, in its turn, upon the further knowledge of the nature of the understanding itself.†

But St. Thomas seems to go further than this and to assert that the mind intuits itself directly in every act of apprehending an object. It does not know itself through its essence but through its act. And it knows itself in act in a twofold way. In every one of its acts it apprehends, or intuits itself, as an individual—merely as an *x* “minding” *hic et nunc*. But it also knows its own essence, or nature, by reflecting upon the character of its acts. In the first case, to have knowledge of itself as an *x* mind, “sufficit ipsa mentis præsentia.” But “diligent and subtle examination of the character of its various acts is necessary before it can itself be characterised.”‡

A further distinction§ is made affecting the “priority” of

* *De Veritate*, Q. 1, a 9. Secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem ejus ad rem.

† *Ibid.* Quod quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quæ cognosci non potest nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus; unde secundum hoc cognoscit veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur.

‡ *Summa Theologica*, Pars 1a, Q. LXXXVII, a 1, c. Non enim per essentiam suam sed per actum suum, se cognoscit intellectus noster: et hoc dupliciter: uno quidem modo particulariter, secundum quod Socrates vel Plato percipit se habere animam intellectivam ex hoc quod percipit se intelligere. Alio modo in universali, secundum quod naturam humanæ mentis ex actu intellectus consideramus. Est autem differentia inter has duas cognitiones. Nam ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis præsentia, quæ est principium actus, ex quo mens percipit seipsam; et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam præsentiam. Sed ad secundum cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit ejus præsentia, sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio.

§ *Ibid.*, a 3. Est autem . . . intellectus humanus, qui nec est suum

knowledge of object and subject. Knowledge of the former is prior to that of the latter; but it may be maintained that this is a logical priority, and that *de facto* the intuition of both may be really simultaneous. And indeed it is a question rather to be determined by fact than by theory as to the nature of cognition. For Aquinas, the human mind could not intuit itself (even as an *x* "minding") until it was "in act"; and its act could only be brought about in its information by an intellectual determinant; just as the senses, by means of which consciousness becomes aware of the *sensibilia*—qualities and individuals—require sensorial determinants to actuate them.

The point is that the mind is directly aware of itself in its acts as an *x*, the nature of which remains to be determined by a diligent and subtle examination of the various acts of which it remembers the performance.

So far we have examined the main psychological data available for a theory of knowledge. We have seen that the Idealist can give no account of the datum of consciousness—distinction of object and subject—which obtrudes itself upon his metaphysical speculations at their culminating point; and that the tendency of the Pragmatist to begin his theory of knowledge with pure experience is arbitrary and unwarranted. We have taken little account of the Intellectualism which is a decided characteristic of Absolutism, and as little of the Voluntarism upon which Pragmatism lays such stress. But it will be clear from the observation at the close of the last paragraph that Thomistic Realism, at any rate, while it analyses and accepts the immediate datum (subject-object distinction) of consciousness, and although it may in

intelligere, nec sui intelligere est objectum primum ipsius ejus essentiae, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei. Et ideo id quod primo cognoscitur ab intellectu humano, est hujusmodi objectum; et secundo cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur objectum; et per actum cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cujus est perfectio ipsum intelligere.

consequence look as if it were purely Intellectualistic, also admits to the full all the claims of other data of consciousness (such as those of will) to an adequate representation.

A further interesting tendency towards thesis and antithesis of Absolutism and Pragmatism, not unconnected with that to which attention has just been directed, is that of the character of the knowledge which the former system ultimately sets forth as reality, and the character of the knowledge Pragmatism asserts to be the only possible—the knowledge of facts. The former presents knowledge (or Reality, for it amounts to the same thing) as a complete whole, integrated of the partial relations which have their reality, such as it is, only in, and in relation to, the whole. Such knowledge is changeless and absolute, for it is the knowledge of the Absolute. The latter system eschews metaphysic and turns to psychology. It finds a stream of consciousness, a succession of experiences, a world of change; and it concludes that knowledge is ever in the making, by way of the verification of postulates. The former system emphasises a point which seems to be a characteristic of certain data of consciousness—the eternal, immutable and universal notes which are connected with the concepts. The latter insists upon another point which seems equally to be a characteristic of certain other data of consciousness, viz.: the temporal, changeable and individual notes which are connected with concrete objects. In the one we have the notion of Parmenides as a motif; in the other that of Heraclitus. As applied to the same “reals” in the same way and without distinction, it would seem impossible that both characters or forms of knowledge should be true; and either, or both, might be false. But as applied to different “reals,” or to the same reals in a different way, both notions might, obviously, be true. Realism makes the distinction that the same “real” may be viewed in different aspects; as a concrete individual sensibly intuited, *hic et nunc* (in which case the Pragmatic notion applies), and as an intelligible “real” from which the individualising notes are abstracted, *abstractione*

abstractiva, by means of a psychical mechanism which enters into theory in the Aristotelico-Thomistic system as a meta-physical (or trans-experimental) condition of knowledge. Thus both points, apparently irreconcilable and leading to diametrically opposed results in theory, when emphasised in isolation, are really conciliable in Realism. There are stable grounds within the flux, essentially fixed types discoverable amidst innumerable variations, if once a distinction between sense and understanding be allowed.

Theory, I may reiterate, is used to explain and reconcile facts—sometimes apparently contradictory facts; but theory should attempt to take account of all the facts. Idealism does not account satisfactorily for the transient and contingent, whether this be real object or merely ideal content. Pragmatism fails to reckon successfully with the universal and necessary. Realism can find a way to reconcile both in a synthesis, which—though confessedly theoretical—does take account of all the facts, and give some explanation of them.

PART II.

We pass now to a second consideration no less important than our previous examination of knowledge. If a careful examination of knowledge—or experience—is a necessary preliminary to the construction of *any* theory of knowledge, it is no less important, once the crude facts of knowledge have been ascertained, to discuss the ontological conditions in accordance with which such facts are *possible*. Here we obviously pass on from fact to the region of theory; and any theory will suffice—at any rate provisionally—which adequately explains the facts.

In this paragraph, in respect of both Absolute Idealism and Pragmatism, we at once encounter difficulties. The knowledge of which we seek the conditions must obviously be that knowledge of which we have already investigated several, at least, of the facts. And, as we have seen, this is human knowledge. But the particular line of ideology that has

developed from Kant, through Fichte and Hegel, to more recent pronounced forms of Absolutism, substitutes a metaphysic of knowledge (or reality) for an examination of the conditions in which human knowledge is possible. The Absolute, and the Absolute alone, is truly real; and the knowledge of the Absolute can be the only truly real knowledge. This may or may not be true, as a fact. The Absolute alone can know it, if the Absolute possess consciousness. But, if it be true, it would appear that the only data of knowledge which can with certainty be accepted as a starting point for theory turn out in the end to be worthless; and the whole elaborate superstructure which was raised upon them is left with no foundation at all.

For notions derived in the first instance from human experience—such as those of the immanence of knowledge, unity amid difference, and the like—are transferred and applied to the Absolute. The consequence of such transference is that immanence, unity, etc., are really applicable to the Absolute alone. The human mind becomes no more than a moment, or finite centre of experience of the Absolute. It, with all that it is or has, is then in some sense immanent and a related part of the Absolute unity; and that is to say, it has ceased to be an individual mind at all—at any rate, in the ordinary sense of the term “individual.” “Hence the data upon which the doctrine of immanence was based (viz., that the ideas of each one of us are immanent within our own minds) have been cut away beneath our feet and the concept of Immanence thereby rendered invalid.”*

But the main point is: what are the conditions of reality for Absolutism in which human knowledge is possible? Briefly, that there shall be an Absolute in which all truth and reality are identified, and that, in some fashion unexplained, the “eternal intelligence . . . partially and gradually reproduces itself in nature and in us”; or that in the Absolute are

* Walker, *Theories of Knowledge*, p. 293.

reconciled the contradictions which certainly appear in the finite centres in a way of which no one can know anything. Now this is very unsatisfactory—perhaps *the* most unsatisfactory point about the various forms of Absolutism. For the theory of the Absolute sets out, at least, with the intention of explaining facts—the facts of experience. But it loses itself in a spider-web of theorising (mainly on relations) which obscures—where it does not denaturise—by metaphysical constructions, the facts to be explained. I am not quarrelling with metaphysic. Metaphysical spider-webs are useful, but only when they are able to catch the flies of fact and fix each in its appropriate place within the web. The web of Absolutism seems powerless to achieve the end for which it was spun.

On the other hand Pragmatism, as metaphysical theory accounting for the possibility of human knowledge, seems to have as little to recommend it as has Absolutism. It makes a claim—always tacit, and sometimes overt—not to be metaphysical in character; but it would certainly seem to be true that some ontological conditions are necessarily involved in a quest as to the possibility of the fact of knowledge. The most evident ontological phases of Pragmatism—and such are found in Pragmatic writings—may be said to consist in the tendency to regard human knowledge as a falsification of “pure” experience, together with the thesis that we make reality by “knowing” and know it by the way of “postulation.”

But who are we, the possessors of human knowledge, in this system? Professor James, who is a spokesman of the Pragmatic school, while admitting a plurality of minds which know a world common to them all, seems to take away with one hand what he offers with the other; for his theory of the self as a collection of phenomena, taking each other over as they succeed one to another in the stream of consciousness, is one which really robs “mind” of both continuity and unity. It has not been shown, nor does it seem possible to show,

how the knowledge or experience we possess comes to be differentiated from the pure experience from which it is supposed to arise, nor how such notions as the unity and continuity of the ground of manifold conscious processes are formed; and I cannot see that James's theory helps us. Indeed it would appear, on this count at least, that human experience could not be at all, or ever come to be; since no valid reason is assigned for the eruption of spots of personal consciousness upon the dead level of pure experience. And if we are referred back to the theory that reality is the result of knowing, and that knowledge consists in the verification of postulates, we seem to be still in the *impasse*; for how is it possible ever to begin a process of postulation at all? Postulation must presuppose something for the sake of which the postulate is framed—no less than a something which postulates—yet knowing seems clearly to be a presupposition of reality (as it is of truth) in this system.

We turn next to Realism, in all forms of which the subject-object distinction is admitted as an immediate result of analysis of mental states. There is a "self," a "something," and a relation between them—a relation of "epistemological co-ordination," or "compresence," of knowing and being known, which is a resultant of the activity of attention. For Lossky the "epistemological co-ordination" is non-causal in character. It is simply the contemplation of reality from which knowledge—"a process of differentiation of the real by means of comparison"—arises. Here there are two problems—the "having" or "giving" of reality in acts of simple apprehension; and the building up of systems of knowledge by means of the analytic and synthetic powers of mind. Realists hold that the latter process does not disfigure or denaturise reality, since both analysis and synthesis are regulated by the objective evidence of reality itself. As Lossky says, "the criterion of truth . . . is the presence in knowledge of the reality we are striving to know." This, however, belongs more

properly to a subsequent paragraph in which truth will be considered. We are here concerned rather with the former problem in so far as ontological conditions of the relation of "knowing" are involved. What must be the character of the knower (or "self") and of the known in order that knowledge should be possible? With regard to this problem the scholastic analysis seems to me to be the most adequate to explain the facts. It is, of course, only a part of a complete and integrated system of philosophy, which must suffer, to some extent at least, when taken in isolation from its context. Still it is worth while to outline it—even in such isolation—in the present paper.

The ontological conditions required are, in the first place, that "self" and "things" should be; and that "things" should be knowable; *i.e.*, be capable of entering into the structure of co-ordinated knowledge. But this implies both analysis and classification; hence "things" must be analysable. They must be such that differences exist (and can be known) in the radical unity of their natures. They must be constituted of matter and form, taken at least in the broad sense as a basis of classification—of quality, in which respect they are similar, and quantity, in which they are different. And this implies their independence, as individual "things," in a systematic universe. Further the rational system of the Cosmos itself, no less than the essential composition of all that enters into it, necessitates a further and more fundamental explanation of its own possibility, as well as of the possibility of knowledge. Some further ground, as source, must be assigned for the Cosmos, such as it is here considered. For the characters of "finite" things make it appear impossible that they should be their own ground or that their sum total should constitute the ground of any one of them. Their contingency is a reason for asserting a non-contingent but a necessary being, as ground both immanent and transcendent of the Cosmos. And this, while it may here be said to be a theory not entirely devoid of difficulty,

serves further to explain the apparent rationality of plan of the Cosmos, the purposive teleology of "things" as expressed in the laws of Nature, and the possibility of human knowledge of them.

But there seems to be a further ontological condition of knowledge on the part of the "things" known; and that is that the "things" themselves should exhibit such distinctions as render knowledge, as co-ordinated and systematised, possible; for knowledge, to be of any value, must in some sense conform to reality, even if "conformity" turn out to be an *ex post facto* discrimination of two aspects of identity. Now systematised knowledge consists mainly of judgments; and in these we find both concrete individuals and universals. The problem of the reality of the universals is thus raised; a problem than which, both on account of its historical development and its central position in philosophy, there is none more important. Thomistic realism solves this problem by the theory of the psychical mechanism known as the *intellectus agens*; but it also has its counter theory as to the physical object known. Stress is generally laid upon the psychical side of cognition in scholastic expositions. It is, however, none the less important to emphasise the objective side. The "thing" as soon as it is discriminated at all (even confusedly as a mere vague "entity") is discriminated with all the character of being. It is one and individual. But it is more than this; for in the being of the individual here and now singled out and sensibly apprehended there is the material incarnation (to use a metaphorical expression) of the abstract concept. The ideal is concretised in the real, the abstract in the concrete, the (potential) universal in the individual. And this applies in the case of the substance or nature of the "thing" discriminated, as well as in the case of its attributes. The universal is thus real, not as a falsification of, or mental construction from, the individual, but as a valid aspect of it as it actually exists in reality. Thus a man, Peter, for example, is (and is known as) entity,

rich and full of as yet undiscriminated possibilities for knowledge, as corporeal entity, organic, living, rational, etc. ; as tall, or white, or learned, etc., and, finally, as Peter himself, in whom the various real aspects have been successively analysed and re-synthesised within knowledge. They have been sensibly, or intellectually, intuited in the real object—the vague and before undifferentiated *hoc aliquid* of scholastics.

With regard to “things” knowable, we have lastly to enquire as to how they become known? By a strictly non-causal “epistemological co-ordination,” or by causal action? Here we are led from “things” to “things” and “self,” and so on to the ontological conditions of knowledge as affecting the knower.

The scholastic holds that the relation at the basis of cognition is not merely static but the result of a joint activity on the part both of the known and the knower. In fact, he conceives all his “substances” as active, each on a line of immanent teleology; and he uses the term “natures” for them as so conceived. But it should not be thought that the causal relation of “things” and “self” in knowledge is considered to be univocal with that of “thing” and “thing” in relations of purely physical causality. Intentional causality may be quite consistent with the nature of the “thing” known, considered as an activity; and with the knower, considered as modified by its action. The very word *intentionalis*, as applied to the modifications of mind in its acts of knowledge, is intended to safeguard the radical distinction that must be made in the concept of causality when applied in the two cases. And because of this distinction and its implications I am inclined to think that “epistemological co-ordination” and “com-presence” are not so unlike the scholastic notion of causality in knowledge as would at first sight appear, since it is quite certain that physical efficient causality and the causality of physical objects in the processes of cognition are not univocally but analogically maintained in the older form of Realism.

We pass now from the objective to the subjective ontological conditions of knowledge. What is presupposed, as far as the knower is concerned, in the fact of knowing? First of all, that the knower shall be a substantial unity; and this not only on account of the general metaphysical doctrine that whatever is is one, but further on account of the special and psychological datum that all forms and kinds of knowledge "belong" to the one individual which experiences and knows. Hence, though "sensible" knowledge is validly distinguished from intellectual, or conceptual, knowledge, both forms are asserted to be the knowledge of one and the *same* individual knower. Senses and understanding alike are thus conceived as no more than faculties—or "powers"—of the knower, by means of which he apprehends the knowable in different ways objectively determinable—and in *true* knowledge actually determined—by the object of knowledge itself. Thus the second ontological term of the cognitional relation must be an individual (substantial unity) capable of appreciating different (though truly actual) aspects of reality.

The two forms into which knowledge is distinguished merit special attention. Though it must not be forgotten that we probably have no knowledge of *sensibilia* unaccompanied *de facto* by intellectual processes it may be said that the object apprehended by sense is always a *hoc aliquid*, an individual thing more or less vaguely discriminated from the background of interrelated individual things which constitutes its actual setting in the world of concrete realities. But as this "thing" has many aspects (and even conceivably many more than we are capable of apprehending) and as these aspects which we do apprehend are apparently reduplicated in other similar things, it is maintained that they are apprehended abstractedly by means of the understanding. Indeed, judgment, in which acts of simple apprehension issue, shows this to be the case. For example, when I judge "This spherical, golden, odorous, 'thing' is pleasant to taste," I am adding a fresh conceptual note to a

number of previously synthesised notes, similar in kind, and predicating it (and them) of a thing at least possibly present, actually or in memory, as sensed. I am thus able to discriminate aspects, both concrete and abstract, in the object. But this is possible only because of the character of the powers of mind; for the objective aspects of real things, while separable in sensorial or intellectual abstraction, are not actually separated in the objective realities themselves.

Theory as to the psychical mechanisms by which such abstraction is rendered possible, does not necessarily belong to epistemology, but rather to rational psychology. I do not, therefore, propose to develop it in any great detail, but in view of the frequent misunderstandings which arise in its regard when considered in relation to theory of knowledge, I feel that something should here be said of it. As far as sense is concerned the scholastics distinguish the *species impressa* from the *species expressa*—a distinction covering both the primary and secondary qualities of things. The former consists in an immutation of the sentient organism by the object, acting “naturally” according to one or more of its “aspects.” The reaction of the conscious organism is the *species expressa*. But this is not the object of sensory “knowledge.” It is the ontological immutation or determination of the subject, by means of which knowledge of the object, in this or that aspect, is possible. The *species* is *id quo*, not *id quod percipitur*. Further, this *species*, since it is an accidental determination of the subject, is psychical in character; and by it the *sensibilia proprium, commune*, or as the co-ordinated sum of qualities sensed, are said to be psychically and not physically (spatially) in the knower.

As to the object of intellectual cognition, some small confusion occasionally appears in expositions of Scholastic Realism. It sometimes appears that this is taken to be a concept or idea, understood in the sense of a mental representation of the essence or of some attribute of the “thing” cognised; and the correspondence of this with the (here unknown) aspect

of extra-mental reality, is asserted or taken for granted. Colour is lent to this view by the frequent use of the expression *similitudo rei intellectæ* with regard to the *species intelligibilis*. Still it is one which cannot be maintained, for scholastics assert categorically that we have direct knowledge of "things," and not of concepts or ideas, except secondarily.

It is admitted that by the understanding alone, by means of which we are concerned with universal aspects of reality, we can never know the concrete individuals of the actual world. The work of the understanding is to form possible predicates rather than to discriminate actual subjects of judgment; except in so far as the whole judgment may be conceptual in character. Ultimately the type judgment is one in which universals are asserted of the concrete individual—*hoc aliquid*, so that both sense and understanding conspire towards its formation.

The real problem here is: What are these predicates which are asserted of such subjects; and how is it possible that they should be apprehended?

The predicates are held, as are the *sensibilia*, to be aspects of reality. I need not again elaborate this point. The psychical mechanism by means of which we are able to apprehend them is complex. It consists mainly in a passive power and an active power—dual aspects of one faculty—together with the sense presentation (or memory image) of the concrete individual, from and in which the universal is cognised.

Like sense, the understanding is acted upon by its object of knowledge; but this, *as such*, is not discoverable in the actual world of reality. The *sensible* must be made *intelligible* by the stripping from it of its individualising notes, and this is the function of the "active understanding." Once more it is not the *species (intelligibilis)* which is understood, but the quiddity, or quality, of the concrete individual (one or other of its real "aspects") which enters into knowledge. "Species quæ est in visu," comments Aquinas, "non est quod videtur, sed est quo visus videt, quod autem videtur est color, qui est in corpore."

Similiter quod intellectus intelligit est quidditas (whatness) *quæ est in rebus*; non autem species intelligibilis, nisi in quantum intellectus in seipsum reflectitur.”*

It is in reflection and theory as to the character of the immediate (direct) act of knowing, that we discover an ontological modification of mind as a sort of intermediary process between the thing known and the understanding knower.

The theory of the “active understanding” is profoundly misunderstood if it is conceived as furnishing objects of knowledge other than the objective abstract essences and qualities of real “things.” It renders actually intelligible what was before only potentially intelligible by “illuminating the phantasm” in such fashion that its individualising notes are obscured while its (potentially) universal notes are forced into prominence. In this way a further *species*, which is capable of determining the understanding in such wise that we “know” the essence or quality in question, is “generated.” This is the intellectual determinant. It is not immediately (directly) apprehended, but mediately and reflexly. “*Id quod primo intelligitur est res, cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo.*”† Thus the similitude or likeness of the *species* to the thing understood is said by Aquinas to be reached by reflection.‡ Hence the actually known is the same thing as the actual knower, but only in the sense that the “similitude” of the thing known is the ontologically determinant form of the knowing subject. “*Similitudo rei intellectæ est forma intellectus.*”§

* *Com. de Anima*, III, Lect. 3.

† *Summa Theologica*, Pars 1a, Q. LXXXV, a. 11, in corp. Similitudo rei intellectæ, quæ est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eandem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod intelligitur. Sed id quod primo intelligitur est res, cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo.

‡ It would follow as well from the general metaphysical principle that *omne agens agit sibi simile*.

§ *Loc. cit., ad primum.*

Finally, there is the concept, or *verbum*. In the scholastic analysis of the psychical mechanisms of knowledge, this is "the apprehension or expression of the object by the mind to itself." It is more than this, for the processes of analysis and synthesis conspire in its formation; and it is verbally expressed as a definition or meaning. Being informed by the *species intelligibilis*, the mind intuits the object. But a mental process of division and composition of aspects of the object then supervenes; and this issues in the concept. This concept, of which the constitutive aspects are immediately given as intuited, may further be regarded as something other than the concrete individual in which those aspects are seen to exist. The *verbum* is thus a complex notion formed by the mind as a consequence of intuition; and is that which constitutes the meaning of the spoken word.* It is an instrument which the mind forms in order to facilitate its judgments with regard to "exterior," i.e., real, "things."

PART III.

It is generally admitted that logical truth is to be found, or is expressed, in judgments, and that it consists in the conformity of that which is signified by the predicate with that which the subject expresses.

But on the basis of Absolute Idealism, truth is something more than this; for it is the sum-total of all interrelated reality, cohering and intelligible. That is the ideal and absolute truth,

* *Summa Theologica*, Pars 1a, Q. XXVII, a. 1, in corp. Quicumque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum, quod est conceptio rei intellectæ, ex ejus notitia procedens. Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat, et dicitur verbum cordis significatum verbo vocis; and

Ibid., Q. LXXV, a. 2, ad 3um. . . . Primo quidem consideratur passio intellectus possibilis, secundum quod informatur specie intelligibili. Qua informatus format secundo vel definitionem, vel divisionem, vel compositionem, quæ per vocem significatur. Unde ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio; et enunciatio significat compositionem et divisionem intellectus. Non ergo voces significant ipsas species intelligibiles, sed ea quæ intellectus sibi format ad judicandum de rebus exterioribus.

short of which no truth can be held to be necessary or final. But this manifestly is not the kind of truth in which we are primarily interested, or with regard to which we make search for a criterion. Human knowledge considered as embodying truth really falls far short of it in the system under consideration in more than one respect; and its criterion is difficult, not to say impossible, to establish or to employ. For, apart from the fact that the knowledge of finite centres consists in a partial unfolding of the knowledge of the Absolute, and therefore will always fail to be exhaustive (which may well be admitted of truth in any system), it will also always be suspect in so far as it is liable to intrinsic change or modification as every fresh advance in knowledge is made. As the part has its reality and significance only in the whole, so the partial truth must adapt itself to the evolving system of truths by which it is conditioned and affected, and which in turn it affects. Thus no statement, taken by itself, can be true as it stands, and may conceivably be false; while no systematised sum of human judgments, even if they have the utmost possible degree of coherence among themselves, can be above suspicion.

The criterion of coherence is thus, for human truth, at any rate, seen to be valueless as absolute or final. At most it could be applied to determine the greater probability of one cognitional system when several were in question; and even this application of it would be a matter of so great nicety as to be practically impossible. It may be granted that in the theoretic absolute knowledge and truth of Absolute Idealism, the coherence is perfect and truth absolute. But this in no way helps us in connection with the facts of human knowledge, the truth of which we are concerned in establishing. Nor does the conception of a gradual unfolding of absolute truth in human minds in any way guarantee such coherence as we may find in knowledge, since the discovery of error is incompatible with the conception; and errors are found to occur.

We are met by inconclusiveness also in the Pragmatic

criterion of utility which has been put forward and discussed in so many shades of meaning. Doubtless all truths are useful in some broad sense of the word ; but it would appear rather that they are useful because in accord with fact, and therefore true, than that they are true precisely because they are discovered, by trial, to be useful. The mental satisfaction which, while it need not necessarily be emotional, is not seldom advanced by Pragmatists with stress laid upon that character, would again certainly appear to be a consequence of truth rather than truth itself or its cause. Both utility and satisfaction as results of truth, however, provide fairly easily workable criteria, which anyone might reasonably—and *de facto* does in practice—accept and employ. But they do not seem to be ultimate ; since utility, even if allowed as a provisional criterion, itself must be judged according to some standard other than utility ; while satisfaction, whether it consist in emotion or its absence, is so subjective in character as to be worthless as a criterion except in so far as it itself might be seen, on other grounds, to have value. Further, the notions of utility and satisfaction as presented in Pragmatism are very vaguely stated ; and their vagueness seems to be the result of a notable ambiguity as to the meaning of truth in the system. Indeed, it would almost appear that exact definitions were deliberately avoided by Pragmatists. Truth and satisfaction are said to mean the same thing. We are told that truth is something which is made, which is verified by application and use, which leads us to reality ; but we are not told what it is in itself. And if we go beyond the point up to which the criteria of utility and satisfaction may be equally well employed in Realism and Pragmatism, we can, I think, say little or nothing as to the meaning of truth in the latter system, save that it seems to be totally other than that which is recognised by Realists. For this reason I shall confine myself to the brief remarks already made and turn at once to the criterion offered by Realism.

There is one and only one positive and ultimate criterion

of truth admitted in the typical realistic system I have selected for cursory examination. This is the objective evidence of the fact or ideal principle or abstract concept or their various possible connections which determines knowledge, and in a sense is identified with it. Whether we consider such an experience as the sensing of a colour or an orange, or the intellectual intuition of entity, or the grasping of some such universal relation as the principle of contradiction, or the following up of a chain of abstract mathematical proof, it is objective evidence—evidence of the objective coherence and sequence of the proof from evident principles, or of the objective relation of the entitative terms of the ideal principle, or of the objective fact of entity itself, or, again, of colour or orange sensed—which determines assent and at the same time is its epistemological justification.

Objective evidence as the sole ultimate criterion of truth may appear to come as a sort of simplist anti-climax at the end of an examination of the nature and conditions and psychical mechanisms involved in knowledge, far more elaborate than the outline which has been given in the present paper. Still, simplicity is not necessarily a fault, even in philosophy: and perhaps its very simplicity is the character which most recommends it, since it has to be applied in a variety of circumstances and with regard to a number of characteristically differing objects, in respect of which complicated criteria might prove more or less, if not entirely, unmanageable.

The criterion of objective evidence leads us to a distinction which has been tacitly understood throughout the present paper wherever Realism has been touched upon. If objective evidence is the sole ultimate criterion of truth, then all knowledge must depend genetically and ultimately for its truth upon the truth of intuition, whether sensible or intellectual. The distinction to which reference is made is that drawn between intuited abstract reality and notional or conceptual habit. A similar distinction might be drawn with regard to sense. Conceptual

habit and imagination are certainly employed, in the absence of intuition, in thought processes. The intellectual and sensorial aspects of "things" given in intuition shake loose, so to speak, from one another so that they can be manipulated, arranged and rearranged by mind. And they can be subjectively arranged and combined otherwise than in reality, more or less at the pleasure of the subject. It follows that much of our so-called knowledge may be false. That we should possess such knowledge (not conformable to fact) is thus mainly due to the free play of the synthetic powers of mind dealing with aspects of real things, sensorial or intelligible. Simply to think, or state these aspects, involves neither truth nor falsehood. But to synthesise them otherwise than they may be seen in intuition is to create error. All ideal or imaginative constructions, no matter how complicated—as mathematical proof or physical theory—must thus be brought to the test of objective evidence and abide by the piecemeal verification of intuition. They can only be accepted as provisional or probable until such verification has been made; that is to say, in order that they should be shown to be true, they must be capable of what has been called the "fulfilment" of intuition.* For it is in intuition that we are furnished with the aspects of reality—or, better, of "things"—which we use in imaginative and ideal construction; and it is to intuition, in the last resort, that we refer these products of mind for verification.

How far such a criterion actually applies to our public or personal systems of knowledge is a matter for further examination. But it would appear that certain things, at least, are universally considered to be evident; and that evidence, as a matter of fact, is the criterion to which ultimate appeal is always made, not only by the unphilosophical, but also by philosophers of every school in support of their doctrines, and

* Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*.

especially of the fundamental principles upon which it is claimed they rest.

Coherence and utility, however, are signs of truth considered in relation to other truths, or to practical issues; and both, as such, find a place in Realism.

Indeed, the claim may be made for Realism that it includes in its system the overstressed and partial aspects developed in Empirical and Idealistic Philosophies; that with regard to Theory of Knowledge it is at once more evident and more comprehensive than either.

XII.—MR. RUSSELL'S THEORY OF JUDGMENT.

By G. F. STOUT.

IN his theory of judgment, Mr. Russell attempts to determine what we mean when we say that a belief is true or false. Belief is sharply distinguished by him from what he calls "knowledge by acquaintance." Knowledge by acquaintance is knowledge of things themselves, including under this head both particulars and universals, whereas belief or judgment is "knowledge about" things such as may be expressed in statements concerning them. In acquaintance, there is no possibility of error; for it simply consists in the thing itself being before the mind. It is only in knowledge *about* things that the distinction between truth and falsehood as possible alternatives is applicable. Thus in merely apprehending a sense-datum, there cannot be any mistake. In asserting that it is red I may be wrong, but it is nonsense to suggest that I may be wrong in being aware of the sense-datum itself, which I must apprehend before I can assert anything about it. Similarly I cannot be wrong in merely thinking of the relation of likeness, though I may be wrong in asserting that something is like something else, or in asserting that the relation of likeness is a predicate. It is only judgments which are capable of being false. This need not, however, hold good for all judgments. Mr. Russell regards it as highly probable that there are some judgments possessing a kind of self-evidence which is an infallible guide to truth. Under this head come "intuitive judgments of perception." When we are directly acquainted with a sense-datum, we can hardly be wrong in asserting its existence. The like infallibility belongs to judgments if and so far as they merely analyse a complex sense-datum

which we know by acquaintance; for instance, on seeing a piece of white paper with a blot on it, I may analyse the visual appearance by asserting that it contains a part which I call white and a part which I call black, and that the white is round the black. I may be wrong in my use of these words; but, so far as in using these words I am merely expressing differences and relations which I find in the actual sense-datum, there would seem to be no possibility of mistake. Besides such intuitive judgments of perception there are also general principles, such as the law of contradiction, which have a strong claim to be regarded as possessing infallible self-evidence. These include such simple arithmetical propositions as "two and two are four."

All judgments which have not this kind of self-evidence are, in their own intrinsic nature, capable of being either true or false. There is nothing in their own constitution to necessitate their truth or to necessitate their falsehood. We have to enquire what is meant by saying that such judgments are true and what is meant by saying that they are false. As a preliminary to the detailed treatment of this problem, Mr. Russell lays down three requisites which, he says, must be fulfilled by any satisfactory theory. The first is that truth and falsity must be regarded as properties of belief or judgments. The second is that no account of what is meant by a belief being true can be accepted unless it also explains what is meant by its being false. We have to show that in its own intrinsic nature the belief is capable of being false as well as true. We must account for the possibility of error. Mr. Russell's third postulate is that the truth or falsehood of a belief must be recognised "as depending upon something which lies outside of the belief itself. If I believe that Charles I died on the scaffold I believe truly, not because of any intrinsic quality of my belief, which could be discovered by merely examining the belief, but because of an historical event which happened two and a-half centuries ago. If I believe that Charles I died in his bed I believe falsely; no degree of vividness in my belief, or of care in arriving at it, prevents it

from being false, again because of what happened long ago, and not because of any intrinsic property of my belief." The something outside the belief which makes it true or false is, according to Mr. Russell, some real existence or "actual fact." Truth, then, consists in some relation of correspondence between belief and actual fact, and error in non-correspondence. In what precise way such correspondence is to be defined remains to be investigated. It is the central problem with which we have to deal. In any case, the actual fact which makes the belief true or false cannot as such be present to the mind of the believer in the act of believing as the object of belief, *i.e.*, that which he means to assert. For if this were so he could never assert anything that was not actual fact and there would be no possibility of error. Plainly the position here maintained by Mr. Russell is of the utmost importance. It is, I believe, far from being generally accepted. But I, for my part, find it quite undeniable. It requires, however, to be very carefully and guardedly stated. We have no ground for affirming that no actual fact which is in any way relevant to the truth or falsity of a belief can be present to the mind of the believer in the act of believing. All that we are justified in saying is this:—If and so far as a belief is capable of being either true or false, those precise and specific features of actual fact on which depends the decision between these alternatives cannot, as such, be present to the believing mind as the object of the belief. This being understood, we may agree that any satisfactory theory of belief must fulfil Mr. Russell's three requisites. But it by no means follows that a theory which fulfils these three requisites is therefore satisfactory. It is at this point that I begin to part company with Russell. He tests his own theory solely by reference to the three requirements which he himself has formulated. But there seem to me to be at least three others, equally indispensable, of which he takes no account.

In the first place, no correspondence can constitute truth which is not a correspondence or which does not include a

correspondence between actual fact and something which is before the believing mind, as such, in the act of believing; similarly no non-correspondence can constitute falsity, except in so far as it involves non-correspondence between actual fact and something which is before the believing mind as such, in the act of believing. Whatever is not thought of at all by the believing mind is irrelevant to the question of truth and falsity.* In other words there is no correspondence of belief with real existence, except in so far as there is correspondence between real existence and what Mr. Russell calls the objective constituents of belief. When I believe "that A loves B," whatever the words "that A loves B" may mean when strictly interpreted, their meaning must be apprehended by me and there can be no correspondence between my belief and actual fact except in so far as there is a correspondence between the meaning of these words as I understand them and actual fact. Thus, if I express my belief to another person by saying to him "A loves B," he can determine whether my statement is right or wrong only by raising the question whether the meaning conveyed by the words "A loves B" does or does not agree with what really exists. To this extent the old definition of truth as the agreement of *thought* with reality is clearly justified. That this is a necessary condition of truth seems to me obvious from the following consideration: It is admitted that in mere belief the actual fact which determines between truth and falsity is not itself present to thought; if, then, what corresponds to the actual fact were not present to thought, it would follow that truth consists in a correspondence between something which the believing mind does not think of at all and something else which it does not think of at all. If anyone is prepared to accept this position, there can be no common basis of discussion between him and me.

* Except, of course, the existence of the believing attitude itself considered as purely subjective in distinction from its object. But this cannot correspond with fact, except in so far as its object does so.

In the second place, what is thus thought of in a true belief differs as such from the actual fact only in one respect. It differs only in not being actual fact. This becomes evident when we consider that any other difference renders the belief false. When I believe "that A loves B," if in actual fact it is P instead of A that loves, or Q instead of B that is loved, or if the relation is any other instead of loving, or if it is B that loves A instead of A that loves B, my belief is false. It follows that the object before the mind in true belief differs from the actual fact not in its nature but in the kind of being which belongs to it. As compared with the actual fact, it is, in some sense which requires to be further defined, relatively unreal. Otherwise it is indistinguishable from the real existence which determines the truth of the belief. Where there is any other difference distinguishable the belief is false.

I do not say that the object of thought in mere belief cannot be actual fact. What I do say is that the sort of being which it must have in order to be an object of thought is not that which belongs to actual fact. It does not follow that what has this sort of being cannot also be actual fact. All that is required to account for the possibility of error is the assumption that it may or may not be actual fact. On the other hand, there is no inconsistency in supposing that what really exists not only may but always does also have the kind of being which is presupposed in being an object of thought.

It is worth noting that this condition is satisfied by the old scholastic distinction between "objective existence" and "formal" or actual existence. Indeed I disagree with this doctrine only on one point—a point, however, of vital importance. The "objective existence" of the schoolmen is a mode of being which *consists* in being apprehended or thought of; whereas the mode of being which I distinguish from actual fact does not consist in being thought of, but is a precondition of anything being an object of thought. I shall presently indicate more precisely what I mean by this mode of being

in discussing another requisite which must be fulfilled by any tenable theory of belief. This requirement is that the correspondence of belief with actual fact must be thought of and asserted by the believing mind. There can be no truth or error unless something not only is actual fact but is taken to be actual fact. If it is not actual fact, the taking of it for actual fact is a mistaking of it for actual fact. There can be no truth or error unless the mind means or intends something to be real.

We have good evidence for this in the verbal expression of belief. I may express a belief simply by saying "A loves B." But if my statement is questioned, I am likely to repeat it in new forms, such as "A *really* does love B," "it is an actual fact that A loves B," "A's love for B is a reality." These variants do not mean anything different from the original statement. They only make explicit the reference to reality which in the original statement is tacitly implied.

Of course, if anything is asserted to be real, "its being real" must be thought of. But "its being real" may be thought of without being asserted. This is the case in mere supposal such as is expressed in the words "if it should rain to-morrow," or "if I were now in the moon." "If I were now in the moon" means just the same as "if the actual fact were that I was now in the moon." What constitutes the distinction between belief and mere supposal is that in belief what is thought of as being real is also asserted to be real.

At this point we encounter a difficulty. How can anything be thought of as being an actual fact, if the actual fact itself is not present to the mind? But in mere belief it is admitted that the actual fact is not present to the mind. In order to give what I regard as a full answer to this question, I should have to explain in detail my own theory of judgment. This would divert us from the proper subject of this paper, which is concerned with Mr. Russell's view, not with mine. None the less, for the sake of clearness I must

briefly indicate how I would meet the difficulty which I have just raised.

When we say that in mere belief the actual fact itself cannot be before the mind, the reference is to the belief only in so far as it is capable of being false as well as true. Hence the reference is only to those precise and specific features of actual fact on which depends the decision between truth and falsity. It is not implied that no actual existence or none that is in any way relevant can be present to thought or perception. On the contrary, some real existence must be apprehended, and it must be relevant in the sense that it includes those precise and specific features of actual fact which determine whether the belief is true or false. It must be before the mind of the believer as the object of a possible question admitting of alternative answers. Further, it must be known to include actual features of such a nature that they make the belief true or false. This being assumed, we may proceed to consider an example. Suppose that a really existing match-box is as such present to my mind. Plainly this does not make it necessary that all its actual features in their specific detail must be present to my mind. In particular I need not know whether the box is empty or has contents, and if it has contents, what these are. None the less I may know as actual fact that, within and between the surfaces of the box, there is either empty space or contents having the general character required for possible contents of this match-box. It may contain matches or beads or cotton-wool, and so forth. I know that if one of these alternatives is not actual fact, some other must be so instead of it. I am aware of the box as having an actual content, including under this expression empty space. I am aware of these contents as having some specific nature or other. What I am not aware of is just the specific and particular actual content which is actually placed between the surfaces of the box. The important point, however, is that I am aware that an actual content having some specific nature is there, and that it

is one of a group of possible alternatives. Further, I may think of this or that alternative, as such, and to do this is to think of it as something which may be actual. For all possibility is possibility of being real. In mere supposal, this is all that is involved. A possible alternative is considered as such. But in belief we do more than this. We not only consider a possible alternative, but we mentally treat it as if it were the realised alternative, and so not only possible but actual. We dismiss more or less completely the thought of other alternatives and proceed in thought and action as if this one were actual fact. When it is so, our belief is true; otherwise our belief is false. I am far from claiming that this account of the matter is incapable of improvement and correction. I recognise that as regards the language in which it is stated it is clumsy. But I do claim for it that it illustrates the kind of explanation which is required, and that Mr. Russell's solution, though it is neater and apparently simpler, purchases its comparative neatness and simplicity by failing to do justice to the complexity of the problem.

Mr. Russell's doctrine consists (1) in the thesis that judgment is a complex unity, constituted not by a dual but by a multiple relation. A multiple relation is a single relation uniting more than two terms. The multiplicity is not, properly speaking, in the relation but in the term. He gives as examples jealousy and intermediacy. On this assumption that the relation involved in believing is a single relation between more than two terms, he proceeds (2) to give an account of the sort of correspondence between belief and reality which, according to him, constitutes truth.

Why does Mr. Russell insist that the judgment-relation must be multiple? He gives no reason, and apparently he can find none to give, except that it cannot be dual. But why can't it be dual? Here we touch the vital point of Russell's contention. If the judgment-relation is dual one of its terms must be the believing mind and the other must be a complex

unity present to the mind as its object. We must suppose that when someone believes "that A loves B," the words "A loves B" stand for a complex unity apprehended in the act of believing. Now Mr. Russell holds that if such a complex unity were apprehended in the act of believing, there could be no way of distinguishing it from an actually existing complex in which A is really related to B as loving B. But if this were so, the actual fact on which the decision between truth and falsity depends would always be before the mind in believing, and error would therefore be impossible.

It is solely in order to meet this difficulty that the conception of judgment as involving a multiple relation is introduced. We must be very careful to realise exactly what is logically implied in this position. The implication is that if such expressions as "that A loves B" stand for a single object having any kind or degree of unity which may be conceived as corresponding with the unity of an actual complex, the hypothesis of the multiple relation is unnecessary to account for the difference between truth and falsity. On this view, when I believe that A loves B, though I may think severally and separately of A and of B and of loving, I cannot think of loving as being a relation between A and B. *A fortiori*, I cannot think of it as relating them in the special sense that it is A who loves B rather than B who loves A. Otherwise it would be possible to account for the difference between truth and falsity without reference to Mr. Russell's multiple relation. The judgment would be true or false according as A and B were or were not related in this way.

It is presupposed throughout Mr. Russell's treatment of the subject that the correspondence which constitutes truth is a correspondence between two complexes. One of them must be what he calls "actual fact." The other must either be an object present to the mind or must be otherwise accounted for. Having denied that in believing there is an object before the mind possessing such unity as would enable it to correspond with the actual complex, he is driven to seek some other explanation.

He accordingly hits on the conjecture that the complex which corresponds with actual fact is purely and directly the judgment itself. But this judgment-complex contains more than two constituents, the mind and at least three objects apprehended by it. Hence its relating relation must be a multiple relation. It is for this reason and no other that he refers to multiple relations at all.

Wherein then does the correspondence with actual fact consist according to Russell? It consists, he tells us, in a correspondence between the judgment-complex including the believing mind as one of its constituents and another actually existing complex which contains the same constituents related in the same order with one exception. It does not contain the mind. The belief "that A loves B" is a complex which includes as its constituents the mind and A and B and the relation of loving. These four terms are united by a single relation, which may be called the judgment-relation. They are united by it in a certain order, the order which passes from "A" to "loving" and from "loving" to "B" rather than that which passes from "B" to "loving" and from "loving" to "A," or from "loving" to "A" and from "A" to "B," or from "loving" to "B" and from "B" to "A."* Russell does not tell us whether the mind has any order with reference to the other terms or whether this order is variable. However this may be, the belief, according to him, corresponds with fact when there is an actual complex comprising all the constituents of the judgment-complex except the mind, and unified, not by the judgment-relation, but by the relation of loving. This complex is the actual love of A for B. When no such complex exists, the belief "that A loves B" is false.

I have here attempted to reproduce Russell's own general

* The last two alternatives do not seem to be excluded. For loving is not a "relating relation," but only one of the terms knit together by the judgment-relation.

statement of his position. But the general statement is clearly inaccurate if we check it by his detailed exposition. In the first place, the contrast between what is called the actual complex and the judgment-complex is not tenable. The judgment-complex is itself as actual as anything can be. Its constituents really exist, and are really knit together by the judgment-relation. I am inclined to think that Mr. Russell's exposition owes much of its plausibility to the false suggestion that the judgment-complex is or may be, in some sense, unreal—that the judgment itself does not or may not really exist. Again, it is not accurate to say that the actual complex to which the judgment is said to correspond contains all the constituents of the judgment-complex except the mind. "Loving" is not a constituent of the actual complex. It is the relating relation which knits its constituents together. If we choose to say that the relating relation may be regarded as a constituent we get the same difficulty in another form. For, in that case, the judgment-relation is a constituent of the judgment-complex but not of the factual complex. This inaccuracy entails another. Russell cannot really mean that the constituents common to the judgment-complex and factual complex have just the same order in both. For the order as determined by the judgment-relation is from "A" to "loving" and from "loving" to "B"; but in the factual complex loving is the relating relation and not one of the terms related; hence in it the order is directly from A to B. "Same order" must therefore be taken to mean an order which is so far similar that it is not reversed.

I have stated what I take to be essential requisites of a satisfactory theory of judgment. I have also analysed Mr. Russell's theory. I have now to enquire whether this theory, strictly interpreted, fulfils the initial requisites. There can, I think, be no question that it fulfils those which Russell himself explicitly recognises. In particular, it certainly

succeeds in placing outside the belief itself the actual facts on which truth and falsity depend. But, so far as I can see, it completely fails to fulfil any of the additional requirements which I have formulated. The correspondence which it regards as constituting truth is not a correspondence between actual fact and anything which is present to thought in the act of believing. It is supposed to consist in a relation between the judgment-complex and an actual complex, such that there are certain constituents common to both and placed in a similar order in both. We are thus confronted with the question whether in the act of believing the judgment-complex itself is always apprehended. This would imply that whenever we believe we must at the same time be aware of the state or process of believing, and of the mind as a constituent of it, a very dubious proposition which Mr. Russell himself would probably not accept. But even if we could grant this it would not be sufficient. It is not enough that awareness of the judgment-complex should follow or accompany its existence. What is required is that it should belong to the very constitution of this complex to be apprehended by the mind. But this is plainly a contradictory assumption. The judgment-complex itself must exist as a pre-condition of our being aware of it. If, then, truth consists in a correspondence between the judgment-complex itself and actual fact, truth must be independent of any awareness which we may have of the judgment-complex. An inevitable consequence of this is that judgment as such does not include an apprehension of the order of the terms in the judgment-complex. For if we are not aware at all of the judgment-relation as knitting its terms together, *a fortiori* we cannot be aware of it as knitting them together in a certain order. On the other hand, it is admitted that we are not aware of the actual complex, from which, again, it follows that we are not aware of the order of the constituents of the actual complex. Hence it would seem that, according to Russell, the truth of a belief consists in a correspondence between

something which, at any rate, in so far as it is a believing mind, it does not think of at all and something else which it does not think of at all. It may be said that according to Russell there are present to the mind certain separate items, at least three in number and including a relation. This being so, is it not sufficient to constitute truth that a complex should actually exist in which the other items are knit together by the relation? I answer in the first place that, if this is sufficient, the hypothesis of judgment as involving a multiple relation becomes superfluous. All that is needed is awareness of the separate items. In the second place, on this view, there would be nothing to distinguish the truth of the belief "that A loves B" from the truth of the belief "that B loves A." For in both cases A and B are united by the relation of loving. In the third place, even apart from any question of the order of terms, the position is untenable. For the correspondence is made to consist in the separate items being actually united in a certain kind of complex. As the mind does not think of them as united in a complex at all, it follows again that the correspondence is between something which is not thought of and something else which is not thought of.

Does Russell's theory satisfy our second requirement, that what is before the mind as its object in a true belief must not differ from actual fact except in not being actual? If we suppose that all that is before the mind is the separate items which are united in the actual complex, the condition is not fulfilled, because the relation which is present to thought as one separate item among others is the relating relation of the real complex. If we suppose the judgment-complex itself to be apprehended, there are further differences. The relating relations of the two complexes are different in kind and there are two constituents of the judgment-complex which are not constituents of the real one, viz., the mind itself and the term which is a relation.

As for the last requisite it is plain that Russell wholly fails

to satisfy it. The mind cannot mean or intend something to correspond with something else when one of them is not thought of by it at all. Still less can it do so when it thinks of neither of them.

It would, of course, be possible to pursue this sort of criticism much further. But I have been already tedious enough. I must, however, in conclusion, mention a direct reason for rejecting the theory which I have tried to assail in a circuitous way. My most fundamental objection to it is simply that it affirms what can be immediately seen to be false. It affirms that when I believe that A loves B, the words "that A loves B" stand for no object present to my thought having a unity such as to make it capable of corresponding with the actual fact of "A loving B." As I have already pointed out, this must mean that I do not think of loving as a relation between A and B, still less as a relation which relates them in such an order that it is A who loves B and not B that loves A. Otherwise the actual complex would correspond with my belief, if A and B were in fact related by the relation of loving and related in this order. But is it not transparently false that in believing or even in supposing that A loves B, I do not think of A and B as being related by this relation and in this order. Everyone can decide the question by "looking into his own mind."

Note on "Knowledge by Acquaintance" and "Knowledge About."

Russell's account of the distinction between "acquaintance" and "knowledge about" is essentially as follows: To be acquainted with anything is to have the thing itself directly before the mind. To know about it is to have cognisance of it as being "such and such" or "so and so." In other words, in knowing about a thing we assert that it has certain characters, we attribute to it certain attributes. This includes the case in which we judge that it exists. That to which the characters

belong is the thing itself, with which we are directly confronted on "acquaintance."

According to Russell it is impossible to know *about* a thing unless we are acquainted with it. But he recognises that, in many cases, we appear to make judgments about things with which we are not acquainted. When this is so, we seem to mark off the subject we mean to refer to merely by what we know about it. Thus in asserting that "the contents of this box will get wet," I need not be actually acquainted with what is inside the box. I may mentally refer to it merely as that which is inside the box, whatever this may be. I am then, in Russell's terminology, said to know by description. What is inside the box is a "descriptive phrase" or a "denoting phrase." But it is impossible for Russell to admit the possibility of knowledge by description being ultimate. It is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of his philosophy that acquaintance with a thing is the indispensable pre-supposition of knowledge about it. He is, therefore, bound to explain away "knowledge by description," and he attempts to do so in his article "On Denoting," *Mind*, N.S., vol. XIV, pp. 479 *seq.* On this point I shall have something to say in the sequel. But I must begin by examining the general distinction between acquaintance and "knowledge about."

On Mr. Russell's view, acquaintance is not acquaintance with characters or attributes, but with the subject as something distinct from all that can be truly asserted of it in judgments. This is a position which I cannot accept. The subject, taken apart from all its characters or attributes, can only be known, if it can be known at all, as that to which the characters or attributes belong. In other words, it can be known only by description. If we persist in asking what it is in itself and yet refuse to take as an answer any statement of its attributes, we can only say with Locke that it is a "somewhat, we know not what." Russell seems to feel this difficulty in the special case of the "I" as subject, "the I

which sees the sun and is acquainted with 'sense-data.'” But there is the same difficulty in the case of all subjects, as such. It is true that knowledge by description seems to involve a distinction between knowing about something and knowing the thing itself. But this distinction, when it is accurately examined, does not support Russell's contention. It is always a distinction between the knowledge that something exists in certain relations and the knowledge *what* it is that is related in this way. But the question What is it? can be answered only by assigning attributes to a subject. It is not answered by any revelation of the bare subject itself denuded of the characters which belong to it. We never reach a mere “that” as contrasted with a “what.” If I know something merely as being whatever is contained in a certain box, this leaves unanswered the question—What then is it that is inside the box? I may get a partial answer by opening the box and examining its contents. But in doing so I merely discover certain further characters of that which I previously knew through a certain relational attribute—through its relation to the box. That which possesses both the relational attribute and the other attributes is never present to the mind by itself as a bare subject.

We may take as a crucial test what Mr. Russell calls the “intuitive judgment of perception.” In such judgments we are directly acquainted with a sense-datum, and we simply assert the characters which we find in it. The question is whether, when we have taken account of all the characters capable of being asserted in judgments of this nature, there is anything that we are immediately acquainted with left over which can be regarded as the subject. I can find no such thing. The sense-datum is, let us say, extended: it is black throughout its extent; it is round; it is bordered by a surrounding expanse of white. Except such attributes as these there is nothing that I am immediately acquainted with. When I speak of being acquainted with them, I, of course, do not mean that in mere

acquaintance there is any apprehension of attributes, *as such*. But it is equally obvious that in mere acquaintance there is no apprehension of a subject or "thing," *as such*. The distinction of subject and attribute is possible only in judgment. It is only in judgment that we can determine what we are and what we are not immediately acquainted with.

It may be said that characters or attributes are always general, whereas the sense-datum we are acquainted with is not general but particular. I do not think that this distinction is tenable. Both the sense-datum and the characters asserted of it are in the same sense particular and in the same sense general. The sense-datum itself is general in the sense that it is a member or instance of certain classes or kinds. It is for instance a member of the class "all sense-data," of the class "all red sense-data," and of the class "all coloured sense-data." On the other hand it is particular, inasmuch as it is a particular member or instance of each of these classes or kinds. To say that it is a certain sort of thing is more accurately expressed by using what is in ordinary language an equivalent expression and saying that it is a thing of a certain sort. This means that it is a constituent of a complex having a unique and ultimate form of unity, the *distributive* unity of a class or kind as opposed to all collective or synthetic forms of unity. The constituents of the complex are what we call the members or instances of the class or kind. The sense-datum is a particular member of many such complexes, and in this sense it may perhaps be called general as well as particular. Whether this is a legitimate use of language or not, my point is that the characters ascribed to the sense-datum in the intuitive judgment of perception are not general in any other sense than this. Each is a particular character and possesses no generality except what may be held to consist in its being a particular instance of a class or kind. When I assert that the sense-datum is red, I mean just that particular red with which I am immediately acquainted. I cannot mean any other because there is no other belonging to this particular sense-datum.

Similarly when I say that the sense-datum is coloured, what I mean to assert of it is the same particular red; the only difference is that I am now considering this particular as a member of the class "all colours" instead of the class "all reds."

Mr. Russell's theory of generality is, of course, different from mine. But can he show that it is superior to mine, or, indeed, that it is tenable at all. It assumes that when each of a plurality of sense-data is truly judged to be red, the meaning is that a single indivisible quality (called a "universal") appears in different places or at different times in connexion with each sense-datum. I ask Mr. Russell whether acquaintance with a particular red sense-datum includes acquaintance with this "universal" quality. If it does not, how can we assert the quality in an intuitive judgment of perception which simply asserts what we *are* immediately acquainted with? If, on the other hand, we *are* acquainted with the quality in this way, then, on Mr. Russell's view, it must be particular, not general, and a subject or "thing" not an attribute. In any case it is pure mythology to suggest that besides the particular red we are also aware of a shadowy counterpart of it called redness, in the form of a floating adjective hovering over this and all other particular reds. Again, the single universal quality is said to appear in different places. What then are we to say of the character common to all places, as such? Can this be said to be single and indivisible and only to appear in a plurality of particular places. The same question arises as regards the common character of *appearing* which belongs to all the particular apparitions of the same universal quality. Mr. Russell's theory of "universals" seems to be beset with insuperable difficulties.* But even if we were to accept it, we should not therefore be bound to give up the view that we are only acquainted with a subject inasmuch as we are acquainted with its attributes. For it would be open to us to hold that so-called particulars are in reality

* I have only referred to a few of them.

"universals" appearing at different times and different places and in varying combinations. Such a view would, I believe, be quite indefensible. But the objections to it are ultimately objections to a theory of generality which I myself reject.

What then is the subject itself as distinguished from its attributes? It would seem that its whole being must consist in being that to which its attributes belong. But how can the whole being of anything consist in its being related to something else? There must be an answer to the question,—What is it that is so related? It is doubtless for this reason that Mr. Russell insists on regarding the subject as something distinct from all its attributes and capable of being present to the mind independently of them. There is, however, another alternative which avoids the difficulty. There is no need to consider the subject as being something distinct from the total complex of its characters. What we call the characters or attributes of the same subject are united with each other by a form of unity as peculiar and ultimate as that which I have ascribed to a class or kind. The complex so constituted is what we call the subject. To be an attribute of the subject is to be a member of this complex. To know the subject as such we need only know one or more of its attributes. The other attributes are then known by description as being those required to complete the complex, whatever they may be in specific detail. On this view, the distinction between subject and attribute would be abolished in the limiting case of a subject with a perfectly simple nature. This emerges with great clearness in the discussions of the schoolmen concerning the conception of God as an absolutely simple being.

I take knowledge by description to be as ultimate as knowledge by acquaintance.* The possibility of it rests for

* This point is of immense importance. The opposite view is fundamental in the systematic structure of Mr. Russell's philosophy, and more or less determines his attitude to all special problems.

me on the fact that some entities, at least, have a certain kind of incompleteness, such that on apprehending them we are able to apprehend them as being incomplete and are therefore aware of something as being necessary to complete them. We may also know that the something, inasmuch as it has to satisfy this condition, must be of a certain general character. But its specific and detailed nature has, at least in most cases, to be otherwise ascertained.

Mr. Russell refuses to regard knowledge by description as ultimate. In his article in *Mind* (vol. XIV, N.S.) he attempts to give an account of it which shall presuppose nothing but knowledge by acquaintance. His explanation is somewhat intricate; but I need not deal with its intricacies here. It is sufficient to say that I stumble on the very threshold. Mr. Russell, in attempting to account for knowledge by description in terms of what is *not* knowledge by description, assumes as fundamental "the notion of the variable" and he cannot stir a step without it. If, therefore, the notion of the variable involves anything which is known by description and not by acquaintance, his explanation moves in a vicious circle. What then is a variable?

A limited or relative variable is something determined as having a certain general character but otherwise capable of alternative specification, so that it may be "this, that, or the other," whatever this, that, or the other may be, provided that they fall within the class or kind originally presupposed. The reference to "this, that, or the other, whatever this, that, or the other may be," is not, I would urge, knowledge by acquaintance but knowledge by description. The absolute variable differs from the relative only in one respect. There is no general character which its values must possess except that of having some kind of being. But the phrase "whatever has any kind of being" is certainly descriptive. It is equivalent to "all things," which Mr. Russell himself expressly recognises as a descriptive formula.

A further objection has been pointed out to me by Mr. Broad. Russell presupposes not only the notion of the variable but also "propositional functions" such as "X is human." But how can we be acquainted with a "propositional function"? It is conceived as being a form of propositions properly so called. It is what Kant would call a form of judgment. Yet Mr. Russell cannot mean to say we are acquainted with all the judgments of which a propositional function is the form. We can know them only by description.

XIII.—SYMPOSIUM—THE IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS.

By E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, BERNARD BOSANQUET, and
F. C. S. SCHILLER.

I. By E. E. CONSTANCE JONES.

THE Import of Propositions was one of the subjects of Platonic discussion. The Eleatic Stranger in the *Sophistes* reports the view of some "tyros" in Logic who held that we can never say: Man is good, but only: Man is man, Good is good. It is interesting that the same conclusion is reached by Hermann Lotze—certainly one of the ablest and most interesting of nineteenth century logicians. After an elaborate enquiry into the import of propositions of the form *S is P** he concludes that *S is P* is an "impossible" form of proposition—that we can only say: *S is S*, *P is P*, *S is not P*. It is hardly necessary to note that this conclusion results from a strictly conceptualist view of Logic, and is, in fact, the only conclusion which can be reached on such a view. As Locke points out, we can never identify one concept with another—*e.g.*, we cannot say: Humanity is Mortality, but only Humanity is Humanity, Mortality is Mortality. We can, however, say that Man is Mortal. Again, we cannot say: Envy is Malice, Perseverance is Success, but we can say: The Envious are malicious, the Persevering are successful.

To refer (as Lotze does) to the Hypothetical Form—*e.g.*, if *M is P*, *S is P*—for the interpretation of *S is P*, and again to the Alternative Form—*e.g.*, *S is P* or *M is not P*—for the interpretation of the Hypothetical, seems clearly inadequate, since the elements of both Hypotheticals and Alternatives are themselves of *S is P* form.

* *Logic*, Book I, Chapter II.

This same question of the interpretation of affirmative categoricals is dealt with by Mill in Chapter V of Book I, of his *Logic* ("Of the Import of Propositions"). *What is it*, he asks in that chapter, (1) *between which connexion is asserted* in a proposition; what do the Subject and Predicate stand for? and (2) *what are the connexions between Subject and Predicate* which are asserted?

The question as he deals with it in, *e.g.*, § 2 of Chapter V concerns *general* import, the import of all affirmative propositions of Categorical form—of the form *S is P*, that is. Of such propositions, he says, quite generally, that: Whatever is denoted by the Subject has the attributes connoted by the Predicate. He goes on to give, as a more exact analysis of a Universal Affirmative (*e.g.*, All men are mortal), the statement that: Whatever has the attributes connoted by the Subject has also the attributes connoted by the Predicate. He refers to these in § 5 as "by far the most numerous class of propositions," and it is these propositions which in his view are of fundamental importance for Logic—one might almost say that they are, in his view, the only propositions of real logical importance, being the expression of "laws of nature," of "the order existing among phenomena"—*e.g.*, Diamonds are combustible. (It is to be observed that Identity of Denotation is the only form in which a combination of Intensions can be manifested to us).

Mill, as we know, in the further discussions of his chapter on Import—*i.e.*, in answering question (2): What are the connexions between Subject and Predicate asserted in affirmative Categoricals?—inadvertently, it would seem, but none the less unfortunately, drops the *general* point of view, and turns to a *classification of differing propositions of S is P form*, which is quite "another story," and he gives us under this head an excruciatingly bad classification of the kinds of assertion made in affirmative Categoricals.

He attempts the rather ungrateful task of forcing upon the

relations between Subject and Predicate a scheme of the relations between States of Consciousness which he had reached in his discussion of Categories in Chapter III, viz.: Co-existence, Sequence, Similarity and Dissimilarity.

His results are not even plausible. He gives, *e.g.*, as examples of—

Co-existence and Sequence (1);

Resemblance (2);

A Sequence accompanied with Causation (3);

the following:—

(1) "A generous person is worthy of honour";

(2) "The sensation I feel is one of tightness";

(3) "Prudence is a virtue."

It is clear that he confuses between *classing* and *asserting*, that (1) is as much a case of resemblance as (2), and that if (3) asserts "a sequence accompanied with causation," then of most propositions with significant Terms we may give the same account, *e.g.*, of (1); and the whole discussion is spoiled by a failure to keep clear the distinction between general analysis of the import of propositions of S is P form, and what Bain calls an "enumeration of ultimate predicates."*

This abortive classification is from my point of view the more distressing because Mill had, as I think, really hit upon an account of Import which only needed to have "Connotation" amended to "Intension," in order to furnish a clear, simple, and satisfactory general theory. And this is what a thinker of Mill's sincerity and acuteness ought to have been capable of providing, seeing that he was familiar with the distinction between what he called the Connotation and Denotation of Terms, and laid stress on the importance of this distinction. It is curious that Jevons, too, should have pointed out—and with extreme emphasis—the importance of the distinction

* See Section VIII of my *Elements of Logic*.

between Denotation and (what he called) Intension, in his *Elementary Lessons in Logic*, p. 37. He does not, however, recur to this, or make any use of it. Like Mill, he drops the clue—and he wanders off into complete confusion between extensional and intensional sameness. See, *e.g.*, *Principles of Science*, Chapter III, and the account of “The General Formula of Logical Inference” in Chapter I of the same work, where we are told that “the one supreme rule of inference consists . . . in the direction to affirm of anything whatever is known of its like, equal or equivalent. *The Substitution of Similars* is a phrase which seems aptly to express the capacity of mutual replacement existing in any two objects which are like or equivalent to a sufficient degree.”

That the Substitution here referred to is, in fact, substitution of terms having identical application, is obvious on the most cursory examination, and is apparent at first sight from Jevons' own examples in illustration, *e.g.* :

The Lord Chancellor (1),

The Speaker of the House of Lords (2).

(1) and (2) are not connotational or intensional *similars*, but numerical, historical, or extensional, identicals.

The important questions as to the difference between Synthetic and Analytic Propositions in Kant's Philosophy, all turn on relations of connotation. If there can be Synthetic Propositions as distinguished from Analytic Propositions, this is only because it is possible for THAT WHICH has the connotation of the Subject to have also another and differing connotation, that of the Predicate—and this, of course (That which has the connotation of the Subject has also the *different* connotation of the Predicate), is exactly what Mill means when he says : WHATEVER has the connotation of the Subject has also the connotation of the Predicate.

Is it possible to connect differing connotations in this way? Mill says Yes. Kant says Yes. The tyros of the *Sophistes*

say No. Lotze says No ; and Lotze and the tyros are thereby—*de jure* though not of course *de facto*—limited to affirmations of strictly tautologous type, to *e.g.*, Lotze's "the drinking dog is the drinking dog." They would seem to be even precluded from asserting A is-not B, as this can be presented in the affirmative form A is not-B.

Thus Mill and Kant are among those who accept propositions of the form S is P. Lotze is among those who (theoretically) reject them. But if they *could* be really and practically rejected, thought would be abolished, and A is A would cover our needs of record and communication.

It might seem that the meaning of *S is P* is very simple and obvious, that no one could fail to understand it, but in point of fact, although we are all perpetually using *S is P* forms, and so practically have the most intimate acquaintance with them, on the one hand it is found difficult to produce a generally acceptable analysis, and on the other hand even thinkers of repute seem to have fallen into confusion through not having clearly in mind the distinction between the Denotation and Intension of terms in propositions. I have already pointed out that this has happened in the case of Mill and Jevons—and it seems to me to occur also in Sigwart, *e.g.*, in Chapter II of his *Logic*. (All these writers also confuse between (1) the relation of Terms in an assertion and (2) the relations of Classes.)

S is P, if it has any significance whatever, is a form of *Synthetic* assertion, and, because it is so, it is regarded by Dr. Bosanquet as preferable to A is A (*S is S*) as a fundamental logical form—"the general formula of thinking."

Some thinkers appear not to allow that the form S is P has any significance. Mr. Russell, I believe, takes this view. As I understand, he allows $a = b$ as a general form for equations, but does not allow *S is P* as a general form for Affirmative Categoricals. Mr. Moore would also, it seems, reject *S is P*. (Of course, if *S is P* is accepted at all, it must be accepted as general.)

The only reason which I have heard given for this refusal is that Affirmative Categorical Propositions are of many different kinds. Quite so—but this does not prevent our calling them Affirmative Categoricals and recognising the similarity (in diversity) which induces us to class them as such. To call them *S is P* propositions is not, to my mind, going any further in the direction of generalisation, of ignoring differences, than to call them Affirmative Categoricals. If we refuse to accept *S is P* as symbolising any Affirmative Categorical, why should we not equally refuse to use, say, $a = b$ as a formula for equations, or the general name Quadruped for such different specimens as Horse and Dog, Lion and Tiger, Otter and Water-rat?

On the other hand all logicians (we may perhaps say) do use *S is P* and similar general forms. Lotze uses *S is P* throughout the long discussion at the end of which he rejects it—and in order even to discuss and reject, he has to give it *some* meaning. Mr. Alfred Sidgwick and Dr. Schiller, of course, use it freely in their latest books, which deal (in very hostile fashion) with Formal Logic, and it seems relevant to ask: What meaning do they give to it? I am not saying that Mill's account (or Frege's, or my own) of the import of categoricals goes to the root of the relation between, *e.g.*, Substance and Attribute, and is capable of elucidating this or any other metaphysical doctrine—but that a general theory of import should do this does not seem to me to be necessary or even possible.

The analysis of a Categorical proposition, and all logical and other controversies, and even the secret of the Universe, could not be expressed without the *S is P* form; and perhaps if we knew all about the first, we should also know all about the others—as Tennyson suggests in his invocation to the “flower in the crannied wall.” The Categorical form, which is for logic the “pillars of the house,” the feet on which it stands, and by which it goes, cannot profess, *quâd* form, to expound the

Universe, but only to furnish an instrument which may be used in such a task, though ultimately it may be found that the Categorical form and the general structure of knowledge go far to confirm each other.

I do not see how it is possible to give a *general* account of the Import of the *Assertum* in *S is P* unless we accept *S is P* as a form applicable to all Categorical affirmations, any more than it would be possible for us to give a general account of *Triangle* unless we could abstract from size, relations of angles, etc.

I therefore accept the form *S is P*, and though I may be unable to offer a general account acceptable to any who reject that form, I may perhaps succeed in recommending my analysis to some extent by applying it later on in certain special cases.

I wish to state quite explicitly that while I regard my (diversity-in-identity) analysis of *S is P* to be of absolutely general application, I do not suppose it to be *in any particular case* an exhaustive account, any more than it would be an exhaustive account of a triangle to say that it is a figure enclosed by three lines.

I ought perhaps to apologise for speaking of the analysis which I adopt, as "my analysis," but I will ask leave to use the phrase provisionally, for the sake of convenience.

Put as briefly as possible, the view of *S is P* which I support, is, that *S is P* asserts *Diversity of Intension in Identity of Denotation*. *S* and *P* apply to one object or group, and assign to that one *Denotatum* the intensions of *S* and *P*, thus the

thing referred to is $\bigcirc \begin{matrix} S \\ P \end{matrix} \bigcirc$. *E.g.*, The Morning Star is the

Evening Star (Frege's example) $\bigcirc \begin{matrix} MS \\ ES \end{matrix} \bigcirc$. The terms "Morning

Star" and "Evening Star" apply to *one thing*, but the meaning, intension, or qualitative implication of Morning Star is not the same as that of Evening Star.

In such propositions as (1) "All Men are Animals,"



(2) "All Sergeants are Non-Commissioned Officers "



there is identity between the Subjects : All Men, All Sergeants—and the Predicates : (some) Animals, (some) N.C.O.'s, respectively—it is one group which is in the one case All Men, (some) Animals, and in the other All Sergeants, (some) N.C.O.'s. The whole intension of the Predicate-name [in (1) Animals, in (2) N.C.O.'s] is assigned to the Subject, but not the whole denotation, otherwise we should be identifying Men with Lions, Tigers, etc., Sergeants with Corporals, Lance-Corporals, etc. It is this denotational unity that is the bond, or the sign of the bond, between the intensionally different Subject and Predicate. I say "or the sign of the bond," because this denotational unity which is indispensable and never absent, is in many cases recognisable as conditioning the manifestation of an inseparable *connexion* of attributes, and it is possible to argue that even in cases where we cannot recognise this connexion, it does in fact exist—that though not a *postulate*, it is a *basis*, of our doctrine of import. Compare the propositions: All isosceles triangles have the angles at the base equal, All men are mortal, All arsenic is poisonous, All crows are black, All daffodils are yellow, This umbrella is mine, Your purse is found.

How are we to interpret the copula in any one of these—*e.g.* All men are mortal?—Every term has two, and only two, aspects or moments, the extensive, applicational or denotational (Thatness), and the intensional, qualitative or attributive (Whatness), corresponding to the two aspects of things or objects of thought. Every such object is:—

- (1) Something or other ;
- (2) Some *sort* of something.

Unless a name *applies to something* (and that is what I understand by having denotation) it cannot be used *in assertion*, and unless it has intension, one name will serve as well as another—it does not matter which we use.


If it is objected that in such a proposition as “the round-square is self-contradictory,” Subject and Predicate have no denotation, I would point out that “denotation” is required not only by the proposition which asserts self-contradictoriness, but also by the Subject *round-square* itself—it is only the supposition of roundness and squareness in *one* denotation, as co-existent attributes of an object which is both square and round, that is self-contradictory and gives rise to difficulty. Unless I make the supposition of roundness and squareness being co-existent in *one* object or thing (in which case roundness and squareness are supposed to have identical *denotation*), what is there that is self-contradictory, what is there to deny, what hindrance is there to thought or to assertion? Even in the wildest region of supposition, no one has ever affirmed that roundness is squareness, that the definition of roundness is the definition of squareness; to suppose that the round thing is also square, that the square thing is also round, is as far as any one can go. And we have to suppose this, after *some* fashion, in order even to recognise its self-contradictoriness, and to reject it. *Self-contradictoriness* itself is a case in point.

To return to the interpretation of All Men are Mortal—I hold that in this proposition there are two intensions, and one denotation (common to Subject and Predicate) to which both intensions belong. The *meaning* (the *intension*) of men is *not* the meaning of mortal, nor can the extension of *men* BE the *intension* of mortal. The only possibility seems to be, that the *is* or *are* of the affirmative Categorical imports identity of denotation between Subject and Predicate; if not, the Copula would have to be negative, for certainly it is only in propositions of the form *A is A* that the *intension* of the Subject is the *intension* of the Predicate. And unless it is denotational identity of Subject

and Predicate that is indicated by the Copula in affirmative Categoricals, how are we to account for the agreement of Predicates in gender and number with their Subjects, in Latin, Greek, French, German and other languages, which have not lost their inflexions to the extent to which English has? Why say: *Ces soldats-ci sont braves, Quelques roses sont blanches, Diese Soldaten sind die tapfersten, Dieses Buch ist das meinige, Diese Rose ist die einzige weisse*, and so on? In: *Quelques roses sont blanches*, the only things which we *say* are *blanches* are *ces roses*, though no doubt many other things are "blanc." We are dealing with Assertion—with the Terms *as they occur and are limited* in the proposition, *i.e.*, with Subject and Predicate—not with the bare classes "rose" and "blanc." We are not using the Predicate in its fullest extension or application, but only as applying to the Subject of Predication, to the denotation of which it is, as so applying, necessarily restricted. Compare Mill's statement: *Whatever* has the attributes connoted by the Subject has also the attributes connoted by the Predicate. Every affirmation, as well as every negation, is determination. It is at any rate clear that Identity of Denotation with Diversity of Intension is a condition of "Synthetic" affirmation which cannot be escaped. In every Synthetic assertion the diverse intensions are asserted to belong to one and the same thing (and in many cases we recognise that they occur together because they belong to each other)—*e.g.* All begonias like plenty of water, All lions are carnivorous, All isosceles triangles have the angles at the base equal.

What happens then to a general name, whether Substantive or Adjective, that is used as Predicate-name in an affirmative proposition, is that its denotation is fixed by the denotation of the Subject to which (and to which alone) it is asserted to apply. Such restriction of denotation (and not any alteration of connotation) is the modification imposed on general names, when they become Predicates of Propositions. If it were not so, it would not be true that Subject and Predicate in *S is P* propositions

have the same application (or denotation)—a statement which it seems to me impossible to deny.* I may perhaps observe here that I do not regard symbolic forms as liable to ambiguity in the way in which significant words are liable. In *S is P* there is, as far as the symbols go, no ambiguity. All that is signified is that Subject and Predicate are different. Symbol *S* is not Symbol *P*, and has not precisely and entirely the same Intension. (I use Intension in Dr. Keynes's sense, as distinguished from Connnotation, and wider than it.)



All Immediate Inferences, and also Mediate Inference, can be made obvious by help of Euler's circles, and anyone who accepts these circles as appropriate diagrammatic representations of the relations of classes, and who allows the validity of Conversion in the case of *A*, *I*, *E*, propositions, and the usual equation of *A* to (1) *or* (3), and of *I* to (1) *or* (2) *or* (3) *or* (4), is forced to admit identity of denotation between Subject and Predicate in categorical affirmatives. All *R is Q* may be diagrammed by (1) or (3) *because* in some cases denotation of *R* and *Q* is identical, while in others it is not—there is no other difference between (1) and (3). *E.g.*, (1) All men are

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Animals} &= \begin{array}{c} \text{M} \\ \text{A} \end{array} ; \quad (3) \text{ All Men are Rational Animals} \\ &= \begin{array}{c} \text{M} \\ \text{RA} \end{array} . \quad \text{Similarly with I.} \end{aligned}$$

* See *Mind* for April, 1914.

And the same admission is forced on us by the use of All or Some with the Subject-name in A and I, and the insertion of similar quantification of the Term which in Conversion has been transferred from the place of (unquantified) Predicate to the place of Subject.

E.g., All Men are Animals.

∴ Some Animals are Men.

It is expressly to guard us against confusing between the possibilities (1) and (3) in A, and the possibilities (1), (2), (3), and (4) in I, that stress is laid on attention to distribution of Terms, when we are dealing with inferences, mediate or immediate.

To anyone who uses *S is P*, I would put the question: What do you mean by *S is P*?

If he says he means nothing by it, then I rejoin—

- (1) that in that case he has no right to use it;
- (2) but unless he *does* mean something, why *does* he use it?

If he says he does mean something, I ask further: *What* it is that in his opinion it does mean?

Pragmatists ought to accept my doctrine of categorical import, as it certainly stands the practical test which they impose—it will apply everywhere—it does “work.”

“We,” says Dr. Keynes, “take the proposition as a whole.” That is exactly what I contend for—and what I think my analysis of *S is P* does with completeness, for it considers the inseparable (though not indistinguishable) relations between the Terms, both in Intension and in Denotation—Identity of Denotations is indicated by the Copula, Diversity of Intensions is shown by the difference which characterises the Terms—each involves the other and is unmeaning without it. We cannot read both terms in Intension merely, or both in Denotation merely—or Subject wholly in Denotation, and Predicate in Intension, or Subject wholly in Intension, and

Predicate in Denotation. No coherent explanation can be got out of these suggestions. Intensions of both Terms *and* Denotations of both Terms must all four go to the make-up of a Significant Assertion, even of the artificially simplified and highly abstract S is P .

Of S is not P a corresponding analysis can be given—namely, that S is not P asserts Otherness of “Denotation with Difference of Intension. It appears that propositions of the form A is related to B come primarily under this rubric, A and B in any such case being related Terms which (unlike S and P in S is P) differ from each other in Denotation as well as in

Intension, thus: \textcircled{A} \textcircled{B} . *E.g.*, Philip and Alexander

are related as Father and Son \textcircled{P} \textcircled{A} , Edward I and

Queen Eleanor as Husband and Wife $\textcircled{\text{Ed. I}}$ $\textcircled{\text{Q. E.}}$, the

Earth and the Moon as Planet and Satellite \textcircled{E} \textcircled{M} .

Compare $A = B$ $\textcircled{A} = \textcircled{B}$, and

A is equal-to- B $\textcircled{\text{A (equal to B.)}}$ $\textcircled{\text{B (equal to A.)}}$.

Relative Propositions are of course not confined to cases in which there are only two *Relata*. Reference to System is very obvious in the case of all Relatives, and they cannot be understood except in reliance upon the System to which they refer. But I should like to point out that in any assertion of S is P form we construct a complete and very interesting system

of illimitable application—a plurality-in-unity definitely connected—a something which exhibits in the simplest form qualitative variety in denotational or extensional one-ness.

S is P gives us something which has both S-ness and P-ness—which is both S and P \textcircled{SP} , which with not-S and

not-P is all-embracing, whatever S and P stand for—S is P affording us the eductions P is S, S is-not not-P, P is-not not-S, and further the complementary form *not-S is not-P* with its corresponding eductions.

S is P analysed as I suggest furnishes a principle which may be called the Law of Significant Assertion, according to which *in any Affirmative Categorical, Subject and Predicate have*


Identity (of Denotation) in Diversity (of Intension) $\textcircled{S, P}$

or $\textcircled{S, \text{not-P}}$. This Law accepts and explains propositions

of the form *S is P*, which we are forced to employ continually whether we wish to do so or not, a form without which we can neither record nor communicate knowledge, and without the use of which it is impossible to give a satisfactory statement of the Laws of Contradiction and Excluded Middle, which are recognised as fundamental Laws of Logic. The necessary starting-point of a Logic which throughout depends on Synthetic assertion is thus secured, and it appears also that logical science is provided with a logical basis which it has heretofore not had, and which, oddly enough, logicians generally do not seem to have missed. That Lotze did miss it and did make an heroic though unsuccessful effort to supply the deficiency, has not, I think, been sufficiently appreciated. This same Law of Significant Assertion provides also, as I will try

to show, a trustworthy clue in dealing with Inference, Mediate and Immediate, and with those forms of Assertion which, as Hypothetical and Alternative, we are accustomed to distinguish from the Categorical.

S is P, as I have been contending, is a system-formula. In using propositions of this form, the speaker expounds in words, for the benefit of the hearer, a construction which is already present in his own mind, and which becomes present to the hearer when he has grasped the assertion. Let us take as illustration the proposition "The next station to this is Cambridge." Suppose that I, to whom this fact is well known, am at a particular point of a journey communicating it to my fellow-traveller who did not know it before. In my own mind "the next station" and "Cambridge" are applicable to one and the same place. My hearer, when he has apprehended and accepted my assertion, has by a very simple process of synthesis reached the construction from which I started



The same sort of thing happens on an extended scale when I read a book, answer a question, search for a missing link. I am the learner, the listener, the seeker. If I understand the book, solve the difficulty, find the link, I have reconstructed in my own mind the thought of the writer, the intention of the questioner, the complete chain. Compare also the study by an artist of some great picture, or of a fugue of J. S. Bach by some student of music.

I think that in Hypothetical propositions it is essentially the same process which takes place.

When I say: If *M* is *P* and *S* is *M*, then *S* is *P*, in this case again the hearer puts together the material given, and reaches

the construction $\textcircled{\text{SMP}}$, and this construction justifies him in

asserting the further proposition (*inferrible* but not yet explicitly enunciated): S is P. Suppose that my hearer and I agree that M is P. Then instead of setting out my full reason for asserting S is P, I need only say: If S is M, S is P. We get the same con-

struction **SMP**. Suppose I say: If A is B, C is D.

This is clearly elliptical.

But if it is *agreed* that, *e.g.*, C is A and B is D, by adding these we get a completely articulated construction, thus:

CABD, which justifies the assertion C is D. *E.g.*, If the

21st Batt. R.F. are quartered at Epsom, then Tom Brown is living in a wooden hut, \therefore Tom Brown is in the 21st Batt. R.F., and all troops quartered at Epsom are living in huts.

Suppose that instead of saying simply: The next station is Cambridge, I say: If this station is Foxton, the next but one will be Cambridge.

This is elliptical. I cannot assert that the Consequent follows from the Antecedent unless I know that Foxton and Cambridge occupy such positions relatively to each other that there is only one station (namely, Harston) between them—*i.e.*, Foxton is two stations from Cambridge—Foxton is next Harston, and Harston is next Cambridge—giving the construction **F \rightarrow H \rightarrow C**. This construction entitles to the conclusion: Foxton is the next station but one to Cambridge.

“Hypothetical” propositions are of course no less likely than Categorical arguments to be elliptical. For further illustration of relations between Hypotheticals and Categoricals I may refer to a couple of examples from my *New Law of Thought*, and to the solution which I suggest of Lewis Carroll’s “Logical Paradox.”

(1) *If Charles I had not deserted Strafford, he would be deserving of sympathy.*



This asserts that supposing denotation of Charles I to be identical with denotation of one who did not desert Strafford then (because not to have deserted Strafford would have been to deserve sympathy) the denotation of Charles I would have been the denotation of one deserving of sympathy. In this example it is not from the expressed Antecedent alone that the Consequent follows, but from that Antecedent taken in conjunction with another (unexpressed) proposition.

(2) *If the building goes on, he will not recover.*

This may be expanded into :


If the work goes on, great noise will be made ;

If great noise is made, he will be disturbed by it ;

If he is disturbed, he will not sleep ;

If he does not sleep, he will die.

The conclusion *he will die* results from a series of suppositions in which *Building Going-on* (1) is identified (denotationally) with *Making Noise* (2), *Making Noise* with *Disturbing-him* (3), *Disturbing-him* with *Preventing-his Sleeping* (4), *Preventing-his Sleeping* with *Preventing-his Recovery* (5).



What holds the argument together denotationally is just as much of the denotations of (2), (3), (4), and (5) as is identical with the denotation of (1), the denotational identities following from intensional connexions.

The efficacy of the identity-in-diversity analysis is perhaps nowhere more strikingly seen than in its application to Hypotheticals, especially Hypotheticals of the elliptical and often complicated

sort which we so commonly employ, and of which the illustrations examined above are instances.

The Logical Paradox which Lewis Carroll offers for solution is that (i) If Allen is out, Brown is out, (ii) If Carr is out, if Allen is out, Brown is in. The circumstances of the case which he presents are that in a certain barber's shop there are three attendants, Allen, Brown, and Carr, and at no time are they all out together, *i.e.*, Allen or Brown or Carr is always in (1). And (2) if Allen is out Brown is out (because Allen has been ill and cannot go out without Brown). Conditions (1) and (2) give the construction of the "system," which is in this case our Universe of Discourse, and solution of the Paradox by reference to this "system" may be very briefly stated as follows:—

If A and B are out, C is in (1).

But if A is out, A and B are out (2).

∴ If A is out, C is in.

∴ If C is out, A is in.

When C and A are out $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{(i) B is out,} \\ \text{(ii) B is in.} \end{array} \right.$

(i) because A is out = A and B are out (2).

(ii) because A and B and C cannot all be out together (1).

As the contradictory consequents cannot both be true, the antecedent from which they follow cannot be true—here the contradictoriness of the consequents (i) and (ii) is actually inferrible from the antecedent)—and we get the Hypothetical Syllogism:—

If C and A are both out, B is both out (i), and in (ii);

But B cannot be both out (i), and in (ii);

∴ C and A are not both out.

(= C is in or A is in.)

Just because we see *Brown is in* and *Brown is out* to be contradictory, we should be entitled to deny any antecedent from which they seem to follow. This mere perception of

contradiction would lead us to deny the assertion that *Allen is out* when Carr is out.

Mr. Russell considers that the "Paradox" is quite simply resolved by application of "the principle that a false proposition implies every proposition." Putting p for "Carr is out," q for "Allen is out," and r for "Brown is out," he says that if q is false, q [simply as a false proposition] implies r and also not- r , because any false proposition implies every proposition. And we reach the result: If p is true, q is false.

What the above principle means is, I suppose, that: If False Propositions are True, all Propositions are True. For

All P are F or T.

But T are T,

and

If F are T, then both T are T and F are T.

Hence, if any False Proposition is True, all Propositions are True. If this interpretation is right, the principle certainly seems indisputable. It also seems to be suggestive of the oneness of Truth.

As we have seen, in—

If Allen is out, Brown is out;

If Carr is out, If Allen is out, Brown is in;

Brown is in and *Brown is out* follow respectively from the stated conditions (1) and (2) of the whole case—they are in the ordinary sense inferrible. But when the Paradox is solved by application of the principle that from any false proposition all propositions follow, our appeal seems to be shifted to a different region—a region where we do not conclude that because *Brown is in* and *Brown is out* are contradictory, the common antecedent is denied, but take the ground that these two are by no means inconsistent, and must both be true if *Allen is out* is false, because on the supposition of its truth any false proposition implies all propositions. It is reference to given conditions, to the Allen-Brown-Carr

"System," that brings us up to our problem, while in Mr. Russell's solution there is no reference to the *content* of propositions, but only to Truth and Falsity, and *B is out* and *B is in* would be implied by *any* false proposition. If *q* is seen to be false from a consideration of the Carr-Allen-Brown "System," then the application of the Falsity principle seems superfluous. If *q* is not seen to be false, either because of the conditions of the System, or because inconsistent propositions follow from it, how do we arrive at its falsity? And would not any false proposition have served the purpose?

That, *e.g.*, *S is P* is an inference from *M is P* and *S is M* may be put generally in this way: The hearer, reader, or seeker apprehends *M is P* and *S is M*, and makes his mental construction accordingly. This done, the construction is found to warrant the inferred assertion, the "inference," *S is P*. It is the *hearer* of whom this is true. For the speaker, who produces *M is P* and *S is M* as premisses on the strength of which *S is P* may be asserted, *S is P* is no more Inference than any of the

other propositions which his construction SMP justifies.

It is perhaps from this point of view that it has been thought a sufficient account of *If A then C* to say that it denies the combination *A true C false*.

Some recent logicians (*e.g.*, Dr. MacColl) hold that we should always say, *e.g.*, If *M is P* and *S is M*, then *S is P*, instead of:

M is P and *S is M*
 \therefore *S is P* ;
 and If *S is P*, then *P is S*, instead of
S is P \therefore *P is S*.

These considerations seem to favour the view that every Hypothetical presents a case of Inference, and that every case of Inference may be appropriately expressed as a Hypothetical (whether "Conditional" or "True Hypothetical").

The above scheme exhibits impressively the grip which each Categorical Constituent of a Hypothetical has on the others. In the absence of a principle of connexion there could be no such grip holding the members together. If *A is B*, *A is D* is elliptical, or it is incoherent. If we add *B is C* and *C is D*, the whole is knit together by the bond of identity (of denotation). In the case of Relatives the basis of connexion is found in the laws of the "system" to which reference is made, *e.g.*, space, time, family relationship. In the case of *S is P* the scheme of Formal Logic is the system to which we refer, it is our Universe of Discourse—as in the example about Cambridge, Harston, and Foxton, given above, the reference is to geographical position, and in Lewis Carroll's Logical Paradox, the reference is to the "system" produced by the two sets of conditions laid down. The rules of the system concerned in any case are the "Rules of the Game" for dealing with members referred to the system.

What holds for Hypotheticals holds also for the propositions which are called Disjunctives or Alternatives.

The essentials of the scheme are extremely simple—

S is P (simplest Categorical);

If *S is P*, *P is S* (simplest Immediate Inference [or Education] and simplest Hypothetical);

If *M is P*, and *S is M*, *S is P* (simplest Mediate Inference and corresponding Hypothetical);

If *M is P*, *S is P* ($\therefore S$ is *M*) (simplest elliptical Mediate Inference and corresponding Hypothetical).

As there are stages of knowledge in which connexion between *S* and *P* is only *known* as a case of bare conjunction, so there are stages in which the connexion between Antecedent and Consequent in Hypotheticals is only known in an elliptical form—*e.g.*, If *A is B*, *C is D*, If this morning's sunrise was red, we shall have rain before night. Perhaps it is the ellipticalness of so many Hypotheticals which has masked their essentially inferential character.

It would be easy to carry on the list to complicated cases, and to apply it to Relatives, and to further concrete instances.

II. *By* BERNARD BOSANQUET.

1. The Import of Propositions is a very comprehensive subject, and raises at once the question whether a single account can be given of it which is valid for all propositions whatever. The account with which Miss Jones has made us familiar refers explicitly only to propositions of S P form, and I will begin by considering it in cases in which that form is natural. I will then say something of propositions not readily reducible to that shape, and, after pointing out a further principle which these suggest, will endeavour to bring them all under a general doctrine.

I refer to p. 359: "Put as briefly as possible"—down to "Evening Star"; and see pp. 360 and 361, down to "*is* the *intension* of the Predicate."

I do not find it easy to discern precisely what sort of assertion is here described. When it is said (p. 361) that "the 'is' or 'are' of the Affirmative Categorical imports denotational identity between subject and predicate," I should have expected that we must be speaking of such assertions as that "A. B. is the same man who was at school with me," or that cited from Frege—"the Morning Star is the Evening Star." For here we do seem to mean, *i.e.*, to wish to convey, that a person or object is the same individual, though considered by us in respect of two different intensions. This would be the nearest approach to reading a whole proposition in Denotation; and a proposition genuinely so read should be reduced to a meaning like that of these. But Miss Jones is not quite so strict, as I gather from her statement in *General Logic* and from her examples here.

"In the predicate of any proposition it is naturally and inevitably Signification [= Intension?] and not Application [= Denotation?] which is prominent" (*G.L.*, p. 29). Miss Jones desires to apply her analysis at least to the import of *all* propositions by which we desire to convey information about persons or things. So "All Sergeants are N.C.O's."

Now this width of the doctrine strengthens a doubt which is raised even by the former examples. Take the second type first—"All Sergeants are N.C.O's." or, say, "The Canadians are brave men." Do we, in saying these things, want to convey anything about the individuals whom we mention in one aspect being the same individuals as those whom we mention in another? Do we not simply want to "qualify" the individuals by an attribute? The import of a proposition, I must insist, surely lies in what we aim at conveying, by it, not in any condition *sine quâ non* of the conveyance. And now for the former cases. "He is the same man I was at school with 50 years ago." Compare the slightly different proposition: "He is just the same as ever—just what he always was." In the latter we are surely predicating a quality, an attribute, which interests us and we hope will interest our listeners. And, I think, we must say the same of the former also. In all S P propositions the application of S and P *is*, of course, the same. But when this sameness becomes the import, it seems to become a quality of intension. And so, I gather, Miss Jones will not admit that her view reads the proposition in Denotation only (*cit. supra* from *General Logic*; *cf.* pp. 364 and 365—you cannot read a proposition in Denotation merely).

So I have a difficulty in seeing, even in the simplest cases, what precisely the identity of denotation is taken to contribute to the import of the proposition. Take the example from Frege. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star." Here, no doubt, is identity of denotation, and we *may* mean to convey it specially. It is a thing we may not all know. The identity of the physical object in S and P does enter into the astronomical fact

conveyed, more, perhaps, than that of the person in the proposition, "The Lord Chancellor is the Speaker of the House of Lords," to which, on the whole, the same remarks apply. Still, I think, the import of the proposition is in neither case satisfied by this account. There is a connection between the intensions themselves, in astronomical truth as in constitutional law. We shall see the nature of this connection below. I think that, probably because of such considerations, Miss Jones has further widened her view. Not merely the denotational identity is the import of *all* S P propositions, but the denotational identity may be not the bond, but only the sign of the bond, between S and P (p. 360). It may "condition the manifestation of an inseparable connection of attributes." Yes, but does not the import lie in the meaning rather than in the sign of it, or in the condition of its manifestation? This point is developed later in her paper (p. 369, *cf.* 360). I will return to it.

Consider, again, once more the passage on p. 361, "The *meaning* (the *intension*) of men is *not* . . . between S and P"; together with Miss Jones' refusal to read the proposition wholly in Denotation (pp. 364 and 365). Can the words "imports identity of denotation between S and P" be strictly maintained? There *is* such identity, it is fully admitted, in all propositions at all like those we have been speaking of. There is an individual Subject (or a group) which is the same under two intensions. But is *this* identity the import even of the propositions of the type in question? You *can* insist upon it; and I have pointed out before that Mr. Bradley, in indicating this possibility, has said all that at most Miss Jones appears to me to say. "In 'Cæsar is sick,' the same person is said to be sick as well as Cæsar. And in 'Dogs are Mammals' there are certain things which are declared to be both" (*Principles of Logic*, p. 168). This reading is possible, but we saw that it was not natural. Even in the propositions where it seems *prima facie* insisted on, we saw, it is at best an incomplete reading. And to the view that it is natural to take

the subject in Denotation and the predicate in Intension Miss Jones seemed *prima facie* disposed to assent (references to *G.L.*, and paper, *supra*). It is what Mr. Schiller calls the predicative view (*Formal Logic*, p. 105), and what Mr. Bradley describes as "qualification" (*Essays*, p. 324).

But Miss Jones, I gather, holds this import impossible (pp. 361 and 364), though apparently inclined to it. Why? First, I think, because she takes a pure denotational meaning as without intension, and therefore unable to be maintained by itself or to be qualified by any intension. This is a difficulty in speaking of denotation as such at all (p. 361). But I take it that in denotation there is intension, only the intension is auxiliary to identification, as in a proper name, and not regarded for its own sake. If so, the predicative view or idea of qualification presents no difficulty, and is much what Miss Jones has described in the *General Logic* (p. 29). Secondly, because of a conviction that the only identity is numerical identity (*numero tantum*, *G.L.*, p. 41), or Identity of Existence or Application (*ib.*, p. 29), combined with the conviction that the "is" of the proposition must express an identity.

Now these ideas seem to me to reveal that the enquiry before us has not at all penetrated into the province of thought connected with the idea of implication, and I will go on to consider the bearing of this upon our problem. But first, to close the present part of the subject, I will say that taking Categorical propositions to mean propositions in which the S is *bona fide* an individual or a group of individuals, we may admit the analysis to be plausible, and the reading which it *prima facie* demands "in Denotation merely" to be always possible, while that of "qualification" is more natural. The difficulty is that Miss Jones rejects *both* of these readings, I presume for the reasons stated above. So that her doctrine as an account of the identity in diversity expressed in the import of a proposition must consist in its resolution into an identity of S P *numero tantum* on the one hand, and a difference of intensions

that explains itself either not at all, or otherwise than by reference to that identity, on the other, simply lying side by side. "Otherwise than by reference to that identity"—we have seen that this is admitted in the discussion before us (p. 360). I will press this point further when I come to speak of implication. But I conclude up to this point that the great principle of Identity in Difference, to which the *General Logic* pays, I fear I must say, a good deal of lip-service, is parodied and not embodied by reduction to an Identity *numero tantum* plus a conjunction of unconnected intensions. The identity is beside the differences and not in them. And it is, as interpreted by the author, *not* the import of the proposition. But it might be so, if the author would allow it.

2. "One intension cannot *be* another intension—nor can the extension of man *be* the intension of mortal" (p. 361). This is partly a verbal question. But in fact there is a connection between distinct intensions which is commonly and very emphatically expressed by saying that one intensional content *is* another, or means or "spells" another. We saw that the paper admits that the denotational identity may be a mere sign of the connection of intensions, though it adheres to the view that the latter can only be manifested through the former (p. 354). And we may note the more obvious widening of the view on p. 369, where we learn that the denotational identities may actually follow from the intensional connection. And in this place an intensional connection is expressed in the very form previously rejected "Not to have deserted Strafford *would have been to* deserve sympathy" (my italics).

Now if there can be intensional connections such that the one intension necessarily carries the other with it, and if there are propositions which seem at least to have an intension or abstract content as their starting-point (whether they have a "subject" is a further question), surely in these at least the intensional connection may directly be the import of the proposition. In a note on Miss Jones' doctrine in the second

edition of my *Logic* I said that in a further sense something of the nature of an identical subject throughout the proposition would turn out to be real; and we will come back to this point. But it will not be an identity of a grammatical subject as *denotatum*.

One content of intension *implies* another, I take it, when the first, being considered in a sphere of conditions accepted *ad hoc*, makes the second necessary. When there is this relation, the two contents are differences within the identity of the system which includes them. The one carries the other with it, makes it inevitable, has it for its consequent. Common language says that it means it, spells it, *is* it.* "To give in now, spells ruin." Accepting the pre-supposed conditions, the two contents are expressions of the same whole, and are often convertible.

In the remarkable paragraph on p. 373 this seems to be admitted for the case of Relatives. If I grasp the idea rightly, S P propositions are treated as a separate case, and one which exhausts the sphere of Formal Logic. This so far concedes the contention attributed to Mr. Moore and Mr. Russell above, that the S P proposition is not the only type of proposition, a contention with which I certainly agree if we do not push the analysis of import beyond the problem of a grammatical subject understood as a *denotatum*. Ultimately, I believe, there is a subject in every proposition (*cf.* Bradley's *Logic*, 271 and 453). But the subject in relational propositions and in abstract Universals I take to be the whole or system within which a connection of distinct intensions is developed. This is what I meant by the remark in my *Logic* to which I referred above. And it appears to me to be the view which Miss Jones is approaching in this passage.

The true analysis of the hypothetical proposition is to my

* Compare Mrs. Varden in *Barnaby Rudge*: "Answering me, Miggs, and providing yourself, is one and the same thing."

mind greatly obscured in the paper by a choice of examples which makes the hypothetical form appear appropriate to dealing with individual objects no less than the Categorical form. "Charles I" and "the building" (p. 369) appear to be individual objects or cases. And we all know that you can pretend to read a hypothetical in extension by saying: "In all cases in which a creature (or "If in any case you find a creature that") is a man, that creature is mortal." But supposing the "if" of the hypothetical to be really meant, I hold that the individuals referred to are not used as individuals, but only as masses of unanalysed content, within which the special intension required is somewhere to be found (*cf.* my *Logic*, i, 238). The hypotheticals with "you," used in giving directions,—“If you go”—are a simple case. Propositional forms are highly continuous, representing a constant effort to modify the meaning of sentences towards new burdens of expression. But with regard to any true hypothetical proposition it seems to me that its constituents are not categorical, nor propositions, nor does their connection lie in one being inferrible from the other. I am not sure if Miss Jones means (pp. 353, 372, and 373) to assert all three of these things. The two first I think she does assert. And all this falls within our subject of the import of propositions. The import of a true hypothetical, as I understand it, is to affirm that from an explicit supposed situation the nature of reality requires a certain consequence to result; in other words, that there is a something in reality which in response to certain supposed situations behaves in a certain way. The proposition is one only, and is so far categorical as this assertion makes it. But it does not assert the actual existence of anything that its terms signify. It asserts the basis in reality of a connection between intensional elements.

It seems unnecessary to analyse in detail such an example as that of "the building" (p. 369), because we here have it admitted that the denotational identities are based upon intensional connections. I need only point out that if we suppose the

intensional connection to be the import asserted, we may drop all the difficulty about the elliptical character of the inference. In the case, "If this is *F*, *C* is next station but one"; "next but one" is as good an attribute as "next," and we may know it in scores of ways, without being aware of the fact that *H* is between. So in the "building" example. The meaning which pervades it is an obvious intensional connection, and is implied at once if we develop what is meant by building going on near a man who is sick to a certain point. The unity is that of a causal system; the denotational unity is that of an instance of the kind of system in question; the pervading subject is not the building, but the entire situation or world of conditions within which the intensional connections hold. And to complete the account of the import of propositions, it must be added that if a proposition is to be affirmed it must be affirmed of a real beyond itself. If this is pre-supposed, the question whether all propositions are S P propositions becomes idle. Certainly in all propositions you can find an identity which holds their elements together (see references to Bradley's *Logic*). Certainly you cannot always find it in any one of the related terms (Bradley, *Principles of Logic*, p. 23), e.g., in the case of "*E* is equal to *F*."

3. The question may be raised (see above, p. 374) whether we have a right to affirm a single import for all propositions. I have no doubt that the different shapes of enunciative sentence have grown up for different needs, and have so far different meanings; and I do not think that any single type of sentence is capable of expressing equally and impartially all the kinds of things that we can want to say. But it does not seem to me to follow from this that a man is always the best judge as to what he himself meant to say; nor that it is impossible to discern universal conditions of expression which all propositions exemplify in various ways. Beginning from psychology with the insight that association marries only universals, and that we and the lower animals *use* universal connections from the beginning of conscious life, I believe that every proposition

possesses in principle the two sides of affirming a fact or conjunction of appearances, and of laying down a law of universal connection. All the main types of proposition are produced, as it seems to me, by the struggle of these two tendencies, and the degrees in which either gets the upper hand, or the two become harmoniously fused. From the very first the principle of selection according to relevance acts upon the statement of facts itself, and the mere expression of fact tends to mould itself into the suggestion of law. A denomination of the subject irrelevant to the point insisted on by the predicate, is resented in conversation and impugned in argument; while the necessary counterpart of the selection which instinctively aims at relevance, is the completion—the successful selection—of the conditions which fully justify the relevance of the one term to the other, and so express the implication which is the import of the more reflective propositions.

But, as I have said, enunciative sentences were forged for special purposes; and I do not think that any enunciative sentence is capable of embodying all at once and unambiguously all the aspects of import which the different combinations of the sides of the proposition may present to the mind aware of their interconnection. I venture to quote a sentence from my *Logic*, i, 236: "When I say, 'All animals need food,' I am probably expressing a quasi-collective conclusion about a property shared by all species of animals, taking its significance from an analogical perception of the generic function and immanent purpose of animal life, but ultimately resting on the hypothetical judgment, expressing a necessary or relative principle, 'If force is to be expended it must be supplied.'" And for the continuity of forms of proposition I may refer to a note in the Preface (p. x).

The elaborate study of the actual effort of the proposition to express meaning, and of its relative completion in the degrees of truth, which forms, at least in my intention, the whole argument of my work on *Logic*, convinces me that this

view is sound in the main. It is an attempt to criticise actual meaning in the light of the conditions of expression and the fundamental impulse of thought. You cannot leave alleged actual meaning uncriticised, any more than any other datum. You must take account of it, but you must take account as well of such general needs as completeness and self-consistency. And I know of no other sense in which actual meaning and truth are disregarded by Logic.

All this, though not expressly challenged by the paper prior to mine, is quite within the subject of the Import of Propositions. And not having the advantage of knowing what our ἔφεδρος is going to say, I thought it only fair to him and me to explain my ideas upon one or two points which I have remarked in his *Formal Logic*. If I have been egotistic I apologise.

I have only to add, in justice to a great thinker, that in partly admitting, in a note in my *Logic*, Miss Jones' strictures upon Lotze, which appear also in her paper, I was unduly carried away for the moment by her book, and did not reconsider the full facts as I should have done. I think that his reason for rejecting S is P as a mere conjunction, and accepting the hypothetical form as a reasoned expression of coherence in change (Lotze's *Logik*, secs. 62-63), was sound in the main. And I must remonstrate, as above, against the idea, used as an objection to his view, that the elements of Hypotheticals are of S P form, if that means that they are propositions. They seem to me to constitute together a single proposition, of a character very largely different from that of an S P proposition.

I ought also to say that the account of Jevons' views seems to me inadequate. I think he divines rightly that intensional connection is the true root of the import of propositions.

In Lewis Carroll's puzzle I can see no logical interest. You lay down two hypothetical rules, one of which, in effect, specifies a case in which the other must be false. You then put the specified case, and put the other rule beside it, and find

that they contradict each other. You can maintain either, but not both. What else could happen? I agree with Miss Jones' treatment of this and of Mr. Russell's solution.

As to the relative merits of A is A , A is B , S is P , as statements of the principle of "propositions" (I have used this term for the expression of judgment without criticising it), I do not think they matter. All these symbols are defective on one side or the other, and you can use none of them without explanation. The first, unexplained, is imbecile; the others, unexplained, are simply false. But the explanation has been familiar ever since Plato's *Republic* and *Sophist*, and the new statement cannot claim, I am bound to protest, anything more than a certain felicity.

III. *By* F. C. S. SCHILLER.

WHEN I accepted our Secretary's invitation to act as a third string to the eminent logicians who have preceded me, it was not without a secret hope that I might thereby be helping to advance logical science and assisting at the philosophic development of the Law of Significant Assertion, of which I had long recognized the interest and importance.* This hope, however, has not been wholly fulfilled. We are, it seems, not to break fresh ground, but merely to invite the Society to rehearse old truth and to remember our Plato and that knowledge is merely recollection. *Soit*. I can adjust myself to the situation. I need merely reiterate my humble acceptance and approbation of Miss Jones's triumphant analysis of her problem—in so far as it is a problem—and continue to cherish a hope that some day she may be willing to proceed to the philosophic corollaries to which her analysis seems to me to point. If the impatience of youth should cavil at our unprogressiveness and think that

* Cf. the review of Miss Jones's *New Law of Thought*, in *Mind*, No. 82.

more vital issues might profitably engage the attention of logicians, let me plead that I at least am innocent. I have done my best to raise the really important issues of logic, but after completely failing to persuade logicians to lift their eyes to higher ground, I can with a good gregarious conscience return to the immemorial wallowing grounds in the logical mire. I shall, however, endeavour to keep my head clear and to preserve the attitude of an upright critic.

I.

(1) First of all let me remark that it is always important, even in philosophy, to ascertain the meaning of the problem under discussion. What then does "the Import of Propositions" mean? Is it, or is it not, the same question as the meaning of judgment? If it is, will it not be necessary to investigate first the capacity of propositions to express the meaning of judgments and to establish a one-to-one correspondence between judgments and propositions? For otherwise shall we not be nonplussed (or at least impeded) by finding that every judgment can be expressed, and can have its meaning conveyed, by various propositions, and that every proposition can express various judgments? If it is not, shall we not have to distinguish in principle between 'import' and 'meaning,' and to say what precisely we mean by a proposition's 'import'? It is to be feared, however, that many logicians would not recognize any distinction between 'meaning' and 'import,' and so could hardly be induced to define it. But as Miss Jones has appealed to me to say what I take to be the import of *S is P*, I must perforce offer my own interpretation of it.

I venture, therefore, to suggest that, like most questions in Formal Logic, the import of propositions is primarily a question about the meaning of words. It is about the 'dictionary-meaning' of the words employed in communicating the thought.* This is to say that it does not actually express any

* Cf. *Formal Logic*, ch. ii, §§ 3, 8.

real meaning at all. For real meaning is always personal and depends on the occasion on which the words are used. But dictionary-meaning merely formulates a verbal form for conveying meanings, if any one should find it expedient to use it as an instrument for this purpose. 'Import' therefore is potential meaning, as I believe Miss Jones also holds. It does not become actual until the proposition is used, and what its actual meaning will be cannot be ascertained until then.

Nevertheless there will be a certain relation between the actual meaning and the 'import of the proposition.' For the traditional meanings of the words will more or less restrict the meanings the words can be made to convey. Only the greatest masters of language will find it as plastic as Plato, only the most arbitrary will dare to overwork their words as audaciously as Humpty Dumpty. In the general run of cases therefore words are used in their ordinary senses. This is why it helps one to solve the real logical problem, viz., to discover what a live judgment means on a particular occasion, to know what is the 'import' of the proposition in which it has been expressed. Still a blackbird is not necessarily black, and a general rule does not necessarily apply to the particular case;* the general sense need not yield the meaning in a particular case, nor is it ever authoritative as against the latter. No amount of study of the 'import' of the verbal form, therefore, can ever determine the actual meaning in advance. It follows that a knowledge of the import of propositions can only be a rough guide to the understanding of the meaning of a judgment.

(2) One may next ask what, from the standpoint of a logic of real knowing, will be the use of a propositional form like *S is P*? Clearly it must occur in the investigation of some problem and in operations on objects of thought. The object of thought selected for consideration will (in general) be

* Cf. *Mind*, No. 89, *On Aristotle's Refutation of Aristotelian Logic*.

denoted by the 'S' in the propositional form, while the 'P' will stand for the operation tried upon it. 'S' and 'P' therefore will refer to and 'denote' the same object, as Miss Jones's theory demands. Nor can I see any difficulty or paradox about this procedure or any obligation to call 'S' nothing but 'S.' For what would be the use of that? Moreover, no one surely will deny that we are able to distinguish a plurality of aspects, attributes, qualities, relations, or whatever we choose to call them, in and about the same thing. Nothing is such an intractable surd as to be barely and immutably itself to the exclusion of everything else, and if there were such a thing it would not form a subject of discourse. Not even the Absolute One is absolutely one. As a logical entity at any rate it has a plurality of aspects. It is, *e.g.*, an object of belief to monists, and of disbelief to pluralists, it both is the many it absorbs and that which negates all plurality.

If now it be objected that 'S' must not be called 'P' because the operation indicated by 'P' is an 'arbitrary' selection, we can reply (1) that no doubt it is, but so is 'S.' It, too, is singled out for consideration out of the total situation by a similar operation, the risk of which lies in selecting anything and judging about it at all. Moreover (2), right or wrong, we all predicate 'P' of 'S,' including the logicians who choose to denounce the practice, and it is more likely that their analysis is at fault than universal practice.

For these reasons there seems to be no difficulty in assenting to Miss Jones's thesis that a proposition may assert an identity of reference or 'denotation' in 'S' and 'P.' But have we not learnt from nature (or from Hegel) that identities are never absolute? If two things were absolutely identical, they would cease to be *two*. There must therefore always be *prima facie* differences where an identity is to be established. In thinking, therefore, when we proclaim an identity, we *ipso facto* declare that differences are to be ignored as irrelevant. But we do not deny their existence. If, then, there may (and must) be

differences implied in any predication of identity, why should not differences between the 'dictionary-meanings' of 'S' and of 'P' be among the differences so set aside? Tautologies and translations are not real exceptions to this. For when tautologous propositions are used, the real judgment is never a tautology, while a translation like 'Jacobus is James' can only occur in relation to some one's ignorance of the equivalence of these terms. I have no difficulty therefore in accepting also Miss Jones's second contention, that the propositional form implies diversity in the connotation of its terms.

(3) So far, then, I have no difficulty in following Miss Jones. But does it follow that because her analysis of the import of propositions is right all others must be wrong? She has offered no reasons for thinking this, and it is not inherently necessary, or even probable. For of all things a variety of analyses may be made which are significant and serviceable relatively to a variety of purposes, and of nothing is there only one definition which is good for all purposes. In so arbitrary a game as Formal Logic, moreover, where unrelatedness to reality and general uselessness are no obstacles to the adoption of a convention, there seems to be no theoretic limit to the number of such analyses. I can see no reason, therefore, for assuming that Miss Jones's analysis of the import of propositions is alone 'valid.'

(4) One minor caution and my comment on Miss Jones's paper may conclude. It seems to me that she should not use 'to be applicable' and 'to apply' as if they were convertible terms (pp. 359 and 361), but that a distinction should be recognized. Strictly speaking, a 'name' does not 'apply' until it is used (successfully); but it can be held 'applicable' in virtue of its past or prospective use. I suppose, however, that when Miss Jones said "unless a name *applies to something* it cannot be used," she meant 'applies' proleptically.

II.

(1) I proceed to Professor Bosanquet's comments on Miss Jones. The general objection he raises to her views differs from mine in that, whereas I questioned (*sub* 3) whether her analysis was *exclusive*, he doubts whether it is *exhaustive*, and whether of the Import of Propositions "a single account can be given which is valid of all propositions whatever."* Now this assumes that it is the business of Logic (1) to seek such a 'single account' and (2) to ensure that such an account shall be (formally?) 'valid.' Now, while I should be deeply grateful to any logician who would consent to argue these assumptions, I do not at present see any reason for accepting either. On the contrary the presumption seems to me to be against both. The problem of the Import of Propositions rests upon so many arbitrary abstractions or 'fictions' that it is more than probable that a plurality of questions about real meanings will be found to be covered by it, and if so there will be no difficulty about accepting a plurality of answers. And why should it be assumed that a scientifically adequate account of the propositional form must show it to be formally valid? Why should it not be found to betray, even to a formal analysis, the inevitably experimental nature of real meaning? The demand for formal validity means a claim to dispense with real experiment, or it means nothing—nothing at least that logicians have succeeded in expressing for the past two thousand years.

(2) It may be observed next that Professor Bosanquet argues against Miss Jones that her interpretation is not "natural," and that there are propositions "not readily reducible to that shape." It is not altogether easy to estimate the precise scope of these objections. At first sight the former would seem to be an appeal to psychology such as should be excluded by the formal basis of the discussion, and the latter to be an

* It appears subsequently (pp. 374–375) that he thinks it can; only that it is *not* Miss Jones's account.

ἀργός λόγος such as could hardly be accepted even from the innovators who endeavour to erect the 'economy of thought' into a logical principle.

But, looking more closely, I take it that what Professor Bosanquet must mean by saying that of the same propositional form one meaning is more 'natural' than another, is that it is nearer to the dictionary-meaning of its terms, or to the commoner dictionary-meaning, or that it is more frequently meant. For each of these situations would generate a certain antecedent probability that in any subsequent use of an *S is P* form the meaning to be conveyed will resemble the meanings that have been conveyed by it. And this no doubt is true, though I fail to see that it bears on the question in dispute. For *nihil obstat* that the less 'natural' interpretation may nevertheless express better the meaning meant on any occasion. As for the objection that some interpretations may be more difficult than others, *i.e.*, may demand more ingenuity, that surely contains nothing that should daunt a logician. Having once set out on the perilous path of finding 'the' Import of Propositions, he must not expect to find it carpeted with roses and primroses all the way. He should be thankful if the complex expedients forced upon actual thinking by the variety of its problems and the stubbornness of language do not conduct his 'logical analysis' to avowed failure. If therefore Miss Jones can show that her interpretation of 'the Import' can convey a meaning that *can* be actual under some circumstances, she seems to me to have established as much of her claim as any logician could possibly achieve.

Nor does Professor Bosanquet establish anything incompatible with it when he shows that the same form may in *other* cases convey another meaning. That psychologically the one meaning is easier to apprehend, or that practically it occurs much oftener, does not seem to make, logically, any difference. It would seem, moreover, that Professor Bosanquet really admits this when he says that in 'the Morning Star is the Evening

Star' identity of denotation is what "we *may* mean to convey specially." How, then, can he go on to argue that "the import of the proposition . . . is not satisfied"? *When* we use the proposition to convey identity of denotation, as he repeatedly admits we *may* do, *then* surely, *ex hypothesi*, to convey *that* is its 'import,' and what *we* mean is *the* meaning. For is it not plainly "what we aim at conveying by it"? The further fact that "there is a connexion between the intensions themselves" (if we accept what is probably meant by it and abstain from cavils at the mythological terminology which speaks of self-existent 'intensions' having 'connexions' *inter se*) does not alter the fact that the 'reading in extension,' though not 'natural,' is 'possible.' In short I would offer mediation to the contending views on the basis that their several claims to truth are neither as exclusive nor as exhaustive as is alleged.

(3) Considering next the interesting criticism that Miss Jones errs in taking "a pure denotational meaning as without intension," whereas really "in denotation there is intension," though it is secondary, I will venture to suggest that on the basis of our formal *ὑπόθεσις* Miss Jones is quite right. For 'denotation' and 'intension' are both highly artificial technical abstractions into which Formal Logic chooses to 'analyse' the actual procedures of real thinking. They must have, therefore, the exclusiveness and sharp-cut outlines of such abstractions. So it contravenes the method of abstract distinction to conceive 'denotation' as having 'intension,' to consider secondary implications in a proposition instead of attending only to the primary. One might as well argue that 'three-ness' contains 'two-ness' because 'three' contains 'two.' Of course, however, when we begin to inquire into the actual meaning of a judgment we remain perfectly able to recognize that our symbols (1) must acquire and develop their meanings in their use, (2) cannot serve to 'denote' unless they also 'connote,' and (3) can only be understood as the vehicles of

the meaning-attitude which progressively determines their 'meaning.' I cannot help thinking that failure to distinguish the question of formal 'import' with sufficient sharpness from that of real 'meaning' here breeds a serious confusion.

(4) Professor Bosanquet criticizes Miss Jones severely for failing to appreciate "the great principle of Identity in Difference" and declares that her account of difference of intensions "explains itself either not at all, or otherwise than by reference to that Identity," so that they end by "simply lying side by side," and the whole amounts "to an Identity *numero tantum* plus a conjunction of unconnected intensions." I confess I do not understand this criticism. What is "a conjunction of unconnected intensions"? If the intensions are conjoined, how can they fail to be connected? And if they refer to an identity, why should not this common reference constitute all the conjunction or connexion that is needed? And why should the connexions of the intensions be taken to exist before they are established? If the news to be conveyed by a judgment is that a distinguished logician has been bitten by a flea, why should it be necessary to assert forthwith an eternal connexion of intension between 'being a distinguished logician' and 'being bitten by a flea'? Is it not more plausible to explain that the vicissitudes of mortal life have occasioned a collocation of words not usually on speaking terms than to hold that the human reason has now at length discovered, 'imitated' or 'reproduced,' an eternally necessary connexion of superhuman self-subsistent Universals? As for the great principle of Identity, which is regarded as totally unmeaning by its critics, while its best friends do not scruple to call it imbecile or false in the senses which logicians have for 2,000 years preferred to Plato's so-called 'explanation,' may one not hope that it is *ἄλλος λόγος*, and that its intrusion is not vital to the discussion?

(5) Professor Bosanquet urges that Miss Jones's contention that "one intension cannot be another intension" is "partly

a verbal question." I agree—partly. For it seems to me to be *wholly* a verbal question, a question about dictionary-meanings. Once we realize that these are only potentially real meanings, we can see both why the two 'intensions' must be as distinct as the words in which they are embodied, and why they come to be thought of as 'connected' *per se* when they have so often been used together that their 'association' has become a 'dictionary-meaning.' To the old maid and the gardener the intension of 'double' is no doubt connected with that of 'single,' to the gambler with that of 'quits'; but there is nothing in either intension to prevent the psychical researcher from using it to describe a sort of 'ghost.' I can assent therefore, almost literally, that extravagance '*spells*' ruin; but that it '*means*' ruin is ambiguous, and that it '*is*' ruin is impossible—so long as the two words differ.

(6) To the 'doctrine' also that there are connexions of intensions which are 'necessary' I must demur, so long as this highly ambiguous word is not explained and the difficult notion of logical necessity is not vindicated.* Supposing, however, that a determinate meaning had been assigned to this notion, it would still not follow that Professor Bosanquet's would be the only true 'analysis' of 'the' Import of Propositions. He, as well as Miss Jones, would still have to show that all alternative analyses were in every case untenable.

III.

I hope that my independent position as a humanist logician has enabled me to testify to the value of Miss Jones's formula without prejudice to the claims of Professor Bosanquet's; but I confess that I am not altogether reluctant to accept his generous invitation (in the third section of his paper) to include in the subject of our discussion some consideration of the logical importance of actual meaning. I do not indeed think that we

* Cf. *Formal Logic*, ch. xiv, § 3.

have strictly any right to include this subject under the formal import of propositions, but, as he has mentioned it, the temptation is irresistible, and I gladly follow suit.

I may say at once that Professor Bosanquet's attitude towards actual meaning seems to me very interesting, but no less difficult. I will not delay proceedings in order to comment on the fact that he seems to have receded from the position he defended in a discussion we had some years ago in this Society about the functions of psychology and logic, and now ascribes to 'logic' a normative control of actual thinking which he then repudiated, nor in order to complain of the picturesque anthropomorphism of his language, which personifies logical entities, allows 'universals' to contract matrimonial alliances, and attributes volitional 'efforts' to 'propositions.' I will come at once to the main issue, viz., whether the meaning of a judgment is a question of fact or of logical interpretation. Now I am proud to recognize that on this issue Professor Bosanquet has made some notable and valuable concessions.

He recognizes its existence, and implicitly its importance, in a way other logicians of the older schools have never yet consented to do. He sees that the way in which meanings arise raises a presumption against attempts to unify judgments that are relative to a great variety of needs. He recognizes also that actual meaning entails processes of selection and decisions as to relevance, though he leaves one in doubt how far he perceives their all-pervasiveness and power in human thinking, and their incompatibility with well-known logical 'ideals.'

Yet he also seems to think that, in spite of all this, logic can somehow withhold its recognition (*i.e.*, approval) from our actual meanings, and establish a tribunal which can sit in judgment on them and 'criticize' them. So he denies that "a man is always the best judge as to what he himself meant to say." But surely he can hardly be a worse judge on this point than the logician, who has on principle ignored his existence, knows nothing of his interests, aims, motives, and habits, and has

nothing to go upon but the bare *words* of his assertions. And if, in spite of his own direct access to his own meaning, a man has not succeeded in saying what he meant, must he not look for help to the psychologist who observes the lapses of his thought and the influence of unconscious 'complexes' and feelings, or to the grammarian who corrects his solecisms, verbalisms, and ambiguities, rather than to the formal logician who has to build even his ideals out of the uniformities and facts of actual thinking? And I cannot conceive by what divination or magic the logician can ascertain that a man who thinks that he meant one thing, viz., that he was attending selectively to certain specially interesting *parts* of his experience and dismissing the rest as irrelevant, really meant another, viz., that he was trying to make an inherently impossible, self-defeating and useless assertion about a totality of reality in which he is not interested at all. If in addition we observe that hitherto the logician has conceived it as his sacred duty systematically to ignore the motives and whole personal context of the thought-process, it is easy to see that any attempt to describe actual meaning in such fantastically artificial terms is foredoomed to failure. Is it not then most charitable to suppose that the logician never *intended* his account to have any relation to actual meaning? For in that case one need no more condemn him than Edward Lear or Lewis Carroll for writing nonsense.

Professor Bosanquet apparently supposes that "the conditions of expression and the fundamental impulse of thought," and also the needs of "completeness and self-consistency," will furnish instruments for a criticism of actual meaning such as he desiderates. But surely the conditions of expression raise merely *verbal* questions. Meaning precedes language, and the meanings of words are not in ultimate analysis antecedent limitations of actual meanings so much as consequences of them, while the structure and contents of every language are moulded by the past meanings of the makers of the language. That there is a "fundamental impulse of thought,"

and only one, is of course a hypothesis, which is not free from difficulty and could hardly be formulated nowadays except in biological terms, as, say, a will to live or an *élan vital*. The needs of 'completeness' and 'self-consistency' are vague terms, which can hardly sustain the burden of the technical senses Formal Logic seeks to impose on them. How 'complete,' we must ask, is the 'completeness' to which 'logic' is to be taught to aspire? Is it to include, *e.g.*, error and fiction, and is its notion of 'reality' to embrace all the various forms of unreality and illusion? 'Self-consistency' again seems patently ambiguous; it can be construed either psychologically and with reference to the harmonious development of a 'self' or personality, or again verbally, with a reference merely to the literal identity of a word. Upon examination it would probably turn out that here, as elsewhere, Formal Logic is constitutionally incapable of deciding upon which horn of the dilemma 'either verbalism or psychology' it means to impale itself.

I cannot see, therefore, with all deference, that Professor Bosanquet's suggestions provide any tenable standpoint for the 'criticism' of actual meaning. I do not say, of course, that such criticism is inadmissible in principle. I do not think that logic need renounce the ambition of becoming normative. But, before it can attempt this with any prospect of success, must it not consent to study patiently and thoroughly the actual processes of meaning and judging, and base its norms and 'ideals' on a knowledge of these? Must it not study psychic facts *in situ*, as they occur in real life, and not as they are represented *ex post facto* in 'propositions,' the study of which must degenerate into verballity? For the site, in which meanings occur, the soil in which they grow up and in which alone they are alive and actual, is always some human soul reacting and operating upon some vital situation. For 'logic,' therefore, to pretend to depersonalize such thought is not only a fiction, but a useless and pernicious fiction. And the compensation promised, the *weregeld* offered to

man by logic for the murder of his thought, can only recall to the humanist the sarcastic exclamation of the emperor Vespasian as he lay dying, *Ut puto deus fio*. In neither case are the divine honours paid to the dead compatible with their continuance on earth.

IV. *Reply by* E. E. C. JONES.

IN discussing Dr. Bosanquet's paper I would begin by saying that the question which I set out to answer is: What quite general account can we give of the import of propositions of the form *S is P*? This question, of course, cannot reasonably be asked unless we have already answered in the affirmative the previous question: *Can* any general account of *S is P* propositions be given? We must allow the possibility of "a single account, valid for all propositions whatever" of *S is P* form,

(SP), before we can usefully discuss any given account of them which is put forward, or any account of other forms of proposition. I hold that a "single account, valid for all" *S is P* propositions *can* be given, and it is primarily such an account that I profess to offer in my paper. No such general account can, in any given concrete case, pretend to be *exhaustive*—it is sufficient for its generality and validity that it should in every case be applicable, and it could not be both universally applicable and exhaustive. Now as far as identity of Denotation goes, my view of import is accepted by Dr. Bosanquet. He says, *e.g.* (p. 375): "In all SP (*S is P*) propositions the application of *S* and *P is*, of course, the same." And (p. 376) that "there *is* such identity (of denotation between *S* and *P*, in *S is P*) . . . is fully admitted." With regard to *difference of intension* as between Subject and Predicate, which in my view is the other factor of general Import in Affirmative Categoricals, Dr. Bosanquet not only admits but insists upon this—in his

view "intensional connexion is the true root of the import of propositions" (p. 383). His only quarrel with me here seems to be that I do not *sufficiently emphasize* the necessary connexion of the intensive elements (or *relata*) in all assertions.

Why then does Dr. Bosanquet so uncompromisingly repudiate my view? I think that he is influenced by the following considerations.

In the first place he seems to consider that I read *S is P* propositions wholly in extension—which, however, I never do, and which I hold cannot be done. He talks of my taking identity of denotation as "*the import*" of certain categoricals, *e.g.*, he says (p. 375) "When this sameness (of denotation) becomes *the import*," implying that I hold that this sameness *does* become *the import*, whereas what I say (p. 361) is that it is "the '*is*' or '*are*' (the copula) of the affirmative categorical which imports denotational identity between Subject and Predicate." Propositions of form *S is P* do not, however, consist solely of the copula. The copula, it is admitted, indicates *unity or connexion*, and it is equally obvious that the differing terms indicate diversity. According to me, it could never be said of a Categorical Affirmative Proposition—a Proposition of *S is P* form—that "the (denotational) sameness becomes *the import*."

What I hold is that in any proposition of this form (S P) *coincidence or identity of denotation* of the terms is always an *indispensable element* of the import—the other equally indispensable element being difference of Intension of Subject and Predicate, as, *e.g.*, in—

The Morning Star is the Evening Star,
London is the biggest city in the world,
Diamonds are combustible.

In each of these cases Subject and Predicate have identical application.

Another, and at first sight somewhat conflicting, reason

seems to be my refusal to read propositions "in Denotation (or Extension) only" (p. 375). I think Dr. Bosanquet holds that identity of denotation furnishes no real link between intensions, while at the same time he thinks that, in as far as I persist in making this identity a constant factor in import, bare coincidence of denotation is all that I have any right to affirm. My refusal of a merely extensional reading, of which Dr. Bosanquet, as I understand (p. 378, end of 1st §), complains, is not an inconsistency, but of the very essence of my view. I have tried to explain what is here in dispute on pp. 359-61 of my paper. I hold that to try and read any proposition *in Denotation only*, reduces us to *A is A*, since we are all agreed, it seems, that in Affirmative Categoricals there *is identity or coincidence of denotation* between Subject and Predicate.

Again, Dr. Bosanquet says (pp. 375, 376): "I have a difficulty in seeing, even in the simplest cases, what precisely the identity of denotation is taken to contribute to the import of the proposition. . . . The import of the proposition is in neither case satisfied by this account. There is a connexion between the intensions themselves." I answer that it is just *because* we have a plurality of intensions connected or conjoined, and *because* such connexion or conjunction is inseparable from sameness of application or denotational unity, and can never be manifested except in such denotational coincidence—it is just because of this, that identity of denotation is required. What I take this identity to contribute to the import of the proposition is that it thus links together the intensions concerned, whether these intensions are necessarily connected or not.

We should never know of combination (let alone necessary connexion) of elements unless we had met with or imagined the elements *as* conjoined.

In *S is P* the intensions of S and P are asserted to *be* conjoined, but the statement that they *are* conjoined differs

from a statement *why* they are conjoined, and even from a statement of *how* they are conjoined—whether merely coincident—"the cup is broken," "the key is lost"—or necessarily connected—"the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles." We know they *are* conjoined, because we find them together, and often we go on to recognise that they are together *because* there is a necessary and inseparable connexion between them, which causes them to appear together, as in the *triangle* case. But often also our knowledge stops short at the mere conjunction.

My view is, I think, not only entirely compatible with Dr. Schiller's "predicative view" (= Mr. Bradley's "qualification," p. 377), but also rather favourable to it—for if denotation or application of S and P in *S is P* is identical, while denotation is given by S, what is *naturally* PROMINENT in P is *not* its denotation, already determined by the Subject, but the new and different *intension* which P contributes. In *These roses are red*, denotation of Predicate as well as of Subject is fixed by the Subject. We are not referring in the whole proposition to anything red *except* these roses.

Dr. Bosanquet (p. 376) makes it a point against me that what I say is what Mr. Bradley has said (though Mr. Bradley appears to be always right, and I to be always wrong). He quotes Mr. Bradley as saying "In *Cæsar is sick* the same person is said to be *sick* as well as *Cæsar*." Now first I would remark that this might be a very important piece of information (though it is certainly not an assertion of mere extensional identity). Secondly, the point here illustrated is not in the least original to either Mr. Bradley or myself—as I have tried on several occasions to show, *e.g.*, in the note on pp. 49, 50 of my *Elements of Logic*. Compare De Morgan, *Formal Logic* (pp. 49, 50): "Speak of names and say 'man is animal'; the *is* is here an *is* of applicability. . . . Every man *is* one of the animals; touch him, you touch an animal; destroy him, you destroy an animal." And so with Hobbes, Mill, Dr. Venn,

Sigwart, etc.—not to mention that it seems to be part of what is meant in all the commonest assertions: *e.g.*, Dick is the naughtiest boy in the school; The rick is on fire; Mankind is a community.

I entirely dispute the view that “taking Categorical propositions to mean propositions in which the S is *bond fide* an individual or a group of individuals, we may admit . . . the reading . . . ‘in Denotation merely’ to be always possible” (p. 377). I dispute this for the reason given above, that this “reading” would reduce us always to *A is A*.

I do not quite understand what Dr. Bosanquet means when he says “I take it that in denotation there is intension,” and when he complains of my taking “a pure denotational meaning as without intension” (p. 377). What is “purely denotational” is, I suppose, *ex vi terminorum* not intensional, and denotation *quâ* denotation is not intension. But I do not think that there can ever be denotation dissociated from all intension. Denotation of a name means its application or applicability—but without some guidance by intension definite application would be impossible (except in cases where names are originally bestowed—*e.g.*, Christian names).

Dr. Bosanquet blames my “conviction that the only identity is numerical identity, or Identity of Existence or Application” (p. 377). This is, I think, a question of words, because I try to use Identity for *sameness of application* only, while recognising of course *sameness of quality* or *intension*, and the unity of things connected in a system, and qualitative difference in qualitative sameness (such as, *e.g.*, one has in a classification). A scalene triangle, for instance, is both similar to and different from an equilateral. But there are, it seems to me, many cases in which difference of Intension does not “explain itself” at all (p. 378), *e.g.*, in Jessamine is fragrant, we do not know what the bond is between the flower and its fragrance—we do not know why it is fragrant, but simply that it is so. Dr. Bosanquet (p. 378) speaks of a

"great principle of Identity in Difference." By this I take him to mean a wholly Qualitative or Intensional principle applicable, as I think, not primarily to *Assertion*, with which I am chiefly concerned, but to *Classification* and *Systematisation*. The principle of Identity in Difference to which I pay heart-service as well as lip-service, is quite distinct from the principle to which Dr. Bosanquet refers.

(P. 375): All Sergeants are N.C.O.'s;
The Canadians are brave men.

"Do we," Dr. Bosanquet asks, "in saying these things, want to convey anything about the individuals whom we mention in one aspect being the same individuals as those whom we mention in another? Do we not simply want to 'qualify' the individuals by an attribute?" To this I answer that the individuals qualified by the Predicate *are*, and are acknowledged to be, the individuals denoted by the Subject; this gives sufficiently the sameness which I advocate as *part* of the *quite general* import of every proposition of *S is P* form.

If we qualify by an attribute (by means of the Predicate) we qualify *something*—that *something* is what is denoted by the Subject.

But as already observed a statement of the *general import* is not an *exhaustive* account in the case of any assertion which has significant terms, and there are various ways of indicating on which aspect of import one desires on any given occasion to lay stress. Terms themselves differ. Quantification of a term emphasizes its Extension—*e.g.*, in *All herrings are some fish*, extension in both terms is emphasized. In *Equality of sides implies equality of angles at the base*, intension in both terms is prominent, because it is the intension of the Subject which is said to imply the intension of *equal angles at the base*.

As Dr. Bosanquet observes (p. 382) no "enunciative sentence is capable of embodying all at once and unambiguously all the aspects of import which the different combinations of the sides

of the proposition may present to the mind aware of their interconnexion." Nor, I would add, is any enunciative sentence capable of setting forth all at once and unambiguously all the actual objective *sine quâ non* implications of Assertion (Denotation of S identical with Denotation of P, etc.). From this point of view we may accept with a slight alteration Dr. Bosanquet's doctrine, and say that a man is not always "the best judge as to what he himself" has asserted (p. 381). Analogously a man is not always the best judge of what his own motives actually are.

Still, we may employ successfully many devices of language the purpose of which is to enable us to indicate more or less accurately the aspects which we on occasion desire to emphasize, and from this more personal and "practical" point of view we see the special force of Dr. Bosanquet's assertion on p. 375 that "the import of a proposition surely lies in what we aim at conveying by it." But in *all* cases, as I believe, the limits of assertion are set by what Dr. Bosanquet calls the "conditions *sine quâ non* of the conveyance" (p. 375). As regards such abstract forms as *S is P*, *S is not P*, their import is, I hold, *entirely* subject to the "conditions *sine quâ non* of the conveyance," which give the irreducible minimum of assertive meaning. What any given person on any given occasion aims at conveying by any concrete or significant assertion must (consciously or unconsciously) presuppose and accept this *sine quâ non*, but within the limits thus set he has a free hand in using every available verbal device to make known his further particular meaning—he has in language the means of showing whether, *e.g.*, he desires to suggest emphasis on Extension in the Subject and Intension in the Predicate, as in *Some flowers are fragrant*, or to lay stress upon the Extension aspect in both terms.

It is upon *this* freedom in Assertion that Dr. Schiller lays exclusive stress. "Real meaning," he says, "is always personal and depends on the occasion on which the words are used" (p. 386). But the condition *sine quâ non* above referred to

is always (though sometimes unconsciously) presupposed—it is without doubt a part of what is implied in every assertion—a man can no more get away from it or do without it than (to use a familiar simile) he can get into a basket and carry himself. But he may be as unconscious of it as he is of the pressure of the atmosphere, or of the beating of his pulse, or of all the familiar context of daily life which is generally quite in the background of our consciousness, but the disturbance or removal of which may cause serious mental shock and dislocation.

What does seem to me to be a real and fundamental difference between Dr. Bosanquet's view and mine is that he holds (as I understand) that in *all* S is P propositions there is a law of *necessary connexion* between intension of S and intension of P , *never* a mere conjunction, and that this connexion of intensions is the true import of affirmative categoricals. It is here, as I think, that the whole stress of the dispute between Dr. Bosanquet and myself falls. His interest is in the connexions of intensions (or concepts)—the *reality* and *meaning* of the world lies for him in qualitative relations—he is always aiming at and working towards and endeavouring to reach a complete coherent system of qualitative difference in qualitative unity—such as (say) the unity in difference that we have in the triangularity-idea which embraces in unity the three species of (1) equality of all angles, (2) equality of two angles, and (3) inequality of all angles. Hence, what *is*, is not in his view sharply divided from what *is implied* or involved, or from what *will be*, or from what *ought to be*—rather, anything *really is* what it implies, what it ought to be, what it fundamentally is as part of the complete whole.

Time and the incomplete actualities of time are mere ladders or stepping-stones to thought, when they are not actual hindrances. And so also (I suppose) of space and of the material world, and of the world of feeling—pleasure and pain. Accordingly, as regards S is P ; he reads back into that form, even in its most elementary application and even in its most abstract expression, the fullest

implication of qualitative connexion. For Dr. Bosanquet the *starting-point* of Logic is comparatively unimportant as compared with its *goal*. He reads the oak into the acorn, the finished scholar and the good citizen into what Carlyle calls "the squalling impotency at the font."

These are ideals which we hope and strive for, but we often have to do with acorns which are yet on the tree, with children who are struggling with the alphabet, with future citizens who have not learnt to love their neighbour, or to think of the common good.

When we set out to try and analyse propositions we come across conjunctions of intensions. This rose is red; Mary's bird sings; Quinine has cured my fever; That spoon is bent; Cæsar is sick; This isosceles triangle has the angles at the base equal. Then we may become aware that all isosceles triangles have equal angles at the base, and that the co-presence of the *two* equalities in *one* triangle results from necessary connexion, but that some roses are not red, that the spoon is only temporarily bent, that Cæsar is soon well again. If we could go far enough into things, we might find that there is no contingency anywhere—but most of us are at the stage where we think we recognise some necessary connexions, and also some connexions which, as far as we can see, are mere conjunctions. What is common to both kinds of combination of intensions is one denotation or application.

In: All isosceles triangles have equal angles at the base, equality of sides *implies* equality of angles at the base, *i.e.*, it implies that in any triangle where there are two equal sides, *in that same triangle* there must be equal angles at the base—this is "what identity of denotation contributes to the import of the proposition in this case."

Dr. Bosanquet's general account of Import is, I understand, this: The nature of the Universe is such that, given any assertion *S is P*, *S* implies *P*. We need not reject this reference to the Universe in the case of true propositions such as: An

isosceles triangle has the angles at the base equal; Crows are black. But *S is P* may represent:

Crows are white;
Angles at the base of an isosceles are unequal;

and we could not here base our statements on the nature of the Universe. Or *S is P* may stand for:

Honesty is the best policy;
or Hypocrisy is the best policy;

and here opinions may be divided.

I add here a few more or less disconnected remarks on Dr. Bosanquet's paper:—

P. 378: "Now if there can be intensional connexions such that the one intension necessarily carries the other with it, and if there are propositions which seem at least to have an intension or abstract content as their starting-point . . . surely in these at least the *intensional connexion* may directly be *the import* of the proposition."

Here I observe (1) that "the intensional connexion" can only be *part* of the whole import; (2) that what Dr. Bosanquet here means by "import" is that particular aspect of a given situation which he wishes to emphasise.

P. 379: "If I grasp the idea rightly, S P propositions are treated as a separate case, and one which exhausts the sphere of Formal Logic." To this I answer that *S is P*, *S is not P*, forms, belong to Formal (*i.e.*, General) Logic, and are I hold of universal application in as far as we are concerned with categorical assertions.—All *Relative* Propositions,

e.g., E is equal to F;
Plato was the pupil of Socrates;
Cambridge is North-East of Oxford,

are primarily of the form: *A is not B*, but can of course be expressed in *S is P* form.

With pages 380–1 I feel for the most part in agreement, and would endorse fully the view that “the [hypothetical] proposition is one only, and is so far categorical as this assertion makes it. But it does not assert the actual existence of anything that its terms signify” (p. 380). But (see p. 380), if we say :

If M is P, S is P ;
or : If M is P and S is M
then S is P ;

are not these “true Hypotheticals”? Are not their constituents “Categorical propositions”? Are not the Consequents inferrible from their respective Antecedents ?

P. 380 : “The import of a true hypothetical, as I understand it, is to affirm that from an explicit supposed situation the nature of reality requires a certain consequence to result ; in other words, that there is a something in reality which in response to certain supposed situations behaves in a certain way, etc.”

In as far as we are referring to “reality” in any hypothetical, I do not see that there is any conflict here between Dr. Bosanquet’s view and mine. In *any* reality it must hold good that :

If M is P and S is M then S is P.

But this relation of reason and consequent must surely also hold in the most “non-real” cases—in the most imaginative and supposititious cases—even in cases which are self-contradictory, *e.g.*, *If A is B, and A is C, and C is not B, then A is both B and not B :*

Dr. Bosanquet in his Symposium paper rather unkindly withdraws the few approving remarks which he bestowed on my *New Law of Thought* in the Preface to the Second Edition of his *Logic*, with reference to my criticisms of Lotze and Jevons, and to the suggestion of *S is P* as symbolising the “general formula of thinking.”

The only fragment of my paper with which he now says he agrees (p. 379) is my treatment of Lewis Carroll's Logical Paradox (which, however, he says has no logical interest) and of Mr. Russell's solution of Lewis Carroll.

Oddly enough, my remarks on Mr. Russell's solution were the one thing in my paper about which I felt doubtful, and it seems to me that acceptance of my account of Lewis Carroll's Paradox involves acceptance of my whole logical scheme. As to my "Significant Assertion" suggestion, Dr. Bosanquet now says that he is "bound to protest that the new statement cannot claim anything more than a certain felicity." This perhaps may mean much or little. Of my account of Jevons' view he simply says that it seems to him inadequate (p. 383). I confess that this reference to my criticism seems to me still more inadequate. I think I have shown that Jevons confuses in the most thorough-going way the *Similarity in Otherness* required for classing, with the *Identity in Diversity* required for Assertion and Inference, and in answer to this Dr. Bosanquet merely expresses the opinion that Jevons "divines rightly that intensional connexion is the true root of the import of propositions."

But even granting that Dr. Bosanquet were right here, it remains to be shown whether the *true root of import* is equivalent to *the true import* itself.

Dr. Bosanquet now says he thinks that Lotze's reason for rejecting propositions of *S is P* form (p. 383) was "sound in the main."

It is, of course, impossible to go into Lotze's long discussion in Ch. 2 of Book I of his *Logic*; where he concludes that "Every judgment of the form *S is P* is impossible and that in the strictest sense we cannot get further than saying *S is S* and *P is P*" (p. 60).* "The impossible judgment *S is P* resolves itself into the three others, *S is S*, *P is P*, *S is not P*"

* Page references are to the English translation of the *Logic*.

(p. 59). I still think that Lotze's difficulties here are chiefly due to his not keeping in view the distinction between Intension and Denotation—see, *e.g.*, § 58 (pp. 62, 63). But I believe a further contributing factor to have been some degree of confusion between the attitudes of (1) Speaker and (2) Hearer. According to Lotze when we say: *SOME MEN are black*, by *SOME MEN* “we mean all along only *those men who are black*, in short, *negroes*; these are the true *subjects* of the judgment” (p. 63). This seems to me to imply that *the speaker* who makes the assertion that *SOME MEN are black*, when he says *SOME MEN*, has before his mind, and means, *black men*. This of course is what happens always in the case of the speaker, writer, or teacher. He has before his mind at starting the whole complex, the elements of which he presents successively to his hearers. But surely it is almost childish to say, as Lotze does, that though I may perceive something which *is* both a rose and red—the one as much as the other—so that I can quite justifiably call it *This red rose*, I yet cannot without intellectual suicide assert: *This rose is red*; but only: *This red rose is this red rose*. And the matter is all the more surprising because Lotze does recognise on p. 63 that the predicate of a Categorical has denotation as well as intension. From Dr. Bosanquet's point of view (that every *S is P* proposition “formulates a law,” that in every *S is P*, *S* implies *P*), Lotze's procedure seems peculiarly futile.

I pass to Dr. Schiller's paper.

Dr. Schiller says that he recognises the interest and importance of what I call the Law of Significant Assertion, but at the same time asks to be absolved from blame for being so unprogressive as to devote an hour or so to its consideration, to the exclusion of “more vital issues” (pp. 384, 385). He starts with a complaint that my paper does not “break fresh ground but merely invites the Society to rehearse old truth.” But though I admit that I have said nothing really fresh, I cannot flatter myself that, so far in this discussion, my view has been treated either as familiar

or as true. Dr. Bosanquet's criticisms sound uncompromisingly severe. Dr. Schiller's agreement does not go beyond the admission that a proposition of the form *S is P* "may assert an identity of reference or 'denotation' in *S* and *P*" and that "the propositional form (*S is P*) implies diversity in the connotation of its terms."

Dr. Schiller thinks, however, that there is no theoretic limit to the varieties of analysis of import of *S is P* which it is possible to make, and that there is no reason to suppose that my analysis is more right than others.

He goes on to say that he does not see any reason for assuming that it is the business of Logic either (1) to seek a single account of propositions, *i.e.*, a *general* analysis, or (2) to insure that such an account shall be valid—he holds that the presumption is against both these assumptions.

I take "valid of all propositions" to mean, true of all propositions, applicable to all of them.

The question as to Import of Propositions which I am asking is simply this: How can *S is P* be analysed? If any analysis which is offered is right, it must apply to *every Affirmative Categorical*. It seems the very simplest thing in the world. It seems also to be one of the most important from the point of view of systematic Logic. And if it is the business of Logic to deal with assertion—if Logic is concerned with *all* the assertions which we think or express—it is surely its business to try and give some coherent general account of Assertion. Surely this fundamental question of logical science ought to be settled, instead of still hanging in dispute, after so many centuries of discussion. The analysis of assertion is the inconspicuous but indispensable foundation of the structure of knowledge, of that science which deals with Assertions and their relations, and with the nature of Inference.

Dr. Schiller has given reasons for accepting in some cases the analysis of *S is P* according to which it asserts Diversity of Intension in Identity (or One-ness) of Denotation—can he

point to *any* instance of an Affirmative Categorical to which this analysis does not apply? Can he provide any other analysis which applies in every case? Can he suggest any analysis applicable in any case whatever which does not presuppose my analysis?

This analysis only professes to tell *something* of every significant Categorical—to give its inevitable structure—but it is incomplete for every concrete case—it is only of the *symbolic* statement that it gives a complete account. (Compare the use of the formula $a = b$.) My analysis of *S is P* is offered with a quite definite purpose—the purpose, namely, of furnishing a general and applicable account of categorical assertion.

This leaves the field open for any and every further elaboration of meaning that may be relevant in any particular case.

Dr. Schiller says (p. 390): “To show that an interpretation of the Import of Categoricals can convey a meaning that *can* be actual under some circumstances, is to establish as much as any logician could possibly achieve.” But what I want to establish, and what I think I *have* established, is an interpretation that goes a long way beyond this—in fact, I think it goes *all* the way—by which I mean that it does actually apply in every case of assertion. It is, I contend, preliminary to, pre-supposed in, both Dr. Bosanquet’s *Metaphysical Logic* and Dr. Schiller’s inquiry into “real knowing,” “real (or actual) meaning,” “the meaning meant on any occasion”—just as it is preliminary to and pre-supposed in all common thought. I recall here the observation of a very intelligent pupil of mine in elementary Formal Logic (a student of Natural Sciences) who remarked to me one day: “Why, this Logic is nothing but Common Sense.” Before reflection we are, to a large extent at least, unconscious of the laws by which we live and think—partly we are not interested—partly we have not reached the stage in which such grasp of thought is possible for us.

Just one other word on a point raised by Dr. Schiller on pp. 394, 395 of his paper. He contends that a listener cannot be a competent judge of the meaning of any speaker, if he (the listener) "has nothing to go upon but the bare *words*" of the speaker. But in most cases of reading or listening, what more have we, what more can we get, than the words of the speaker? Authors of books and articles, newspaper correspondents, political speakers, are not generally at command to be cross-questioned as to their "real meaning." And even if they were, their only means of further explanation would be further words, as for instance, in our discussion this afternoon. If writers and speakers want to be understood, it is precisely their business to use words so as to convey their particular meaning on any given occasion.

Dr. Schiller goes on to ask, rather ironically, what resource a man has who "in spite of his own direct access to his own meaning . . . has not succeeded in saying what he meant" (p. 395).

But, unless a man is clear in thought and skilful in expression, he constantly does *not* succeed in saying what he meant, nor even in knowing what he meant to say.

And often if a person is struggling with thought, with a new subject or a new idea, another person may know much better than he himself, what he is really trying to think, trying to say. Any sympathetic, intelligent and better instructed person may do this—a good teacher, for instance, does it constantly.

V. *Rejoinder to Dr. Schiller's Paper.*

By BERNARD BOSANQUET.

THE subject of our discussion was the Import of Propositions, and I agree with Dr. Schiller that we have not completely done justice to it. I have explained why it seems to me that

Miss Jones' theory, by her own admission, does not quite cover the ground. And I believe I shall do best, in a rejoinder which must be short, to explain in outline with reference to Dr. Schiller's paper how from my point of view the problem should be treated; how, that is, as I see the matter, modern logic deals with it as essentially a question of actual meanings, including in these the living thought which operates on them.

Above all things, I must begin by saying, the study of the Import of Propositions does not seem to me to be a study of the dictionary-meanings of words, but of the expressive value of enunciative sentences. The sentence is the unit of language, and dictionary-meanings are its destruction. Miss Jones seems to me to be more on the right track when she speaks (p. 362) of "what happens to a general name when it is used as a Predicate-name in an Affirmative Proposition." And it is, I think, a first approximation to the study of what Propositions as such convey, when we ask with Miss Jones what is expressed by the union of a subject with a predicate. But, as I explained, this seems to me to be an approximation only, because in different types of S P propositions S and P play very different parts, and in many propositions no S and P are *prima facie* discoverable.

What in my view, then, we desire to learn when we study the Import of Propositions, is the actual nature of that striving for expression which we find embodied in all forms of the enunciative sentence, and which we trace in all literature and science, as also in our own efforts to say what we mean; its differences, if it has differences, and its common features.

I have never understood Dr. Schiller's attitude to the treatment (or as he avers, the non-treatment) of actual meanings by what he calls formal logic; nor do I now understand his use of the term formal in connection either with logic or with the Import of Propositions (pp. 392 and 394). What I was taught at

Oxford was that "Formal" as applied to any science was an otiose epithet, implied in the name of science in so far as every science has a restricted point of view of its own; and that therefore the term was not applicable to the science of Logic in any pre-eminent way. If I *had* to find a meaning for the epithet as applied to Logic, I should use it of symbolic Logic.

The study of Logic, before it comes to explicit inference, is surely almost coincident with the study of the Import of Propositions. And both of them I take to be, above all, the study of actual meanings, with the spirit of expression which embodies itself in them. It is this enquiry which fascinated me from the beginning, and in the course of it the ancient conceptions I have referred to in my paper, which Dr. Schiller, ironically, professes to be unfamiliar with, *e.g.*, pp. 392, 393, 395, have certainly appeared to me essential.

I suppose there may be two difficulties, or degrees of the same difficulty, in treating Logic as dealing with actual meanings.

First, like any other science, Logic is unable to drag the whole actual context of its specimens into its laboratory. I really think I may venture to quote what I published on this subject in 1885, because I believe it contains all that is true in what Dr. Schiller has since said about the Formalism of Logic. I wrote* "It must always be borne in mind that the consideration of isolated propositions, which is necessary in Logic, is as far as possible removed from the interpretation of judgments which takes place in living thought.

"I do not hesitate to say that a proposition which neither has a literary context, nor refers to the fixed standards of science, nor is uttered in answer to any question expressed or implied ('implied' as when we exchange views about a subject that is in all our thoughts), is a proposition that can hardly convey a distinct judgment at all."

* *Knowledge and Reality*, p. 51.

But, of course, Logic meets this difficulty, as the other sciences do, by knowledge and experience. We have inexhaustible stores of propositions in full use with the most complete and accurately known application and context, in literature, science, and philosophy. From these, by the experience of the skilled interpreter, we can select endless specimens of actual meanings precisely defined by use and application in their context, and by their help can survey the general character of actual meanings which prevails over the whole area of meanings in use. I note that the psychologist *as such* has here no *locus standi*. It is the scholar, the man of science, the philosopher, who is the authority on meaning as determined by great fields of organised expression. And no one, I hold, is competent to conduct logical investigations who is not well versed in some or all of these provinces. Who would ask a psychologist to interpret a passage in Shakespeare, or in a physical or economic treatise? (The neglect of this immense actual world of organised meanings is characteristic, I think, of Dr. Schiller's polemic. He always seems to me to have in mind abrupt and interrupted conversation. It is part of his attitude to disregard the world in which meanings are distinct and certain. This accounts perhaps for his emphasis on the psychologist as interpreter and on the personal nature of meaning.) Here, then, there is a problem of replacing context by knowledge which logic shares with all sciences, but there is no formalism in a special sense.

Secondly, in connection with the point mentioned in the parenthesis, I think that Dr. Schiller has much in mind propositions of imperfect form, the context of which is implicit, not, as in science and literature, explicit. And here a psychologist might more reasonably be appealed to, if he were given cognisance of the whole situation. You may say "How hot," or "Now it is twelve." And you may say that to know what this proposition really is you have a right to make it explicit by sympathetic interpretation of the circumstances. I

deny this. I draw the line where you pass beyond explicit ideas. Such propositions as these are at a stage of high ambiguity (including both truth and error) and of low truth. If you improve their formulation, you change their type. To do this is to destroy all differences of logical level between propositions. There is no formalism in accepting and criticising propositions at their own given level of expression.

In the expert survey of the immense area of actual meanings defined by context, we find certain common features of the proposition as an expression of mind, together with certain differences; and our introspective experience of our own striving for expression at once confirms the analysis and is criticised by it.

I will select one common feature, which is affirmed of actual meanings by Dr. Schiller as well as by me, and will try to show how it implies one of the most fundamental of those conceptions in my paper which Dr. Schiller rejects with scorn. I mean the conception of an eternal connection of intensions.

We are agreed that actual meaning is selective and relevant from the first. Now selection and relevance imply a purpose, and so far I believe Dr. Schiller is with me. I need not raise the dispute which here is close at hand. I am only using the idea of purpose to illustrate my point. It is, that, governing the selection of matter in our propositions, in a way analogous to and including the operation of practical purposes, there is an impulse to complete expression, which is also precise expression—the impulse by which thought aims at totality. I judge this from my reading of actual meanings in the survey of literature and science, and also from my personal experience in the effort to express my own actual meanings. In making a proposition, when we see a circumstance which affects the truth of the connection we are asserting, surely it is obvious that we naturally guard ourselves by putting it into the proposition. "This is only true under such and such conditions." "Very well; we

add these conditions to the proposition." Now no doubt we may direct this process in the interest of a practical purpose; and break it off, in any one series, when we have the knowledge which our purpose requires. I am only continuing and enlarging this doctrine when I say that through and beyond this relevance to non-contradiction in practice, there operates the impulse to complete expression as involving non-contradiction over the whole or any coherent area of experience. Such complete expression, involving the minimum of liability to be contradicted by experience, is what I call the ideal of truth, and of this the operation of all minor purposes in governing the selectiveness of propositions is only an aspect and fragment. Thus the universal fact of selection and relevance as exhibited in actual meanings implies the ideal of eternal truth, as non-liability to contradiction, operating in the proposition from the first. (A meaning, therefore, has always vistas beyond its primary point.*) I do not say that knowledge can attain this ideal. I do say that it is always in motion towards it, and that an examination of the facts of selectiveness and relevance and of the guidance of our expression by them establishes this tendency beyond dispute. And these are the facts of actual meaning on which Dr. Schiller principally insists. Indeed, we have only to give a wider interpretation to Dr. Schiller's idea of purpose to make *his* arguments establish *my* point (e.g., in Essay on "Error," p. 158, *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1910-11). If to order our experience is our ultimate interest, the question is settled.

All this I take to be expressed in Plato's *Republic*, 475 to end of Book V.

Even the example of the logician and the flea, intended to throw scorn on the implication of eternal connection, really testifies to this implication. I think it repays analysis. It

* Cf. pp. 391, 394, 395. The road it has to travel is only in part determined by its author, and in great part by logic—its implications. This is how it can be criticised.

serves as a sort of joke only because the presupposition of relevance between the denominations of S and P calls our attention to the counter-relevance, which in this case disappoints this presupposition, and so to the different degrees of pretentiousness of the two creatures involved. It is a simple *παρὰ προσδοκίαν*. But the logical importance is in the nature of the *προσδοκία*, which is, that the one term should carry some sort of *raison d'être* for the other. This expectation, purposely disappointed, so far as possible, in our proposition, is fulfilled in, say, a proposition such as "This plague-patient was bitten by a flea," which implies a development unlimitedly beyond our present knowledge in the direction of biological truth.

You cannot devote yourself to the study of the world of actual meanings without being attracted by general features such as the implication just analysed, or the contrast of conjunction and connection, or of fact and necessity. These, with the Existential, Categorical, Hypothetical, Relational, and other features of actual meanings, are what I take to be the object matter of the enquiry into the Import of Propositions. The nature of Truth and Error is thus made theoretically clear. Of course, there would be no theoretical gain in determining the truth and falsehood of particular propositions, which Dr. Schiller's language sometimes suggests to be his ideal. We are doing that all day long, without the smallest gain in the way of understanding their nature. The same applies to repeating the meaning of a proposition in other words, pp. 386* and 390.

There is a very great deal more I should like to criticise, but I have already taken too much time. I must not be held to admit what I have not referred to.

* "The real logical problem—to discover what a live judgment means on a particular occasion." This can only signify, so far as I see, to restate it in other words. To determine general characters inherent in classes of meanings is another matter.

VI. *Reply by F. C. S. SCHILLER.*

THE parties to a discussion do not often succeed in conveying their meaning in their first attempt, but since the virtue of discussion as compared with mere dogmatizing lies in the opportunity it affords for trying again, I will make a brief reply on some of the highly controversial issues we have contrived to raise.

I. As regards Miss Jones I think she underrates the extent of my agreement with her. I have *not* denied that her analysis holds, in the only sense in which the 'import' of propositions can be analysed at all. I beg to assure her therefore that I can swallow her doctrine whole, though I doubt whether it is nutritious enough to enable the logician to do the whole of his work. Wherefore I do not think that he should have to abjure all other forms of nourishment. Now there are *many* general accounts of propositions, and Miss Jones's is not the only one. Moreover many of these are not incompatible with hers. When therefore I am challenged to "provide any other analysis which applies in every case," I am not at a loss. Let me mention the relativity of all meanings to problems, purposes and persons. In each case this relativity is quite general and formal: it does not depend on the problems and persons concerned. Strictly perhaps it belongs to the judgment rather than to the proposition. But propositions, as I urged on pp. 385-6, have 'import' only as vehicles or instruments of the meaning of the judgment. And if we permit ourselves to use 'apply' in the sense of 'to be applicable to' (as Miss Jones does), must we not hold that it is a perfectly general characteristic of propositions that they 'apply' to problems and are formulated by persons in the pursuit of their purposes? Here then are *three* other general analyses of 'import' which do not compete with Miss Jones's, but cannot seriously be denied, even though logic has hitherto been too formal to exploit them. And why, after all, should a 'general analysis' form a 'single account'

which excludes all others? Is not a general analysis, like a definition, relative to a purpose and a standpoint, and may there not be a plurality of these?

Miss Jones's demand that her account shall be accepted as 'valid' I must meet with certain reservations and distinctions. The notion of 'validity,' though it is the pivot on which Formal Logic turns, is very misleading when it is applied to the analysis of real thinking. And to be 'valid' is so far from being equivalent to being true as to be almost its antithesis. A 'valid' conclusion seems never to be 'true' in virtue of its 'validity,' nor is a 'true' conclusion ever really 'valid.*' I can hardly assent, therefore, to making 'valid,' 'true,' and 'applicable' convertible terms, and think that even on Miss Jones's assumptions she should not have spoken on p. 410 of her "analysis of assertion," but only of an analysis of the *form* of assertion.

Lastly, I would say that Miss Jones exaggerates my caution when she represents me (p. 412) as contending that "a listener cannot be a competent judge of the meaning of any speaker if he has nothing to go upon but the bare words of the speaker." I agree that the discussion of meaning should not shirk the problem of the *communication* of meaning (though since Gorgias hardly any attention has been given to it); but the passage referred to was merely making the much humbler point that when the logician 'analyses' a proposition, he is (as Professor Bosanquet truly says on p. 414) considering 'isolated' propositions in abstraction from their context, *i.e.*, bare forms of words, and has divested himself of the advantages of listening to a speaker and eking out the bare words by observing his tone, gestures, and personality, all of which are potent aids to understanding. The formal logician, in fact, does all he can to make understanding of actual meaning impossible, before he promulgates his 'analysis,' and I fail to

* Cf. *Formal Logic*, ch. xvi.

see *why* he should thus handicap himself and reduce his science to inanity.

II. With Professor Bosanquet I have many bones to pick—practically all that compose the skeletons which are kept in the capacious cupboards of Formal Logic. But on this occasion we had better not disarticulate the skeletons. I will not, therefore, pry into the mysteries of how ‘explicit ideas’ differ from dictionary-meanings, or how the latter ‘destroy language,’ or how striving for expression is embodied in *sentences*, and still less will I question the ‘logician’s’ right to ‘analyse’ the sentence instead of the judgment. I will merely make a few comments on a few of the issues.

(1) I am truly sorry to learn from p. 413 that Professor Bosanquet has not understood my conception of logical Formalism. I regret this both because I tried very hard to define it in *Formal Logic* and because it follows that the argument of my book must be largely wasted on him. But his difficulty perhaps arises in part from the fact that his own logical attitude is by no means free from (unconscious) Formalism. I regret also that I cannot adopt his own conception of formality. But an interpretation which renders the epithet ‘formal’ “otiose” and destroys a technical term in constant use seems to condemn itself, while it condemns science because it fails to perceive that the self-limitation of every science is essential to its usefulness, and does *not* entail Formalism *in its use*.

(2) I highly appreciate the candour of Professor Bosanquet’s positive declarations that “Logic is unable to drag the whole actual context of its specimens into its laboratory” and that “the consideration of isolated propositions, which is necessary in logic, is as far as possible removed from the interpretation of judgments which takes place in living thought” (p. 414). I agree that this describes accurately the attitude of logicians for the past 2000 years. But it is just this attitude which I deplore, and, despite its antiquity, it does not seem to be reasonable. Why

should logic 'isolate' propositions before it deigns to consider them? Why should it pride itself on making its subject-matter as unlike as possible to anything that occurs in living thought? Because it cannot consider the whole actual context? That is the only approach to a reason that is ever hinted at. But surely it is no reason against including the whole *relevant* context, *i.e.*, as much context as may be necessary for the purpose of understanding the meaning to be conveyed. Is not the fact that it is impracticable to take the whole context into account a very poor excuse for not considering any of it? Surely the notion of relevance, which I am glad to see Professor Bosanquet acknowledges, provides the requisite 'limit' to the infinite extension of 'context,' whenever a proposition is to be actually used to convey a meaning. Indeed it seems clear that if a logician is aiming merely at a truly general account of our actual procedure this is all he need say. It will apply to *all* cases of actual meaning, and he need not confine himself to such as are technical or recondite. It will, moreover, guard him against the error of supposing that the meaning of any proposition is so 'fixed' that he can predict in advance by pondering on its 'import' the precise meaning which will be given to it in use. He may know all Vergil by heart and have at his fingers' ends all that the commentators have said about *Timeo Danaos*; but will it be seriously contended that he will thereby be enabled to foresee the exact circumstances of every one who quotes it, what he fears and whom he means by his '*Danai*'? Or, again, would the most consummate mathematician, for all his knowledge of the theory of number, have been able to anticipate Myers's delicious poem about the 'eternal truth' that "the square of 1 is 1"? Surely so long as the meaning of the judgments is discriminated from the import of the proposition it is incumbent on logic to investigate their relations, and impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that neither can determine the other, because every meaning can be conveyed in a multitude of ways and every proposition can convey a multitude of meanings.

(3) By far the most important part of Professor Bosanquet's reply, however, was his treatment of the relation between the selectiveness, relevance, and purposiveness of actual thought and the logical 'ideal' of total inclusion or comprehensiveness. I was particularly grateful for it, because I had for years been wondering how Professor Bosanquet managed to combine these conceptions, which to me seemed so irreconcilably opposed. For is it not clear that if one is to think to the purpose, and with a purpose that can be achieved in a finite time, one *cannot* include the whole of the things that might be thought about, but *must* select the relevant and reject the rest? How then could the selective procedure of actual thought point to an 'ideal' (however incapable of realization) which recognized no truth save in the whole?

Now Professor Bosanquet has not, indeed, justified this paradoxical procedure, but he has explained how he has come by it. As I understand his account, his 'ideal' is deduced from natural caution in providing for any circumstance which "affects the truth of the connexion we are asserting." So we "naturally guard ourselves by putting it into the proposition" (p. 416). We then find that no such precautions ever guarantee complete truth, because some one can always object that what was asserted absolutely is true only under conditions. So to minimize the "liability to be contradicted by experience," we include more and more in our proposition (till it bursts?), and (having *failed* to include the whole) set up the 'ideal' of 'complete expression,' and treat all our actual procedures as approximations to it.

This ideal, however, seems to be thoroughly self-contradictory in idea and false in fact, and though one can recognize as facts the materials out of which it is built, it seems to put them together quite wrongly.

In the first place does it not verge upon a contradiction that an ideal of all-inclusiveness should be reared upon a basis of selections and rejections? Surely the fact that a good

reasoner tries to go to the point as straight as possible is *not* a reason for holding that good reasoning should wander away from it on an infinite quest to include the totality of reality, and should try to circunnavigate the universe?

Secondly, it is true that every meaning has 'vistas,' *i.e.*, radiates out from the centre of interest into an indefinite fringe of irrelevant associations and implications. But does it follow that reasoners must pay attention to this fringe and that logic must emphasize it to the destruction of the primary meaning? Surely not. It is quite impracticable to take everything into account in every judgment, and, moreover, to do so would defeat every cognitive purpose by making all judgments assert the same thing. But the sciences know this; for them the existence of the fringe is the reason why they all abstract. They equip themselves with blinkers, because they do not want to be distracted by 'vistas.' Hence real reasoning does not explore 'vistas': it puts up *screens*, in order to cut off vistas.

Neither does Professor Bosanquet appear to describe correctly how we try to guard ourselves against hasty thinking. It is vain to hope to safeguard oneself against every possibility of misinterpretation in which logical quibbling can involve the terms of every proposition, and so this is not tried. We do not commonly proceed by making hasty assertions which have at once to be withdrawn because they overlooked important and obvious considerations: normally we make up our minds before we judge as to what considerations are likely to be relevant to our purpose and what not, and select accordingly. Even so we may be wrong and may have to correct our judgments; but it simply will not do to represent our conscious self-imposed limitation of the relevant context as a narrow-minded failure to perceive the logical implications of our assertion, and so to turn it into a 'proof' of the paradox that no assertion is 'true' until it is all-embracing. Nothing could be more contrary to the facts of actual thinking, which always more or less

consciously excludes, and concentrates upon the relevant. I can attribute the vogue of the theory to which Professor Bosanquet so pertinaciously endeavours to accommodate the facts only to the old confusion which substituted the meaning of the proposition for that of the judgment. A judgment, if it is successful, has a definite purpose and meaning, both of which depend on limitations, but which in virtue (and *not* in spite) of them it manages to convey. It has not, therefore, *in rerum natura*, any indefiniteness, fringe or vista to beguile its maker into a wild-goose chase of an 'ideal' which stultifies his whole procedure. But none of this is true of the proposition. The terms of the judgment, when contemplated *ex post facto* as words, *have* got vistas and seem capable of conveying an infinity of (dictionary) meanings. It is, therefore, merely necessary to replace the actual judgment by the proposition to arrive at the orthodox paradox. And any logician who is not wholly free from Formalism is pretty sure to do it.

(4) In considering the 'eternal' connexion between the philosopher and the flea it is well to recall the point in dispute. I demurred to treating predications as reproductions of eternal connexions of Platonic universals, because they seemed to be essentially relative to the vicissitudes of human thinking. My illustration was meant to show how unnecessary and undesirable it was to allege an eternal and essential connexion between the philosopher and the flea merely because some one on some occasion wanted to say that the former had been bitten by the latter. Professor Bosanquet thinks my illustration an undignified jest. But I am quite willing to adopt his own and can still uphold my contention. He thinks that if we say "This plague-patient was bitten by a flea" we shall become scientifically respectable again, because we shall be implying an eternal and necessary connexion between fleabites and plague.

But will this example really make such a decisive difference?

(a) It is worth noting that my judgment still stands. It may still be the news to be conveyed. And (b) it is still the

presupposition in nature and in logic of Professor Bosanquet's. If the philosopher had not been bitten by a flea, he would not have become plaguy. (c) What is the value of an eternal connexion save as a guarantee of particular judgments (applications) and a guide to the prediction of happenings? The scientific 'law' or universal is no doubt more valuable than a particular observation, because it can lead to an indefinite number of such observations. But for all that all scientific generalizations are constructed on a basis of particular observations, and must ultimately show themselves relevant to the course of events. If they fail to do this they become unmeaning, and, sooner or later, we balk at calling them 'true.' Even Professor Bosanquet's example, therefore, is scientifically important only because it suggests a way by which a multitude of individuals can avoid becoming 'plague-patients.' (d) Even if all Professor Bosanquet's contentions were accepted so far, he would still be as far as ever from a proof that the connexion between fleabite and plague deserved to be called an eternal one. Biology is under no delusions on this score. It does not suppose that *Bacillus pestis* is an eternal parasite of man and the rat-flea. It is disposed to regard all parasitism as an acquired habit, and does not regard any of the parties to the predicament as eternal. As there was a time when there were neither men, rats, fleas, bacilli, nor, consequently, plagues, there was a time when Professor Bosanquet's judgment was not true and could not have been made. And it can again become untrue in the future in a multitude of ways, either by the extermination of fleas or of rats, or of men, or of the *bacillus*, or by our becoming immune to the plague-virus or unpalatable to the flea. The attempt to evade the point of these obvious objections to the doctrine of eternal connexions by juggling with the ambiguities of the word 'eternal' seems to me to break down so soon as attention is called to these ambiguities.*

* Cf. *Formal Logic*, ch. xxi, § 7.

(5) I must conclude with a word of surprise at the interpretation Professor Bosanquet puts on my statement that the real problem of logic should be to determine actual meaning on particular occasions. For him "this can only signify to restate it (the judgment) in other words" (p. 418, *n.*). Surely this betrays the cloven hoof of Formalism in an extreme form. At any rate it is one of the last expedients I should use, if I had failed to understand a judgment, to ask its maker to restate it in other words. If the utterance had been too rapid, I should ask him to say it again slowly. If its terms had been obscure, I should ask him to explain them. If I suspected it of ambiguity, I should ask 'Do you mean this or that?' If I suspected its good faith, I should try for independent evidence of its allegations. As for sitting down with a dictionary to translate its phrasing into other words myself, I could suggest no more unreasonable procedure. Yet this is apparently what Professor Bosanquet understands me to intend when I endeavour to ascertain the meaning of a live judgment. If he really believes this, there is verily an impassable gulf fixed between the logic of Humanism and that of Intellectualism. And yet indisputably Professor Bosanquet sometimes appears on our side of it, even though he dwells by preference on the other. How does he manage to do it?

ABSTRACT OF THE MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE
THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION.

November 30th, 1914. Dr. Bernard Bosanquet, Vice-President, in the Chair.—Dr. Bosanquet delivered the inaugural address on "Science and Philosophy." A discussion followed, in which Prof. Brough, Mr. Carr, Prof. Dawes Hicks, Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Lynch, Miss Oakeley, Mr. Worsley, and others took part. Dr. Bosanquet replied.

December 14th, 1914. Dr. F. C. S. Schiller in the Chair.—The Symposium on "Instinct and Emotion" was taken as read. The writers of the papers, Mr. McDougall, Mr. Shand, and Prof. Stout, replied to the criticisms in their papers and introduced the discussion, in which Miss Edgell, Dr. Ernest Jones, Prof. Nunn, Dr. F. W. Mott, and Mr. Winch took part.

January 4th, 1915. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks, Vice-President, in the Chair.—Prof. Sir Henry Jones was elected an Honorary Member of the Society. Prof. C. Lloyd Morgan read a paper on "Berkeley's Theory of Esse." The Chairman opened the discussion, and was followed by Col. Bethell, Mr. C. Delisle Burns, Mr. Carr, Dr. Tudor Jones, Prof. T. P. Nunn, Mr. Shelton, and Mr. Worsley. Prof. Lloyd Morgan replied.

February 1st, 1915. Prof. T. Percy Nunn, Treasurer, in the Chair.—Mr. G. D. H. Cole read a paper on "Conflicting Social Obligations." A note on the paper by Dr. Bernard Bosanquet was also read, and communications from Mr. Delisle Burns, Mr. Boutwood, and Mr. Shelton were referred to. The Chairman opened the discussion and the following Members took part:—Mr. Carr, Mr. Dale, Mr. Ginsberg, Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Murray, Miss Oakeley, and Miss Shields. Mr. Cole replied.

March 1st, 1915. Prof. A. Caldecott in the Chair.—Mr. Albert A. Cock read a paper on “The Æsthetic of Benedetto Croce.” A discussion followed, in which Mr. Douglas Ainslie, Mr. Carr, Mr. Coomaraswamy, Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Mead, Mr. Thomas, and others took part. Mr. Cock replied.

March 15th, 1915. Miss Hilda D. Oakeley in the Chair.—Dr. Tudor Jones read a paper on “The Philosophy of Values.” A discussion followed, in which the Chairman, Mr. Ainslie, Mr. Cock, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Mead, Prof. Nunn, Miss Shields, Mr. Stuart, and Mr. Worsley took part. Dr. Tudor Jones replied.

April 12th, 1915. Dr. A. Wolf in the Chair.—Mr. C. D. Broad read a paper on “Phenomenalism.” The discussion was opened by Mr. Bertrand Russell, followed by Mr. Delisle Burns, Mr. Carr, Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Merriman, Mr. McIver, Mr. Worsley, and Dr. Wolf. Mr. Broad replied.

May 3rd, 1915. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks, Vice-President, in the Chair.—Prof. A. Robinson read a paper on “The Philosophy of Maine de Biran.” The Chairman opened the discussion and was followed by Mr. Ainslie, Mr. Delisle Burns, Mr. Carr, Prof. Caldecott, Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Mead, Prof. Nunn, and Mr. Worsley. Prof. Robinson replied.

May 17th, 1915. Hon. Bertrand Russell, Vice-President, in the Chair.—Mrs. Stephen read a paper on “Complexity and Synthesis: a Comparison of the Data and Philosophical Methods of Mr. Russell and M. Bergson.” The Chairman opened the discussion, in which the following Members took part:—Mr. Ainslie, Mr. Carr, Miss Gabain, Mr. Lynch, Mr. Mead, Miss Oakeley, Mr. Thorold, Mr. Worsley, and Dr. Wolf. Mrs. Stephen replied.

June 7th, 1915. Dr. A. Wolf in the Chair.—Dr. F. Aveling read a paper on “Some Theories of Knowledge.” The discussion was opened by the Chairman, followed by Mr. Carr, Dr. Downey, Dr. Tudor Jones, Mr. Mead, Mr. Worsley, and others. Dr. Aveling replied.

July 5th, 1915. Prof. T. Percy Nunn in the Chair.—The Report of the Executive Committee for the Thirty-sixth Session and the Treasurer's Financial Statement were read and adopted. The following nominations of Officers for the next Session were approved:—President, Dr. H. Wildon Carr; Honorary Treasurer, Dr. T. P. Nunn; Honorary Secretary, Prof. G. Dawes Hicks. Dr. Goldsbrough and Dr. Shearman were re-appointed Auditors. The following Members were nominated and duly elected to serve on the Executive Committee:—Dr. A. Caldecott, Miss Beatrice Edgell, Miss Constance Jones, Mr. A. D. Lindsay, Miss H. D. Oakeley, Dr. A. Wolf.

ABSTRACT OF MINUTES OF THE JOINT SESSION OF
THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY, THE BRITISH
PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY, AND THE MIND
ASSOCIATION.

July 3rd, 1915, at University College, Gower Street, W.C. Prof. G. Dawes Hicks in the Chair.—Thirty-seven Members and guests dined together. At the meeting following, the paper by Prof. G. F. Stout on "Mr. Russell's Theory of Judgment" was taken as read. Prof. Stout opened the discussion and Mr. Russell replied.

July 5th, 1915, at 5 p.m., at 22, Albemarle Street, W. Prof. T. Percy Nunn in the Chair.—The Symposium on "The Import of Propositions" by Miss Constance Jones, Dr. Bosanquet, and Dr. Schiller was taken as read. In the general discussion Mr. Delisle Burns, Prof. Brough, and Prof. Stout took part, and the authors of the papers replied on the whole discussion.

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR
THE THIRTY-SIXTH SESSION, 1914-15.

THE work of the Session was practically arranged before the war broke out, and we have been able to carry it through with very little modification. Our President, Mr. Arthur J. Balfour, was unable to open the Session with an address, on account of the strain of the political situation and his duties in the national service. The inaugural address was delivered by Mr. Bernard Bosanquet, who kindly took Mr. Balfour's place at very short notice. Our Society was expecting to take a leading part in the preparations for the International Congress of Philosophy which was arranged to be held in London in September of this year. This meeting has, unfortunately, had to be abandoned. We hope that when peace is restored it may be found possible to continue these International Congresses.

The Society has held ten ordinary meetings and also two special meetings in joint session with the British Psychological Society and the Mind Association.

We regret to record the death of one member, Mr. W. W. Carlile.

Our membership has increased, and now consists of 129 Ordinary, 5 Honorary, and 7 Corresponding Members.

ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

FINANCIAL STATEMENT—36TH SESSION, 1914-1915.

RECEIPTS.

Balance brought forward from last Session	£	s.	d.
	..	235	16 0
Members' subscriptions—			
Current Session	..	102	18 0
Arrears..	..	6	6 0
In advance	..	3	3 0
		112	7 0
Sale of <i>Proceedings</i> (nett) to June 30th, 1914	..	51	11 7
Fee for loan of four volumes of <i>Proceedings</i>	..	0	10 6
Interest on deposit in Joint Stock Bank	..	2	0 9

£402 5 10

EXPENDITURE.

Royal Asiatic Society, for use of rooms	£	s.	d.
Harrison and Sons for printing—	..	11	11 0
<i>Proceedings</i> , Vol. XIV	111	2	3
Proofs of Papers sent out, Notices of Meetings, etc.	42	7	9
	153	10	0
Gratuities
Income tax
Loss on Scotch cheques and on exchange
Cheque book
Treasurer's postage and stationery
Balance in hand—
On deposit in Post Office Savings Bank	45	8	11
At Joint Stock Bank (Deposit Account)	100	0	0
At Joint Stock Bank (Current Account)	89	19	11
	235	8	10

£402 5 10

2
F

Examined and found correct, July th, 1915.—

(Signed) T. PERCY NUNN,
Treasurer.

(Signed) GILES F. GOLDSBROUGH } Auditors.
A. T. SHEARMAN

RULES OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.

NAME.

I.—This Society shall be called “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY FOR THE SYSTEMATIC STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY,” or, for a short title, “THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY.”

OBJECTS.

II.—The object of this Society shall be the systematic study of Philosophy; 1st, as to its historic development; 2nd, as to its methods and problems.

CONSTITUTION.

III.—This Society shall consist of a President, Vice-Presidents, a Treasurer, a Secretary, and Members. Every Ex-President shall be a Vice-President. The business of the Society shall be managed by an Executive Committee consisting of the President, the Treasurer, the Secretary, and six members elected in accordance with Rule VIII.

SUBSCRIPTION.

IV.—The annual subscription shall be one guinea, due at the first meeting in each session.

ADMISSION OF MEMBERS.

V.—Any person desirous of becoming a member of the ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY shall apply to the Secretary or other officer of the Society, who shall lay the application before the Executive Committee, and the Executive Committee, if they think fit, shall admit the candidate to membership.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

VI.—Foreigners may be elected as corresponding members of the Society. They shall be nominated by the Executive Committee, and notice having been given at one ordinary meeting, their nomination shall be voted upon at the next meeting, when two-thirds of the votes cast shall be required for their election. Corresponding members shall not be liable to the annual subscription, and shall not vote.

ELECTION OF OFFICERS.

VII.—The Committee shall nominate the President, the Treasurer, and the Secretary for the ensuing session, and shall, at the Annual Meeting, submit the nominations for the approval of the Society.

ELECTION OF COMMITTEE.

VIII.—At the same meeting the six members to constitute with the officers the Executive Committee shall be elected by ballot. Nominations, which must be signed by two members of the Society, must reach the Secretary fourteen days before the meeting, and a balloting paper shall be sent to all members. Members may return their balloting papers by post before the meeting or hand them in at the meeting.

Should a vacancy occur at any other time, the Committee may co-opt a member to serve for the remainder of the Session.

SESSIONS AND MEETINGS.

IX.—The ordinary meetings of the Society shall be on the first Monday in every month from November to June, unless otherwise ordered by the Committee. Such a course shall constitute a session. Special meetings may be ordered by resolution of the Society or shall be called by the President whenever requested in writing by four or more members.

BUSINESS OF SESSIONS.

X.—At the last meeting in each session the Executive Committee shall report and the Treasurer shall make a financial statement, and present his accounts audited by two members appointed by the Society at a previous meeting.

BUSINESS OF MEETINGS.

XI.—Except at the first meeting in each session, when the President or a Vice-President shall deliver an address, the study of Philosophy in both departments shall be pursued by means of discussion, so that every member may take an active part in the work of the Society.

PROCEEDINGS.

XII.—The Executive Committee are entrusted with the care of publishing or providing for the publication of a selection of the papers read each session before the Society.

BUSINESS RESOLUTIONS.

XIII.—No resolution affecting the general conduct of the Society and not already provided for by Rule XV shall be put unless notice has been given and the resolution read at the previous meeting, and unless a quorum of five members be present.

VISITORS.

XIV.—Visitors may be introduced to the meetings by members.

AMENDMENTS.

XV.—Notices to amend these rules shall be in writing and must be signed by two members. Amendments must be announced at an ordinary meeting, and notice having been given to all the members, they shall be voted upon at the next ordinary meeting, when they shall not be carried unless two-thirds of the votes cast are in their favour.

LIST OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS FOR THE THIRTY-SEVENTH SESSION, 1915-1916.

PRESIDENT.

H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt.

VICE-PRESIDENTS.

BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1894-1898).

G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1899-1904).

REV. CANON HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A. (President, 1904-1907).

RIGHT HON. VISCOUNT HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A. (President, 1907-1908).

S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A. (President, 1908-1911).

HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S. (President, 1911-1913).

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.D., LITT.D. (President, 1913-1914).

RIGHT HON. ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M.P., LL.D., F.R.S. (President, 1914-1915).

TREASURER.

T. PERCY NUNN, M.A., D.Sc.

HONORARY SECRETARY.

PROF. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., PH.D., LITT.D.

COMMITTEE.

DR. A. CALDECOTT.

MISS BEATRICE EDGELL.

MISS CONSTANCE JONES.

MR. A. D. LINDSAY.

MISS H. D. OAKELEY.

DR. A. WOLF.

HONORARY MEMBERS.

F. H. BRADLEY, M.A., LL.D., Merton College, Oxford.

Prof. W. R. DUNSTAN, M.A., LL.D., F.R.S., 38, Cranley Gardens, S.W.

Prof. Sir HENRY JONES, M.A., LL.D., LITT.D., F.B.A., The University, Glasgow.

Prof. A. SENIER, M.D., PH.D., 28, Herbert Park, Donnybrook, Dublin.

Prof. JAMES WARD, M.A., LL.D., 6, Selwyn Gardens, Cambridge.

CORRESPONDING MEMBERS.

- Prof. J. MARK BALDWIN, c/o Harris Forbes & Co., 56, William Street,
New York.
Prof. HENRI BERGSON, 31, Rue d'Erlanger, Paris.
Prof. J. M. CATTELL, Garrison, New York.
M. H. DZIEWICKI, 11, Szczępańska, Cracow, Austria.
Prof. JOSIAH ROYCE, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
Prof. E. B. TITCHENER, Cornell University, United States.
Prof. WM. WUNDT, Leipzig.

MEMBERS.

Elected.

1885. Prof. S. ALEXANDER, M.A., LL.D., F.B.A., *Vice-President*, 24, Brunswick Road, Withington, Manchester.
1915. DOUGLAS AINSLIE, B.A., 19, St. Leonard's Terrace, Chelsea.
1899. R. ARMSTRONG-JONES, M.D., Claybury, Woodford Bridge, Essex.
1913. Rev. FRANCIS AVELING, D.D., Ph.D., University College, Gower Street, W.

1908. Right Hon. ARTHUR J. BALFOUR, M.P., LL.D., F.R.S., *Vice-President*, 4, Carlton Gardens, Pall Mall, S.W.
1908. SIDNEY BALL, M.A., St. John's College, Oxford.
1912. Prof. SURENDRA NATH BARAL, M.A., 45, Silverleigh Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey.
1915. Miss B. C. BARFIELD, Bicknell, Athenæum Road, Whetstone, N.
1907. Mrs. MARGRIETA BEER, M.A., Writers' Club, 10, Norfolk Street, Strand.
1893. E. C. BENECKE, 182, Denmark Hill, S.E.
1913. Col. E. H. BETHELL, 18, Hyde Park Square, W.
1907. Miss ALICE BLUNDELL, 42, Powis Square, W.
1888. H. W. BLUNT, M.A., 183, Woodstock Road, Oxford.
1913. Prof. A. BONUCCI, Perugia.
1886. Prof. BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., D.C.L., *Vice-President*, The Heath Cottage, Oxshot, Surrey.
1912. WILLIAM BOULTING, 40, Westholm, Hampstead Garden Suburb.
1890. A. BOUTWOOD, Bledlow, Bucks.
1914. C. D. BROAD, M.A., The University, St. Andrews.
1889. Prof. J. BROUGH, LL.D., Hampden Residential Club, Phoenix Street, N.W.
1908. WILLIAM BROWN, M.A., D.Sc., Psychological Laboratory, King's College, W.C.
1895. Mrs. SOPHIE BRYANT, D.Sc., Litt.D., 6, Eldon Road, Hampstead.
1913. C. DELISLE BURNS, M.A., 26, Springfield Road, St. John's Wood.

1906. Prof. A. CALDECOTT, M.A., D.D., King's College, Strand, W.C.
1881. H. WILDON CARR, D.Litt., *President*, More's Garden, Cheyne Walk, S.W.
1908. E. C. CHILDS, M.A., 5, Percival Road, Clifton, Bristol.
1912. ALBERT A. COCK, B.A., King's College, Strand, W.C.

Elected.

1907. J. F. O. CODDINGTON, M.A., LL.M., 28, Endcliffe Terrace Road, Sheffield.
1895. STANTON COIT, Ph.D., 30, Hyde Park Gate, S.W.
1913. G. D. H. COLE, M.A., Magdalen College, Oxford.
1911. F. H. B. DALE, M.A., C.B., 33, Clarendon Road, Holland Park, W.
1912. Prof. WILLIAM L. DAVIDSON, M.A., LL.D., 8, Queen's Gardens, Aberdeen.
1896. E. T. DIXON, M.A., Racketts, Hythe, Hants.
1912. Miss L. DOUGALL, Cutts End, Cumnor, Oxford.
1899. J. A. J. DREWITT, M.A., Wadham College, Oxford.
1911. Mrs. N. A. DUDDINGTON, M.A., 13, Carlton Terrace, Child's Hill, N.W.
1910. Miss BEATRICE EDGELL, M.A., Ph.D., 15, Lyon Road, Harrow.
1893. W. H. FAIRBROTHER, M.A., Lincoln College, Oxford.
1914. ERIC FARMER, Trinity College, Cambridge.
1912. G. C. FIELD, M.A., B.Sc., The University, Manchester.
1914. Miss MARY FLETCHER, Newnham College, Cambridge.
1914. Miss MARJORIE GABAIN, The Manor House, Bushey, Herts.
1913. Miss MABEL E. GADSDON, M.A., Mouseldale House, 14, Powerscroft Road, Clapton, N.E.
1897. Prof. W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A., Lichfield, Wallace Avenue, Torrak, Melbourne.
1911. Prof. C. M. GILLESPIE, M.A., The University, Leeds.
1913. MORRIS GINSBERG, M.A., University Hall, 11, Carlyle Square, Chelsea, S.W.
1900. G. F. GOLDSBROUGH, M.D., Church Side, Herne Hill, S.E.
1912. Prof. FRANK GRANGER, D.Litt., Lucknow Drive, Nottingham.
1910. Prof. S. W. GREEN, M.A., 3, Bellasis Avenue, Streatham Hill, S.W.
1912. J. C. HAGUE, M.A., London Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C.
1883. Right Hon. Viscount HALDANE OF CLOAN, O.M., K.T., LL.D., F.R.S., F.B.A., *Vice-President*, 28, Queen Anne's Gate, S.W.
1915. Miss S. ELIZABETH HALL, 47, Campden Hill Road, W.
1913. R. P. HARDIE, M.A., 13, Palmerston Road, Edinburgh.
1915. H. J. W. HETHERINGTON, M.A., The University, Cardiff.
1890. Prof. G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., *Vice-President* and *Hon. Sec.*, 9, Cranmer Road, Cambridge.
1912. Prof. R. F. A. HOERNLÉ, M.A., Ph.D., 62, Brattle Street, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.
1913. ALEXANDER C. IONIDES, jun., 34, Porchester Terrace, W.
1911. Principal L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., Manchester College, Oxford.
1904. Principal F. B. JEVONS, M.A., D. Litt., Bishop Hatfield's Hall, Durham.

Elected.

1892. Miss E. E. CONSTANCE JONES, D.Litt., Girton College, Cambridge.
 1911. Rev. TUDOR JONES, Ph.D., 5, Wilmington House, Highbury Crescent, N.
 1912. Miss E. F. JOURDAIN, D. ès L., St. Hugh's College, Oxford.
1912. J. N. KEYNES, D.Sc., 6, Harvey Road, Cambridge.
1881. A. F. LAKE, Wrangaton, Sundridge Avenue, Bromley.
 1911. Prof. GEO. H. LANGLEY, M.A., Dana College, Bengal, India.
 1898. Prof. ROBERT LATTA, M.A., D.Phil., The College, Glasgow.
 1915. Miss MARJORIE LEBUS, 11, Netherhall Gardens, N.W.
 1908. A. D. LINDSAY, M.A., 2, Fyfield Road, Oxford.
 1897. Rev. JAMES LINDSAY, M.A., D.D., Annick Lodge, by Irvine, Ayrshire.
 1912. THOMAS LOVEDAY, M.A., 2, Moorgate Avenue, Sheffield.
 1909. ARTHUR LYNCH, M.P., M.A., 80, Antrim Mansions, Haverstock Hill, N.W.
1911. WM. MACDOUGALL, M.A., F.R.S., Woodsend, Foxcombe Hill, Oxford.
 1910. W. LESLIE MACKENZIE, M.A., M.D., 4, Clarendon Crescent, Edinburgh.
1899. J. LEWIS MCINTYRE, D.Sc., Abbotsville, Cults, N.B.
 1912. R. M. MCIVER, M.A., 113, Hamilton Place, Aberdeen.
 1914. G. R. S. MEAD, B.A., 47, Campden Hill Road, W.
 1915. F. V. MERRIMAN, B.A., St. John's School, Leatherhead.
 1889. R. E. MITCHESON, M.A., 46, Ladbroke Square, W.
 1896. G. E. MOORE, M.A., Litt.D., Trinity College, Cambridge.
 1912. DAVID MORRISON, M.A., 23, South Street, St. Andrews.
 1910. Prof. C. LLOYD MORGAN, LL.D., F.R.S., 5, Kensington Place, Clifton, Bristol.
1913. Rev. CAVENDISH MOXON, B.A., Marske Rectory, Richmond, Yorks.
 1910. D. L. MURRAY, M.A., 29, North Gate, Regent's Park.
 1913. J. MURRAY, M.A., Christ Church, Oxford.
 1912. C. S. MYERS, M.D., Sc.D., F.R.S., Great Shelford, Cambridge.
1900. Rev. G. E. NEWSOM, M.A., 44, Mecklenburgh Square, W.C.
 1904. Prof. T. PERCY NUNN, M.A., D.Sc., *Treasurer*, London Day Training College, Southampton Row, W.C.
1908. Miss HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., 61, Primrose Mansions, Prince of Wales Road, Battersea Park, S.W.
1903. Miss E. A. PEARSON, 129, Kennington Road, S.E.
 1913. Prof. A. S. PRINGLE-PATTISON, LL.D., D.C.L., F.B.A., 16, Church Hill, Edinburgh.
1914. ADAM RANKINÉ, Newstead, Monkham's Avenue, Woodford Green, Essex.
1889. Rev. Canon HASTINGS RASHDALL, M.A., D.C.L., F.B.A., *Vice-President*, 18, Longwall, Oxford.
1895. Prof. ARTHUR ROBINSON, M.A., D.C.L., Observatory House, Durham.
 1908. G. R. T. ROSS, D.Phil., Rangoon College, Burma.

Elected.

1912. SATIS CHANDRA ROY, B.A., 19, Herzberger Chaussée, Göttingen.
1896. Hon. BERTRAND RUSSELL, M.A., F.R.S., *Vice-President*, Trinity College, Cambridge.
1905. F. C. S. SCHILLER, M.A., D.Sc., Corpus Christi College, Oxford.
1912. J. W. SCOTT, M.A., The University, Glasgow.
1892. ALEXANDER F. SHAND, M.A., 1, Edwardes Place, Kensington, W.
1901. A. T. SHEARMAN, M.A., D.Lit., University College, Gower Street, W.C.
1911. H. S. SHELTON, B.Sc., 17, Cornwall Road, Twickenham.
1910. Miss F. ROSAMOND SHIELDS, M.A., 32, Craven Hill Gardens, W.
1907. W. G. SLEIGHT, M.A., D.Litt., 16, Eardley Road, Streatham.
1908. Prof. J. A. SMITH, M.A., Balliol College, Oxford.
1886. Prof. W. R. SORLEY, M.A., Litt.D., LL.D., St. Giles, Chesterton Lane, Cambridge.
1908. K. J. SPALDING, M.A., Whitburgh, Northwood, Middlesex.
1908. Miss H. M. SPANTON, 1, The Paragon, Blackheath, S.E.
1911. Miss C. F. E. SPURGEON, D. ès L., 19, Clarence Gate Gardens, N.W.
1912. Mrs. STEPHEN (Karin Costelloe), 2, Hoop Chambers, Sidney Street, Cambridge.
1910. Miss L. S. STEBBING, M.A., 8, Queen's Mansions, Brook Green, W.
1887. Prof. G. F. STOUT, M.A., LL.D., *Vice-President*, Craigard, St. Andrews.
1915. OLIVER STRACHEY, 96, South Hill Park, Hampstead Heath, N.W.
1912. E. H. STRANGE, M.A., 35, Pengwain Road, Cardiff.
1915. JAMES STUART, Kenilworth Hotel, Great Russell Street, W.C.
1915. Prof. KOJIRO SUGIMORI, 1, Highbury Grange, Highbury, N.
1910. W. E. TANNER, M.A., Fordlynn, Winscombe, Somerset.
1908. Prof. A. E. TAYLOR, M.A., D.Litt., F.B.A., 9, Dempster Terrace, St. Andrews, N.B.
1915. F. W. THOMAS, M.A., Ph.D., Hawk Hill, Chaldon, Caterham, Surrey.
1900. Prof. C. B. UPTON, M.A., St. George's, Littlemore, near Oxford.
1902. JOSEPH WALKER, M.A., Pellercroft, Thongsbridge, Huddersfield.
1908. SYDNEY P. WATERLOW, M.A., 3, Temple Gardens, E.C.
1912. HENRY J. WATT, M.A., Ph.D., D.Phil., 9, Oakfield Terrace, Hillhead, Glasgow.
1890. CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, M.A., Holywell Ford, Oxford.
1896. Prof. R. M. WENLEY, M.A., D.Phil., D.Sc., Litt.D., LL.D., 509, East Madison Street, Ann Arbor, Mich., U.S.A.
1912. H. A. WHEELER, B.A., 8, Riverdale Terrace, Petersham Road, Richmond.
1907. Mrs. JESSIE WHITE, D.Sc., 49, Gordon Mansions, W.C.
1915. Prof. A. N. WHITEHEAD, D.Sc., F.R.S., 12, Elm Park Gardens, S.W.
1900. A. WOLF, M.A., D.Lit., The Chums, Chesham Bois, Bucks.
1911. ARTHINGTON WORSLEY, Mandeville House, Isleworth.
1910. Sir FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, Litt.D., 3, Buckingham Gate, S.W.





B Aristotelian Society for
11 the Systematic Study of
A72 Philosophy, London
ns.v.15 Proceedings

**PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET**

**UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY**

